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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation examines how contentious collective action in two post communist 
states, Poland and the Czech Republic, has broadened to included European and 
international actors. It identifies the emergence of new opportunities for contention 
brought about by recent episodes of institutional change, specifically EU accession, and 
questions how they benefit materially or politically weak NGOs. With the intention of 
determining how three interrelated processes, democratization, Europeanization and 
internationalization, affect the nature and scope of contentious politics, this dissertation 
carries out an investigation of several concrete episodes of political mobilization and 
contention. As shown these ‘contentious events’ involved a myriad of national, European 
and international actors, mobilizing to challenge national policy. Data from NGO 
questionnaires, interviews and newswire/newspaper archives are used to discern the 
nature and 2scope of contentious collective action.  This dissertation assesses the extent 
to which transnationalization of advocacy politics has disrupted existing power 
arrangements at the national level between NGOs and government. 
 
Hypothesizing that European Union accession in 2004 changed the nature and scope of 
contentious collective action in post communist Europe, this dissertation undertakes a 
comparative empirical examination of three sectors, environment, women and Roma, and 
twenty-nine representative NGOs. My research identifies three important developments 
in the Polish and Czech nonprofit sector: first, European advocacy networks and 
institutions are helping national NGOs overcome power disparities at the national level; 
second, issues once confined to national political space has acquired a European 
dimension, and; third, despite Europeanization, a few notable policy issues (i.e. 
reproductive rights, nuclear energy and domestic violence) remain firmly under national 
jurisdiction.   This dissertation contributes to existing collective action/post communist 
scholarship in three ways. It applies established theories of contention/collective action to 
several recent episodes of political mobilization; it confirms that post accession 
institutional change does offer new political opportunity structures to national NGOs, and 
finally; it presents new empirical research on post communist collective action. 
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The growth of non-party associations and organizations typical of established 
democracies has been inhibited by the suspicion that many political leaders have of non-
profit organizations and by regulations that do not favour their development 
  (Wolchik 1995: 37) 
 
 
In the demobilized post-communist context, many interest groups, even economic interest 
groups with rational incentives to lobby state institutions, have not adequately understood 
where their own interests lie or have been too weak institutionally to make effective 
demand on the state. 
(Orenstein and Desai 1997: 43) 
 
 
If you take the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, we had and we still have 
some social movements, but on the whole, they are very limited. If you take Poland or the 
Czech Republic, there is practically nothing right now. 
(Touraine 2002: 94) 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE: 
Introduction 
This dissertation investigates political mobilization in two post communist states, Poland 
and the Czech Republic, to discern how new institutional arrangements influence the 
scope and character of contentious collective action. Primarily concerned with how EU 
accession has changed repertoires of contention1 at the national level, this dissertation 
explores policy areas that encourage transnational advocacy, like the environment and 
human rights. The architecture of European governance means no institution, either 
national or European, is completely autonomous. Even states/governments that have 
traditionally been able to keep lobbyists and advocacy groups at arm’s length are 
discovery in an integrated Union this is virtually impossible.  
Lacking embedded policy networks and advocacy communities, and an 
established system of interest intermediation, post communist states are particularly 
vulnerable to European and international influences. Additionally, accession means 
European NGOs and advocacy networks are able to spread eastward into states that, 
thanks to EU directives and customs, look awfully similar to their own. An examination 
of several episodes of contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic reveal how 
on several occasions a myriad of actors, European and international, converged with great 
effect on issues that would have once attracted only national actors. Today, however, 
normally unconnected groups and institutions are becoming directly involved in episodes 
of contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic. The opening-up of several key 
policy sectors, the environment, women’s rights and gender equality, and human (or 
minority) rights2, has had a profound effect on power dynamics within these states and 
                                                 
1
 Similar to Tilly and Tarrow (2007) this dissertation uses the term ‘repertoires’ to indicate 
“inherited forms of contention” (p.4). 
2
 At the EU level for instance there exist several committees, directives and agencies dealing in 
and monitoring the application of EU law in such areas. These include: the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Equality (FEMM); the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, which was adopted by EU members in 2000 and if the Lisbon 
Treaty is ratified by all 27 member-states will attain legal standing; the Copenhagen criteria 
places democracy and human rights atop accession criteria; an EU Ombudsman for the 
environment; the European Environment Agency (EEA) which works to facilitate cooperation 
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also on the political capital of national NGOs. Still a powerful actor, the state is just now 
realizing its power is tempered by a network of European and international actors, able 
and willing to assist national NGOs and movements should the need arise.   
Nongovernmental Organization (NGOs) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
have recently been confronted with two simultaneous challenges. One, improve their 
organizational capacity/competency at the national level, while two, learning how  to 
lobby European Union (EU) institutions, such as the European Commission (EC) and its 
Directorates – General (DGs), the European Parliament (EP) and, national level 
representatives in Brussels and Strasbourg. Whereas once it was possible, even preferred, 
to analyze discrete civil societies (cf. Almond and Verba 1989; Putnam 1993) in a thick 
descriptive manner, now, especially in the context European governance, it becomes 
necessary to consider the impact of outside forces (i.e. norms), external institutions (i.e. 
European Commission, European Parliament) and European advocacy networks, on 
policy development and contentious collective action. National governments still wield 
considerable power and not all policy falls within an EU sphere of competence, but the 
nature of contentious politics has changed enough to warrant special investigation. 
After examining three interest sectors, the environment, Roma and women, and 
several specific points of contention or convergence within these broad areas (see Table 
1.2), it becomes clear policy formulation in Poland and the Czech Republic involves 
traditional modes of contention, that is national actors and institutions competing for 
power and influence (i.e. political parties, interest groups and trade unions) and  
nontraditional forms of claim making and issue framing, best exemplified in how 
international actors, agencies and institutions are frequently able to shape the parameters 
of contention itself. Recognizing that contentious politics and contentious collective 
action are shaped largely by environmental factors and politics (Kriesi et al. 1992), and 
that the political and legal institutions of the two states under discussion here, Poland and 
the Czech Republic, have change in fundamental ways since 1989, there is a very good 
chance some of this dissertation may already be dated. However the core argument, that 
contentious politics is becoming less about discrete national actors and more about 
                                                                                                                                                 
between all EU actors on environmental matters, and; the Århus Convention, which provides 
access to environmental information.   
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European and/or international advocacy networks and European institutions and 
directives, should have application beyond the particular cases and episodes being 
investigated in this dissertation. Mindful not to overstretch the argument, this dissertation 
will also look at examples to the contrary, when the state/government retains full decision 
making power and alas both national and European actors are effectively ‘shut out’.    
The highly stratified system of governance that characterizes EU decision-making 
means among others things that international and European actors can have influence 
over how decisions are taken by lawmakers in Poland and the Czech Republic. Kohler – 
Koch (1999) suggests,  
The European Community (EC) is governed without government and, therefore, it 
is bound to be governed in a particular way. In addition, EC governance is 
penetrating into the political life of member states and its particular mode of 
governing may disseminate across national borders (p.14). 
 
Kohler – Koch’s idea, that governance has a transformative effect on policymaking and 
politics is particularly illuminating when evaluated against contentious events in Poland 
and the Czech Republic. Few policy issues fall exclusively under the competency or 
jurisdiction of a single domestic institutions or actor. As a result NGOs float from 
controversy to controversy raising public awareness and pressuring decision-makers 
(both EU and national) in an interconnected policy environment that enhances their 
impact potential and power. Kriesi et al. argue 
The development of this Euro-polity has gone hand in hand with politicization 
and a widening scope of decision-making at the EU level. From the point of view 
of national political actors, the emergence of the new supranational layer of 
decision-making at the EU level implies a transformation of their macro-political 
context. The EU level adds new opportunities and constraints, which modify the 
distribution of power at the domestic level (2006: 343). 
 
The impact of European level institutions is felt in several prominent policy 
areas/domains as well. The surprising thing is EU rules and convention influence member 
state behaviour even when the policy area, i.e. nuclear energy, falls squarely outside EU 
institutional competency3. This is not to imply that national or local groups are entirely 
                                                 
3
 With reference to the Temelin NPP, the European Union does not have competency over the 
energy policy of member-states. As Prime Minister Zemen said, “there existed no European rules 
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ineffectual or forced into redundancy with the ascendance of some issues to the European 
level, because this is simply not the case. Many groups that function exclusively within 
their ‘home’ state still manage to find power and influence, and this dissertation will 
discuss several such cases. The point is, a one-dimensional view of interest group politics 
or opportunity framing that would see discrete national actors vying for power and 
influence is being replaced by a two or even three-dimensional model that takes into 
consideration the blurring of national boundaries and the new transnational character of  
environmental and human rights policy (and norms). Many issues, but not all issues, cut 
across administrative and political lines. Those which have the most salience with 
international and continental actors, like environmental protection or a sub-sector issue 
like Temelín nuclear power plant (Temelín NPP) in southern Bohemia, will draw 
together a myriad of national and international actors and activists. The European 
Parliament, Commission, and its atomic energy watchdog, EURATOM4, along with 
Czech, Austrian and European NGOs and affiliated networks, plus Austria and Germany, 
made public statements about the safety, need and cost of Temelín NPP.  The issue (i.e. 
issue salience) becomes an important determinant of whom or what attempts to exert 
influence over domestic policymakers and policy outcomes. My research indicates that 
human rights (both Romani and women’s rights) and environmental protection are highly 
salient issues inside and outside Poland and the Czech Republic and therefore a variety of 
institutional and non-institutional actors were compelled into action.  
Another equally important determinant beside the salience of the policy issue is 
political opportunity. Proponents of ‘political opportunity structure’ (POS) believe 
political institutions have both a constraining and enabling effect on social movements 
and NGOs (Oberschall 1999; Tarrow 1999; Giygni et al 1999; Tarrow and Tilly 2007). 
To clarity, Tarrow and Tilly think of POS as “features of regimes and institutions (e.g. 
splits in the ruling class) that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective action” 
(p.203). This would seem to imply that a phase of contentious collective action should 
follow regime collapse or institutional change. This model places contentious politics 
firmly in the political realm, but is rather vague about exactly  which ‘features of regimes 
                                                                                                                                                 
for the safety of nuclear power plants. There only exist international norms and the Temelin plant 
fulfills them” (CTK, 23 June 1999) 
4
 EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Community 
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and institutions’ afford groups new political opportunities. The Dynamic Statist variant of 
POS best approximates the structural realities of European-level contentious politics, as 
institutional change is very much a feature of post-1989 politics. The model assumes 
“entire political systems undergo changes which modify the environment of social actors 
sufficiently to influence the initiation, forms, and outcomes of collective action” (Tarrow 
1999: 44). When investigating contentious politics in Europe it is important to take stock 
of institutional change at both the national and supranational level, as opportunities can 
materialize on either plane. The examples of contentious politics analyzed below show 
European NGOs populating national spaces, using (or utilizing) European institutions and 
directives, pressuring both European and national decision-makers, and also lobbying EU 
member-states foreign capitals. It seems nothing is out of bounds or beyond the reach of a 
committed NGO. 
New avenues or “routes of influence” (Greenwood 2007: 25) have emerged for 
Polish and Czech NGOs over the past decade, both as a result of the accession process 
and EU membership. The globalization of environmental protection and human rights 
discourse means these routes of influence extend to international IGOs (i.e. the UN) and 
non-EU states, such as America. In the first instance, individuals are able to take (or can 
threaten to take) their grievance(s) to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
and/or the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In a landmark decision handed down by the 
ECHR  in November 2007, the ‘Roma only’ or ‘special’ schools that operate in the Czech 
Republic were deemed to constitute racial segregation and discrimination, a clear 
violation of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. In the second instance, 
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are able to lend material and 
nonmaterial support to fledgling groups, in a way helping to “top-up” post communist 
civil society. A clear example of this, the International Mire Conservation Group 
(IMCG), which specializes in the study and protection of mires worldwide, played a 
decisive role in delaying the construction of the Via Baltica through Poland’s Rospuda 
valley. The Secretary General of IMCG, Dr. Hans Joosten, sent a letter directly to EU 
Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas summarizing the results of their own 
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environmental assessment, 5which cast doubt on the accuracy of Poland’s evaluation.  
These two examples are discussed in much more detail below.                
The examples alluded o above are indicative of the ad hoc way contentious 
politics occur in CEE and how NGOs and associations are mobilizing around issues that 
before accession would have been outside their sphere of activity. It is testament to the 
breadth and scope of European advocacy networks that so many groups and institutions 
became involved in the Rospuda valley ‘affair,’ as up until very recently the whole 
project and its environmental implications were known to very few academics and 
journalists. No longer are national groups attempting to influence government policy 
alone, choosing instead to align themselves with larger more influential NGOs and actors. 
National courts and parliaments are no longer the only institutional recourse available to 
disgruntled national groups. Comparing contentious politics in Europe with traditional 
collective action models, Imig and Tarrow write:  “the reality today is far more complex, 
with conflict and reconciliation occurring at a number of levels and between them”  
(2001: 16). European NGOs and NGOs from abroad are prepared to assist local 
campaigners, thus giving international dimension to issues that are essentially of a local 
nature.     
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In trying to locate sources of political power in post communist Europe, one must be 
ready to examine a constellation of actors and institutions. It became apparent early on 
that European institutions and norms must be considered alongside national political 
culture. European institutions are thus a key feature of post communist political life, 
namely because new democracies are more susceptible to external political stimuli. 
Referring to new institutionalist scholars that rose to prominence in the 1980s, Shepsle 
suggests “they seek to explain characteristics of social outcomes on the basis not only of 
agent preferences and optimizing behaviour, but also on the basis of institutional 
features.” (Shepsle 989: 135 – emphasis added). It is this rationale that guide governance 
(Jachtenfuchs 1995; Hooghe and Marks 1997; Kohler-Koch 1999) and much of the new 
social movement/contentious politics scholarship (Kriesi 2006; Tilly 2004; Tilly and 
                                                 
5
 An electronic version of the letter can be found on the IMCG website, www.imcg.net.  
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Tarrow 2006). This reorientation toward institutions and institutional design can be seen 
in many branches of the social sciences. International Relations (IR) scholars, political 
sociologists and comparative political scientists, are examining how institutions (and 
intergovernmental organizations) affect everything from foreign policy to local grass-
roots activism. The overwhelming sense is that agents react to institutions just as 
institutions reflect prevailing norms and convention. The discussion here accepts the 
possibility that institutions are a determinant of political behaviour and thus endeavors to 
investigate the notion.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Does the myriad of European and international actors that inhabit contentious 
spaces in post communist Europe change domestic patterns of contentious politics 
and NGO in any discernable activity? 
2. Can an underdeveloped civil society be ‘topped up,’ so to speak with political 
actors from other regions and countries?   
3.  What will happen to strictly national NGOs in a highly integrated European 
polity? 
 
The following hypotheses were developed with certain independent variables in mind, 
namely political institutions and the prevailing culture of contention.  So how politics is 
actually carried out and the role institutions play both at the national and European level 
in facilitating contentious politics are the utmost concern. This approach to analyzing 
post communist collective action is preferred because the introduction of new European 
institutions in 2004 and extension of advocacy networks into Poland and the Czech 
Republic must be regarded as politically significant events. Moreover these structural 
changes reframed contentious politics in an important way.   
 
HYPOTHESES 
1. For the foreseeable future government and state institutions will possess an 
inordinate amount of political power and by extension an ability to shut NGOs 
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and other stakeholders out of the policy process, regardless of their popularity and 
policy competence; 
2. The NGOs under analysis here, due to their inexperience and material weakness, 
will not be able to influence policy in a meaningful way. 
3. EU accession will not alter status quo power dynamics in any empirically 
significant way. Thus political parties (and government of the day) will continue 
to control all aspects the policy process.  
 
This dissertation is concerned not with civil society organizations per se, but with 
contentious political activity and the NGOs that participate in it. This excludes sports 
clubs, fraternal societies and other nonpolitical associations from the discussion. While 
influenced by social movement literature (McAdam et al. 1995; McAdam and Snow 
1997; Giugui, McAdam and Tilly 1999; Tarrow and Imig 2001) the discussion here deals 
with NGOs, defined as fairly stable and embedded organizations that have attained a 
level of both legitimacy and institutional validity (not necessarily acceptance). Social 
movements may form into NGOs and vice versa. This dissertation is concerned almost 
exclusively with identifiable groups, NGOs, and contentious collective action. 
Nongovernmental organizations are part pressure group and part interest groups. Not 
every NGO action culminates in disruptive public protest or direct lobbying, though they 
are known for both of these activities. NGOs are “formal (professionalized) independent 
societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or 
the international level” (Martens 2002:282 – italics in original). The term NGO is used in 
IR literature to denote non-state actors that exist on the international plane, tending to 
lobbying intergovernmental organizations, states and regional associations. What 
distinguishes a NGO from a social movement or a solidary6 group, is that  
NGOs have—at the least— a minimal organizational structure which allows them 
to provide for continuous work. This includes a headquarters, permanent staff, 
and constitution (and also a distinct recognized legal status in at least one state) 
(ibid). 
                                                 
6
 According to Paul Pross (1992) a solidary group “is made up of individuals with common 
characteristics who also share some sense of identity. What these individuals have in common 
may be sufficient to encourage them to vote for one another, or act in one another’s interest. It 
may foster enough group feeling to elicit a common reaction to public events…: (p.6). 
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This dissertation examines a series of contentious episodes that involve mostly NGOs and 
political institutions, but in a few cases (e.g. Rospuda valley) non-institutionalized actors 
are compelled to mobilize as well – by protesting or lobbying government. These 
temporary associations are not NGOs nor should not be considered social movements. 
The do however add to the complexity of post communist/post accession contentious 
political and political mobilization. 
Social movements develop in response to social and/or political injustice, whereas 
NGOs are created by a discrete constituency for the purpose of articulating a particular 
point of view to government and affiliated agencies. NGOs, like many social movements, 
seek to protect or promote a ‘public’ interest, as they interpret it. In academic literature 
NGOs are often portrayed as possessing an international dimension, though this is not 
always (or necessarily) the case. McAdam and Snow (1997) contend interest groups “are 
typically regarded as legitimate actors within the political arena [unlike] social 
movements [which are] typically outside of the polity, or overlap with it in a precarious 
fashion” (p. xxi). The groups under study here are interest groups, as McAdam and Snow 
define them, but because most of them work across one or more national frontier(s), they 
have been categorized as nongovernmental organizations. Incidentally a majority of the 
groups surveyed for this dissertation, 72 percent, self-identify as a nongovernmental 
organization.    
 Many groups in post communist Europe straddle the typological line between 
social movement and NGO, oscillating between institutionalized modes of contention and 
more disruptive political protest and collective action. In some instances this has more to 
do with how the state perceives a particular NGO than its actual character. For example, 
during the Klaus premiership (02 January 1992 – 17 December 1997) most Czech 
environmental NGOs, even organizations considered ‘mainstream’ and ‘legitimate’ 
outside the Czech Republic, i.e., Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth/ Hnuti DUHA, 
were labeled ‘extremist’ and put on an official terrorist groups “watch list” (Beckmann 
1999). Some friction occurred between protesters and police as a result of their disruptive 
(not necessarily violent) direct action tactics, like the unfurling of banners from 
smokestacks, demonstrating outside government offices and the blockading of Temelín 
nuclear power plant. As reported, “The attempt to brand the environmentalists as official 
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enemies of the state backfired; the ragtag bands of young "radicals" suddenly gained 
respect and status among many of the leading policy and opinion makers” (ibid). Such is 
the nature of contentious collective action that a degree of antagonism is expected 
between nongovernmental actors and state officials/officers. 
The political opportunities available to NGOs during an episode of contentious 
collective action ultimately depend on regime type, institutional design7 and issue 
salience. In this way NGOs structure their repertoires of contention according to the 
political geography of their environment. However it is important to recognize that 
invariably each policy sector will have its own political opportunity structure, what might 
be available to environmental NGOs may not be available to Roma NGOs, or vice versa. 
Some generalizations can be made about the relative receptiveness of a given government 
or state to NGO input, but if the state in question is in any way pluralistic (i.e. containing 
discrete governmental organizations and bureaucratic offices) a variance in opportunity 
should exist between departments and state-level actors. Borrowing from governance 
literature, “the ‘state’ is not a unitary actor but is divided into functionally differentiated 
sub-structures which are part of sectoral ‘policy communities’ and drawn into various 
‘issue networks’ (Kohler-Koch 1999).    
Additional political opportunities exist for Polish and Czech NGOs thanks to EU 
accession. POS should not be limited to analysis of state-level contentious politics. If a 
group wishes to operate on three political levels, local, state and European, it must devise 
a highly sophisticated action plan.  There are added material and nonmaterial costs for 
groups wanting or needing to interface with politicians and bureaucrats at both the 
European and state level. When determining the relative potency of NGOs in CEE it is 
important to keep socio-political and economic factors in mind, as repertoires of 
contention and decision calculus are very often the result not of the internal dynamics of 
a particular group but the influence of external stimuli.    
                                                 
7
 Political opportunity structure, defined as “features of a regime and institutions (e.g., splits in 
the ruling class) that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective action and to changes in 
those features” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 49) is used regularly by social movement theorists to 
determine how and why contentious politics occur. They are primarily concerned with its 
emergence and persistence in a comparative perspective, over time and between states. I find the 
emphasis placed on (changing) institutions and (dynamic) regimes by political opportunity 
structure theorists particularly useful when trying to analyze group politics in highly fluid 
political environments. 
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METHOD AND METHODOLOGY 
The methodology employed by this dissertation, guided by democratization theory and 
new institutionalism, is concerned primarily with the political causes and consequences 
of third sector8 mobilization as it impacts contentious collective action in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. The argument relies on several conceptual understandings that are 
common to (new) social movement literature, like political opportunity structure (POS) 
and contentious collective action.  NGOs are assumed to be rational actors, as they will 
‘choose’ to lobby institutions and actors which yield the highest expected utility. Also, 
when confronted with an impediment, statutory or political, NGO activists will seek out 
other avenues and routes. After all NGOs are trying to advance a particular conception of 
political and/or social life and thus will pursue tactics and strategies which present the 
greatest likelihood of success.  
 In terms of democratization theory, Whitehead’s own theoretical starting point, 
that “Democracy is best understood not as a predetermined end-state, but as a long-term 
and somewhat open-ended outcome, not just as a feasible equilibrium but as a socially 
desirable and imaginary future (p.3)” is applied to this discussion. Democratization is a 
process complicated by a host of factors, economic, political and cultural. However 
Poland and the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU changed the course of 
democratization in a significant way and also changed the nature of contentious collective 
action. This dissertation utilizes a comparative method not out of convenience or concern 
for prevailing literature on post communist politics, but because it seeks to show how 
despite historical differences (i.e. past regime type and transitions to democracy) 
contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic exhibit similar tendencies. This is 
                                                 
8
 The term ‘third sector’ is used here and throughout this dissertation to denote the totality of 
voluntary groups and organizations that exist to represent the interests of a particular 
constituency. In this sense the third sector is political, whereas civil society contains political and 
apolitical (and nonpolitical) associations and clubs. Mendelson and Glenn (2002) determine:   “a 
third sector of nonprofit organizations can serve as advocates for the public good and as 
watchdogs of political power” (p.6). In order to do this, groups must be either overtly political, 
e.g. a pressure groups, or have potential to become political, e.g., a help or information centre. 
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why examples are drawn from both states and why the survey was conducted cross-
nationally with NGOs representing similar sectors. 
This dissertation collected data by several different methods to discern how 
contentious politics occurs in Poland and the Czech Republic. First, open-ended 
interviews were conducted with NGO workers, current or former political activists, and 
with one former Czech dissident, Charter 77 activist Vaclav Zak. Second, a search of 
pertinent newswires and newspapers was conducted to isolate sectoral specific episodes 
of contention, namely in the areas of the environment, romani rights and gender equity or 
reproductive rights. The purpose was not only to discover how contentious episodes 
transpired, but also to isolate all participants, including national governments, NGOs, 
European institutions and agencies, intergovernmental organizations and the different 
local and state-level administrative offices/agencies, that became involved. It was 
important to map selected episodes of contention, determine their character, and report on 
how ‘international,’ ‘European,’ or ‘national’ they were – in other words the scope of 
contention. Third, questionnaires were distributed by regular mail (‘snail mail’) to 103 
NGOs, 48 went to NGOs in the Czech Republic and 55 went to Polish NGOs. An attempt 
was made to distribute approximately the same number of questionnaires to 
environmental, Roma and women’s NGOs, in both countries; however, in the end this 
was not possible. It seems many groups have either changed address or closed without 
notifying webmasters of the website directories they post their activities and contact 
details on. Many groups were hard to track down after moving from their published 
address. Chapter 4 goes into far more detail about questionnaire design and analysis. This 
questionnaire achieved a 30 percent response rate (slightly higher if “return-to-sender” 
questionnaires are subtracted from the total).     
  
* * * 
 
Working relations between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the European 
Union are positive and reciprocally constructive (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; 
Greenwood 2003). Whereas state-level interaction between public interest groups/ NGOs 
and successive Polish and Czech governments have been characterized by NGOs as 
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frustrating and antagonistic. This was exposed when former Czech prime minister and 
current president Vaclav Klaus publicly stated that NGOs were a danger to democracy 
and did not reflect popular sentiment in the Czech Republic (Radio Praha 6 June 2005). 
Approximately 90 NGOs demanded Klaus offer a public apology for his anti-NGO 
remark (ibid). Even though Klaus is loathed by many highly competent and professional 
NGOs, with my research data supporting this, he does raise a valid concern. How much 
emphasis should be placed on civil society development in relation to institution and state 
building? In Klaus’s words: 
 
We need a political system which must not be destroyed by a postmodern 
interpretation of human rights (with its emphasis on positive rights, with its 
dominance of group rights and entitlements over individual rights and 
responsibilities and with its denationalization of citizenship), by weakening of 
democratic institutions which have irreplaceable roots exclusively on the territory 
of the states, by the ‘multiculturally’[sic] brought about loss of a needed 
coherence inside countries, and by the continental-wide rent-seeking of various 
NGOs (Speech delieverd in Brussels 8 March 2006)9. 
 
Most would agree an appropriate balance must be struck between civil society 
promotion and the development of democratic institutions, considering both are needed to 
sustain democratic governance and facilitate public contestation.  There is disagreement 
however among some practitioners and scholars about the state’s role in facilitating civil 
society development (cf. Klaus, Havel and Pithart 1996). The concern is that an active 
civil society containing strong entrenched interest groups may actually undermine rather 
than contribute to the development of institutionalized democracy. So instead of a 
polyarchy10 emerging you would see a system that draws political capital away from 
traditional core of political contestation, political parties and parliaments. The resultant 
arrangement, weak state institutions and strong non-state actors, will undermine 
mechanisms of interest aggregation, e.g. political parties, and by extension the 
institutions they traditionally inhabit. Is it robust democratic institutions that sustain 
                                                 
9
 http://klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=WpNHn7MwQdlA 
10
 Polyarchy here refers directly to Robert A. Dahl’s conception. He writes: “Polyarchies, then, 
may be thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes, or, to put it another 
way, polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, 
highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation” (Dahl 1979: 8).  
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liberal-democracy or the presence of a multifarious and autonomous civil society? 
According to Dahl both are required. He lists eight requirements ‘for a democracy among 
a large number of people’: 
1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support  
 5a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes 
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and 
other expressions of preference (Dahl 1979: 3) 
 
This list of requirements helps identify what is needed to sustain democracy and 
democratic governance. Dahl (1979) recognizes that democracy is an ideal regime-type, 
hardly attainable in modern pluralist societies, preferring therefore to label regimes 
exhibiting most of the above characteristics ‘polyarchies’ (p.8). Another aspect of Dahl’s 
argument that applies to this dissertation, concerns his elucidation of political 
opportunity. His contention is that all full citizens should possess the opportunity to 
access the political process, to “have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of 
government, that is, weighed with no discrimination because of content or source of the 
preference” (p.2). Being an essential part of participatory democracy Dahl’s sentiment 
has been echoed by many (cf. Lijphart 1984; Putnam 1995; Diamond 1997). Figuring out 
a way to equitably and expediently deliver citizens’ preferences to government and state 
agencies has proven most difficult.  Dahl’s conceptualization of democratization sees 
contestation, opposition and participation as being nodal points along a continuum, from 
hegemonic regime to polyarchy, which states must pass through if they seek a more 
inclusive and equitable regime. He argues “when hegemonic regime and competitive 
oligarchies move toward polyarchy they increase the opportunities for effective 
participation and contestation and hence the number of individuals, groups and interests 
whose preferences have to be considered in policy making (1979:15). Poland and the 
Czech Republic are not hegemonic regimes, but the sequencing Dahl offers is applicable 
to third wave democratization. 
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 Dahl places ‘public contestation’ and ‘right to participate in elections and hold 
office’ on separate axes, the ‘y’ axis and ‘x’ axis respectively. According to Dahl, 
political systems can be plotted theoretically anywhere within this two plane model. 
When examining contentious politics the focus is on the ‘y’ axis and therefore the degree 
of contestation permitted in any given system becomes a defining characteristic. The 
ability of any singular NGO or network of NGOs to influence government, measured 
either by degree of inclusion in the policy process or ability to pressurize from the 
‘outside’ (agenda setting vs. shaping) is an expression of a system’s overall openness to 
political contestation and contentious politics. There is, importantly, no guarantee that an 
open system, one which encourages dialogue and contestation between government and 
stakeholders, will take the preferences of any single constituency seriously. States and 
governments have their own policy preferences, which may or may not be based on their 
interpretation of the collective good.   
Summarizing Schmitter’s contribution to an edited volume, Diamond writes: 
“civil society can (…) impede consolidation by making political majorities more difficult 
to form, exacerbating ethnic divisions and pork-barrel politics, and entrenching 
socioeconomic biases in the distribution of influence” (p. xxxiii). There are as many 
problems associated with a system lacking ‘enough’ civil society organizations and 
NGOs as there is with a system containing too many powerful non-governmental actors. 
Democratic systems require NGOs for purely functional reasons, to check state power, 
offer alternative perspectives on proposed legislation and represent particular 
constituencies (which political parties find difficult to do). The presence of intermediary 
institutions helps secure what Diamond and Morlino (2005) call a ‘quality democracy’, 
which according to them “provides its citizens a high degree of political freedom, 
political equality, and popular control over public policies and policy makers through the 
legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions” (p. xi). They list a few more 
determinants but overall democracy hinges on freedom, access to institutions and 
policymakers, and opportunity to publicly express grievances, which is similar to Dahl’s 
list of prerequisites. There is no agreed upon formula for determining the appropriate 
number of civil society associations for a given state, neither is there a sense of how 
powerful civil society associations should be in relation to the state and other political 
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actors. It seems appropriate, however, for a ‘quality democracy’ to contain a mixture of 
civil society organizations, NGOs, philanthropic organizations and professional 
associations. But in an interconnected multilayered polity such as the European Union, 
where organized interests are nomadic, the number and type of organizations inhabiting 
and one state’s civil society is of limited consequence to overall patterns of contestation 
and political mobilization.  
 As table 1.1 indicates, the transnational character of EU policy and policy making 
coupled with the international scope/appeal of the issues singled out for investigation 
(which have been italicized in the diagram) encourage involvement from a diverse array 
of state and non-state actors. For instance thirteen different actors converged on the issue 
of Temelín, many of whom contributed to the framing the Temelín NPP debate, even 
though under EU law the Czech Republic has the final say in the design and 
implementation of their energy policy. However, as Imig and Tarrow (2001) correctly 
identify, the European system as a composite polity.11 This suggests that clear cut 
jurisdictional boundaries are become rarer to find. They wrote about the EU being a 
composite polity before the May 2004 enlargement. The addition of post communist 
states to the Union further substantiates their claim, as many fledgling NGOs in Poland 
and the Czech Republic have been able to advance their concerns through European 
NGO networks and institutions. The EU was involved, in some way, shape or form, in all 
the policy issues investigated below. Furthermore, the Europeanization of contentious 
politics means policy areas clearly outside EU competency still attract European NGOs 
and sometimes even EU institutions.  
                                                 
11
 Composite polity: “A system of political relations in which actors at various levels and in 
different geographical units within a loosely linked system face both horizontal and vertical 
interlocutors and find corresponding opportunities for alliance building across both axes” (Imig 
and Tarrow 2001: 15).  
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1.1 Actors, Issues and Sectors Table12 
SECTOR       ISSUE        ISSUE  
A. Environment Temelin and Energy Policy (CZ) ‘Via Baltica’ (PL) 
International  IAEA Birdlife International, IMCG 
European EURATOM, WENRA, EC, EP, Germany and Austria, CEE 
Bankwatch 
EC, CEE Bankwatch, ECJ 
EEA, RSPB 
State and local Greenpeace, Hnuti DUHA, CEZ, SUJB, South Bohemian 
Mothers 
Greenpeace, WWF Poland, OTOP, Augustow 
Township, PGN 
B. Romani Housing and Racism (CZ and PL) Sterilization and Education (CZ) 
International  IRU, UN, CERD, USA IRU, UN, CERD, USA 
European ERRC, ECHR, EP, EC ECHR, British Embassy, ERRC, EP, EC 
 
State and local BRRR, ROU, Dzeno, IQ Roma Servis, LIGA Dzeno, Romea Association, 
IQ Roma Servis. LIGA 
C. Women Abortion (PL) Domestic Violence (CZ) 
International UN, NEWW, Catholic Church UN 
European  WoW, ECHR EWL 
State and local NEWW, PFWFP. PCC ROSA 
 
           WENRA  Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (NGO)   LIGA  League of Human Rights (Liga Lidských práv) 
           SUJB   State Nuclear Safety Office       PGN  Polish Green Network 
          IAEA      International Atomic Energy Agency      WWF  World Wide Fund for Nature 
         OTOP   Polish Society for the Protection of Birds     CEZ  Czech power utility 
       ECHR  European Court of Human Rights      NEWW Network of East West Women 
             ECJ    European Court of Justice       PFWFP  Polish Federation for Woman and Family Planning 
EP  European Parliament        PCC   Polish Catholic Church    
 EC  European Commission         WoW  Women on Waves 
 ROI  Roma Civic Initiative (Romská občanská iniciativa)    EWL  European Women’s Lobby 
 IRU  International Romani Union        IMGC  International Mire Conservation Group 
 BRRR  Board of Romani Regional Representatives     EEA  European Environmental Agency 
 ERRC  European Roma Rights Centre       EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community 
 CERD  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination    USA  United States of America 
 UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Commission     RSBP  British Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
                                                 
12
 The actors, a combination of NGOs, IGOs, specialized institutions and other civil society organizations, were identified through and added to this matrix as a result 
of their citation or mention in various newspapers and newswires. This list is by no means exhaustive but is reflective of the complex web of actors taking position 
around the identified ‘issue’ areas. 
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CASE SELECTION 
In selecting two post communist states it was important to consider each state’s past 
regime type, how each transitioned to democracy, when (and how) democracy was  
consolidated, and each state’s standing with the international community , including the 
EU. It was important to compare two states that experienced different levels of 
independent activity under communism but were similar enough in terms of regime type 
as to permit comparison. Before 1989 Poland was an authoritarian regime with a de facto 
civil society. From the beginning of normalization in 1969-70, a programme initiated by 
Husák to undo the Prague Spring reforms of 1968, until the ‘velvet revolution’ in 
November 1989, Czechoslovakia was a frozen post- totalitarian state (Linz and Stepan 
1996:47) with very few voluntary associations and civil society organizations. As Linz 
and Stepan posit, a frozen-post-totalitarian state is far more likely to capitulate in times of 
crisis than an authoritarian regime (ibid). This point will be taken up later in the 
dissertation, for the moment it is important to recognize that while both Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were ‘state-socialist,’ the tolerance shown toward independent 
associations in Poland was unique among Eastern European states of that era.  
A mixture of international, European and national influences have gone into the 
development of their respective civil societies since regime collapse in 1989, with several 
contentious issues of the post accession period drawing attention from international and 
continental non-state actors. Both states have proven fertile ground for contentious 
politics, whether in the form of public demonstration, petition, strike or disruptive 
collective protest. The rise of populist politics in Poland (i.e. Samoobrona – Self 
Defence) and the regularity of public demonstrations in the Czech Republic between 
1998 and 2001 would seem to support this. Equally important is each state’s respective 
trajectory. Both states emerged from state socialism at approximately the same time 
(1989), both joined the European Union at precisely the same moment (May 2004), and 
during the communist period both experienced dissident activity rooted in human rights 
discourse and idealized notions of civil society. Members of both Charter 77 and 
Solidarity were in favour of creating a civil society, for they believed only with the 
construction of a civil society would individuals acquire freedom and truth. A civil 
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society would finally correct the backward relationship that had existed between state and 
society since the communist takeover (Schöpflin1993: 1). Poland and the Czech Republic 
will be used throughout this dissertation to test the hypotheses relating to post communist 
contentious politics. The development of these states from communist to democratic will 
be detailed in a subsequent chapter. 
In the Czech Republic, groups tend to be clustered around a few sectors, namely 
the environment and human rights. This is owing to the vital role played by 
environmental groups in the lead up to the November-December 1989 revolution (Fagin 
1994) and also to the human rights tradition started by Charter 77 and Výbor na obranu 
nespravedlivě stíhaných (VONS- the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly 
Persecuted). Of the 94 00013 NGOs currently operating in the Czech Republic (USAID 
2006) only a small fraction could be considered politically active. For sake of clarity, 
politically active means engaging in contentious collective action, lobbing or public 
protesting, or any combination of the three. In Poland the number was slightly less at 63 
000 but a marked increase from the 2004 level of 52 000 (USAID, 2006). USAID reports 
the vast majority of these registered non-profits in Poland are non political and 
approximately 39 percent concern themselves with sport, tourism and other recreational 
pursuits. Based on the information gleaned from available on-line NGO registries (i.e. 
Polish Environmental NGOs Directory and NGO.pl) the total number of groups that can 
confidently be labeled ‘pressure group’ or ‘public interest group’ is quite small. For 
instance the Polish Environmental NGOs Directory lists 35 “ecological lobbying” 
groups. A similar directory in the Czech Republic offered by The Green Circle14 
(www.zelenykruh.cz) mentions 27 associate environmental groups on their website. 
Many NGOs have come and gone since the year 2000 let alone the early 1990s. It would 
be worth exploring in some detail NGO cycles of growth and decline, for such data 
would likely reveal something fascinating about overall patterns of contention in post 
authoritarian states. But the focus here is almost exclusively on contemporary issues and 
                                                 
13
 This number is inclusive most types of civil society organization and association in the Czech 
Republic, “civic associations, foundations, foundation funds, public benefit organizations, 
church-related legal entities, and associations of legal entities” (USAID 2006). 
14
 Questionnaires sent out to four organizations listed on the Green Circle website were returned 
undelivered, suggesting that the website is either out of date or associate groups are closing down 
so quickly that the webmaster is unable to maintain an up-to-date directory.  
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the contestation that occurs between groups and the state in identifiable policy sectors, 
e.g. the environmental, human rights and gender equality.   
Many consider the 1989 revolutions in East-Central Europe (CEE) a concrete 
example of how the tripartite ideas of civil society, liberalism and democracy can initiate 
regime collapse (Smolar 2001: 5; Kopecky and Barnfield, 1999: 76). The ‘tripartite’ ideas 
were cultivated during the dissident period and provided anti-regime activists in both 
Poland and the Czech Republic with a clearly defined goal, the realization of a more 
open, democratic, ‘western’ society. Ignatieff believes “…Lech Walesa  and Vaclav 
Havel drew legitimacy away from the regime to the human rights movement, and in 
doing so, dug the grave of the [Soviet] empire” (2002: 116). Advanced by dissidents in 
both normative and empirical terms, it was hoped these three interrelated concepts would 
on the one hand serve to illustrate the poisonous effect socialism was having on their 
lives (in both economical and political terms) and on the other, present a tenable 
alternative to status quo politics.  Considering this, many just plainly assumed that the 
post-communist order would be built on a foundation of ideas not dissimilar to those once 
advanced in samizdat publications and discussed over čaj in living rooms throughout 
Central Europe. 
It has been suggested that power, prestige and, patronage are now more a part 
contemporary CEE politics than anything articulated by Chartists or KOR members 
during the dissident years (cf. Holmes 2006). Corruption is rampant in both Poland and 
the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic scored 4.8 out of 10 on Transparency 
International’s corruption scale (10 being the best possible rating). The Czech Republic’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) at 4.8 was in 2006 the same as Kuwait and 
Lithuania’s (www.transparency .org). Poland faired much worse however. In 2006 with a 
CPI index, 3.7 Poland was rated lower than both Turkey and Columbia.  For comparative 
purposes, in 1998 Poland’s CPI was 4.6, while the Czech Republic’s was 4.8. Problems 
at the political level persist despite EU accession.  
 This dissertation is a cross-national and cross-sectoral examination of contentious 
politics. As mentioned, a comprehensive questionnaire was sent out to 103 NGOs15 in 
                                                 
15In an article about the many definitional/conceptual problems with the term, NGO, Martins 
settles in the end on the following definition:  “NGOs are formal (professionalized) independent 
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Poland and the Czech Republic. Groups were selected based on three main criteria. One, 
they had to represent a coherent constituency - the environment, Roma or women. Two, 
they had to be based in either the Czech Republic or Poland. It did not matter if they were 
an affiliate or a subsidiary of an international NGO. Three, they had to be a recognized 
NGO. Correspondingly their activities had to reflect those of a ‘traditional’ NGO. 16 The 
groups ultimately selected for analysis look to represent either a marginalized segment of 
society or an issue not adequately dealt with by political elites – again as defined by the 
NGOs themselves. Finally, all of the groups eventually selected to receive the 
questionnaire had to be both autonomous and voluntary, as far as possible.  
 
THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 
At the EU level the Commission (EC) is particularly friendly toward public interest 
groups (NGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (Greenwood 2003: 176 – 178) and 
through a variety of methos encourages their development and professionalization. The 
White Paper on European Governance published by the EC (2001) regards European 
civil society and interest groups as an important part of their governance model and a 
concrete way to overcome the democratic deficit. However, as Eising (2007) argues, 
since EU-level interest groups are not necessarily tied to a fixed constituency, they may 
not necessarily enhance democracy. Those investigating interest representation in the 
European Union often comment that the “EU is one of the most citizen-friendly polities 
to be found anywhere, and an easy one for public interest organizations to engage” 
(Greenwood, 2003: 176). The number of NGOs operating within the EU has risen 
dramatically over the past decade (Eising 2007:205). Policy networks crisscross Europe 
linking NGOs from Malta to Ireland and from Estonia to Portugal.  Whereas Imig and 
Tarrow (2001) look at how EU institutions provoke episodes of contention, their 
frequency and effect, this dissertation is most interested in examining how contentious 
politics in post communist states, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, is structured 
when its so heavily influenced by externalities and European actors.     
                                                                                                                                                 
societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the 
international level: (Martins 2002: 282 – italics in original). 
16
 As Martin (2002) suggests, NGOs are primarily voluntary and nonprofit, but this does not 
preclude them from maintaining a professional (paid) staff at a permanent office. 
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European governance, multilevel governance (MLG) and transgovernmentalism 
(and transnationalism) (cf. Slaughter 1997) are today popular topics. Among scholars of 
international relations and comparative European politics there is a belief the European 
project is stretching existing theories of interdependence and federation to near breaking 
point. The above models, especially those concerning governance (Kohler-Koch 1996; 
Jachtenfuchs 2001; Walzenbach2006) help us understand and make sense of an emerging 
European polity that does not easily fit classification. Decision-making involves many 
actors from a variety of stations. Consequently theories that account for this are useful 
precisely because they recognize the fact that decision making is complex and not 
reducible to a one-dimensional model. Importantly such notions of governance take into 
consideration non-state actors, social movements and associations, along with traditional 
sources of political power, like governments and European institutions, when analyzing 
EU politics and policymaking. As Stoker (1998) suggests, “governance is ultimately 
concerned with creating conditions for ordered rule and collective action…The outputs of 
governance are not therefor different from those of government” (p. 17). Governance 
includes systems of formal and informal decision making. Still, the European Union 
clearly has intergovernmental qualities about it. Andrew Moravcsik argues “the EU’s 
power is highly constrained, it interferes little in the salient issues of national politics and 
it already has as much democratic oversight as is practicial” (2003:38). Formal EU power 
is constrained by the corpus of EU treaties that point to the EU Council as the ultimate 
decision-making body. Thus power is technically always the hands of member-state 
leaders. But concern here is with informal sources of power and how the EU can shape 
contentious politics and issue framing. Interest groups at the European level operate 
inside and outside formal corridors of power and NGOs with no connection whatsoever 
to Brussels or Strasbourg and use EU institutions and directives to their advantage. This 
holds especially true for the examples cited in the case study chapters of this dissertation.  
An injection of money, from either the EU or private funding bodies (i.e. Open 
Society Fund) can similarly stimulate a sector and change the parameters of contestation. 
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The PHARE (Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Restructuring)17 programme and 
Community law have since early in the accession process been directly and indirectly 
influencing the development of interest groups cross CEE. The Copenhagen Criteria has 
led to the direct funding of NGOs, particularly Romani ones, and more generally to 
groups and associations which work to enhance civil society. Without EU assistance 
many fledgling associations would lack financial viability and thus the means to 
pressurize government. Under the title ‘Phare National Programmes’ the Roma 
community received during 1999 – 2001 a total of € 6,350,000 in direct funding. In 1998, 
for example, € 900,000 went towards the development of local Romani NGOs. These are 
two examples among many. A scheme like this may retard the development of grassroots 
networks and diminish local accountability, but few if any Romani NGOs would exist at 
all if not for the funding provided by the EU, Czech government and municipalities. 
More will be said about this in the case study section of the dissertation.  
The transformation of Central East European (CEE) polities from state socialist to 
liberal democratic has been occurring lock step with the transformation of politics at the 
European level.  In this way European integration and globalization have directly 
influenced the nature and character of contentious politics18 in CEE. Groups and 
professional lobbyists for instance must consider along with domestic policy and political 
discourse European Union (EU) directives and norms emanating from Brussels and 
Strasbourg. Therefore institutional change is occurring at two discrete levels, domestic 
and European. This, along with an ever-growing (and spreading) network of professional 
associations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private actors (Greenwood and 
Aspinwall 1998) has meant non-state actors in Poland and the Czech Republic must 
contemplate and ultimately deal with a second (and sometimes even a third) political 
dimension. This geographical diffusion of political power across time and space, coupled 
                                                 
17
 PHARE was extended to all accession countries in the mid 1990s as a way to ensure CEE states 
in particular were economically and political prepared to join the EU. This was and continues to 
be a successful programme now covering some of Romania and Bulgaria’s accession costs. 
18
 According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007) “contentious politics involves interactions in which 
actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf 
of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, 
or third parties. Contentious politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: 
contention, collective action and politics.” (p.4).    
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3. International Society 
1. State 
2. European Union 
 
with the rapid societal and institutional changes that have accompanied CEE 
democratization, suggests three important developments.  
 
Figure 1.2 Three-dimensional Governance  
and Planes of Contention 
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judicial advocacy and                                                                                                   politics and INGO      
NGO networks            networks  
   
 
 
 
 
First, civil society is no longer strictly a domestic sphere twinned with a partner set of 
political institutions and cultural peculiarities. It is for all intents a wide open (or has the 
possibility to be) space susceptible to the influence of foreign actors and agents for 
change, whether they be continental or international in origin. Second, NGOs in CEE 
have to learn the skills of domestic politicking while at the same time figuring their way 
around international and European treaties, which are becoming more complex and 
encompassing as time passes. There are pros and cons associated with such a process, but 
importantly it has direct affect on the way non state actors, such as NGOs, formulate 
their decision calculus. Third, explanation for the logic of NGO activity and their 
repertoires of contention (Tilly and Tarrow 2007), that is the way strategies and tactics 
are determined and used by groups to facilitate political contestation and gain influence 
in policy matters, may lay outside traditional social movement and interest groups theory.  
A theoretical model which places democratization alongside both Europeanization and 
globalization, whilst at the same time acknowledging the real and potential impact of 
political elites during transition (and subsequently during EU accession) would be ideal 
for the purposes of this dissertation. While not wanting to adopt strictly an agency-
centred theory here, the subsequent analysis of group politics in post communist Poland 
and the Czech Republic utilizes the transition paradigm to understand and explain why 
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the state, institutionalized politics and externalities loom so large in two states that 
experienced the potency of civil society first hand in 1989. It is worth noting that 
literature on post communist politics and societies is now paying much closer attention to 
institutionalized politics, the state and political agents, including elites, than on 
associational affiliation, social movements and civil society, even though the latter three 
ideas have become synonymous with the revolutions themselves. 
A two pronged process of democratization and Europeanization calls upon 
lawmakers and decision-makers to implement procedural democracy first, i.e. electoral 
laws and party systems, and substantive democracy second, i.e. associational affiliation 
and civic participation. In other words, there is a real possibility that the weakness of civil 
society in accession countries, Poland and the Czech Republic are exemplars, is due 
largely to the demands placed upon legislators by the European Union, specifically the 
acquis communautaire and the conditionality established by the Copenhagen criteria. 
According to the EU Council President’s report outlining the accession process for 
Central and Eastern European countries, “membership requires that the candidate country 
has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Council, 1993). Only three 
and a half years after the collapse of communism in CEE, associated countries (those 
seeking EU membership) effectively began a process of economic and political 
harmonization. Although the Council report (1993) does not specifically mention the 
ordering or sequencing of conditions, it does bode well for the argument being presented 
here that ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy’ is mentioned first. The whole 
accession process unfolded rather quickly. One year after the Copenhagen criteria was 
established Poland had already applied to join the EU. The Czech Republic applied for 
EU membership in 1995. Both countries began accession negotiations 31 March 1998 
and officially joined 1 May 2004.  
Thus multilevel governance (MLG) must be regarded as a critical and unique 
feature of post communist state and civil society development in CEE. A system of 
stratified decision making alone complicates contentious politics.  Coupled with a weak 
civil society (Howard 200; Kopecky and Mudde 2003) such an institutional environment 
could potentially act to frustrate the creation of new, and the development of existing, 
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public interest groups (NGOs). Any group working in any of the areas explored by this 
dissertation, the environment, women’s rights and minority rights, must seriously 
consider European level policy and directives. The anti-nuclear (anti-Temelín) campaign 
in the Czech Republic (Fawn 2006), the pro-life movement in Poland, and the Romani 
rights movement in both states (Vermeersch 2001), have all utilized the European 
dimension to further enhance their respective political opportunities. On the one hand, by 
joining forces with existing European-level NGOs CEE groups improve their likelihood 
of success, especially when dealing in areas of policy that fall directly under EU 
competency. On the other hand, passing power over (literally passing it up the chain) to 
existing European NGOs could act to retard the growth of strictly domestic NGOs in 
post-communist countries. This is worrisome only if associational affiliation is positively 
correlated with democracy (cf. Putnam 1995) and only if the presence of home-grown 
interest groups and solidary associations are needed to improve governance. In many 
instances groups are reacting to institutional and structural changes, not leading them. 
Many of the more pressing, and coincidentally difficult to resolve, policy issues, like 
human rights, environmental protection and economic vitality, have a transnational 
dimension to them. So it becomes mostly out of necessity that domestic NGOs unite with 
international or European NGOs to challenge either European or member state policies.  
As Wessels (2004) points out, “the history of interest group systems in nation-states 
shows that interest group formation has often responded to changes in the allocation of 
authoritative competencies” (p.199).           
For many CEE states their transition from authoritarian rule and subsequent 
democratization happened to coincide with the internationalization and Europeanization 
of their respective civil societies, interest group sectors and policy communities. Polish 
and Czech groups concerned with the environment, human rights and gender equality 
(issues which already had an international dimension in 1989) found the existing network 
of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and European interest groups 
(NGOs) most hospitable. Many American and West European based NGOs, like 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the Network of East West Women, were willing to 
organize conferences, information sessions and exchange progammes with nascent 
groups in post communist Europe. In fact within a decade of transition most ‘western’ 
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NGOs, especially those having or building towards international standing, had in Poland 
and the Czech Republic either a permanent office or a subsidiary organization. All the big 
environmental NGOs, Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth, have become active 
in CEE.   
Writing on collective action in the European Union, Aspinwall and Greenwood 
(1998) remark: “the European tradition of interest representation differs from practice in 
the United States” (p.1). On the same page they contend Europeans have grown 
accustomed to the presence of robust mediating institutions, like political parties, to 
transmit their grievances to decision-makers. Contrasting this with the United States, the 
authors argue “there has always been a focus within the American polity on both the 
pluralist nature of civic voice and its relevance to political life” (p.1). Such an 
understanding provides a useful template not only for the analysis of EU lobbying and 
contention but also to help understand the central tension that exists in post communist 
states concerning the creation of civil society and participatory democracy versus the 
development of liberalism and institutionalized forms of public contestation.  
With states and nonstate actors working together to formulate comprehensive pan 
European policy, enmeshed in a lattice of supranational, national and subnational policy 
communities and networks, it is best to refer to this process not as European government 
but European governance. This is because governance is recognized as a less rigid and 
more inclusive form of decision-making, which includes both traditional actors, such as 
state institutions and, less traditional actors such as professional associations, advocacy 
groups and EU-level institutions and bureaucrats. This places a great deal of stress and 
strain on newly emergent public interest groups and nongovernmental organizations from 
Poland and the Czech Republic, as they are forced to quickly adapt to a system which 
began to take shape long before their respective states were even democratic.  
In the span of fifteen years (1989 – 2004) post- communist states like Poland and 
the Czech Republic have been almost entirely recreated19. Transforming from a socialist 
state to a member of both the European and global community has meant a 
reconfiguration of both political culture and systems of governance. These two states 
                                                 
19
 In the case of Czechoslovakia, which separated on 1 January 1993 into two distinct states, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic, such a characterization holds especially true. 
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have had to simultaneously integrate themselves into an array of regional and global 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and create robust systems of domestic 
governance. Not only have interest groups, for instance, had to acquire the skills 
necessary to lobby government but they have also had to figure out the new multilevel 
political landscape complete with new sometimes grandfathered in European laws and 
relatively new transgovernmental policy communitie and networks. A. M. Slaughter 
(1997) argues “…courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures (…) are 
networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that 
constitutes a new, transgovernmental order (p.184). 
 
TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
Before I proceed any further with this discussion, it is important to touch on the seven 
terms/concepts that lay at the core of this dissertation. That they even appear together in a 
dissertation committed to understanding group politics in Poland and the Czech Republic 
should speak to the changing nature of European politics, both at the EU and member-
state level, and the need for an eclectic theoretical approach to the analysis post 
communist contentious politics. It is no longer appropriate to investigate contemporary 
politics in post communist Europe without at least considering the pressures applied to 
domestic institutions and actors from outside sources. By every indication the very nature 
of contentious politics is shaped by both internal and external stimuli; issues are no 
longer outside the range of any well-appointed interest group.     
 
1. Democratization 
Democratization is a process whereby a state or political community develops or attempts 
to develop institutions which translate the will of the people into effective rule. 
According to Grugel, “theories of democratization have been concerned chiefly with 
causation and the identification of the main factors that lead to the emergence of 
democracies” (2002: 47). They can also be used to determine requisites for democracy 
and democratic governance after consolidation. Within democratization studies exists 
several different approaches. They differ according to the emphasis they place on 
structural determinants and agential factors (Grugel 2002: 46). The transition paradigm 
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offers an illuminating account of CEE democratization, especially so in the case of 
Poland and the Czech Republic, as it stresses the impact of elites and pact making on the 
process. It does however leave collective actors and agents out of the equation (ibid.). 
The historical sociology (HS) approach does take into consideration the impact of 
collective action and the structural changes that initiated democratization in the first 
instance. But it too has shortcomings. It appears unable to adequately explain transitions 
to democracy that occur as a result of elite bargaining and negotiation, where the 
important structural changes HS theorists speak of only provide an opening  for the 
nascent elite.  
As Poland and the Czechoslovakia experienced pacted transitions, it seems 
appropriate to look more closely at the transition approach. Grugel writes: “democracy is 
not, therefore, a question of waiting for economic conditions to mature or the political 
struggles unleashed by economic change to be one” (p.56). Democracy is a purposeful 
choice made by elites and state-level actors. For the anciem regime a pacted or negotiated 
transition is more favorable than regime collapse because by helping to choose the rules 
of the political game they maintain a degree of power. The transition model is compatible 
with rational choice theory as well. More will be said in a subsequent chapter about 
democratization and the influence of European institutions and networks on contentious 
politics in Poland and the Czech Republic.  
 
2. Governance  
The term governance is used to describe a decision making process that incorporates both 
formal and informal sources of political power. Linked most commonly to the EU, it 
helps make sense of a policy making system that balances the interest of member-states 
with those of European nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) and the EU’s 
supranational institutions, the European Commission and European Parliament. In a 
system regulated by treaty and ‘European’ norms, power becomes much more fluid. Even 
though member-states wield considerable political power they alone do not shape the 
terms of European contentious politics. Thus multilevel governance (MLG) reflects the 
stratified nature of political authority in the Union. MLG means “the dispersion of 
authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels” (Hooghe and Marks 
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2001: xi). Each level has a particular logic to it, but all levels can simultaneously come 
into play. It would be impossible to put forward an argument about contentious politics in 
Europe without, at least, entertaining the idea of governance.   
 
3. Europeanization 
Not necessarily describing a process of cultural homogenization, Europeanization 
encapsulates a host of simultaneous political and institutional developments. One vision 
of Europeanization sees horizontal ties developing between national actors with little if 
any direct influence from EU institutions in the process (Quaglia et al.2007: 407). 
Radaelli (2003) provides a useful definition of Europeanization: “Europeanization 
consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion, c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared 
beliefs and norms….”(in Quaglia 2007: 407). This is a particularly illuminating 
conception of Europeanization because it regards institutional change and changes to the 
normative order as two reinforcing phenomenon. Kohler-Kock discusses a similar 
phenomenon but relates it to governance. For her, “governance has an ideational 
dimension as well as an organizational one” (1999). Part of Europeanization then is the 
extension of governance to all European decisions, replacing realpolitik with Europolitik. 
 
4. Contentious Politics   
Having defined this term above, I only want to stress two points here. First, contentious 
politics is a useful concept because rather than focusing on actors it stresses the 
interchange and interaction between them, which is useful when you are primarily 
concerned with patters of public contestation. Second, the term ‘contention’ opens this 
study to a whole host of institutionalized and non-institutionalized actors, which is useful 
when examining issues that bring both governmental and nongovernmental actors 
forward.  
 
5. Power 
Power can be conceptually understood as influence, coercion or force, and despite 
definitional uncertainty power lay at the core of most social and political inquiry. In an 
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introductory political science textbook, Khan et al. (1977) suggest “power is the central 
organizing factor in politics, while government is its basic operational structure” (p.3). As 
Weber conceives power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will 
be in a position to carry out his [sic] will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests” (in Haugard 2002: 5). Dahl’s now famous formula interprets 
power as “A” getting “B” to do what “A” wants. However is “A” any less powerful if she 
only gets some of what she wants, while “B” remains in a subservient position to “A”. In 
the context of EU and European policy networks, politics should be understood as a non-
zero or positive sum game rather than a zero sum game. Therefore we can talk of 
absolute gains in relation to state power and the accumulated power of non-state actors. 
As this is the case, power is about getting something, opposed to nothing. Admittedly it is 
difficult to assess the power (or power potential) of any one NGO or particular 
government. Power is ubiquitous, discussed in all branches of the social sciences, and yet 
awfully difficult to pinpoint. For the purposes of this discussion, power is perceived as 
political influence in the context of decision-making. Influence does not necessarily have 
to translate into clear-cut policy victory. 
 
6. Rational Choice Theory 
I want to go into some detail about rational choice theory for two reasons. One, it fits 
nicely with the transition model, and two, though controversial in the social sciences 
(Green and Shapiro 1994) rational choice theory (RCT) provides a conceptual model for 
analyzing the discrete actions of political actors. RCT and models of similar design (e.g. 
political opportunity structure, public choice and resource mobilization structure) have 
come to dominate political science and literature concerning group politics and collective 
action (McLean 1991; Finkel and Muller 1998; Jones 2003; Hay 2004).  RCT offers, 
among other things, an opportunity to make fairly robust generalizations about social 
activity and individual level political calculus. It also enables social scientists to construct 
theoretical statements about group decision-making and derive conclusions about why a 
particular group membership behaves the way it does.   
Those adopting a rational choice model of reckoning invariably see collective 
action as a choice taken willfully by a number of individual actors confronted with a 
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discrete number of ‘tangible’ options. For instance, an individual actor’s decision to take 
part in a rowdy public protest (xP) or engage in a more subtle form of disobedience, say 
non-voting (xV), could be perceived as two options, among several. While completely 
disengaging (xD) from politics altogether could be construed as yet another possible 
option. Thus xP, xA and xD are three discrete courses of action open to an individual 
actor. After calculating expected utility, an individual will pursue the course of action 
which best reflects their own needs, wants, desires and/or aspirations. Subsequently xP 
and xR are at opposite ends of an ordinal spectrum, which can be comprised both of 
dichotomous and more closely related options.  The chosen option becomes the one with 
the highest expected utility quotient. Under such a model collective action becomes the 
culmination or result of individual-level decision-making, when a group of individuals 
sharing a common utility structure choose to act in unison. Popular literature, however, 
challenges this notion (cf. Olson 1971).   
Olson argues that collective action should not always be regarded as the sum total 
of individual level rational choice. That is, rational individuals rarely exhibit the exact 
same decision calculus and most significantly are susceptible to the free ride problem. 
Individuals may thus determine through a cost benefit analysis (which is a personal 
endeavor) that non-action or inaction is the most rewarding option. By now a well known 
and oft quoted thesis statement, Olson agues “unless the number of individuals in a group 
is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other kind of special device to make 
individuals act in their common interests, rational self interested individuals will not act 
to achieve their common or group interests” (1971: 2). It is much easier to apply a 
rational choice model to individual action or inaction than to collective action or group 
protest. So Among Olson’s (1971) many contributions to the study of collective action 
and group politics, it is perhaps his admittance that the analysis of group politics and 
groups themselves is not as straightforward as many might have thought which resonates 
so loudly.  
RCT can be used to discern the nature (not necessarily the quality) and substance 
(not necessarily the logic) of decision making. It can thus be used to investigate group 
decision making and resultant activity within a discrete political environment. This is 
opposed to using RCT to analyze the decision-calculus of individual members of a 
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particular organization or association (Olson 1971). It is important to understand and 
determine why non governmental organizations (NGOs), for instance, take the course(s) 
of action they do and why preference is given to certain types of collective action over 
others. For this dissertation, RCT is begin used strictly as an analytic tool in the hope of 
showing how the complex socio-political environment NGOs in post communist Europe 
find themselves ultimately influence their strategies and tactics. Interest groups in Poland 
and the Czech Republic exist in a diffuse multi-tiered political system. To be effective in 
the Czech Republic NGOs and interest groups must monitor EU level policy while 
paying attention to and acting on regional (kraje20 and voivodeships21) and national-level 
policy. A highly stratified system encourages, among other things, the use of a much 
more complex and involved decision-making model. In this instance, a simple decision 
calculus should not be assumed. Rather groups and NGOs may take decisions that on first 
inspection appear ill conceived or irrational. But in an unpredictable system sometimes 
imperfect information is all that groups can access. 
The application of RCT in the analysis of group politics in post communist 
Europe should not be construed as a blind endorsement of RCT. Colin Hay’s (2004) 
critique of RCT warns us not to be too literal with RCT. That is, it is entirely appropriate 
                                                 
20
 In 2000 the Czech Republic was divided into thirteen administrative regions (kraje), along with 
one separate capital region, Prague. Municipal government is an important and critical part of 
Czech governance, as regional assemblies, to which there are correspondingly thirteen, have 
considerable de facto and de jure power. For instance, the administration of museums, cultural 
centers and separately sports and recreation, fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the kraj. This 
has specific impact on Romani groups for instance because funding is often routed through 
regional assemblies and distributed according to their own formulae. Most notably for 
environmental groups, kraje are responsible for establishing and running environmental 
inspection regimes and also determining land use and general zoning.  This system was adopted 
by Constitutional Act No 347/1997 Sb. of 3 DCEEmber 1997 on the Creation of Higher 
Territorial Self-Governing Units and on Amendments to Constitutional Act of the Czech National 
Council, No. 1/1993 Sb., the Constitution of the Czech Republic. Chapter Seven, Article 99 – 102 
and 104 – 105, of the Czech Constitution affirms the autonomy of Kraj and refers to them as 
‘self-government’.   
21
 In Poland there exists a similar delineation of power. In 1999 Poland adopted a new system of 
local government whereby sixteen administrative districts, voivodeships, would replace the 
previous forty-nine. Chapter VII of the Polish Constitution (Articles 163 – 172) determines the 
structure and function of these voivodeships and entrusts to each regional assembly competency 
over matters not directly handled by either the Council of Ministers or President. For a discussion 
of how these changes came about and their perceived affect see Andrew H. Dawson (1999) “The 
Transformation of Polish Local Government.” Public Administration, Vol. 77, No. 4: Pp 897-
902.    
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to use RCT as a analytical aid or guide when investigating social action and interaction. 
He argues: 
If recast [RCT] less as of a universal theory of human conduct – or indeed a 
theory at all – and more as a set of analytical strategies for exploring the logical 
consequences of a given set of heuristic or imported assumptions, rational choice 
has a crucial role to play in critical political analysis (Hay 2004: 45) 
  
 
I am stressing the importance of RCT for three specific reasons. First, Polish and Czech 
NGOs, like NGOs elsewhere in other places at other times, make their decisions in a very 
particular political environment, which is periodically subject to change. The decision 
calculus employed by NGOs ultimately reflects the dynamism and uncertainties of the 
institutional environment they find themselves, and all the evidence seems to support this 
thesis.         
 
7. The ‘State’ 
To clarify, a state is the sum total of governmental agencies and bureaucratic offices 
which have a hand in policy formulation. Almond et al. (2004) contend “a state is a 
political system that has sovereignty – independent legal authority over a population in a 
particular territory, based on the recognized right to self-determination (p.16). Newton 
and Van Deth (2005) suggest a state is “the organization that issues and enforces biding 
rules for the people within a territory” (p.8). Hague and Harrop (2004) determine “the 
state defines the political community of which government is the executive branch” (p.7). 
Finally, Pal argues the state as actor “refers to the officials, both elected and appointed, 
who constitute the government of the day” (1993: 272). It is Pal’s conception of the state 
which this dissertation employs, as it identifies the state as an autonomous and purposeful 
group of individuals, holding public office, with an intention to implement policies that 
reflect their ideological disposition (or preferences). Additionally, “states may be sites of 
autonomous official initiatives, and their institutional structures may help to shape the 
political process from which social policies emerge” (Skocpol and Amenta 1986: 131). 
Finally, the term ‘state’ is used, instead of government or name of the political party in 
power, because since the end of state socialism in 1989 the primary concern of successive 
governments has been to implement liberal democracy and a market economy. The 
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problem identified by Orenstein and Desai (1997) is “unwilling to relinquish control, 
Czech reformers encouraged only those organizations that would directly further the 
goals of the economic reform programme and held back the development of NGOs, 
professional associations, and public or quasi-public sector organizations” (p. 44).  In this 
way, when reading the word ‘state’ one should think of the political core of an 
administrative state which takes decisions and implements policies.   
 
OVERVIEW  
This dissertation is organized into 7 separate chapters with chapter 1 and 2 forming the 
introduction and conclusion, respectively. The discussion proceeds without a traditional 
literature review but relevant scholarship is identified throughout. The introductory 
chapter discussed key theories and concepts related to contentious collective action and 
spent time establishing the theoretical (and empirical) scope of this dissertation. Part of 
this dissertation involves an analysis of specific contentious episodes. These contentious 
‘events’ or ‘episodes’ are presented in a more comprehensive fashion at the end of each 
‘case study’ chapter. For example Rospuda valley is discussed as a stand alone case at the 
end of the environmental politics chapter, while reproductive rights/abortion appears at a 
similar point in the chapter dealing with contentious collective action in the area of 
women’s rights and gender equality. These episodes illustrate the complexity of 
contentious collective action in CEE, which can draw-in actors from across Europe and 
even North America.   
Chapter 2 investigates the absence of strong policy networks in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. By focusing on structural level variables and determinants it explains 
how many national NGOs and other advocacy groups are blocked from participating in 
policy making. The purpose is discover if certain structural impediments, namely 
institutional change and ad hoc law making, challenge or complicate traditional modes of 
lobbying and interest articulation.  
Chapter 3 looks at group development since the end of communism, focusing 
specifically on noticeable phases of contentious politics. Only at the very beginning of 
democratic transition did NGOs and interest groups have a real opportunity to influence 
policy. However as Schmitter cautions, there are longterm consequences associated with 
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a transition driven by societal stakeholders rather than political elites or institutionally 
embedded actors. 
Chapter 4 presents findings generated from a questionnaire distributed to NGOs 
in Poland and the Czech Republic. It also discusses laws pertaining to nonprofits and 
NGOs. A section of the chapter explores Poland’s relatively new 1% law, which enables 
tax payers to redirect up to 1% of their income tax to a registered Polish NGO. The 
majority of chapter 4 is dedicated to presenting and analyzing empirical results.  
Chapter 5 details the environmental movement in Poland and the Czech Republic 
arguing despite publicly stating their willingness to work alongside environmental 
interest groups (NGOS) successive governments have treated them with disdain. While 
relations between NGOs and ministries of the environment have improved since the mid 
1990s, there still exits a chasm between interest groups and environmental policy makers 
– survey data supports this idea. In large measure this is the result of lingering hostility 
between politicians and activists and the ideological clash which accompanies market and 
industrial sector expansion. The environment is once again of primary concern to EU 
lawmakers. 
Chapter 6 looks at the women’s sector. The primary task here is to look at how 
responsive the state has been to the NGO sectors various demands, including gender 
equality laws, free access to abortion and domestic violence laws. In this regard, the state 
has not been entirely helpful when it comes to women’s issues or the construction of a 
‘women’s rights’ policy community. Instead, the Polish government closed the equal 
opportunities plenipotentiary in Poland, and in the Czech Republic, government failed to 
enact a domestic violence law until February 2004, despite vigorous lobbying on the part 
of women’s NGOs. 
The first part of chapter 7 considers what the European Union will mean for post 
communist civil society and contentious politics. Much of it deals in hypotheticals 
because it was written just before Poland and the Czech Republic acceded to the Union. 
The second part looks at minority rights and the Roma NGOs. It concludes with an 
examination of coercive sterilization and ‘special’ schools for Romani children – both 
practices attracted the attention of European activists and lawmakers.   
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Group Politics in the Post-communist Era 
 
An open and constructive policy network is yet to emerge in either Poland or the Czech 
Republic. Interest groups have been unable to influence policy in any meaningful way. 
This condition stems more from state action than NGO inaction, as many groups have 
already attained a high level of professionalism and policy competency. Ost (1993) 
determines “so far the organization of civil society in the post-communist period has been 
surprisingly weak, while the state has maintained its strong position” (p.453) and its 
ability to establish the terms of contentious politics.  The fact that both Polish and Czech 
states are more powerful in terms of resources and policy influence than any one 
particular non-state actor or an interest sector should not come as a complete surprise22. 
However, when one considers state preponderance in the context of post-communist 
political society, a period that has been characterized by purposeful attempts to construct 
a multifarious civil society and dense advocacy networks, it becomes somewhat 
surprising that in spite of this bureaucrats and parliamentarians  wield as much political 
power as they do.  
In terms of what a policy is, Skocpol and Amenta (1986) write: “policies are lines 
of action pursued through states” (p.131). Lobbying must therefore be seen as an attempt 
by interest groups to influence state action. This is precisely why policy formulation and 
power are inexorably linked, Brookes argues, “public policy is whatever government 
chooses to do or not to do (…) policy, then, involves conscious choice that leads to 
deliberate action – the passage of a law, the spending of money, and official speech or 
gesture, or some other observable act – or inaction (p.12). Since the first days of 
transition the state has played a critical role in setting the tempo and scope of 
democratization along with defining the character and architecture of political 
institutions. Civil society or more precisely the third sector has been adversely affected 
                                                 
22
 The Czech regime, in particular, managed to usurp independent groups and disrupt dissident 
activity for thirty years. Groups did manage to form and samizdat publications managed to 
circulate. This is true. But the regime in Czechoslovakia was particularly successful in controlling 
political dissent (cf. Linz and Stepan 1996: 316-321).  
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by the pace of institutional and legislative change. Power dynamics in post-communist 
societies favour elites over interest groups, politicians over activists and formal inter-
party politics over the dynamism of group politics and lobbying. Political society, while 
not reverting back to how it was during communism, i.e. atomized and fragmented, it is 
decidedly elite driven. But this is in part due to the nature of pressure groups and 
organized interests, on the one hand, and the ethos of state building on the other. For as 
Newton and Van Deth (2005) caution: “if they [interest groups] become too powerful, 
and if they get too close to the top levels of government, they may ‘capture’ and control 
government policy in their own interests: (p. 174). It could be construed that the state 
building exercise stays on course when the power of potentially divisive pressure groups 
are mitigated. But at this stage the noticeable power imbalance between government 
(including state agencies) and the third sector is not necessarily the result of a state trying 
to secure itself from powerful lobbyists; rather it is a strategy to ensure state 
preponderance in key policy areas, namely economic development and market reform.  
Is it an exaggeration to say postcommunist civil society is dead or dying? Marc 
Morjé Howared’s study of civil society in Central Europe does conclude that civil society 
is, in fact, weak and underdeveloped. A neo-Tocquevillian like Robert Putnam would 
raise concern over such a situation. He and others who advance a ‘civil society’ thesis 
(one which posits a positive correlation between strong civil society and strong 
democracy) would assume Central European democracy is either floundering or a more 
autocratic variant. But a weak or fragmented civil society in a transitional or 
democratizing state is probably less of a concern than it would be in an established liberal 
democracy. In other words, a more rigid system of governance that places a premium on 
legislative and executive decision-making may actually benefit democracy development, 
in the long run. And if this state centric model of governance does not directly enhance 
participatory democracy it surely reinforces institutionalized politics and routine electoral 
politics. There is always a worry that if unelected, unaccountable and, undemocratic 
forces hijack the policy process, democracy becomes all but a sham. However, 
democracy suffers all the same if large segments of an electorate are unable to transmit 
their concerns to state officials outside election time. Trying to get this balance right, 
between formal and informal aspects of governance, is easier said than done.  
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In the most elementary of ways the third sector of any state is the sum of its parts. 
This means its vibrancy and effectiveness, i.e. its ability to interact with and influence 
policy makers, is largely contingent on the structure and function of the entire policy 
network. Therefore it should be recognized that no single variable can be used in 
isolation to discern the quality of a given civil society or the policy networks that exist 
within it. It may be entirely possible to look at individual-level participation and political 
efficacy (agency) to determine the relative ‘health’ of a state’s third sector, as the data 
should provide indication of general levels of volunteerism and associational 
membership. But the conclusions drawn from such data can in no way be used to draw 
inference about the effectiveness of the third sector or the states responsiveness to any 
particular segment of the interest community.  To understand the dynamics of contentious 
politics in post-communist societies one must look at the point of interchange between 
the third sector and state agencies. This usually occurs during the policymaking process 
or at points of contentious interaction between NGOs/interest groups and government. 
In the context of post transition state building it tends to be structural 
determinants that are most relevant and revealing when it comes to understanding state 
and elite behaviour vis-à-vis the policy community writ large. Political institutions and 
elite actors become far more prominent and influential in framing contentious politics 
during periods of sustained state building. In the absence of clusters of effective interest 
groups and lobbyists in each policy sector - to query proposed legislation - policy 
development and implementation becomes a state dominated process. The state’s 
autonomy is all but guaranteed in those policy areas where it alone can claim a monopoly 
over relevant information and expertise. This speaks volumes about the effectiveness of 
existing policy networks and the relative power of the state, to influence not just policy in 
general, but the way interest groups and the third sector operate. While written before the 
end of communism (1977) Cairn’s assumption has particular currency in the study of new 
democracies: 
The impact of society on government is a common theme  in the study of 
democratic politics. Less common is an approach which stresses the impact of 
government on the functioning of society (Cairns, 1977: 695). 
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The state will behave quite differently in an environment devoid of entrenched interests 
because it need not accommodate (or even appear to) the interests of competing political 
actors. The state then, by virtue of its privileged position in the area of policy creation is 
one of the most (if not the most) important actors. This is problematic for a variety of 
reason, but most notably because it undermines the activities of existing interest groups 
and the formation of new ones. If interest groups require opportunity (as the opportunity 
structure suggests) before they can act or publicly formulate their grievances, then limited 
access to policymakers must diminish their opportunities from the outset. As Burstein 
argues (1999) “social movement organizations and interest groups can influence policy, 
but this influence is strongly constrained by (…) limits on the ability of citizens and 
legislators to pay attention to many issues at the same time” (p.4). As focus has shifted 
away from the social requisites of democracy to the economic foundation of liberalism, 
so government priorities and the issues which have national salience have changed. 
Special interests or minority interests have taken a back seat to matters of ‘national 
importance’.   
If this discussion were directed at policy networks in established democracies the 
argument would not be entirely uncommon. Literature detailing the ‘embedded state’ or 
“the capacity of government to make society responsive to its demands” (Cairns, 1977) 
can easily be found within North American public policy literature (cf. Pal 1997).  What 
is novel about adapting this approach to the study of Polish and Czech group politics is 
precisely what it says and assumes about contentious politics in these two countries. First, 
because interest groups in both countries have had fifteen years to learn the rules of the 
democratic game, there is an assumption they should now be better equipped to lobby 
and perform functions common to interest groups in western democracies. And this is not 
yet the case. Second, considering both states have reached democratic stability (EU 
accession has otherwise confirmed this23), there is an assumption they should be 
                                                 
23
 EU membership provides a clear demarcation from the past or transition period. While Poland 
and the Czech Republic were considered liberal democratic before this, their ‘return to Europe’ 
became formalized on 1 May 2004. It is also worth mentioning that regular reports commissioned 
by the EU on Czech and Polish governance (before and after accession) opened their institutions 
up to outside scrutiny like never before. Thus EU membership confirms Poland and the Czech 
Republic as open democracies. But debate remains over the effectiveness or indeed the density of 
their respective civil societies. 
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investigated with heuristic devices designed with the modern liberal democracy in mind. 
One should really examine CEE politics with sensitivity to historical legacy and 
transition (democratization and liberalization). But this does not preclude an examination 
of state power and interest articulation, which may not be wholly affected by past modes 
of interest articulation. The realization that the policy community is chronically 
underdeveloped and government is purposefully excluding key public interest groups 
from policy formulation does not sit well with many academics and pundits, who may 
have once saw the mass movements of the 1980s as a hopeful start to a new kind of  
political system.  
The weakness of post-communist civil society is not due to an apathetic 
population, per se, or a lack of political sophistication on the part of NGOs. The 
weakness stems from a problem in political society, a disjunction between policy makers 
and stakeholders; between the state and third sector; and ultimately between the ethos of 
state building and the needs of participatory democracy. One could say interest groups 
are victims of circumstance, of a rapidly evolving and changing political environment 
that waits for no-one. However, it would be wrong to think the state is not an autonomous 
player with its own needs, wants and motivations. The state, like any other political actor, 
will pursue its preferences over the preferences articulated by others. Sometimes it is in 
the state’s best interest to accommodate or act favourably towards an interest group. As 
Dahl (1979) argues, “any transformation that provides opponents of the government with 
greater opportunities to translate their goals into policies enforced by the state caries with 
it the possibility of conflict with spokesmen [sic] for the individuals, groups, or interest 
they displace in the government” (p.15). Thus, it is in the best interest of government and 
state agents to minimize the effect competing interest have on policy formulation. This is 
especially true during regime transition, when interests are not well defined and 
delineated. While Linz and Stepan (1996) sought to investigate the relationship between a 
regime’s nondemocratic past and its democratic future (and the transition in-between), 
this dissertation will focus exclusively on how transition itself (state-building; 
institutional change; redistribution of power; constitution making, etc.), not the past per 
se, complicates ‘normal’ interest articulation in Poland and the Czech Republic.       
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The frustrations conveyed by interest group members in Poland and the Czech 
Republic are real and palpable. A representative from the Gender Studies Centre (Praha) 
in Prague was perplexed as to why it is exactly that government officials are unwilling to 
listen to the recommendations offered by her organization, especially when the creation 
of a robust interest community was at the heart of the government’s agenda in the early 
1990s. She also questioned the logic of a government which fails to incorporate women’s 
rights groups in the policy formulation process, especially when the legal status quo was 
clearly detrimental to women and mothers. The state has consistently opted to devise 
legislation without aid of interest groups and other interested parties.24  
Public policy, rather than emanating from the grassroots or an interest community 
is being constructed vis-à-vis a fragmented and unstable post-communist party system. In 
several critical policy areas (i.e., environment, women’s rights/gender equality, visible 
minority rights) the lack of rCEEptive and organized political actors, whether in the form 
of a political party or interest group, means the state can essentially ignore huge swaths of 
the interest community without fear of reprisal. There is a certain paternalism that exists 
in Poland and the Czech Republic in that the government is convinced they know what is 
best for the population and they alone determine which policy areas are of immediate 
concern. Far from being reciprocal, the relationship between the third sector and the state 
is one based on mutual distrust and resentment, with the state guarding its position 
against NGO incursion and interest groups unable to mount viable public campaigns in 
response. This situation is not unique to Poland and the Czech Republic however, for 
other governments in other parts of the world have been accused of similar indifference. 
But in the context of post-communism, the state’s inaction - in terms of being open to 
interest groups - can more easily be explained away as a necessary part of political 
transition. This is a result not of group malaise but of a state concerned with pushing 
forward particular policy objectives. 
Jiri Tutter, the executive director of Greenpeace Praha, supports the idea that 
policy formulation in the Czech Republic is state-directed. He believes the government 
(and the Czech Environment Ministry in particular) is prone to pretence and mendacity. 
                                                 
24
 Interview conducted with Lenka Simerska, senior member of the Gender Studies Centre o.p.s., 
in Prague 15 August 2003.  
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That is, it publicly proclaims a willingness to work with interest groups and then takes 
measures to hinder Greenpeace’s ability to respond directly to particular pieces of 
environmental legislation.25 Polish interest groups are, for different but equally valid 
reasons, finding it very difficult to organize in what can best be described as an 
asymmetrical policy community. Professor Wojciech Krawczuk – a former member of 
the Krakow Green ‘group’ – determined that the government “must change the mindset 
[of politicians] and the mechanisms [of interest articulation] in order to reinvigorate civil 
society”26 He also suggests nothing will change in Poland until a “suitably stable middle 
class emerges”.27 The problem is one of connectivity – between the state and the third 
sector - and therefore developing a robust interest group network without the state’s 
assistance is a highly unlikely proposition. Brock and Banting argue (2001) “it is perhaps 
not surprising that the relationship between the nonprofit sector and government is 
complex, combining exhilarating potential and perpetual wariness (p.1, emphasis added).  
The quotes offered at the beginning of this chapter point to a civil society in 
Poland and the Czech Republic without the structures needed to mount any serious 
opposition to government policy. Among the many structural and agential level 
impediments effecting interest group mobilization in these countries it appears the state 
itself has become a most challenging obstacle for public interest groups to navigate. 
Irrespective of the type of group or the protest repertoires used, the state remains 
impervious to lobbying conducted by prominent rights based interest groups. Their 
monopoly over policy development, communication and agenda setting is such that many 
of the Polish and Czech political elite (regardless of their party affiliation it would seem) 
operate with virtual immunity. That is, the civil society envisaged by Ernest Gellner 
(1994) which could and should counterbalance the coercive potential of the state, is so 
underdeveloped and disparate that it lacks both the legitimacy required to make a direct 
public appeals and the potency to challenge the government directly. This is the result of 
                                                 
25
 Interview conducted with Jiri Tutter, Greenpeace Executive Director, in Prague, 22 August 
2003. 
26
 Interview conducted with Dr Wojciech Krawczuk, Professor of Sociology Jagiellonean 
University (and former member of the Krakow Greens), in Krakow 17 July 2003. 
27
 Ibid 
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an ‘embedded state’ rather than a disinterested third sector. The traditional focus on 
agential level variables and civil society writ large tends to obscure this fact.  
Importantly, and this is unique to new democracies, without a ‘sober second 
thought’ from a well heeled opposition party or career bureaucrat, the state has the added 
advantage of being able to develop political institutions in an ad hoc fashion. The process 
of state building itself is an impediment that few scholars have recognized when 
discussing the weakness of post-communist civil society (see Howard 2003). Ongoing 
systemic and institutional developments mean political elites are far more likely to devise 
solutions to policy problems in isolation. Without the presences of a robust third sector, 
political elites, namely parliamentarians, senior bureaucrats and party functionaries, are 
free to negotiate and devise policy without the constraints traditionally imposed by an 
institutionalized policy community. With reference to the Czech case, Tucker (2000) 
argues  
The aftermath of the June 1998 election proved the  degree of freedom of action 
for Czech political elites in the absence of civil society. The outcome was  solely 
a matter of elite strategy. The competing political parties of ODS and the SD 
signed a so-called opposition agreement (p.239).  
 
Poland is not immune from such cavalier elite behaviour either. For a succession of 
governments have managed to ‘ignore’ or sideline numerous women’s rights groups over 
the issue of abortion – the government made abortion illegal except in circumstances of 
rape or when imminent health problems for expectant mothers and/or the unborn child 
are of concern. This law reverses a communist law which permitted publicly funded 
abortions for nearly 40 years. Far from being a neutral arbiter the state in both these 
instances is concerned with neutralizing political (policy) competition, both at the elite 
and third sector level. In the first instance, by overlooking significant ideological 
differences to form government, parties are ipso facto forming cartels, which have been 
duly noted as a proven way to keep power at the elite level. With reference to the Polish 
example, parties have successfully prevented alternative policy visions from entering the 
legislative process.  
State building coupled with insulated political elites severely limits the reach and 
effectiveness of interest groups, which are traditionally concerned with pinpointing the 
best ‘entrance points’ along the policy-making chain and developing the acquaintance of 
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those officials charged with drafting legislation in the first instance (i.e. bureaucrats, 
party executives, deputy ministers, and cabinet ministers). Some third sector 
organizations are inadvertently distancing themselves from the very policy makers they 
wish to influence. Western donors and agencies which fund civil society development in 
CEE are undermining the horizontal and vertical expansion of networks. As Mendelson 
(2002) argues, “the efforts to link local groups to Western networks has come at the cost 
of ties between like-minded groups and has diverted local groups’ attention from pressing 
local needs” (p.234).  
There is a noticeable gulf between the theory and practice of group politics and 
public policy development and between the theory and practice of interest aggregation 
and articulation in Poland and the Czech Republic. In theory both states are ‘liberal 
democracies’ with an established and inclusive policy making system, which is amenable 
to the wants and needs of interest groups and receptive to societal pressures. In practice 
however, it seems the state is both: a) not willing to accommodate, in any meaningful 
way, the proposals being tabled by women’s rights groups, environmentalists and visible 
minority organizations (i.e. Roma rights groups) and; b) preoccupied with securing their 
own position in an otherwise fragmented interest community.  
There is no reason whatsoever to assume those individuals in positions of power 
in new(er) democracies will be (or should be) any more accommodating to societal 
interests than their western European or North American counterparts. Most of what has 
happened since the transition period in terms of the rapid development of democratic 
institutions would actually suggest quite the opposite. Based on the policy and political 
actions of successive governments one is left with the impression that the dissident past 
has no bearing on the democratic present, except in the sense that the antagonisms that 
existed between the state and the population during the communist period exist in equal 
measure, but now in the form of traditional societal cleavages.        
In this regard, interests of state are an equally important consideration. Especially 
if one wants to determine the relative affect lobbyists and interest groups have on 
governmental business and public policy formulation. Considering the modern state, Pal 
(1995) argues: 
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The key consequence is that the state must bee seen as a nodal point in an 
increasing number of contemporary political conflicts. Its growing structural 
autonomy gives it and enhanced interest in shaping civil society and deliberately 
constructing and regulating the normative order (p.40) 
 
The central question, as Pal (1995) once opined “If the state were to fund interest 
organizations which, in the absence of that funding, either could not organize or would 
organize differently, would that not make a difference to the flow of political and social 
forces?” (p. 4). This question has particular relevance to post-communist group politics, 
considering most groups are finding it very difficult to find the funding necessary to 
sustain their activities. The kinds of groups that are now well established in western 
democracies are still struggling to find their way in the post-communist milieu. For 
example the state (and the various governments that have come and gone over the past 
fifteen years) has been largely preoccupied with state building.  These observations point 
to something unique about civil society development in post-communist states.  
First, interest groups, regardless of their form or function, are having a difficult 
time adapting to the rules of the democratic game. Irrespective of their level of funding, 
membership numbers or the cause they represent, interest groups are less likely to 
compete in the policy sphere than their western European of North American 
counterparts. Second, the state and political parties are doing little to foster the 
development of a robust third sector. This, as it will be discussed, is both the result of 
accident, in that state building has thus far been occurring in an ad hoc manner, and by 
design, in that particular government officials are acting in such a manner as to purposely 
thwart group development. Third, and most damaging for the nascent civil society of 
Poland and the Czech Republic and the fledgling groups therein, is the interchange 
between policy makers and interest groups is less reciprocal and more a public relations 
exercise orchestrated by government officials. The interplay between members of a 
legislature and representatives from interest groups is a barometer for measuring 
participatory democracy, and as it stands, the political status quo firmly favours political 
parties, institutions of the state, governments and the bureaucracy.    
 The idea of civil society, which is hardly new, gained particular currency during 
the last decade of the communist period. However it was after the transition period 
(1989-1991) that the idea of civil society started being applied to the revolutionary period 
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retrospectively, both as an explanatory frame (cf. Glenn, 2001) and an actual theory for 
the regime collapse and subsequent democratization (see Di Palma 1991; Smolar 1996). 
The problems is, neither Solidarity nor Civic Forum were truly acting as the vanguard of, 
or representing, civil society. Therefore, considering certain segments of the population 
were excluded from the round table negations, it would be better to analyze what 
transpired from the early 1980s in Poland and the Czech Republic to 1992 and beyond 
with a theory (see Olson 1992) that appreciates cleavages, power and interest articulation. 
It is the contention of this dissertation that civil society in Poland and the Czech Republic 
has never been robust and from the transition period until today many interest groups 
have been purposefully excluded from the policy making process. It is better, and 
ultimately more illuminating, to look at a few representative sectors from civil society 
(environment, women’s rights and Roma) to understand the weakness of the third sector 
in post-communist Poland and the Czech Republic. By starting with ‘civil society’ level 
analysis instead of looking at the conduct of the state and particular groups, one is more 
likely to miss the idiosyncrasies that frame contentious politics and collective action. 
In North America and Europe academics have long discussed group politics, 
interest groups and policy networks without mention of civil society. Some of the most 
influential textbooks on interest group development and activity do not even mention 
civil society – or civic society (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Pal 1993; Pross 1992). 
This dissertation will look closely at group politics in both Poland and the Czech 
Republic with a critical eye on how the idea of civil society, calling attention to instances 
when it is being misused and misappropriated. 
It is also important to understand that the post-communist state is neither idle nor 
without favourites. As Baumgartner and Leech (1998) argue “the state is not a captive of 
economic groups, its autonomy is based on unique sources of power, on the capacities 
and will of state officials. . . the result is a policy process driven by the logic of the state 
itself”28 (p. 31). It therefore does little good to focus on the third sector, or even particular 
interest groups without examining the totality of the policy process and state bias. 
Consequently this dissertation is concerned primarily with that area of a polity where the 
state (policy areas, agencies, departments etc.) and the third sector (NGOs, not for profit 
                                                 
28
 Italics added by this author 
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organizations, social movements) intersect. The concern is with the architecture of policy 
communities and networks in Poland and the Czech Republic – their function and form - 
and the relative influence of the state in determining the terms and conditions of 
contentious politics.  
Synonymous with dissidence itself, civil society is now often discussed and 
mentioned alongside the associations which actively challenged the communist state. No 
distinction is made between civil society, Solidarity, Charter 77, or Civic Forum and, 
sometimes civil society alone is presented as the cause of the 1989 revolutions 
themselves. However remarkable the events of 1989 were, and however impressive the 
actions taken by dissidents might have been, it is not accurate to say civil society led to 
the demise of the communist system.  It is simply wrong to identify civil society as the 
catalyst for the popular protest that occurred in the streets of Prague in 1989 or the strikes 
that swept Poland in the early 1980s. When this is understood, it becomes much easier to 
reconcile the weakness of post-communist civil society with what occurred during the 
last days of the communist system. That is there is no real correlation between the two. 
Pre 1989, the transition period (1989-1991) and the post-communist period are very 
much different and distinct phases, with interest groups and the state exhibiting 
characteristics unique to those phases. 
The groups that sought to bring about political change during the communist 
period were not typical civil society organizations. This is not at all surprising 
considering the state’s dominant position in communist society, controlling most if not all 
associations and organizations (from sports teams to orchestras, from universities to the 
media) and usurping all those it could not control. Ultimately independent associations 
and dissident groups had a very limited political opportunity structure from which to 
draw upon and hence they could only work within a tightly controlled ‘autonomous’ 
sphere. When one examines how groups like Solidarity and/or Charter 77 organized and 
the environment they found themselves, it becomes apparent the traditional 
understanding (or definition) of civil society has little application (or relevance).  
Civil society is an area of a democratic polity where autonomous associations 
compete for members, recognition (by government), money and attention (by media) and 
generally only represent a thin wedge of the policy spectrum. The difficulty in analyzing 
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communist era groups with what is essentially an idea couched in liberal democratic 
theory, is one is constantly searching for ways to compare apples and oranges. In this 
case the apples are dissident groups and the oranges are western-styled pressure groups or 
voluntary organizations. Civil society did not emerge until after the collapse of 
communism in 1989, before then the area between family and state was not an open and 
competitive sphere. It is competition, between sub-state actors and between these actors 
and the state, which characterizes a civil society.   
In the Polish instance it was the trade union Solidarity, displaying the 
characteristics of a mass party rather than those of an interest group, which managed to 
negotiate for semi free elections with the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). This 
needs qualification. Solidarity, while being a mass protest movement, social movement 
and trade union, had to reconcile several competing strategies and theories of dissidence, 
which were being articulated by several discrete internal factions. As a mass party might 
do, Solidarity had to carefully steer through disparate groupings of intellectuals, 
academics, workers and farmers etc., to arrive at a political mission statement that would 
not alienate any of its membership. As it happened, the movement was primarily 
concerned with interest aggregation, not articulation, and as a result offered a broad 
normative solution to Poland’s political and economic problems. But importantly, as Ost 
(1990) argues, Solidarity struggled to reconcile its normative core with the reality of 
politics (inc. dealing with the state), but ultimately it had to change tack to become an 
active party:  
In practice, this meant that once Solidarity existed, the question of the state has to 
be confronted. But at that point Solidarity was unprepared, because its ideological 
origins had counseled bypassing the state. The program that was ‘ingenious’ in 
one epoch became irrelevant the moment it succeeded (p.57). 
 
Charter 77, the Czech equivalent (though vastly different in terms of structure and 
power), could not operate like a political party, trade union or even a social movement. 
The Chartists knew what was possible and what they could achieve in a ‘frozen post 
totalitarian’ (Linz and Stepan 1992) system, and hence kept their activities modest. Here 
to, no evidence of a traditional interest group or social movement can be found. Charter 
77 was not pursuing one particular issue but publicizing the state’s inability to honour 
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and indeed enforce its own human rights laws – including laws pertaining to the Roma. 
The Chartists realized  “ a revolutionary overthrow or radical change of the state or its 
social basis for power was out of the question; this was forcibly demonstrated to 
independent and reformist party activists by the experiences in Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968” (Weigle and Butterfield, 1992: 8). Thus their activities were 
self-limiting from the outset.   
During the late 1970s and 80s, civil society as a concept with antiauthoritarian 
potential was being discussed by academics in the context of East European dissidence 
(cf. Skilling, 1981). In this way, civil society had been linked to communist era 
dissidence from the time of Charter 77 and Solidarity (and even KOR), but it did not 
become a ‘theory’ of regime collapse until after the transition period. The pace with 
which the transition occurred came as a surprise to many and the scholarship of that 
period seemed most willing to support the civil society argument. However Musil (1994) 
suggests “a paradoxical side effect of the smooth, non-violent take-over of power by the 
democratic forces (…) was the creation of the illusion that the transformation of society 
from real socialism to democracy would be relatively easy” (p.177). As we now know the 
transition to and consolidation of democracy has created both winners and losers. 
Up until 1989 the communist regimes of Poland and Czechoslovakia had 
managed to control most dissident activity and the nomenklatura seemed well positioned 
to quash any popular movements or ‘counter revolutions’.  Now that some fifteen years 
has passed since the round table talks, it is possible to look back at the 1980s, the 
transition period and the early phases of democratization, with a more skeptical and 
discerning eye. It is also now possible to apply theories of collective action and group 
politics to these distinct political and sociological phases. 
To a certain extent what was being presented by academics and those with a 
particular interest in CEE democratization was a rather romanticized version of how the 
events of 1989 transpired and ultimately what it was that led to the collapse of 
communism. Aleksander Smolar (1996) for example argues “the peaceful revolutions of 
1989 in Central and Eastern Europe were carried out in the name of civil society” (p.24). 
There is some truth to what Smolar argues, but only if one is to accept a very broad and 
normative understanding of civil society. However, the concern today is that by assigning 
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too much responsibility to civil society, in effect overemphasizing the role played by 
dissident groups and ‘civil society’ on the whole, one might be confounded by the present 
state of civil society and the voluntary sector.     
Civil society (of the type advanced by Alexis de Tocqueville and Robert Putnam) 
was most often discussed and analyzed by Polish and Czech dissidents in normative 
terms alone. But within a few years of the actual transition period, when democracy 
started to take shape and the old communist era institutions were replaced with new 
liberal inspired ones, it seemed many academics (and those who aspire to understand the 
revolutions of 1989) grew convinced that civil society, and civil society alone, served as 
the catalyst which ultimately sparked the popular discord of 1989. The question arises: 
How could civil society, which is after all just a normative assertion about the way a 
polity ‘ought’ to be organized, have developed into such a powerful symbol for political 
and social change? It is surprising that such an ambiguous term, one that has been a part 
of popular political lexicon for almost two hundred years (excluding pre Enlightenment 
philosophers), has come to represent pre 1989 dissidence as it has.  
Remembering that civil society is neither a political ideology nor an idea with 
inherent revolutionary appeal, it is sometimes hard to accept that it managed to topple 
what was an enduring political and economic system. It still seems odd to speak of 
communism in the past tense. However, before civil society can be isolated and credited 
with the sparking off the revolutions of 1989, it is important to consider why Solidarity 
and Charter 77, in particular, are thought to encapsulate (and represent) the whole of civil 
society. What becomes apparent is the weakness of contemporary civil society in Poland 
and the Czech Republic is directly related to how democracy was introduced and the new 
institutions developed.  
A THEORY OF GROUP POLITICS 
The idea of civil society, which is generally referred to as a space within a polity 
comprised of self organizing autonomous associations or groups, tends to confuse if not 
misrepresent the very idea of interest politics. The whole in this instance is not the sum of 
its parts. For unlike the civil society envisaged by Gellner (1994) or de Tocqueville, 
modern civil society is tantamount to competition between interests and also between 
organized interests and the state. An interest group community is best understood as: 
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a) A competitive arena where “in some measure, every political interest is and must 
be ‘intolerant’ of its opponents (Pal 1995:9); 
b) A dynamic sphere that characteristically reacts to rather than initiates public 
policy. Baumgarnter and Leech argue for instance: “if interest groups must cope 
with a variety of political contexts, then their answers regarding which lobbying 
strategies they adopt will certainly depend on that context” (p. 166); 
c) An area of a polity with an asymmetrical distribution of power. That is, civil 
society groups are hostage to public opinion and government policy. Some 
groups will see their popularity increase along with their relative power, as others 
will experience unfavourable public perception. Defining the role of pressure 
groups, Pross (1992) contends “pressure groups focus on the special interests of a 
few, a restricted role that permits them to complement rather than to rival 
political parties in the process of political communication. Any power pressure 
groups do exert is delegated to them by government and is narrowly defined” 
(p.4).29  
 
This dissertation is predicated on a particular view of civil society, and it is therefore 
crucial to comment on how civil society will be understood and interpreted. The surest 
way to clear up any misunderstandings is to spend time detailing what civil society is not. 
The arguments presented here assume two things about post-communist civil society, 
which challenge the tenets of more prominent or mainstream interpretations of civil 
society and the groups which inhabit it. They are as follows: 
First, civil society is not a harmonious sphere of like-minded individuals with 
virtuous or even liberal inspired intentions. There is rarely a single common incentive 
that would inspire groups to work collectively to solve a policy dilemma. It is precisely 
the dynamism of civil society that makes it prone to competition, corruption and 
                                                 
29
 Emphasis added. It should also be said, in the post-communist political context, political parties 
are themselves still trying to come to terms with their obligations and responsibilities. Some 
political parties, most notably the ODS, do not view civil society as a complementary sphere – in 
fact, they consider it potentially dangerous to institutionalized politics. 
 53  
contestation, and also enables a stable actor (the state in this instance) to drive a wedge 
between interest groups and other political actors.  
Second, civil society is not an autonomous sphere that exists beyond or parallel to 
the state. It can neither ignore nor avoid the tremendous influence exerted by a state 
during times of institutional building and/or development. While a particular nexus has 
always existed and will continue to exist between civil society and the state, the state in 
new democracies has an enormous organizational and resource advantage.     
Third, neither in Poland nor Czechoslovakia did civil society ‘overthrow’ the 
Communist Party. While Solidarity was a prominent pseudo social movement30 in the 
1980s, and KOR managed to exert a degree of pressure on PUWP in the 1970s, to say it 
was civil society that forced the regime to capitulate is to say civil society was united, 
without dissention, and spoke with one normative voice. It is widely accepted now that 
Poland’s Solidarity movement was comprises of many factions. Certainly it was a force 
for change, but ostensibly it was a collection of workers, intellectuals and dissatisfied 
party members who wanted a more liberal socialist political system. This is confirmed 
when all these factions went their separate ways as soon as real political competition 
began in 1990, leaving only the carcass of Solidarity intact (cf. Ekiert, 1996; Ash, 1999; 
Ost 1990; Michnik 1998). It was Solidarity and Civic Forum respectively, at that point 
two visibly political organizations, which negotiated a peaceful transition from 
communism to democracy, not civil society as such.  
Finally, civil society has not developed at the same rate as post-communist state 
institutions and the economy have. These were the state’s priorities at transition and 
continued to be throughout democratization. Critically, what Dahl says in Polyarchy 
(1979) about democratic transition has application here. He writes “the two processes – 
democratization and the development of public opposition – are not, in my view 
identical” (p.1). What this means is state institutions can develop, take on all the 
                                                 
30
 I say pseudo because Solidarity does not easily fit the standard definition of a social movement 
or new social movement. It was far too large and encompassing to speak on behalf of a discrete 
constituency. Also, with its root in trade unionism, Solidarity was a hybrid organization: certain 
attributes were those of a social movement, yet others were those of a more formal political 
organization. 
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attributes of a liberal democracy, while the third remains underdeveloped, fragmented 
and without adequate recourse to the policy process. 
 
THE STATE 
Much has been said in relative terms about the decreasing power of the modern state. 
This commentary tends to be rooted in the belief that globalization and new forms of 
regionalism (i.e., the European Union) are supplanting certain areas once firmly 
controlled by state legislatures. As Susan Strange (1996) suggests, the ‘the diffusion of 
power in the world economy’ has diminished the potency of states and created a host of 
new, sometimes very powerful, international/transnational/supranational actors. The role 
of the state has changed significantly over the last hundred years. From the so-called 
‘night watchman’ state of the 19th century to the welfare state of today, it has developed 
in both size and complexity to occupy a central role in many areas once denoted as 
‘private’ or contained within the rubric of civil society. Barany (2002) captures the 
function of modern states succinctly: 
The regime type (in other words, the category or class of political system) is the 
primary determinant of the minority policies of particular states (…) This 
explanation privileges structural-institutional variables having to do with the 
organization and logic of state power and suggests that extraneous factors (such as 
the size of a given minority or the attitudes of the state’s population toward the 
marginal group) are not important determinants of policy (p.4). 
 
Far from being politically weak or losing prominence CEE states are more powerful 
today, in both their ability to set the political agenda and limit interest group influence, 
than one might imagine. Consequently, this dissertation will consider the post-communist 
state as having: 
 
1. Inherited a population with little to no experience organizing, developing or 
running interest groups, which in western democracies are important political 
watchdogs and/or policy advocates; 
2. Maintained its power over society, as many dissident groups dissolved 
immediately after (and sometimes before) the first democratic elections. Other 
 55  
than the Polish Catholic Church, the state remains the only organization with 
institutional roots in communism;  
3. Secured its power through EU accession and subsequently the acquis 
communautaire. The EU process provided political elites in Poland and the 
Czech Republic with nCEEssary political leverage to determine huge swaths of 
public policy without formal (or even informal) public consultation; 
4. Developed institutions (and closed others) which enhance the role (and power) of 
political parties and elite level ‘deal making’ while limiting the influence of sub 
state actors and trade unions.  
 
Thus this dissertation is premised on a very specific interpretation/understanding of the 
structure and function of the state in Poland and the Czech Republic. The argument, 
while appreciating the role agency played (individualistic voluntary actions) in bringing 
about the demise of the communist regimes of Poland and Czechoslovakia and the 
subsequent pattern of democratization, is concerned more with how structural variables 
(non-voluntary) are shaping political contention. This is not to say the actions of 
individual politicians and/or policy advocates or political activists are not important 
considerations when studying interest group activity and public policy, just that the focus 
here is biased towards institutional determinants.  
The character and function of the state has changed profoundly since the 
communist period. But in Poland and the Czech Republic, two of the more successful 
transition state, certain ‘past practices’ have found their way into contemporary politics 
and political discourse. For instance, it was through coercion and appropriation that the 
Communist state managed to usurp most organized interests. Today, while the state does 
not rely on coercion to silence political dissent, it does exercise enormous political 
power. As Ziolkowski (1998) argues, “one of the paradoxes of the post-communist 
development is the enormous role of the new political authorities in both the political and 
economic transformation. In the political sphere new political incumbents are responsible 
not only for the resolution of current problems of ‘normal politics’ but also for the 
definition of new rules of the game, which  make up the institutional framework of the 
‘regime’ (p.121). The intention of this short section is to detail the functional changes in 
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the state third sector relationship: from pre transition to post consolidation. I will also 
explain why Poland and the Czech Republic have been selected for this comparative 
study of post-communist interest politics, when they clearly are the two most successful 
post-communist states in the region. 
Both Czechoslovakia and Poland arrived at democracy with the help of organized 
opposition, stemming as it were from civil society – a sphere in competition with the 
state. In Poland it was Solidarity, a ten million member strong trade union that pushed the 
issue of political and economic reform until the state capitulated and Solidarity’s 
demands for semi free election came true 4 June 1989. Solidarity developed into a nation-
wide network with offices throughout Poland, which were there to service the political 
and subsistence needs of its membership. The Polish Catholic church was a part of this 
dissident network as well, and on many occasion provided safe haven to Solidarity 
members. It was a highly effective organization that garnered attention from international 
media and governments throughout the world. Unlike the dissident movement in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland’s was far more tangible and recognizably political – as it had a 
discrete political organization speaking on behalf of a large discrete segment of the 
population. Although some, like Ost (1990), see Solidarity as a highly evolved (post 
modern) organization which “embraces civil society and pluralism, and freely 
appropriates from different spheres: the right, the left, the Catholic Church” (Ost 1991: 
16), I regard it in functional terms a having been a potent substate actor.    
In Czechoslovakia Charter 77 formed (and published its Charter) in response to 
the Communist Parties inability (or unwillingness) to meet its own articulated human 
rights obligations under the Helsinki Agreements. The Chartists publicly challenged 
Czech and Slovak leaders to honour all international agreements they had signed 
pertaining to political freedoms and civil rights. In this way the Chartists were operating 
within the limits of Czech law (cf. Wolchik 1991: 153; Palous 1991: 124; Skilling 1981 
and 1991) while offering effective moral opposition to state socialism.  However, many 
Chartists were arrested, detained, imprisoned, demoted or stripped of their professional 
qualifications and pestered by the StB (Statni bezpecnost: secret police). In this way, 
what they were doing was political, however not as explicitly political as the strikes and 
public demonstrations orchestrated by Solidarity in the early 1980s (cf. Ruane, 1982).  
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The architecture of each dissident movement was largely contingent on the character of 
the regime. Kullberg (2001) argues “the institutions and rules of the game of the party-
state had profound effects on the structure of society and the rationality of groups and 
individuals outside the state (p. 10). In a similar way (though at an entirely different 
scale) communist society was fragmented into smaller groupings and segmented along 
political and social lines. In Czechoslovakia, this meant Charter 77 would remain small 
and localized in Prague, while in Poland, with aid of established trade union 
communication networks, Solidarity could emerge with national appeal and reach. 
The protest repertoires of Solidarity and Charter 77, along with those of other 
dissident groups not under discussion here, e.g. VONS and KOR, were largely a 
reflection of regime type or the functionality of the state. That is, the sorts of actions 
taken by dissident groups were influenced by what the state would and would not 
tolerate, in terms of public dissent and overall disruption to production and society. Even 
though Chartists and Solidarity members – and this was a point of internal contention – 
sought to establish a parallel polis (Michnik 1988: 104) or the conditions which would 
permit them to ‘live in truth’ (Havel 1991: 169) they had to deal with the political reality 
of the day, and thus they could not ignore the state (cf. Ost 1991; Ash 1999). 
Much of what has been written about Polish and Czech opposition movements 
focuses on the conduct of dissidents; the internal dynamics of dissident groups; dissident 
philosophy, and; the development of post-communist civil society (including the impact 
of a communist legacy on contemporary political and civil society). Less time has been 
spent on investigating how decisions taken by the state, sometimes in a strikingly 
autonomous way, impact the third sector and its further (and future) development. During 
the communist period the state was powerful in a straightforward way, as it drew its 
legitimacy from Marxist-Leninist ideology and exercised a near monopoly on political 
communication – not to mention a monopoly on coercive force. No question the state, 
particularly the Polish state, paid attention to public sentiment and gauged their economic 
policies accordingly. But its actions indicate it was not concerned with public opinion in 
the same way governments in Western democracies are.  It was a bit like déjà vu then 
when the Polish government recently closed the Plenipotentiary on the Equal Status of 
Women and Men without consulting any of the stakeholders. It implies a) the power of 
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the state has not abated, and b) the women’s sector and the Parliamentary Women’s 
Group (PGK) have no institutional recourse to fight this move.  Yes, many groups 
publicly decried the Plenipotentiary’s closure, but none was powerful enough – nor the 
women’s network suitably established - to challenge the government’s “new” policy 
programme or the way they went about instituting it.  
 
THE STATE IN OPPOSITION 
The state was targeted by dissident groups during the communist period and consequently 
characterized as the enemy or villain. The state was subjugating independent associations 
and civil society to further the Party’s ends. This prompted dissidents to evoke national 
symbols and national mythology in their struggle against the Communist regime. In 
Poland, Glenn (2001) argues “Solidarity sought to identify itself (as all participants in the 
election did) as the representatives of the national legacy, invoking the historical 
association of society and the nation against the state” (p.106). Ash contends “if 
nationalism means love of country and a desire to see that country free from foreign 
domination then it cannot be denied that the whole of Solidarity was rabidly nationalist” 
(2002:323).  This sort of nationalistic vein ran through Czech dissidence as well. For as 
Holy points out, symbolic action was an important part of dissident mobilization. For 
example:  
All of the demonstrations started in Wenceslas Square, with participants 
assembling near the equestrian statue of Saint Wenceslas and attempting to march 
from there to the Old Town Square, with its monument to Jan Hus. The final 
destination was Hradcany Castle across the river, but no demonstration managed 
to reach it. All of these standard venues are redolent with nationalist connotations 
(1996: 34).  
 
The state was not considered a partner of society nor a wholly legitimate actor as it was 
associated with Soviet ideology and thus an imposition. Because the state was not ‘part of 
society,’ dissidents developed the idea of a parallel society or parallel polis that would 
enable them to carve out their own liberated niche in an otherwise state dominated 
society. Therefore, this period (the Communist period) saw a society alienated from the 
state and government, a working class frustrated with economic policy, an intellectual 
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class pondering the merits of a civil society and, a clear line demarcating the ‘us’ from 
the ‘them.’ In Poland this was straightforward, as Karpinski suggests 
The terms ‘dissent’ and ‘dissidents,’ which evoke images of a small network of 
isolated individuals working in an indifferent or even hostile environment, seem 
to be particularly inadequate for describing intellectual and other opposition in 
Poland. A hallmark of contemporary Polish [c.1987] reality is the existence of a 
civil society, that is, of extensive groups and networks organized independently of 
the authorities, despite the strivings by Poland’s rulers to impose their own, 
totalitarian, model of social organization (1987: 44). 
 
In Czechoslovakia, a disjuncture between the populatoin and the Communist 
Party was the result of the 1968 Soviet invasion, which subsequently led to the removal 
of Aleksander Dubček as Party leader and several years of normalization.  Normalization 
was a policy designed to reestablish the state as the locus of political and social activity, 
which had not been the case during Prague Spring when a more pluralistic socialism - 
socialism with a human face – gave rise to non-state sanctioned autonomous 
organizations. Ash (1989) describes the process of normalization this way: 
Forgetting is the key to the so-called normalization of Czechoslovakia. In effect, 
the regime has said to the people: forget 1968. Forget your democratic traditions. 
Forget you were once citizens with rights and duties. Forget politics. In return we 
give you a comfortable life (…) We don’t ask you to believe in us or our fatuous 
ideology. All we ask is that you will outwardly and publicly conform (p.62). 
 
Dissidents could thus regard the state as being a Soviet imposition rather than something 
of their own creation, which meant it could be viewed as an illegitimate regime and one 
that did not speak on behalf of or represent Czechs. 
 
THE STATE IN TRANSITION 
The problem of institution building arose immediately after the collapse of communist 
power in 1989, when the old vertical power arrangement had to be quickly replaced with 
a horizontal, open and democratic, one. Both Polish and Czech opposition groups, then 
Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland, entered into negotiations with 
the Party to implement an exchange of power and to set the terms of democratization. 
This pacted transition, as Linz and Stepan (1996) call it, or roundtable, preserved order 
and ensured the democratization process could go forward without serious interruption by 
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the Party faithful. Ultimately it prevented the kind of violence that best Romania’s 
revolution. However exhilarating the process was, considering dissidents groups had won 
the right to construct the ensuing political order according to their vision, it did not 
benefit third sector development. Welsh argues 
Transitions are elite centered. Independent of whether regime change has been 
initiated from above by political elites or from below by the masses, the terms of 
transitions are settled by emerging elites, not by the public. Mass mobilization is 
short lived; demobilization and retreat to the private sphere follow (1994:382). 
 
In this way interest groups were unable to take advantage of the euphoria, because as 
soon as the terms of transition were established it was the political elites (insiders) that 
determined policy and institutional reforms, not dissidents, and not leaders from the third 
sector. Even those dissident that rose to prominence, like Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, 
were immediately constrained by new constitutions and new legislative arrangements, 
which in Czechoslovakia favoured smaller parties and independent candidates, opposed 
to Civic Forum (Elster et al. 1998: 115). In Poland the powers of president were limited 
from the outset and former communists, “reconstituted as Social Democrats and by 1991 
renamed the Democratic Left Alliance, with one of the largest memberships (150 000) of 
any party” (Dryzek and Holmes, 2002: 227) were still active and organized.  
 
CONSOLIDATION 
Consolidation is when the rules and practices of democracy are accepted by most if not 
all political actors and rule of law is recognized as the cornerstone of the system. Linz 
and Stepan suggest the following, which has become the definitional standard: 
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached 
about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government 
comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this 
government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the 
executive, legislature and judicial power generated by the new democracy does 
not have to share power with other bodies de jure (1996:3) 
 
This is a helpful standard but is based on the transition paradigm, which would 
presuppose movement on a continuum from point (a), authoritarianism or totalitarianism, 
to point (b), liberal democracy (cf. Caruthers 2002). Linz and Stepan acknowledge that 
liberalization and democratization are two different but certainly complimentary 
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processes. But their seemingly low threshold for what constitutes a consolidated 
democracy means democracy can exist accordingly without the presence of any 
substantial and fixed third sector – with ability to mitigate state power. Schneider and 
Schmitter offer a more robust definition: 
Regime consolidation consists in transforming the accidental arrangements, 
prudential norms and contingent solutions that have emerged during the uncertain 
struggles of the transition into institutions, that is, into relationships that are 
reliably known, regularly practiced and normatively accepted by those persons or 
collectivities defined as the participants/citizens/subjects of such institutions; and 
is such a way that the ensuing channels of access, patters of inclusion, resources 
for action, and norms about decisions making conform to one overriding standard: 
that of citizenship (2004: 62) 
 
Though Schneider and Schmitter’s definition emphasizes the importance of a democratic 
political cultural, they are in agreement with Linz and Stepan in determining 
representative political institutions are critical components of any consolidated 
democracy. It is thus reliability, regularity and consistency that set a consolidated 
democracy apart from non consolidated democracy, or semi-authoritarian regime, and not 
just an election or political agreement between rival elites. What is useful about 
Schneider and Schmitter’s definition is that is focuses on access to institutions and 
‘patterns of inclusion’, which emphasizes the need for accepted patterns of interest 
articulation between the state and non-state actors. It thus becomes an important 
precondition of full consolidation to have recognized patterns of contentious politics and 
a state that provides citizens with access to policy makers and legislators. As I will argue, 
the state has prioritized institutions over policy networks and as a result many groups are 
without adequate access to ministries and/or policy makers.  
First, Poland had a tradition of dissidence dating back to the 1950, evolving into a 
more concrete form with KOR (Workers Defence Committee) and ending with 
Solidarity. Autonomous associations (the Polish Catholic Church) and privately owned 
farms made Poland a unique case amongst ECE states. Also, the intelligentsia worked 
closely with the working class, manifest in the development of Solidarity from KOR, 
which enabled the trade union Solidarity to become a legitimate oppositional force. In 
this way Poland must be regarded has having the embryo of ‘normal’ democratic civil 
society well before Czechoslovakia. In stark contrast to this, independent activity in 
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Czechoslovakia was limited. Jan Urban, a leader of Civic Forum wrote in 1968 “about a 
half a million Party members were purged and about 800 000 lost their jobs. From that 
moment on, the CPCz (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) established itself in 
opposition to the nationalist and humanist forces within society (…)This party could no 
longer reform” (see Linz and Stepan  1996: 318 notes). 
Second, Czechoslovakia’s democratic reforms were spurred by sustained mass 
protest in Prague, and not as had been the case in Poland, by a clearly visible opposition 
movement. The roundtable in Poland started the transition to democracy whereas the 
negotiations in Czechoslovakia came after the regime capitulated (cf. Linz and Stepan 
1996: 316). The Czech roundtable strongly favoured Civic Forum as the CPCz was in no 
position to negotiate, only to assist Civic Forum with determining the formal aspects of 
transition. As Stokes (1997) points out,  
One of the most useful functions the roundtables performed was simply to initiate 
the process of discussion. The talks themselves created a consensus for change 
that had been lacking earlier. Negotiators in Poland and Czechoslovakia entered 
discussions with hostile feelings toward each other and emerged with a new sense 
of community. The party reformers and opposition negotiators became “we,” 
whereas the nomenklatura and more extreme elements of the opposition became 
“they” (Stokes 1997).  
 
This cemented the ‘society versus state’ sentiment that had once served as a catalyst for 
dissident activity throughout the 1980s and would help citizens separate the past from the 
democratic present and future. In this way, Poland’s transition to democracy was initiated 
by Solidarity and not the people, per se. 
Third, in Poland and the Czech Republic NGOs are not fully incorporated into the 
policy making process, even though environmental policy, gender equity policy 
(especially relating to domestic violence laws) and human rights policy was to be created 
and codified during the transition period. It is customary during constitution-making to 
include major societal stakeholders, or groups representing their interests, for sake of 
more representative and equitable laws pertaining to minority groups31. This was not the 
                                                 
31
 In Canada for example, when the Trudeau government (c.1981) decided to patriate the 
constitution governing Canada, they created a host of consultative bodies which enabled women’s 
groups, representatives from the aboriginal community and other interested parties to have 
standing during the creation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Czech and Polish 
interest groups were not included in their respective constitutional processes. 
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case in either Poland or the Czech Republic and as a result many laws pertaining to equal 
rights, hiring equity, sustainable development, minority rights, were only developed after 
EU accession negotiations began. Groups in both countries, regardless of each state’s 
history of dissidence, seemed to be starting anew after democratic transition. One reason 
for this was the sheer pace with which a new constitution was formulated for the Czech 
Republic. As Osiatynski (1997) suggests, “Passage of a constitution is easiest when a 
new state is being born, because at that moment there is a general drive to be grounded on 
some foundation. After 1989 in Czechoslovakia, the main political forces could not agree 
on a new constitution. But immediately following the decision to divide the country, both 
Czechs and Slovaks prepared their constitutions in record time, in only a few months” 
(East European Constitutional Review – online). Osiatynski, who took part in the 
Constitution process in Poland, offers yet another reason for such a limited consultative 
process:  
I believed that after the various politicians had reached an agreement among 
themselves on the text of the constitution, they would together persuade society to 
accept it. Today, I am a little wiser. I know that a majority of politicians will use 
every available opportunity for enhancing their political careers or for securing 
some other personal benefits. They have no desire to educate the public, and the 
arrogance stemming from the possession of an elected office, a "democratic 
mandate," makes many of them incapable of learning. In a particular way, this is 
confirmed by the history of failures accompanying the drafting process (EECR 
1997). 
 
Both in Poland and the Czech Republic, the constitution process favoured elite level 
negotiations and bargaining rather than a more open and civil society oriented (or 
inclusive) consultative approach. This was permitted even though former dissidents, 
particularly Havel and several Solidarity leaders, envisaged a new style of post-
communist democracy that would rely more on civil society and informal interest 
articulation than on a traditional parliamentary system in which political parties have 
almost exclusive jurisdiction over decision making (cf. Osiatynski 1997).  
Fourth, As Offe argues “The purposive, administered, state-orchestrated, elitist, 
and instrumental “shortcut” towards Western institutions adopted in the East was, to be 
sure, without any feasible alternative, given the way in which the ancien régime collapsed 
and left behind unprepared and profoundly divided societies” (EECR 1997). This point is 
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critical to the comparison of Poland and the Czech Republic. For unlike other democratic 
‘revolutions’, where war and conflict provided for a coherent break from the past, ECE 
transitions grew out of past institutions and past practices. Without a tradition of real 
pluralism and policy networking, the top-down model of decision making (albeit 
supplemented with political bargaining between rival political factions in both Poland 
and the Czech Republic) was successfully carried over to new democratic institutions. 
Why this is important is twofold. First, it means both states under study here are having 
to deal with a legacy of state socialism in both an institutional as well as a psychological 
sense. Second, the transitions to democracy in both states, again, irrespective of dissident 
traditions, has been shaped by elitist compromise and bargaining rather than the dissident 
ethos that sought a more open and consensus-driven political process. 
  
INTEREST SECTORS 
The last three chapters of this dissertation concern three specific constituencies: women,   
environmentalists and Roma. Instead of focusing on trade unions, guilds or professional 
associations, I thought it would be more revealing, in terms of understanding how interest 
groups are viewed by the state, to examine groups that had little if any standing during 
the communist period. Whereas environmentalists lobbied the state during the communist 
period by assuming the guise of an ecological club, which was well within the limits of 
accepted political activity, other sectors, namely women and visible minority groups had 
little opportunity to form coherent associations. All of the latter two sectors mobilization 
would come after 1989 when the state was quickly moving to adopt market liberalism 
and rational bureaucratic model of politics. 
These three sectors have the most to gain, in the sense they were not well defined 
prior to 1989, but also they have the most to lose, as they have been the recipients of 
Western aid and European Union funds since they began to form during the transition 
period. The laws which correspond to these sectors fall under EU competency, which 
means Roma groups, women’s rights groups and/or feminist organizations and 
environmental groups are having to figure out the EU policy rubric as they continue to 
find ways to influence domestic-level public policy. Thus, these groups were selected 
because they are a part of and representative of European dynamism – they are the 
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products of democratic transition and represent the ethos of it; they also have to change 
as the institutional arrangements change around them and this provides a host of 
intriguing possibilities for both NGO development and the way contentious politics 
unfolds. 
 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
Both Poland and the Czech Republic experienced rapid democratic transition, in that both 
acquired the institutions of democracy in only a few years without any significant set 
backs or complications. After the collapse of communism in 1989 both quickly joined the 
requisite intergovernmental institutions, such as NATO, the IMF and the WTO, and 
began what turned out to be a ‘short march’ to EU membership. Perhaps it could be 
argued May 2004 is when democratization stopped for these two post communist states 
because, as the EU has made it known (and did make it known at the Copenhagen 
European Council in 1993), only countries with a demonstrated commitment to 
democratic practice and values can join the Union. The Copenhagen criteria and sections 
of the Treaty on European Union (Sec. 46 and 6.1) clearly indicate democracy as being a 
prerequisite to accession. But does this really mean democratization for these two states 
stopped in 2004? 
According to Linz and Stepan (2005) democracy is consolidated when 
“democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even 
psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success” (in Diamond 
and Morlino 205: xix). By most measures Poland and the Czech Republic are 
democracies. However it has not been uncommon for Czechs and Poles to publicly voice 
dissatisfaction with certain features of post communism. Results of the 1999 World 
Values Survey (WVS), which asked questions about trust in political officials, confidence 
in political and civil institutions and levels of satisfaction with elements of the soci-
political environment, suggest Poles and Czechs are not entirely happy with the political 
status quo. In fact, when asked about confidence in parliament, 85.8 percent of Czech 
respondents and 61.6 percent Poles indicated they had “not very much” or “none at all.” 
Confidence in the justice system was similarly low, with 74.6 percent of Czechs and 54.6 
percent of Poles indicating “not very much” or “none at all”. With regard to “satisfaction 
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with the way democracy develops,” 61.6 percent of Czech respondents and 49.1 percent 
of the Polish ones indicated they were “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied”. In 
1999 two prominent anti-government/ anti status quo politics movements formed in the 
Czech Republic, Impulse 99 and Thank-you, Now Leave. These two episodes of 
contentious collective action quickly faded, but they seemed to tap into a general sense of 
apathy and frustration amongst Czechs. At the time it was reported “the organization 
[Impulse 99] contains some 200 signatories who want to push political parties to listen to 
people and reinstore [sic] some integrity to Czech society” (Radio Praha 2.8.99).  
  The opening sentences of this dissertation alluded to several concurrent process, 
democratization, Europeanization and globalization. All of which are affecting the nature 
of contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic, and most probably all CEE 
states. Bideleux (2001) does not regard these processes as reinforcing. He argues that 
Europeanization and democratization “are not as mutually reinforcing as is generally 
supposed” (p.25). He goes on to write “in important respects these tendencies are pulling 
in different directions” (ibid). Bideleux does raise a valid point when he suggests 
legislative powers are being eroded or ceded at the member-state level, considering EU 
decision-making (i.e. intergovernmental conferences) is predominantly an executive 
driven exercise. However, when specifically looking at NGO activity in Europe, one 
cannot help but notice the presence of international NGOs, philanthropic agencies and 
networks. Pridham believes EU conditionality did help post communist states, which are 
now EU member-states, consolidate democracy. He argues, “The EU possesses an 
institutionalized regional framework which readily transmits the kind of influences and 
pressures that may affect the course of democratization, deliberately or otherwise (1999: 
60). It is worth noting that while there is national variance in institutions, party systems 
and electoral systems, all EU member-states are required, even before full accession, to 
subscribe to the same notion of democracy.  
Diamond and Morlino (2005) have made a career theorizing and pondering 
democratization and democratic consolidation. For them, the best kind of democracy is 
participatory democracy, in the sense of groups (NGOs, interest groups and political 
parties) actively competing for power in the policymaking arena. They write: 
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 One particular type of democracy seems better fit for a higher democratic quality: 
 namely one that generates and facilitates high levels of participation and 
 competition and therefore vigorous vertical accountability and at least some 
 degree of system responsiveness (2005: xxxvii)  
 
System responsiveness has to do with two systemic developments. First, the state through 
formal and informal channels (government and administrative bodies) is able to interact 
in a meaningful way with stakeholders from civil society, and two, lawmakers are a part 
of and utilize broader policy communities and networks. Civil society is regarded as 
fundamental to consolidation (Diamond et al. 1997: xxxii; Putnam 1995) but at the same 
time viewed skeptically. Whitehead’s (2002) summary of Schmitter does well to illustrate 
some of the problems associated with an overzealous and unaccountable civil society. 
Schmitter cautions “civil society, however, is not an unmitigated blessing for democracy” 
(in Whitehead 2002: 80 – 81). He distinguishes between political democracy and civil 
society, arguing that the former can be eroded by the latter. Arguing civil society “may 
build into the policy process a systematically biased distribution of power” (ibid), he 
challenges the view that ‘you can’t ever have enough civil society’.    
Democratization is a contested concept, exemplified by the differences of opinion 
concerning the nature and need for, and nostalgia of, civil society. Schmitter’s ideas are 
useful here because unlike some transitologists he openly wonders how significant a fully 
functional civil society is for the development of democratic governance (cf. Diamond et 
al. 1997). Something that he has identified, which this dissertation supports both 
theoretically and empirically, is the rise of elite-level or executive politics after 
democratic consolidation, and it corollary, the decline of civil society after transition 
(ibid). The NGOs surveyed for this dissertation think three things in particular about 
‘their’ consolidated democracies. First, approximately 62 percent of NGOs think 
democracy is better today than it was 10 years ago and of that 62 percent only 50 percent 
think it definitely better. Second, 71 percent of those same NGOs say NGOs and political 
parties “never” work collaboratively on issues of public policy. Third, 59 percent of 
NGOs fall on the side of “strongly disagree” when issued the statement, “government 
encourages groups like mine to participate in the policy making process.” EU 
conditionality did spur on democratic development in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
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but it also helped produce a system of democracy that is unlike anything else. Civil 
society has both been internationalized, as non-Polish/Czech actors through philanthropy 
and technical assistance helped (re)construct much of Polish civil society, and 
Europeanized, as many NGOs belong to pan-European networks or receive financial 
assistance from the EU.   
  Democratization does not occur in a predictable and patterned way, as the number 
and type of intervening variables, between authoritarianism and liberal democracy, are so 
numerous and varied that it is extremely difficult to predict a country’s path to 
consolidated democracy. It is important to keep the following in mind:  
 
 Democracy activists admit that it is not inevitable that transitional countries will 
 move steadily on this assumed path from opening and breakthrough to 
 consolidation. Transitional countries, they say, can and do go backward or 
 stagnate as well as move forward along the path (Carothers 2002: 7) 
 
The quickness with which democratic institutions and free market structures were 
introduced in Poland and the Czech Republic illustrates their readiness for state wide 
restructuring. However, Polish and Czech democracy, for lack of a better phrase, is still 
working out some of the ‘transitional’ kinks. The EU must be regarded as an intervening 
variable that helped prod democratic institutionalization forward, but at the same time, 
disrupted the ‘natural’ course of democratization, if there is such a thing. The point is the 
EU has potential to both help and hinder the rest of the democratization process in post 
communist Europe. One thing is for certain, the civil societies of Poland and the Czech 
Republic are an amalgam of international, European and national groups that take lessons 
from each other and take the political opportunities that are presented. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Post communist State and Interest Articulation 
 
In the democratic era, the groups which were the levers of regime change –including 
environmental and women’s groups – have generally declined...as these social 
movements disappear and some institutional interests decay, so orthodox interest groups, 
with their detailed and routine demands, should take root in democracy’s fresh soil. 
(Hague and Harrop 2004: 181)  
 
 
Hague and Harrop are correct to say there ‘should’ be a host of ‘orthodox’ interest groups 
vying for power and influence in post consolidation east central Europe. They, along with 
many others (cf. Keller, 2005; Kraus 2003; Poznanski, 2001, 2002; Appel, 2002; 
Howard, 2003), are concerned with what appears to be an ineffectual and disconnected 
third sector. In the early years of transition (1989-1991) civil society and newly created 
interest groups appeared well positioned to lead both Poland and the Czech Republic into 
an era of real participatory pluralist politics. This has not yet transpired. The result of a 
long and bumpy state-building process has instead been:  a) an autonomous and powerful 
state; b) a weak and marginalized interest community, and; c) a policy process that is 
neither open to organized interest nor connected to major societal stakeholders. Bearing 
this in mind, and with a desire to move beyond an explanation predicated solely on a civil 
society heuristic (cf. Chapter II), it is the express purpose of this chapter to rely on an 
institutional based theory of group politics to illuminate the massive discrepancy in 
power (inc. resources and influence) that exist between the third sector and government. 
To fully explain what constitutes an impediment to collective action and/or 
interest articulation this chapter will concentrate on three structural-level conditions that 
exist in post-communist states: 1) an autonomous state and a state-directed policy 
process; 2) a fragmented policy community, and; 3) an elite dominated state-building 
process. These institutional and system level variables, as this chapter argues, are 
precisely where one ought to look if attempting to understand why the third sector is not 
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developing into a western-style interest community or network. It should become clear by 
the conclusion of this chapter that an institutional inspired model of analysis (inc. 
neoinstitutionalism) is useful in determining the net effect of institutional change on 
group politics, but elite theory, used in conjunction with neoinstitutionalism, will offer 
the most complete theoretical explanation for third sector underdevelopment. The 
argument will benefit from the coupling of these two traditionally antithetical approaches 
to the study of politics as together they are best able to reconcile the structural imperative 
of regime change with the agential impact of new or reconstituted elites. This chapter is 
therefore predicated on the following three assumptions. 
First, the post-communist state is best understood as an autonomous actor insofar 
as the political elites who ‘run’ the many state institutions and ministries have 
successfully managed to insulate themselves from the greater policy community. This 
schism is even more pronounced in the policy areas under discussion here, the 
environment, women’s rights/gender equality, and Roma rights. Successive Polish and 
Czech governments have managed to devise and implement public policy without 
directly consulting, in any meaningful way, those groups who would otherwise represent 
the interests of key societal stakeholders (e.g., interest groups and/or organized interests). 
Observing early (c.1991) institutional development in East Central Europe, Offe (2004) 
argues:  
The newly elected parliaments also function as constituent assemblies. This 
indeed means nothing other than the players determine the rules according to 
which the future game will be played, and with which it will be decided who will 
be a fellow player (P.516).  
 
This first point directly challenges a pluralist understanding or analysis of post-
communist state development which would endeavor to highlight the multitude of 
interests which seem privy to policy formulation and are able to influence policy 
outcomes. However, this explanation of policy development tends to consider the state 
more an arbiter between major interests (an umpire) and less an actual player in the game. 
As Pal (1997) suggests “the pluralist tradition as a whole tended to de-emphasize the state 
or policy-making institutions, and stressed the influence of lobbies and interest group 
politics” (p.194). Appreciating how state building itself places power into the hands of 
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national elites, without the sort of competition common in western (established) 
democracies, part of the task of this chapter is to put forward a compelling explanation of 
contemporary group politics in both Poland and the Czech Republic with aid of non-
pluralist paradigms.  
Second, the fragmentation of the post-communist policy community and their 
inability to engage with policy makers has meant a policy network skewed in favour of 
politicians, bureaucrats and, only a thin stratum of the policy community. This again 
challenges the pluralist approach to the study of post-communist group politics, which to 
be a valuable paradigm, would needed to be vindicated through prolonged dialogue 
between state level officials and traditional interest groups. The dialogue between the 
state and civil society seemed to abruptly stop shortly after 1990. Coincidently this is 
when dissident groups became full fledged political parties (sometimes further morphing 
and/or splintering into other political groupings shortly afterwards) and many former 
dissidents became the new holders of public office. The focus shifted rather quickly from 
the message, which was the creation of a participatory, liberal democracy, to the 
implementation of democracy, which ipso facto involved the establishment of ‘new’ 
political elite. 
Hadjiisky (2001), referring to the problems encountered by Civic Forum during 
this period, identifies the very beginnings of post-communist elite maneuvering and 
settlement: 
In Prague itself, however, the former dissidents who had founded the Civic Forum 
thought their political  ‘task’ as ‘architects of democracy’ lay in the government, 
and not at the top of a political organization. . . This situation provoked a level of 
discontent that came to the fore after the June elections when Civic Forum 
activists realized that  they were not involved in the formation or in the 
programme of the new cabinet (P. 54)  
 
This politicization of civil society actors had a lot to do with the way power had to be 
quickly allocated and distributed to a multitude of new political actors shortly after the 
Round Table negotiations of 1989 – and later after the elections of 1989 and 1990. To 
call former dissidents, those who railed against the nomenklatura system for many years, 
the new post-communist political elite should not be taken as an indictment, but rather 
recognition of a process that swept many inexperienced people into positions of immense 
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power. In the case of Poland, Wasilewski and Wnuk-Lipinski (1995) have determined the 
following: 
After the Round Table and the June 1989 election, the Party fell like a house of 
cards. A new party, Social-Democracy of the Republic of Poland, was formed on 
its ruins in January 1990. Most of the old leaders did not join the new party, 
passing the leadership into the hands of the younger generation. The new leaders 
were mostly people politically shaped in the 1980s and directly engaged in the 
Round Table negotiations (p.691-92).  
 
Third, separate from the weakness of post-communist civil society, post-communist 
states – including Poland and the Czech Republic, which have been particularly 
successful in developing procedural or mechanical democracy – are realizing their public 
policy options with little direct third sector consultation. The subsequent policy outcomes 
are not reflective of the needs and wants of substantial segments of society. This suggests 
that opposed to a well delineated policy network what exists in Poland and the Czech 
Republic is top down system which emphasizes the needs of government over the 
demands made by any particular segment of the interest community. It is helpful to 
consider what Poznanski (2001) suggests: 
For the state to work, it is not enough that the ruled  take part in the political – 
state – life, it is also necessary that elites or rulers themselves have a well-
developed sense of responsibility to society.  Namely, they must consider the 
needs of the ruled to be of primary importance, above their personal ambitions  
(p. 219). 
 
Without a full-scale social revolution to sever the communist past from the democratic 
present (and future), many East Central Europeans have discovered the limits to their 
pluralistic democracy32. Certain patterns of behavior persist, which are thought to be the 
direct result of forty years of communism. A communist or Leninist legacy is a popular 
explanation for the contemporary malaise that seems to have taken hold of the two 
respective populations. This is not to say that a more robust form of participatory 
democracy cannot be realized in the future, just that scholars must appreciate the 
                                                 
32
 Here Skocpol’s definition of a social revolution is assumed: “social revolutions, defined as 
rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part 
accomplished through popular revolts from below” (Skocpol, 1994: 5)  
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cleavages and intervening variables that do exist in post-communist systems when 
evaluating the democratic performance of East Central European states.  
 
* * * 
 
As an important but often forgotten consideration, it is crucial to consider how power is 
reallocated and distributed after democratic transition. For instance, Ziolkowski (1998) 
argues “one of the paradoxes of the post-communist developments is the enormous role 
of the new political authorities in both political and economic transformation. In the 
political sphere new political incumbents are responsible not only for the resolution of 
current problems of ‘normal politics’ but also for the definition of new rules of the game” 
(p. 121). As elected and non elected officials are the ones determining how democracy 
should be applied and practiced, it is they who hold a considerable amount of real 
political power and are, under the pretence of ‘democracy building,’ able to exclude 
public interest groups from the policy formulation process.  This seems at odds with the 
spirit of democracy, granted, but when two rival visions of democracy emerge it is 
usually those in power that are able to turn their vision into reality (cf. Klaus and Havel, 
1996).  
An example of how this power translates into institutional change comes via the 
Czech Republic’s political elite, who have done well to diminish the investigatory powers 
of quasi autonomous non governmental agencies (Quangos)33 and other key – in house - 
bureaucratic agencies (Appel 2002). In quick succession, the Czech government, first, 
refused to initiate a parliamentary commission to examine political corruption, second, 
“organizations and institutions set up to monitor political economic crime and corruption, 
such as the Supreme Audit Office and the Securities Exchange Commission, were kept 
weak or deliberately weakened (Appel, 2002: 534), and finally the system of public 
prosecutors was changed so that “public prosecutors lost substantial powers of oversight 
and investigation” (ibid). Apart from the obvious stresses and strains such political 
malpractice places on public support for politicians and democratic governance, such ad 
hoc policy (esp. the kind that changes institutional arrangements) has the added effect of 
                                                 
33
 Quango being the name assigned to such bodies in the United Kingdom.  
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destabilizing the third sector and the state agencies that work with NGOS. The reason for 
this is three fold: First, public interest groups do not have the capacity to quickly adapt to 
changes in state structure, thus diminishing their influence. Second, as Colomy (1998) 
argues, “newly created institutions and their operatives frequently seek to expand their 
position and authority. The result of this institutional fluidity is that “this drive toward 
institutional expansion . . . typically infringes on the interests and authority of other 
established or emerging institutions or groups” (p. 285). Third, as a belief emerges 
amongst interest group leaders and their respective membership that state institutions will 
change as a matter of course, irrespective of the tactics and strategies they employ, they 
will be less inclined to engage in meaningful – sustained – lobbying with any one branch 
of government.  
Consider while the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia have had the same 
prime minister and government for nearly a decade (c. 2006), Poland, during 
approximately the same time period (1997 – 2005), has been seen five different prime 
ministers. This fact alone does not undermine lobbying or mobilization strategies as 
parliamentary systems are periodically prone to the sort of leadership fluidity seen in 
Poland. But when this issue of prime ministerial constancy is placed alongside the ‘shock 
therapy’ of the 1990s, the 1997 Constitutional accord, EU accession talks and 
membership (1998-2004), and the numerous international agreements signed by Polish 
delegates (e.g., NATO, WTO, and OECD)since the end of communism, it become 
apparent that the political landscape is ever changing. 
  Adam Fagan (2004) supplies a succinct explanation as to why the structure and 
tempo of state change is as important to interest groups as it might be to politicians. He 
argues by reference to his own study on Czech environmentalism: “Firstly, the notion that 
the process of democratization has been entirely enabling for social movements is 
challenged . . .the argument here is that power relationships established in the early stages 
of transition set a precedent in terms of social movement access and interaction with 
elites” (p. 2). Fagan’s point is a crucial one because it supports the idea that separate from 
a communist or socialist legacy, separate from the revolutions of 1989 (and the way in 
which they unfolded), exists an understudied and underappreciated variable. This ‘other’ 
factor, as it has been identified, is the state and institutional building process itself, which 
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makes lobbying and other forms or constructive protest less straightforward than it  
otherwise might be. Offe (2004) determine that “the core problem of the political and 
economic modernization of the former socialist societies resides in their lacking any 
noncontingent ‘givens’ that would be suitable fixed parameters of the politics of reform . 
. . everything becomes contingent, and nothing can self-evidently remain as it is” (Offe 
2004:516). The structure and processes of the state must been seen in the same light, 
then,  as say political efficacy and protest repertoires, for they are yet another variable 
which effects the viability of the third sector. 
This all comes back to the idea of political power, which is a key but often 
contested and misrepresented variable. However, in light of this section’s emphasis on 
political institutions and the national (or political) elite, it becomes necessary to spend 
some time determining how power manifests itself in a developing democracy. First, 
power is much more than the exercise of force or threat of force or the coercive 
capabilities of a state, group or other political actor(s) within a polity. The one 
dimensional definition of power (cf. Lukes 1974: 11) suggests a process whereby an actor 
‘compels’ another actor to do something they do not want to voluntarily do. This type of 
power can be understood as active power, that is, when state power is exercised 
purposefully to influence the conduct of individuals or interest groups. Dahl’s widely 
quoted definition: “A has power over B to the extent that he [sic] can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do” (cf. Lukes 1974). Lukes (ibid) offers a 
compelling argument for a more substantial definition if not more complex view of 
power, which incorporates both active and passive forms of power and recognizes that 
power may be realized through decision making, nondecision- making, and control over 
the political agenda (Lukes, 1974: 25). Alas, the state can be seen as powerful in a 
traditional sense, by virtue of it having a monopoly over coercive institutions (i.e., police 
and army), but also critically, the state may gain power through agenda setting and non-
decision making.  Bachrach and Baratz note: “Here A devotes his (sic) energies to 
creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the 
scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A” (quoted in Hay, 1997: 46).  To this end the post 
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consolidated state’s (Poland and the Czech Republic in particular) resultant autonomy 
comes via its own mandate and the democratization process itself. 
 
* * *  
 
Many of the theories and methodologies employed to understand and explain group 
politics and policy formulation in developed democracies have only thus far been 
exercised at the periphery of post-communist scholarship. The concern, and what is 
limiting their use in ECE dedicated analysis, is over conceptual stretching and traveling 
(cf. Collier and Mahon, 1993) and the appropriateness (or appropriation) of 
methods/methodologies which rely on a host of implicit understandings and explicit 
concepts developed over a sixty year period to explore lobbying and pressure politics in 
the United States, Canada and Western Europe. However, as Poland and the Czech 
Republic enter a post consolidation phase of democracy, it seems perfectly reasonable to 
take a hard look at group politics and policy development vis-à-vis established meta and 
micro theories of politics34 and policy formulation. Political scientists and sociologists 
have long been theorizing about the nature of institutions and the role of agency in the 
context of group politics, and it seems out of sequence not to ask similar questions about 
post-communist politics, as Poland and the Czech Republic offer a unique opportunity to 
test these theories.  
It is a fairly well established idea that democracy in CEE was and continues to be 
developed from the bottom-up – that is, an active and dedicated civil society generates 
the democratic (participatory) ethos needed to support both the procedural and 
substantive elements of democracy (cf. Putnam, 1995). Examining the social requisites of 
democracy, Lipset (1994) argues: 
More important than electoral rules in encouraging a stable system is a strong 
civil society – the presence of a myriad of mediating institutions, including 
groups, media, and networks, that operate independently between individuals and 
the state. These constitute subunits, capable of opposing and countervailing the 
state (p.12). 
                                                 
34
 Here I am referring to politics in the most elementary (or classical) of ways: that is, who gets 
what, how and when. 
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Lipset’s intuition seems sound enough, but what he fails to consider and include in the 
above formula is institutions which are receptive to public interest groups, lobbyists and 
all of society’s stakeholders. When sustained lobbying fails to culminate in some 
noticeable institutional or policy gain, the schism that already exists between the state and 
the interest community can but only grow deeper.  
It was determined earlier that power manifests itself in many different ways, from 
overt coercion to, what is of greater concern here, non-decisions and agenda setting. Part 
of the problem in identifying power is locating its origin. This is no easy task, 
considering the locus of power often moves from one place to another often imbuing 
some actors or institutions with power while limiting the power of others. In other words 
there is both a temporal and spatial element to power. This complicates the study of 
group politics in Poland and the Czech Republic for the very reason that the policy 
networks that would otherwise incorporate interest groups into the consultation process, 
are ill-defined and lack permanence. Offe (2004) argues: 
The logical difference between their [ECE groups] way of proceeding and the 
activities of ‘new social movements’ in the West lies in the fact that the Western 
movements operate within the context of already created and solidly established 
democratic institutions and focus on overcoming some of the built-in biases, 
deficiencies, and blind spots, of these institutions (p. 517).  
 
While Offe’s commentary is useful, it does not provide a sense of who is to blame (and 
therefore what needs to be fixed) for third sector underdevelopment and the 
underutilization of interest groups.  
Out of the debate waged between academics claiming paradigmatic superiority 
has emerged a series of competing theories (roughly hinging on the question of whether 
structure or agency is the ‘correct or favoured’ independent variable) developed to shed 
light on the power dynamics and communication channels which exist in modern 
democracies, ultimately shaping how politics ‘really’ occurs. Functionalism (and 
structural functionalism), Institutionalism, Behaviouralism and elite theory, were (and 
still are in their contemporary guise) concerned with how state institutions and actors 
compete for various resources and how, precisely, one may impact the function and/or 
behaviour of the other. As Mule (1999) observed, “a general trend developed that was 
inclined to see the causal links between society and polity as running from the former to 
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the latter, rather than the other way round” (p. 145). Now as this chapter argues ‘that 
other way round’ is precisely how one ought to examine the dynamics of group politics in 
Poland and the Czech Republic, as institutions and state-level decisions are having a 
dramatic impact on the nature and scope of lobbying and interest articulation. This is not 
the same as saying institutions are the only variable worth considering or that agency is 
irrelevant in the context of institutionalized politics. But during a period of state building, 
when political institutions are being (re)created for the particulars of democratic 
governance and capitalism, the influence institutions (Legislature, Constitution, 
Executive etc.) have on the repertoires of interest groups becomes all the more 
significant. The very instability and fluidity of new political institutions is what makes 
them crucial variables in the analysis of group politics and policy development. As 
Papadoulis (2005): 
Post-communist states were obliged to move very fast to organize the necessary 
state structures and functions on which they could base their political and  public 
policy processes and practices, which are still underdeveloped, and consequently, 
they have not  reached a stable end point. On the contrary, in fact some are in a 
state of flux (p. 518).  
 
The structure agency debate is one that, while having existed in various forms for quite 
some time (cf. Hay 2001)35, still seems to end in what amounts to a theoretical or 
conceptual stalemate. Is it indeed necessary to focus on one to the exclusion of the other? 
Hay argues, “structure and agency logically entail one another – a social or political 
structure only exists by virtue of the constraints on, or opportunities for, agency that is 
effect” (1995). Similarly, Johnson is able to reconcile the ‘agency-centered’ approach 
with the ‘structure based’ account of post-communist political development by showing 
how both actors and institutions inform each other in the development of economic 
policy (Johnson, 2003: 289-316).  
What Poland and the Czech Republic offer, as consolidated democracies with a 
well documented democratization process, is an opportunity to examine the development 
of political institutions in a relatively pristine political environment – pristine in the sense 
that institutional choices can be mapped with some degree of confidence. Discussion has 
centered on civil society, communist legacy and, the development of political parties, 
                                                 
35
 http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/archive/cshay_wpisad.html 
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rather than on the usefulness of specific theories for state – society analysis.  This chapter 
uses elite theory as a heuristic aid to discover a) how elite settlement and the persistence 
of elite friendly institutions shape the policy community in both states – to the detriment 
of the third sector; b) what is preventing the emergence of an open policy network, and; 
c) where power lies in the post-communist policy community.  
Democratization in Poland and the Czech Republic has been controlled by former 
communists, state and municipal level bureaucrats and former dissidents. This group of 
men can correctly be called the new post-communist elite, for as Elite Theory suggests, a 
fairly cohesive network of national elites will emerge after a period of political instability 
(Burton & Higley 1987; 1989; Cammack, 1990).  What makes democracy endure 
afterwards is more a matter of elite negotiations and bargaining and less a realization of 
an open, liberal pluralistic democracy. Cammack (1990) argues “transformation from 
elite disunity to consensual unity is an essential precondition for political stability and 
lasting democratic transition” (p. 415). 
This is not a revelation, considering both countries determined their respective 
transitions to democracy vis-à-vis round table negotiations in 1989. Yes, both Solidarity 
and Civic Forum played some part in pressuring the communists to negotiate a settlement 
and a peaceful transition to democracy but, the presence and persistence of elites – both 
communist, ex communist and dissident - cannot be ignored when examining group 
politics. Elites are indeed a necessary part of the modern democratic state, as they operate 
as both brokers and entrepreneurs in an effort to negotiate political compromises to 
political problems. But Baylis (1994) recognizes a problem with ECE elites: 
Neither between the new elites and reformist elements of the former communist 
elites, nor among the new elites themselves, can we find much evidence of the 
pragmatism and trust needed for such bedrock agreement. Instead we find a level 
of hostility and mutual recrimination that has produced a splintering of political 
forces and pose a continuing threat to the stability and effectiveness of East 
European governments (p. 316).     
 
What happened during the formative years of Czech and Polish democracy can only be 
described as an example of an elite driven transition to democracy. Three elite driven 
phases: the Round Table talks; constitution building; EU accession. If contemporary 
policy development is somehow modeled on old patterns (or an old ethos), that is the 
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frustrations conveyed by civil society organizers point to a top-down ‘closed’ elite 
dominated policy community, then it seems entirely possible that either: a) the same 
cultural or economic elites are occupying positions a top the policy ladder, or b) the same 
structural  
Interest in elite settlement and the political consequences of ‘bourgeois 
maneuvering’36 in times of either regime change or democratization is certainly not new 
(see Bell, 1958; Lachmann, 1990; Burton and Higley 1987). However, in the context of 
this dissertation – one examining post-communist group politics – elite theory and/or the 
idea of elite change and settlement has particular currency. As Bozoki (2003) argues, 
Transitions, roundtable negotiations, institution-building, constitution-making, 
compromise-seeking, pact-making, pact-breaking, extended consensualism, 
strategic choices – all underline the importance of elites, and the significance of 
research on political elites (p. 216). 
 
Thus far scholarship on the topic of post-communist group politics has tended to focus on 
civil society and/or individual agency (see Howard 2004; Glenn 2001) thus shying away 
from looking expressly at the emergence of a new political or national elite class after the 
fall of communism. It is customary to discuss elites as a separate sphere or group of 
political actors not directly linked or fused with the groups that comprise civil society. 
But as it turns out, the very nature of regime transition in East Central Europe, with the 
pivotal role played by dissident groups and social movements, provided a sense of how 
elites and non-elites are What has been written on the topic of civil society is illuminating 
and useful, but it tends to stop short of considering the implications - for interest groups 
especially - of an institutionalized form of interest politics that favours elites over other 
political actors – namely rights based pressure groups. What is of interest here is the idea 
put forward by Burton and Higley (1987): Many scholars now view the establishment 
and maintenance of democratic institutions as decidedly political acts (p. 295). 
Anton Steen (1997) provides a compelling description of elite settlement in post-
communist Europe: Elites interacting under few institutional constraints, adapting to the 
                                                 
36
 This language is linked to class based or Marxist derived analysis of elites, but should not be 
understood as necessarily reflecting the thrust of the argument here. Contemporary elite theorists 
have moved away from a Marxist or ideologically driven class based analysis of elites, opting to 
use a more secular language that describes transition as ‘elite games’ etc. See Andras Bozoki, 
2003, for a detailed explanation of this evolution.  
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rhetoric of market liberalism, while using the state for pragmatic pursuit of special 
interests, make this kind of state formation very different from Western countries (in 
Bozoki, 2003: 225) The tempo and character of democratization, especially as it relates to 
and effects public policy development in Poland and the Czech Republic, has thus far 
been shaped not by civil society, as many argue (e.g. Di Palma 1991; Smolar 1996; 
Geremek 1993), not by the dissident groups that challenged the legitimacy of the 
communist regime prior to 1989, as many might have hoped, and certainly not by a 
vanguard of post-communist liberal democrats. Rather, it has been influenced by two 
particular interconnected phenomena.  
First, the political elite of these two countries, who have managed in many cases 
to retain (or realize) a high degree of autonomy and power in what is an otherwise 
disorganized and fragmented policy community, are framing post-communist political 
discourse in such a way that it cannot (and should not) be overlooked when examining 
contemporary modes of interest articulation. This elite driven scheme (and the resultant 
state autonomy in particular) appears reminiscent of the top-down policy formulation 
model used during the communist period (see Wolchik, 1991: Pp 59-63) and is certainly 
not one akin to a textbook definition of pluralism. Second, the state-building process, 
which has its own unique ethos, is at the same time empowering state-level elites and 
marginalizing rights based groups.  
State building itself, as a means to a more democratic end, is often used to justify 
a policy programme which favours efficiency over inclusiveness, or in the language of 
policy studies, a  “state-directed” system has won out over “clientele pluralism” 37(Pal 
1997: 202). A state-directed system implies three things in particular: One, state agency 
is strong and autonomous; two, the associational system is weak and dispersed, and; 
three, the state dominates the policy sector and the associational system (ibid). This 
should not be confused with a corporatist system in which civil society associations (viz. 
an explicit agreement with state agencies) are charged with creating or monitoring public 
policy in coordination with state-level actors. In both Poland and the Czech Republic it is 
traditional ‘new social movements’ or rights based advocacy groups that are being 
                                                 
37
 As defined: In a ‘Clientele Pluralist Network’ state agencies are both weak and dispersed, as 
are associational systems. Agencies rely on associations for information and support and allow 
them to participate in policy making (Pal, 2002: 203).  
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routinely ignored by ministers, parliamentarians and senior civil servants. The brand of 
democracy being practiced in Poland and the Czech Republic is more of a bureaucratic 
and elite driven exercise than one might suspect, considering democratic consolidation 
was supposed to create a more open, participatory, political system (cf Havel, 1992).  
It is worth restating here that during a period of sustained state-building when 
institutions are being constantly modified (sometime ad hoc) and laws seemingly 
introduced, modified and sometimes repealed (e.g. abortion laws in Poland) without a 
sense of continuity, the state has a distinct advantage in terms of its ability to develop 
policy in relative isolation. This can be construed in two ways. First, it can be intentional 
on the part of state officials to take advantage of this autonomy and pass laws in the 
knowledge public opposition will be minimal. Second, it can be less a conscious decision 
on their part and more a result of a structural reality that enables – because of institutional 
fluidity – elite bargaining.  The political elite of these countries along with their state-
level counterparts have been instrumental in shaping public policy and modes of policy 
formulation in both countries should not be confused with a conspiracy theory38 which, 
taken to would suggest an intentioned group of politicians manipulating all facets of 
political life through bribery and coercion. The role of the elite in shaping public policy is 
something that should be explored in a matter of fact way and in many ways this 
approach is consistent with what we already know about transitions to democracy and the 
difficulty of realizing a robust form of liberal democracy after a prolonged era of 
totalitarian governance.  
Approaching the topic of democratization with a concern for agency level 
variables and explanation, Howard (2003) identifies three particular deficiencies that 
continue to contribute to the weakness of post-communist civil society. He surmises that 
a persistence of friendship/kinship networks, which undermines the formation of interest 
groups, coupled with a legacy of mistrust, which impedes the development of political 
efficacy and post-communist disappointment, which complicates further third sector 
                                                 
38
 Here I am referring to persons such as Polish Pres. Kwasniewski and others of similar ilk who 
effectively ‘survived regime transitions by repackaging themselves as socialists and social 
democrats’ (Higley et al., 1996: 137). It was (and still is) a possibility for ex communists to take 
advantage of the fractious nature of post-communist civil society by relying on communist-era 
policy networks and their knowledge of the bureaucracy to effect change.  
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development, helps “to explain the lasting weakness of civil society in the region” 
(Howard, 2002: 160). Just as these three ‘problems’ complicate civil society 
development, it is equally true to say that these same issues have prevented the state and 
those charged with policy formulation from consulting civil society organizations (CSO). 
CSOs are only one level of a multilayered policy network and so it must be stressed that 
Howard’s concerns for civil society, being as it is weak and unable to perform all 
functions traditionally ascribed to it, should be considered in-turn a concern for the way 
governance occurs. 
By exploring each of these issues in turn, it will become apparent that the state 
(and government; and political parties) and other elite level political organizations are: a) 
able to act with a high degree of autonomy and; b) display skepticism towards CSOs can 
really offer – in the way of expertise and policy sophistication. The civil society 
paradigm fails to account for such matters, as was discussed in chapter of two. 
Immediately before the start of the state crafting project in 1989, which in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia was a negotiated or ‘pacted’ transition? This process can be summarized 
quite literally as the nascent elite (emerging elite) negotiating the terms of regime change 
with the ancien elite. This is a critical     
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter argued: One, the fluidity of institutional change coupled with the ad hoc 
nature of policy formulation renders traditional policy communities (and interest groups) 
if not impotent, considerably less effectual than they would be if a stable, fixed, system 
were in place. Two, theories predicated on the civil society heuristic, while providing a 
sense of general levels of political efficacy and trust, cannot offer a complete picture of 
group politics in Poland and the Czech Republic – as it is the institutions themselves that 
constitute an impediment to collective action and not a disorganized third sector. Three, 
neoinstitutionalism (and historical institutionalism) and elite theory, which emphasise 
structure and agency respectively, can be used in tandem to properly reveal how post-
communist elites use institutional uncertainty to their advantage, thus ensuring a high 
degree of state autonomy.  
 84  
This chapter provided a short summary of two popular theories, institutionalism 
and elite theory, which would normally be excluded from an analysis of post-communist 
group politics. They have historically been applied to to the study of group politics, 
interest articularion and contentious politics. They are particularly useful for examining  
Poland and the Czech Republic where institutions and structural determinants seems to 
play a much larger role in shaping the conduct of pressure groups and social movements. 
Most of this chapter debated the theoretical suitability of the two theories, and in so doing 
offered only a cursory explanation as to how Polish and Czech institutions work to stymie 
third sector mobilization, and what NGOs actually think about the institutional 
environment. The following chapter will provide an empirical study of NGO activity in 
both countries.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Empirical Findings and Analysis 
 
This chapter summarizes results of a questionnaire distributed in the fall of 2007 to 103 
NGOs in Poland and the Czech Republic. The questionnaire was designed specifically for 
this dissertation, asking questions relevant to the hypotheses, research questions (see 
Chapter 1) and methodology. The questionnaire was designed, first, to elicit certain 
empirical facts about participant organizations, i.e. membership level, structure and 
designation (i.e. legal status), and second, to discover how these organizations perceive 
themselves, i.e. their role, function and potency, in a political system that has undergone 
significant institutional change in the past fifteen years. Respondents, the majority of 
whom hold/held a paid position at the participant NGO (usually as the director or 
assistant director) were asked to rate government performance, rate the government’s 
willingness to work specifically with their group and, also the NGO community writ 
large, and rate the effectiveness of political parties. Questions were designed to permit 
either ordinal or nominal level measurements, allowing for straightforward comparison of 
answers from groups of similar description. A battery of questions relating to political 
efficacy, the policy process and democracy were also included. The questionnaire 
comprised 10 pages and 45 questions.  
Thirty-one (31) completed questionnaires were returned (two were discarded39), 
and eleven (11) others were returned without having reached their intended destination – 
even though the mailing list was constructed using the most up-to-date on-line NGO 
registries available. Every attempt was made to contact potential respondent 
organizations by email before the questionnaire was posted. To this end an email was 
sent to each and every NGO a month before the actual questionnaire was distributed. This 
was done to both alert groups to the pending questionnaire and to familiarize groups with 
                                                 
39
 After reviewing the activities and bulletins about Česká lesnická společnost (Czech Forest 
Society) and Polskie Towarzystwo Przesyłu i Rozdziału Energii Elektrycznej (Polish Power 
Transmission and Distribution Association), it became apparent these two “professional 
associations” were not public advocacy NGOs like the others presented  – they were not 
voluntary and/or not-for-profit as all of the other respondent organizations are.  
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its scope and intent.  As it so happened, several emails ‘bounced back’ (were returned) 
almost immediately, most likely suggesting that many of the NGOs initially selected for 
this study have ceased operations.     
4.1 Respondent NGOs from Poland by Category 
 
Environmental/Ecological 7 
Women’s rights/Gender equality 4 
Roma/Romani Rights 1 
Other40 1 
                                                      Total 13 
 
4.2 Respondent NGOs from the Czech Republic by Category 
 
Environmental/Ecological 7 
Women’s rights/Gender equality 4 
Roma/Romani Rights 5 
Other 0 
                                                      Total 16 
 
 
Part II of this chapter details the legal framework governing NGO activity in Poland and 
the Czech Republic. This section explains how very little has changed in the Czech 
Republic with regard to NGO laws, tax exemption laws and the overall legal status of 
advocacy groups and NGOs. In other jurisdictions (i.e. Hungary and Poland) NGOs are 
able to take advantage of tax exemption laws and incentives, in some instances the 
claimant NGO may deduct a sizable portion of their overhead expenditure (i.e. rent, heat 
and hydro) and other related operating costs, much like a registered business or 
corporation might. Furthermore, in Poland (and Hungary) individual taxpayers can assign 
up to 1% of their income tax to a qualifying NGO. Almost all of the Polish NGOs 
                                                 
40
 This group, Instytat Spraw Obwatelskich (Civil Affairs Institute), is a civil society umbrella 
group which focuses on promoting volunteerism and civic involvement. 
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approashed for this study have listed somewhere on their website an advertisement for 
the 1% law, and conveniently provide their banking and legal details in close proximity. 
An NGO umbrella organization in the Czech Republic, called Czech Donor Forum 
(Forum darcu), has been lobbying government for a similar progamme since 2005 – 
though the organization’s beginnings can be traced back to 1996. Czech Minister for 
human rights and minorities Dzamila Stehlikova (of the Czech Greens) said recently “the 
Czech Republic lacks a law on NGOs that would define their form, functioning and 
financing” (CTK 4 March 2008). No question the Czech Republic lags behind other post 
communist states in the development of laws, taxation or otherwise, which would 
encourage philanthropy and volunteerism. 
Part III of this chapter looks at several ways in which NGOs benefit from EU 
membership, what exactly respondent NGOs are reporting with regard to EU funding and 
democracy after accession , and how European institutions can enhance the political 
power of  Czech and Polish NGOs. Watson and Shackleton (2008) argue that interest 
groups and NGOs are increasingly “venue shopping” (p. 93).  That is, they are looking 
for access points along a fairly long policy chain on which political institutions and actors 
are nodal points. Usually starting with their own local assemblies (i.e. voivodships and 
kraje) and ending with the European Commission or European Court of Justice, NGOs 
are looking for a path of least resistance. The Commission’s 2001 White Paper on 
European Governance states: 
 The organisations which make up civil society mobilise people and support, for 
 instance, those suffering from exclusion or discrimination. The Union has 
 encouraged the development of civil society in the applicant countries, as part of 
 their preparation for membership. Non governmental organisations play an 
 important role at global level in development policy. They often act as an early 
 warning system for the direction of political debate. 
 
In an effort to make the EU more democratically accountable and legitimate, the 
Commission established a civil society website and an on-line forum for public 
consultation. These measures encourage NGO activism and advocacy at all political 
levels. It is now appropriate to speak of an EU NGO, a European advocacy network and a 
European lobbyist. The examples presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 bears this out. There 
are now thousands of NGOs operating at the EU level. Of the groups surveyed for this 
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dissertation, 62% report being a member of a larger European NGO network. In the 
Czech Republic, three-quarters of surveyed groups belong to an EU network of some 
kind. The number is significantly lower in Poland, as only 46% of respondents indicated 
their NGO as being a member of a larger European NGO network. A clear majority of 
NGOs are either already a part of an existing network, a subsidiary to an international 
NGO, or will be in the next couple years. If the Lisbon Treaty goes forward, thus giving 
the EP more legislative power, a new crop of NGOs will certainly want to have 
representation in Brussels. Already many NGOs think they possess policy expertise and 
can contribute something tangible to the policy process. When asked, Do you consider 
your organization knowledgeable enough to offer valuable policy advice to government, 
93 percent of respondent NGOs answered “definitely yes” or “most of the time, yes”. In 
most instances they have identified their usefulness to government correctly.   
How useful are NGOs for the dissemination of charitable aid or assistance? Can 
they contribute anything positively to the policy process? In 2002 Polish President 
Aleksander Kwasniewski praised NGOs for contributing to civic society. He said 
“experience of other countries shoes that non-profit organizations can often spend money 
for public tasks more effectively, economically and better than state and local 
government bodies” (PAP 22 September 2002). Furthermore, in 1998 Polish Agricultural 
Minister Jacek Janiszesski said “non-governmental organizations are a blessing for any 
government as they fulfill its role and duties more effectively” (PAP 4 May 1998). 
Despite this, 46 percent of respondent NGOs rate PM Buzek’s commitment to their 
policy area “fair” or “poor”.41 The results for Leszek Miller are actually worse. Nearly 62 
percent of NGOs rate his commitment to their policy areas as either “fair” or “poor”. 
None of the prime ministers listed (and all twelve post 1989 prime ministers are listed) in 
the survey obtained a ‘passing grade’ in their dealings with respondent NGOs, but with 9 
of the 13 NGOs rating his performance as “poor,” Jarosław Kaczyński42 is for NGOs 
clearly the worst prime minister. Survey results in combination with newswire and 
newspaper reports indicate a degree of political turbulence that is not uncommon in other 
democracies. The difference is Polish civil society is fragile and clearly without the sort 
                                                 
41
 Jerzy Buzek was prime minister of Poland from 31 October 1997 to 19 October 2001. 
42
 Jarosław Kaczyński, the prime minister from the Law and Justice Party, served from 14 July 
2006 – 16 November 2007.  
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of embedded groups and networks (excluding some communist era groups that persist 
today) that exist in ‘western’ liberal democracies. The Polish nonprofit sector has been 
unstable for some time. In 2003 it was reported that only 60 percent of all NGOs are 
actually ‘active’ (World News Connection 2003) and of those, half do not have a 
membership base exceeding 50 (Polityka 2002: 22). Only a few NGOs can legitimately 
claim to represent a substantial constituency and fewer still possess the sort of policy 
competency needed to contribute positively to the policy process. However as several 
governments have admitted, there is still a place for NGOs in post accession Poland.  
Evidently not all governments/legislators view NGOs with the sort of skepticism 
and ire that Vaclav Klaus does. However his concern with NGOism, as he has put it, 
should not be dismissed. The language he used was certainly inflammatory, but the 
underlying concern, that unelected and unaccountable NGOs are taking decisions or 
influencing policy without a mandate to do so, does have merit. What he said in 2005, 
that “NGOism is almost at the same level as Communism” (CTK 10 September 2005) is 
not entirely accurate. Moreover several Czech government have made genuine attempts, 
it would seem, to elevate the status of the NGO sector. Dr Jana Fristenska, Secretary of 
the Government’s Council on Foundations, said “the situation has changed in favour of 
the nonprofit sector, as evidenced by certain developments and a change in the indifferent 
attitude” (Prague Post 1999). This statement was made soon after Valclav Klaus stepped 
down as prime minister. Most likely Klaus’s departure is the ‘change in the indifferent 
attitude’ that Fristenska is referring. After EU accession however it has become much 
more difficult to any one political agent, political party or institution (excluding the EU) 
to effect in any significant way third sector (in) activity.    
The quantitative approach utilized here helps ground the more theoretical parts of 
this dissertation. The directors and assistant directors (and administrators) who 
participated in the survey collectively represent a substantial number of grass-roots 
activists and segment of the population, so the survey data should be regarded as 
statistically significant and useful for conducting an inter state comparison. The 
respondent NGOs from Poland (N=13) claim to represent 5, 427 full-time members. This 
number excludes part-time members and members from a few of the large(er) NGOs in 
Poland, like Greenpeace, which did not report their membership levels. Assuming the 
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answers given reflect membership sentiment and experience, Polish and Czech NGOs in 
the area of environment, Roma and women, see their political environment in similar 
ways. The questionnaires were helpful for identifying similarities and differences 
between groups from the same sector and especially useful in detailing general trends and 
practices   
In order the test the hypotheses, the survey had to ask pointed questions about 
organizational competency, funding sources and recent undertakings. Realizing 
beforehand that the NGO sector, particularly in the Czech Republic, has had a strained l 
working relationship with government since the Klaus administration, it was important to 
see, a)  if this is still the case nearly 4 years after EU accession, and b) if NGOs have 
different priorities post accession . Some of the headlines pulled from newswires and 
international newspapers point to an NGO sector that is under funded, under utilized by 
government, and perhaps even underachieving. Tension, animosity, mistrust and 
skepticism are all words that could be used to describe government – NGO interaction.  
But does this impact democracy and governance in any noticeable way?  
 
NEWSPAPER HEADLINES 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC: 
 
• “Czech NGOs Suffer From Lack of Funds” (CTK, 7 March, 2005) 
• “Several Czech NGOs Ask For More Room For Civil Society” (CTK, 6 
November 2000) 
• “Czech President Refuses to Apologize to Angry NGOs” (Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, 6 June 2005) 
 
POLAND: 
 
• “NGOs to Form Federation for Lobbying against Government’s Negligence” 
(Polish News Bulletin, 25 September 2002) 
• “NGOs Fearful of Taxation Changes that May Curb Donations” (PNB, 9 
September 2003) 
• “NGOs to form Federation for Lobbying against Government’s Negligence” 
(PNB 25 September 2002) 
 
Attempting to answer that fundamental question involves discovering answers to a host 
of other questions, which the survey was designed to do. It was therefore important, in an 
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earnest attempt to discover if anything has improved empirically for NGOs since EU 
entry, to have groups answer questions relating specifically to their perceived ‘political 
opportunity structure’ and the institutional environment they find themselves. If the 
political environment is hostile to NGOs, as hypothesized, most groups should report 
being frustrated in their dealings with government or state officials. Though every NGO 
should experience some frustration, for in a pluralist system not every group will get 
everything they wan all the time. Government should not seek to integrate every (or even 
most) policy proposal stemming from an NGO, as this would as Schmitter cautions, 
result in a highly skewed democratic system. Also, because many NGOs receive funding 
from international philanthropic institutions or NGOs, the relationship between a group’s 
financial vitality and their political potency may actually be inverted. Meaning well-
funded groups may be the least likely to engage in contentious collective action. The 
international funding of NGOs (Glenn 2002; Fagan 2004; Carothers 2000) has be 
explored in some detail over the past eight to ten years, Carother for instance fears that 
aiding civil society and the NGOs sector from abroad may actually retard 
democratization. He argues,  
 A central assumption of civil society aid carried out under the auspices of 
 democracy promotion is that advocacy NGOs are a critical segment, perhaps the 
 critical segment, of civil society, at least with regard to democratization 
 …however the assumption of NGOs’ centrality is questionable. Other kinds of 
 civil society groups frequently drive political change, eclipsing what it often the 
 circumscribed role of policy or advocacy NGOs (2000: 295). 
   
Environmental groups, Women’s organizations and Roma NGOs were randomly 
selected from several on-line registries; 43randomly in the sense that I was not selecting 
groups based on any subjective criteria. The criterion used for selecting an NGO is 
elaborated below: 
 
1. The group had to be functionally political. It had to be (at the time of mailing) 
performing a task or service related to public education, lobbying or policy 
                                                 
43
 On-line NGO registries: 1. English NGOs Poland (http://english.ngo.pl/); 2. Stop Violence 
Against Women website ( www.stopvaw.org); 3. Polish Environmental NGOs Directory/ Polska 
Zielona Sieć (www.ecolink.org.pl);4. Green Circle/Zelený Kruh (www.zelenykruh.cz/en/); 5  
Czech Ministry of the Environment (http://www.env.cz/AIS/web-en.nsf/pages/Links). 
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formulation. The group need not be overtly political, in the sense of initiating or 
organizing a public demonstration or disruptive collective action, but it should 
nevertheless represent a particular cause or constituency, like the environment or 
Roma. When asked about their perceived policy competency, almost all 
respondents (92.85%) felt their organization could offer “valuable policy advice 
to government” (Question 11). This willingness to critique existing government 
policy or perhaps help in the development of policy confirms each group’s 
political character.  
2.  The group had to part of a larger NGO community, network or NGO list-serve. 
That is, their mailing address, email and other particulars (i.e. status and 
membership) had to appear on at least one of the on-line registries consulted. This 
was one way to weed out potentially defunct NGOs – unfortunately not all NGO 
lists were current. The databases or NGO directories were usually, and usefully, 
presented in both Czech or Polish and English. It is remarkable how internet 
savvy many Polish and Czech NGOs are, considering most of the groups 
consulted have a limited number of permanent staff (see Questions 12 and 13) and 
an equally limited operating budget.     
3. The group had to be based (i.e. have a permanent office) in either Poland or the 
Czech Republic, and operate within either state. It is worth noting that a majority 
of the NGOs consulted for this study base their operations in large urban centers. 
In Poland, Gdansk, Krakow and Warsaw were home to nearly all participant 
groups. The capital city of the Czech Republic, Prague, is home to most Czech 
NGOs, though a few prominent NGOs can be found in Brno and Ostrava.   
4. Importantly, all participant NGOs had to be independent and voluntary.  So they 
could neither be a state-run (or sponsored) organization nor a professional 
association. However, many of the groups ultimately surveyed do receive state 
funding, either directly or indirectly. In fact, 48 percent of respondent NGOs 
indicated they currently receive “direct government funding” and 86 percent said 
they have applied to their government for funding. All sixteen Czech NGOs that 
completed the survey indicated they had at one point applied for government 
funding. Nine out of thirteen Polish NGOs did the same. 
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Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are considered by many legitimate and 
potent political actors, and depending on the issue, have tremendous potential to augment 
or undo existing government policy. Thus NGOs have a role to play in the policy process. 
When surveyed, respondents more often than not identified themselves as an NGO. 
4.3 Self-Identification - Poland
Pressure Group 
14%
Interest Groups 
14%
NGO 44%
Civil Society 
Organization 
14%
Other 14%
 
4.4 Self-Identification - Czech Republic
Civil Society 
Organization 
30%
NGO 45%
Pressure Group 
10%
Interest Group 
15%
Other 0%
 
 
While respondents were permitted to self-identify in a number of ways (see above) most 
felt the title NGO or civil society organization (CSO) best reflects their organization’s 
structure and function. This internationalization of the third sector may be a reason for 
 94  
this, as many of the participant groups work across national boundaries, either at the EU 
or global level, and feel a part of larger continental network. Environmental groups like 
Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth have long operated as international or global 
actors, so for them NGO is a most appropriate identifier.  
 
LAW GOVERNING NON-PROFITS, NGOs AND ASSOCIATIONS 
If other structural/institutional impediments to collective action and lobbying can be 
viewed as occurring outside or beyond the control of state legislators, laws pertaining to 
NGOs, i.e. taxation, legal status and legal rights, fall expressly under the jurisdiction of 
national parliaments. This short section will outline how exactly the state has helped 
stimulate voluntary sector growth, improve the economic situation for NGOs and assist in 
the development of a more coherent lobbying system. Some time will be spent detailing 
what the state has not done, in terms of their failure to make the legal-political 
environment more amenable to associational affiliation and volunteerism. 
To give an example of how government can help encourage third sector 
development, I turn to the recently introduced 1 percent law in Poland. This new law 
came into effect 24 April 2003 after much debate and dialogue between the NGO sector 
and government. With the express purpose of assisting registered NGOs, both with 
operating costs and the charitable work they often carry out, the 1% law was heralded by 
most NGOs and would-be philanthropists as an important first step in stimulating third 
sector activity and volunteerism. As reported, “the one percent system is an important 
experiment that allows a portion of the people to allocate public funds and to strengthen a 
philanthropic culture” (Guess and Abrams: 2005: 4). In order to quality for this 
programme NGOs must first register with government, open a registered banking 
account, and critically, become registered as a “Public Benefit Organization” (PBO). The 
U.S. Council on Foundations (USCoF) provides clarification: “To qualify as a PBO, a 
non-governmental organization, including a foundation or association, must conduct at 
least one of the 25 benefit activities listed in law” (USCoF: 2007). The 1% law was part 
of a package of laws adopted by the Sejm to help regulate the whole nonprofit and 
voluntary sector. The “Law on Public Benefit Activity and Volunteerism,” which finally 
establishes a comprehensive legal structure for NGOs and other philanthropic activity, 
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was well received by most Polish activists and donors (ICN 2003). However, those who 
wish to contribute 1 percent of the income tax to a particular NGO or the public benefit 
sector, are complaining that the process is far too complicated (PAP 11 Dec, 2005). Of 
the Polish NGOs surveyed for this dissertation, one-third (see below) collect donations 
from private individuals. The Czech NGO sector is calling for a similar package of laws 
to be introduced. 
 
4.5 Meeting operating  costs - Poland
Donations 
from private 
individuals 
33%
EU 29% Donations from 
private 
organizations or 
corporations 13%
Other 3%International funding 
bodies 6%
Government 
16%
 
The classification system in the Czech Republic is fairly straightforward. 
Nongovernmental organizations can take one of only four legal forms: association, 
foundation, fund and “public benefit corporation” (PBC or obecně prospěšná společnost 
– o.p.s.). Groups registered as an o.p.s., like Gender Studies o.p.s. in Prague, are closer in 
form to a Quango (quasi-autonomous governmental organization) than a traditional 
foundation or association. U.S. International Grantmaking suggests “this legal form 
[o.p.s.] is commonly used by government-dependent NGOs such as theatres, hospitals, 
homes for the elderly, drug rehabilitation clinics, and so forth…PBCs may engage in 
economic activities. Only 5 of 11 Czech NGOs surveyed are registered PBCs. 
 
THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 
This short section, in consideration of the argument presented above, will outline how EU 
institutions and the European polity, the latter now comprising 27 member states and a 
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host of substate and nonstate actors, have worked to fundamentally alter the dynamics of 
contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic. Several commentators (Imig and 
Tarrow 2001; Schmidt 2006; Greenwood 2007) have identified EU institutions as prime 
ground for professional and lay lobbyists, as policy advice from ‘outside’ experts is 
expressly encouraged44. Subsequent chapters of this dissertation, specifically those 
discussing specific episodes of contention, will present case study evidence to support the 
argumentation. This section will perform three tasks: First, those parts of the 
questionnaire relating to group funding and finance will be presented and analysed; 
Second, the implications of EU funding will be discussed, both in terms of how it impacts 
state-level NGO activity and European integration, and; Third, the idea of 
Europeanization will be elaborated upon, as its speaks to the growing interconnectedness 
of the third sector in Europe, especially amongst “special interest” NGOs (i.e. 
environmental groups) and their membership.  
Many NGOs in Poland and the Czech Republic have benefited enormously from 
new (and old) EU funding programmes, like PHARE, which injected billions of euros 
into ECE (Mendelson and Glenn 2002: 5) and western Balkans. A separate and more 
modest programme with an annual budget of €1 million seeks to fund NGOs directly. 
Beginning in 2004 it is geared toward NGOs that, in some way, work to enhance liberal 
democratic governance. The Commission’s webpage stipulates that NGOs interested in 
applying for funding should be active “in the areas of the rule of law, democracy, 
fundamental rights, media pluralism and the fight against corruption” (European 
Commission – Freedom, Security and Justice)45. Prospective NGOs are required to 
submit an application for funding and additionally “provide evidence of their legal 
existence such as an official registration” (ibid). NGOs from 2004 accession countries 
can each apply for up to € 150,000, but the funding they receive cannot, in the end, 
constitute more than 80% of the project’s overall budget. This is an important caveat for 
several reasons, but most importantly it encourages NGOs to solicit funds from private 
individuals, firms and other levels of government. Programmes of similar scope and 
                                                 
44
 The White Paper on European Governance (2001) and elements of the Lisbon Treaty clearly 
encourage NGOs to participate in the development o f EU policy. For a summary of the Lisbon 
Treaty see http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm. 
45
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/support_ngo/funding_support_en.htm# 
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design are now commonplace in Europe with several funding bodies having been 
established over the past three years46.  
4.6 Q: Would you say your organization needs 
additional funding?
Entirely 31%
Mostly 38%
Partly 28%
Not at all 3%
 
 
Nearly 70 percent of respondent NGOs surveyed indicated a need for additional financial 
support. In fact of the twenty-nine respondent NGOs only one claimed to be completely 
satisfied with their group’s financial situation. This came as bit of a surprise considering 
most NGOs operate on a fairly limited budget to begin with and are almost always on the 
hunt for additional support. However, the National Contact Centre – Women and Science 
(Projekt Národní kontaktní centrum - NKC), a Czech NGO dedicated to gender equity in 
the sciences, is able to meet all their operating costs through a combination of state and 
EU funding. The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport funds NKC as part of the 
EUPRO programme, which is dedicated to improving research and development in 
accession countries and also helping incorporate researchers into an ever growing 
network of European scientists and scientific researchers (Regionální kontaktní 
                                                 
46
 When searching for news stories about NGOs and NGO activity I could not help but notice 
how many Newswire entries from Poland and the Czech Republic mention “EU funding”, “EU 
money” and “NGO financing”. In 2007, for instance, € 3 million were made available to Czech 
NGOs (CTK 18 January 2007). In Poland, NGOs will be able to apply for funding from a coffer 
containing € 37.8 Billion. It is expected that this money will “contribute to reducing the economic 
and social disproportions in Poland” (Polish New Bulletin 25 April 2007 – originally published in 
Gazeta Prawna, 20-22 April 2007) 
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organizace)47. NKC was established three year before Czech accession, in 2001, and has 
since then actively sought to bring gender equity to the sciences and improve the number 
of women holding executive-level positions in research and development (R & 
D)(Central European Centre for Women and Youth in Science, website48). The goal of 
this organization is really three fold: to bring more women (and girls) into the sciences; to 
provide both legal and emotional assistance to women experiencing sexual harassment 
and other workplace indignities; to integrate Czech women scientists and academics into 
national, international and global R & D networks (ibid).  
NKC can confidently be labeled a successful, professional and competent Czech 
NGO, however, their working relationship with the Czech state, the Ministry of 
Education and the Government Council for Research and Development, is according to 
information provided on the survey anything but amicable. It is worth highlighting three 
specific examples. First, NKC representative that completed the questionnaire “strongly 
disagreed” with the statement, “government strongly encourages groups like mine to 
participate in the policy making process”. Second, on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being 
“strongly agree” and 1 being “strongly disagree,” the respondent selected 3 to indicate 
how eager government is to hear from NKC. Third, the NKC representative indicated that 
the policy process in the Czech Republic is controlled by political elites and when asked 
about levels of cooperation between NGOs and government, wrote “there’s no concept of 
cooperation so there’s no favoritising [sic].”  This does not appear to be an isolated 
sentiment either, as several of the NGOs surveyed for this dissertation indicated similar 
frustrations with government. However when asked to rate government performance in 
their respective policy area, i.e. environment, gender equity, domestic violence and Roma 
rights, just over half (56 percent) of Czech organizations indicated it has been “neither 
good nor poor”. This level of indifference is surprising as most NGOs believe the policy 
process is controlled by elites and that government thinks they know best. The Polish 
numbers are presented in chart form, below. Notice not one Polish organization was 
inclined to rate government performance in their policy area as “good” or “very good,” 
                                                 
47
 Information about the EUPRO programme was obtained at the website for Regionální kontaktní 
organizace (Regional Contact Organization), 
http://www.vuts.cz/rko/com/finance/financovani5.asp. 
48
 http://www.cec-wys.org/html/index.php?s1=1&s2=3&s3=2&s4=1&lng=13 
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which unlike the Czech case is more consistent with press reports and other secondary 
sources. 
 
4.7 Rate government performance - Poland
Very poor 8% Neither good 
nor poor 38%
Poor 54%
 
 
 
The NGOs and NGO sectors selected for this dissertation have benefited most from EU 
membership, as the EU Commission has made gender equality, environmental protection 
and minority rights a priority since the early 1990s. Natura 2000, a Commission 
programme establishing an EU-wide network of protected parklands and nature 
preserves, gave many ecological NGOs fresh impetus to organize and subsequently 
monitor policy proposals and implementation. It also linked up west European NGOs 
with their counterparts in ECE, giving the whole ecological network a reason to work 
together. The G10, a Brussels based umbrella organization for ten key environmental 
NGOs, including Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth, works “purposefully [to] 
coordinate resource between network members” (Greenwood 2007: 120). Working at the 
EU level the G10 works not only as an environmental policy watchdog and pressure 
group but also as an “indispensable” member of the EU environmental policy-making 
community (ibid: 134). This elevates the status of environmental organizations at the 
national level and gives them a degree of legitimacy that they otherwise might not have. 
Though this may not necessary be a precondition for legitimacy in the Czech Republic as 
NGOs there are one of the most trusted institutions. CTK reported 29 June 2007 that 
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“NGOs enjoy quite a high trust [and] an absolute majority of Czechs have trusted NGOs 
in the long-run.”49 The G10’s presence at the European level, in combination with the 
European Environmental Agency (EEA)50 and comprehensive EU-level environmental 
standards, means national NGOs have, one, a host of organizational and institutional 
support, and two, a way to circumvent unresponsive national lawmakers.    
In terms of minority rights, the EU has been quite clear to both 2004 and 2007 
accession countries, and Turkey, that human rights are a critical part of the European 
ethos, and moreover the acquis. The Copenhagen criteria developed in 1993 with Central 
European and former Soviet republics/states in mind, establishes “…respect for human 
rights and the protection of minorities” as a condition to EU entry (Barnes and Barnes 
2007: 426). Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which enumerates membership 
criteria, lists human rights, democracy and liberty as “common” Union values, and as 
such, a prerequisite to membership. Furthermore, in an effort to improve human rights 
and democratic governance the EU provides NGOs and other organizations with grants in 
those areas which further Union aspirations. The following four granting agencies/bodies 
are part of this programme: European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights; 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights; Gender Equality; Anti-discrimination 
and relations with Civil Society.51 A final example, Daphne II Programme to combat 
violence against children, young people and women, and to protect victims and groups at 
risk, is working to enhance NGO power across Europe. In reference to the inherent value 
of NGOs, their website reads: 
 In many cases, these organisations offer services which the public authorities do 
 not have the power or the ability to provide. Society will only benefit from the 
 expertise and experience of the NGOs if their ideas and programmes are 
 disseminated throughout the European Community and shared with like-minded 
 organisations in other Member States (Daphne Programme website52). 
  
                                                 
49
 The CTK National News Wire report quoted the STEM polling agency for their story on trust. 
CTK (29 June 2007) “Most Czechs do not trust political parties, church – poll: General News. 
50
 The purpose of the EEA is to provide NGOs, consumers and business with information about 
EU environmental standards and also general facts about conservation, recycling and pollution 
reduction. This environmental nodal point is meant to facilitate dialogue between all parties.  
51
 Information on EU grants and funding can be otained at   
http://ec.europa.eu/grants/index_en.htm#human 
52
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/daphne/funding_daphne_en.htm# 
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Daphne is a clear example of how some EU initiatives actively encourage the creation 
and development of transboundary advocacy networks, which in turn change the 
parameters of contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic and state – NGO (or 
third sector) relations. For it becomes easier for weaker groups to accumulate power 
through a system of cross-cutting networks than a system of unitary, discrete actors. Even 
if the state tries to usurp power from a particular NGO, either through limiting their 
access to information or to government officials, it becomes possible in the current EU 
polity to utilize EU institutions, namely the Commission and ECJ. The Rospuda valley 
affair is a clear example of how a previously unconnected group of NGOs can coordinate 
a campaign around a single salient issue against a member-state, in this case Poland, and 
ultimately win. 
It is precisely this sort of arrangement between new member states and the EU 
that effects power dynamics in post communist Europe. Kriesi et al. (1992) argue that 
politics and institutional arrangements have a dramatic effect on how (and with what 
effect) citizen groups mobilize and which protest (or lobbying) repertoire they utilize. 
They argue “that the overt collective action that constitutes the organized, sustained, self-
conscious challenge to existing authorities is best understood if it is related to political 
institutions, and to what happens in arenas of conventional party and interest group 
politics” (Kriesi et al. 1992: 239). To elicit change Polish and Czech NGOs have to work 
through existing national political institutions, just like any other interest group would 
have to. But in 2004 they were provided a brand new set of institutions that thus far have 
enhanced their standing both at home and across Europe.  
Grant programmes and funding schemes are only two of the ways in which the 
EU can directly influence NGO development, and by extension contentious politics in 
Poland and the Czech Republic. The Europeanization of contentious politics, that is the 
spreading of advocacy networks and NGO communities across continental Europe, has 
generally had a validating effect on collective action. Referring back to figure 1.1 in the 
introduction, it would seem that every EU member-state, not just Poland and the Czech 
Republic, are subject to sudden, often potent, episodes of collective action orchestrated 
by traditionally fragmented constituencies. Imig and Tarrow (2001) edited a volume, 
Contentious Europeans, specifically on this topic. They argue a corollary of EU 
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integration is (or will be) European level contentious collective action, and most 
significantly, an overall nexus between domestic (member-state) and European nonstate 
actors. There is strong evidence to support their perspective on European contentious 
politics and that a composite European polity has formed thus encouraging the 
development of truly European policy networks. The effect of these networks is more 
pronounced in Poland and the Czech Republic and other post communist/Soviet states 
because civil society generally lacks embedded networks of advocacy groups. Multilevel 
action coordination, which assumes politically weak groups coordinate their actions 
vertically, from the EU to the national and vice versa, speaks to the growing irrelevance 
of demarcated boundaries when it comes to contentious collective action and lobbying in 
Europe (Helfferich and Kolb 2001: 151). Helfferich and Kolb’s idea, which is now 
almost a decade old, has even more relevance today, as EU 27 contains thousands of 
politically weak NGOs looking for ways to strengthen themselves both materially and 
numerically.    
Europeanization is a contested concept, for it suggests the loosening of national 
boundaries, erosion of state sovereignty, enmeshment of third sector actors, and the 
gradual homogenization of European political culture. Anderson argues “important policy 
debates and decisions that once unfolded within purely national parameters have now 
been ‘Europeanized’ (2002:794). This is an important development for national 
governments that want to accumulate or retain power in decision making and also NGOs 
that want to effect change through collective action. This dynamic is explored in 
subsequent chapters by way of five separate case studies, which when taken together 
clearly illustrate the power and influence external actors and institutions have during 
episodes of contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic. The ideas and theories 
Kriesi et al. were discussing in a 1992 article about new social movements and political 
opportunity structure (POS) in Western Europe now seem prophetic. They wrote: 
 The relevance of the national POS, may, however decline in an even more 
 fundamental way, if the nation-state loses its prominence in conventional politics 
 in a unified and/or regoinalised Europe (1992: 240). 
 
For the reasons national POS is losing relevance, domestic networks are gradually being 
extended outward. Survey results indicate the nearly 80 percent of respondent NGOs 
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believe that developing ties with European NGOs ought to be a strategic priority (See 
below). If the Lisbon Treaty falls short of full ratification, perhaps CEE NGOs will 
attached less importance to forging links with the EU and EU NGO networks. 
 
 
4.8 Importance attached to developing ties with 
European NGOs - Poland
Extremely 
Important 39%
Very Important 
38%
Somewhat 
Important 8%
Not very 
important 15%
 
 
A concerted effort has been made since 2001, the year the Commission published 
the White Paper on European Governance, to assist both civil society organizations, 
directly, and initiatives aimed at improving democratic governance. Based on survey 
results it seems many of the Commission’s recommendations, especially those calling for 
the funding of NGOs and civil society organizations, have been put into practice. For 
example, when respondents were asked about funding (how their operating costs are 
met), almost 70 percent (69.2) of the Polish participant NGOs and 75 percent of the 
Czech ones, indicated the European Union as one of their main sources of funding. 
Almost all groups surveyed plan on applying to the EU for some type of financial 
assistance in the near future. Fully 83 percent of NGOs surveyed indicated they had 
previously applied for EU funding (see below). In Poland the percentage of respondent 
NGOs having applied for EU funding, 84 percent, is slightly higher than the combined 
average. No question the EU has helped and will continue to help support certain 
segments of the nonprofit sector in CEE. In terms of how the EU views NGOs, both the 
Commission and Parliament “have sought to improve the organizational capacities of 
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diffuse interest groups so as to enhance their standing in the policy process…” (Eising 
2007: 215). Does this however mean that European groups are more powerful political 
actors, in Europe and in their respective member-state? 
  
4.9 Funding Applications* ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * Respondents were permitted to indicate more than one funding source on the questionnaire 
 ** NGOs were asked: Has your organization applied to any of these sources for funding? 
 
 
The table reveals several other interesting funding developments. For all the complaining 
Czech and Polish NGOs do about government, they appear willing to approach 
government agencies for funding and use acquired public authority funding to run 
operations. More than 86 percent of NGOs surveyed have applied directly to the state 
(i.e. government and/or auxiliary agencies) for financial assistance. The survey results are 
only a snapshot in time, granted, but it is surprising that so many groups are willing to 
accept government funding when many times they are publicly critical of the post 
communist (and now post accession) situation. For example, A CTK newswire of 6 
November 2000, reports the NGO community as being utterly frustrated with the political 
status quo, which they contend is elitist and unfair to NGOs. Several NGOs made their 
feelings publicly known just a day or so before the European Commission was to assess 
the Czech Republic’s “preparadnes as a candidate for EU entry” (CTK 6 November 
N = 29 Poland (N) Czech Republic 
(N) 
Total (%) 
European Union 11 13 83 
Government 9 16 86 
Other 
Government 
2 2  14 
Private 
Philanthropist 
6 15 72 
International 
NGOs 
3 9 41 
Other 1 7 28 
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2000). Polish NGOs have made similarly unflattering statement about government in the 
past. But the government of Jerzy Buzek (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc - AWS) injected a 
lot of złoty into the civic/NGO sector. For example the Education Ministry “handed out 
279 commissions for NGOs in 1999-2000” and also the Ministry of Finance allocated 30 
million złotych to the third sector (Polityka 15 September 2001: 25). In this way 
government actually helps support third sector development, but in doing so they get to 
determine where (and to whom) the funding goes. The EU disrupts this most basic of 
political advantages. Greenwood (2007) reports, “a four year action programme (2002 – 
06) for promoting NGOs in the field of the environment has a budgetary contribution of  
€ 32 million” (p 132), thus illustrating EU commitment to developing the environmental 
advocacy sector. With all this EU-level funding, many NGOs, especially Polish ones, are 
looking to Brussels for financial security.      
 
4.10 Importance attached to working directly with the EU 
- Polish NGOs
Extremely 
important 46%
Very important 
31%
Not very important  
15%
Somewhat 
important 8%
 
Advocacy groups are an important part of the nonprofit family as they are able to 
challenge government on specific issues relating to policy development and 
implementation, and most often have the policy expertise to do this effectively. Referring 
to America’s (more precisely USAID’s) perception of advocacy NGOs, Carothers notes: 
 
The single most favoured area of US civil society assistance is that of advocacy 
NGOs, such as human rights groups, election monitoring organizations, and 
environmental organizations. In the view of US aid organizations, the crucial 
feature that distinguishes such organizations from social service oriented NGOs, 
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or from the many other intermediate associations and groups that usually exist 
within  societies such as kinship organizations, sports clubs, and cultural 
associations, is that they seek to influence governmental policy on some specific 
set of issues (1997: 114). 
 
A critical difference between EU grant programmes and USAID, in terms of how monies 
can be distributed and spent, is that both Poland and the Czech Republic are members of 
the EU and therefore a part of the budgetary process. Thus both governments will have 
some say in how EU money is spent and allocated, even if the Commission has it 
earmarked for the NGO sector of civil society development. USAID and international 
philanthropic agencies, in particular are able to fund NGOs with minimal political 
constraint. However many NGOs and NGO forums are upset with the present 
institutional arrangement, in which national governments have the ultimate say in how 
EU funds are distributed to nonprofits – especially if funding must first be routed through 
state ministries and agencies. The Commission only approves the overall budget and 
spending formula, where and who the funds are ultimately channeled to is up to 
government. Polish MP, Witold Gintowt-Dziewaltowski (SLD), is quoted in Gazeta 
Bankowa saying “…the process of EU funding distribution is too centralized…local 
governments, as well as NGOs play too small a role in it” (PNB 15 May 2007). Problems 
with distribution date back to before EU entry but in many places they persist. Referring 
to the Polish experience, Stankiewicz (2003) notes that “a mere 3.4 percent of Polish 
NGOs [c.2003] have tapped into EU funds so far” (World News Connection 26 August 
2003). But it seems as though things are now finally improving for the Polish and Czech 
NGOs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this section was to add some empirical weight to several ostensibly 
theoretical arguments about NGO activity in Poland and the Czech Republic and also the 
manner in which NGOs conduct their activities in a highly stratified European polity. The 
inclusion of quantitative data, though limited to only a few types of organizations in two 
post communist countries, was not accidental. Comparative research in the areas of group 
politics in post communist states, interest articulation in the EU and, the development and 
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expansion of policy communities and networks in Europe, had become much more 
empirically based over time (Greenwood 2007; Eising 2007; Schmidt 2006; Toepler and 
Salamon 2003; Mendelson and Glenn 2002). The study of NGO development in post 
communist Europe has become, as Mendelson and Glenn (2002), overly empirical and 
quantitative. Thy took effort to provide a more qualitative account of NGO activity in 
their latest book. For the purposes to this dissertation it was important to consult groups 
directly, if anything, to get a sense of how they view government and what it is, 
specifically, that may be impeding their development. The empirical findings suggest 
three things about post communist and post EU accession group politics in Central 
Europe.  
First, in an attempt to acquire political power, understood here as influence, 
groups have been busy building advocacy networks with groups both inside and outside 
their home state that stretch the length and breadth of the EU. The fact is, European 
institutions and the quasi-federal nature (or compound nature) of the EU encourage 
NGOs, both old and new, to seek out alignments and partner with stakeholders of similar 
kind. This holds especially true for NGOs in Poland and the Czech Republic, which thus 
far have been unable to exert influence over policy makers using what amounts to 
traditional lobbying strategies and tactics – lobbying parliamentarians and policy makers 
directly without aid of intermediary institutions, supranational agencies or networks. 
None of the NGOs consulted for this study felt whole heartedly that their respective 
government actively encouraged their participation in the policy process or were eager to 
hear what they had to say about pending policy. Thus, as rational actors, they have 
intentionally looked for other ways to gain political advantage. This explains the growing 
number of EU interest groups (Greenwood 2007: 12-14; Watson and Shakleton 2008: 
94), the way contentious politics occurs, and increasing density of policy communities 
and advocacy networks. It is worth repeating, NGOs from Poland and the Czech 
Republic are more likely to join pan-European networks53 or utilize EU institutions to 
                                                 
53
 Networking may occur on an issue to issue basis. That is, groups may align, as was the case 
with the Raspuda valley episode, in an attempt to exert one-time pressure on an agency or 
government over a discrete event or policy decision. It is this unpredictability which characterizes 
contentious politics in the post Nice EU. The cases studies present in subsequent chapters are a 
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pressurize their national government, as they have not been receptive to their lobbying 
efforts.  
Second, respondent NGOs from the Czech Republic have been in operation, on 
average, twice as long as their Polish. Nearly 70 percent (N = 13) of the Polish NGOs 
surveyed for this dissertation indicate an organizational lifespan of between for 2- 5 
years. This is remarkable considering every single participant NGO from the Czech 
Republic report being over 6 years old, with approximately two-thirds indicating their 
age at over 10 years. While it is impossible to extrapolate or indeed make any definitive 
generalizations about all Polish and/or Czech NGOs from such a limited sample, it is 
perhaps telling that when comparing the more service-sector oriented and urban Czech 
Republic, to the more agrarian and rural Poland, it is the Czech Republic that is most able 
to support the voluntary sector. The Economist reports GDP per head purchasing power 
parity for the Czech Republic at US$ 24, 336, and for Poland US$ 16,291.54  But in a 
globalized or internationalized system the relative economic strength of any one 
particular state (even if calculated per capita) is offset by how much international aid the 
voluntary sector is able to secure. By most estimates, the NGO community in the Czech 
Republic has historically received more philanthropic assistance per capita than Poland. It 
is difficult to obtain reliable data on overall/total philanthropic contributions to any or all 
of the voluntary sector(s) in Central Europe. Of the NGOs surveyed, on average it is the 
Czech ones that have been around longer, have more paid than voluntary staff, and 
believe they can contribute “valuable policy advice to government.”  
Third, most of the respondents believe their NGO and NGOs in general contribute 
positively to democracy, policy development and governance. The data indicates that 
political parties are viewed quite negatively by the NGO community and are, for the 
most, unable to adequately represent the interests of a divergent population. This was 
almost unanimous, with fully 59 percent of respondents “strongly disagreeing” with the 
statement, “political parties are better able to translate the needs of the population than 
non-governmental organizations”. Only 2 of the 29 respondents indicated any agreement 
                                                                                                                                                 
testament to the diversity of interests which converge on a particular policy issue, if it is highly 
salient to enough actors, that is.  
54
 Data can be found at http://www.economist.com/countries/CzechRepublic/ and separately 
http://www.economist.com/countries/Poland/. These numbers reflect 2007 averages. 
 109  
whatsoever with the statement. In this way NGO activists regard the third sector as both 
important to the functioning of democracy and imperative to the development of truly 
responsible and equitable public policy. This is however a skewed result, as only active 
NGOs were consulted for this dissertation. There may well be a number of disillusioned 
activists out there that regard the NGO community as too powerful or elitist and unable to 
world collaboratively with other NGOs and government. Vaclav Zak, a Charter 77 
signatory and now social commentator and media lecturer in the Czech Republic, 
believes that NGOs are undeserving of public funds, are less accountable than state 
organizations, and do not behave responsibly.55 Current Czech President Vaclav Klaus, as 
mentioned, regards NGOs in a similar way. But Dzamila Stehlikova, minister of 
minorities and human rights in the Czech Republic, believes something quite different: 
 
 Non-governmental organizations can enrich considerably the priorities [during the 
 Czech Republic’s EU presidency] since it is them who always reacts [sic] most 
 sensitively and quickly to the current needs of citizens and complement the state 
 sector and public administration in areas that are necessary for the operation of 
 our society” (CTK 4 March 2008) 
 
In the end there is no consensus either in the Czech Republic or Poland on what role the 
voluntary sector should play and specifically how NGOs should be incorporated into the 
decision making process. But almost all NGOs surveyed believe all NGOs should be 
given time to read draft government policy and, critically, be provided with an 
opportunity at least to communicate their ideas, concerns and views to government. So 
there is a noticeable disconnect between policy makers and the NGO sector, as a clear 
majority of NGOs surveyed feel marginalized. Kit Kimberly wrote:  
 Since 1990, the more than 30,000 NGOs that make up the Czech nonprofit sector 
 have struggled to gain recognition and respect for filling the gap – created by the 
 transition to a civil society – among government, business, and citizen interests. 
 (Prague Post 4 March 1998)  
 
Similar charges have been levied at state authorities in Poland. For example on 22 
September 2002 over 500 members of NGOs convened a meeting in Warsaw to consider 
possible solutions to what they determine is  a crisis in the voluntary sector (Polish News 
                                                 
55
 Interview conducted 18 August 2003 in Prague, Czech Republic.  
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Bulletin 25 September 2002). The goal of the meeting to was construct a federation (i.e. 
an encompassing advocacy network) capable of exerting pressure on Polish decision 
makers. As reported, “of all the registered non-governmental organizations [in Poland] 
nearly a half have ceased to exist, due to financial problems, low spirits and negligence 
by state authorities” (ibid). While other source suggest a similar decline in the total 
number of Polish NGOs (i.e. the Nations in Transit series) it is important to recognize 
that USAID stopped providing SEED support around this time, and other philanthropic 
agencies began turning their attention to the former Yugoslavia, the Ukraine and other 
Eastern European states. In other words there are intervening variable that should be 
taken into consideration when determining the reasons for NGO decline in Poland.  
4.11 Rate government performance in your policy 
area
Very good 
0% Good 19%
Neither 
good nor 
poor 56%
Poor 25% v
 
 
A result that contradicts one of the hypotheses is presented in chart form above. Three-
quarters of Czech NGOs surveyed rate government performance in their particular policy 
area “good” or “neither good nor bad.” A few of the other results relating to Government-
NGOs relations and interactions is presented in graph form below.  
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Despite EU accession and several policy victories at the European and national level, 
survey data suggests that many NGOs are still unpleased with the status quo. However 
this may not be an indictment of EU governance and multi-level decision making. Rather 
it could be that respondent NGOs have either unrealistic expectations or have rated 
current political practices according to how they ‘wish’ it transpired. Thus there will 
always be a lower degree of political efficacy among very active (and demanding) NGOs. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Environmental Politics 
 
One fundamental problem with interest articulation stemming from the environmental 
sector in ECE is while many groups have gained experience and lobbying know-how 
since consolidation, government and state agencies have retained socialist era skepticism 
toward sub-state actors. Two examples seem to support this position. First, President 
Vaclav Klaus has – several times - publicly condemned NGOs for being undemocratic 
and illegitimate. Referring to Klaus’s speech at the Council of Europe Summit in 
Warsaw, the Prague Post quoted him as saying “various manifestations of NGOism [sic], 
of artificial multiculturalism, of radical human rightsism [sic], of aggressive 
environmentalism" were ways of "endangering and undermining freedom" in the post-
communist era.”56 Polish politicians do not seem to have the same penchant for stirring 
up controversy over their views on NGOs, but undervalue the potential policy expertise 
of third sector advocates a similar way. For the second example I turn to the relationship 
between the Polish government and the third sector. It is worth quoting Regulska (1999) 
at length: 
The national state’s policy towards the NGO sector in Poland is confused. In the 
context of a high rate of government turnover – nine governments presided during 
the past nine years – the attitudes of elected and appointed officials toward NGOs 
also have oscillated. Several Polish Prime Ministers and their governments of 
example felt obliged to take public stands regarding NGOs, and with each sending 
different signals, a clear policy is yet to be established. Various fiscal and 
financial provisions have been introduced, only to be either withdrawn shortly 
afterward, remain unimplemented, or to be hampered in implementation by 
excessively bureaucratic procedures (1999: 67) 
 
This chapter will accomplish four things. First, it will determine why policy formulation 
in Poland and the Czech Republic is state-directed and, shed light on the reasons for state 
autonomy.  Second, it will supply an overview of lobbying, contentious politics and the 
protest repertoires available to several established and emerging environmental groups. 
Third, a synopsis of environmental group development in Poland and the Czech Republic 
                                                 
56
 Dinah A. Spritzer “Speech Against ‘NGOism’ Haunts Klaus,” Prague Post online 
(www.praguepost.com): last accessed 5 August 2006. 
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will be given with focus on trajectory and relative potency – that is, how EIG 
development relates to structural changes at the political elite and institutional level. 
Finally, the protests at Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic, along with the 
Green party movement (fissure?) in Poland will be analysed to discern the impact of state 
building on interest group behaviour, in the first instance, and the political factors 
influencing the Green party activities, in the second.       
This chapter is expressly concerned with the interchange, or lack thereof, between 
state officials and environmental interest groups (NGOs), and also the unwillingness of 
elected officials to implement environmental policy with aid of non-elected or non-state 
groups – e.g., environmentalists. It has been noted that however well this sector is 
currently performing, its dependency on western donors means many environmental 
groups and correspondingly their policy community is without a robust grassroots 
network to draw support from (cf. Fagin 2000; Fagan 2004; Davis 2004; Andonova 2004; 
Jehlicka et al. 2002). According to these same authors it is precisely the preponderance of 
international aid which has exacerbated this problem, creating a situation where local 
environmental groups are concerned first and foremost with donor expectations and 
requirements and not with developing meaningful connections to the grassroots. 
Incidentally, because some donors are forced to seek out and support apolitical or less 
political organizations, something that American philanthropic associations are bound by 
law to do, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of research centers and 
educational programmes (McMahon 2001). As McMahon suggests, “foundations and 
other non-profit organizations can only make grants for charitable, scientific, literacy, or 
educational purposes only (…) their support cannot be used to influence legislation or 
support groups with a political agenday” (McMahon 2001: 56). The growth of 
educational programmes, however, has been at the expense of direct lobbying and 
contentious politics. This is beginning to change, as Davis indicates, “although research, 
education, publicity, and occasionally protest remain the core activities of Czech 
environmental groups, a few have begun to engage in more of the ‘insider’ modes of 
political participation – namely lobbying and litigation – that have long formed the 
nucleus of their American counterpart’s efforts” (2004: 386). But for the first years of 
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democracy many groups were less involved in policy making than they might have 
hoped. 
 The piecemeal way policy is created and developed is also problematic for 
NGOs, as they are unable to regularize their contact with parliamentarians and/or 
bureaucrats.  For example,  once a part of the policy making process, “the stunning 
reversal in the policymaking access enjoyed by environmental groups highlights the 
development of weak connections between the state and society (…) Environmental 
groups saw their involvement in policymaking diminish gradually through 1996 and their 
interests openly derided as naïve and harmful” (Green 1999: 9). Also of concern to 
lobbyists, anywhere really, is the stability of a given government and/or governmental 
ministries. In Poland for instance, where governments are short lived and susceptible to 
fissure, groups are less likely to engage in conventional forms of political protest and/or 
lobbying. There is simply less opportunity in Poland to establish working relationships 
with parliamentarian and non-elected officials. Dalton et al.’s study of environmental 
modes of action across six regions reveals, 1) East European environmental groups are 
least likely (out of all six regions) to engage in conventional activities, and 2) the second 
least likely (only behind North America) to use protest as a way to pressure officials 
(Dalton et al. 2003: 754). Considering NGOs publicly stated willingness to work with 
government during the first years of transition, and then their inclusion in environmental 
policy making in the early 1990s, it would appear that as state building has proceeded, so 
NGOs have become marginalized. Both Jiri Tutter of Greenpeace CZ and Vojtech 
Kotecky of Friends of the Earth CZ (FoE CZ) confirm as much, as they report a less than 
ideal working relationship with the Czech Ministry of Environment. Two questions 
underpin this chapter: 
 
1. Is the development of effective environmental groups in Poland and the Czech 
Republic being hampered by the persistence of communist era collective action 
tactics?  
2. Are policy networks (or communities) suitably able transmit the desires of both 
NGOs and the population to decision makers so that environmental policy takes 
into consideration the needs/wants of relevant stakeholders?   
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This chapter argues Czech and Polish environmental NGOs have struggled to find a 
positive place in post consolidation policy making, even though they have toiled long and 
hard to effect change and develop western-style advocacy networks (Carmin and Hicks, 
2002). A socialist legacy has something to do with this, certainly, as the actions taken by 
both contemporary politicians and environmentalists are likely to be influenced by 
communist era (anti) politics. Without policy networks and interest communities, for 
example, communist era politics was segmented and closed off from societal 
stakeholders, providing the state with considerable autonomy and thus no direct 
challengers. This is a difficult condition to overcome. Fragmentation within the 
environmental community has enabled state institutions to continue their paternalistic 
practices and avoid direct, meaningful, dialogue with environmental groups. But as new 
EU directives take effect, the environmental lobby at both the EU and member-state level 
becomes more powerful. Environmental groups are prominent and important political 
actors at both the national and international level. Growing in size (total number of 
organizations and membership) and gaining institutional competency over the past 30 
years, such groups as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund and Friends of the Earth, have 
managed to secure their place in a complex worldwide network of environmental policy 
advocates and professionals. Direct action campaigns, educational programmes and 
membership drives have made these groups household names – and the face of 
environmentalism. Recognised as legitimate environmental policy experts, environmental 
NGOs are now credible and potent sub-state actors, able to influence environmental 
policy and government planning in profound ways.  
It is not an exaggeration to say environmental NGOs have managed to push 
sustainable development and renewable energy atop the international policy agenda while 
drawing attention to such destructive practices as driftnet fishing, clear-cut logging and 
automobile pollution. In Poland and the Czech Republic however, these issues have less 
salience with the population than more immediate concerns, such as job security, 
unemployment and healthcare. Pollution, both water and air, along with inadequate 
solutions to toxic waste disposal, open pit mining and inefficient logging practices, have 
provided democratic-era ECE environmentalists with a litany of problem areas to focus 
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their attention on.  After forty years of maltreatment at the hands of Communists, the 
environment in both Poland and the Czech Republic was in need of immediate attention. 
The As Pavlinek and Pickles (2004) identify:   
It is now well known that post-socialist Europe inherited a complex legacy of 
environmental problems with their own distinct and important geographies (…) 
By the late 1980s, large areas of the region suffered  from excessive air pollution, 
water pollution and land degradation, particularly in the former East Germany, the 
Czech Republic and Poland (p.239).     
 
Many local groups, often accompanied by (or sometimes led by) large international 
NGOs, started asking tough question of the newly elected governments of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. They wanted to know what the government’s immediate plans were for 
environmental clean-up and sustainable enterprise in both the industrial and agricultural 
sector. NGOs were quickly becoming powerful policy advocates at both the local and 
state level, putting to work an established network of environmentalists with requisite 
policy experience.  Examples of their activity range from a Greenpeace authored ‘letter to 
the editor’ in the Prague Post about river contamination after the floods of 2003, to a 
rather ruckus series of protests in Warsaw’s Targowek borough over a proposed 
incinerator. While the environment, as an area of discrete policy concern, has slipped 
down the political agenda (Carmin and Hicks 2002: 314), it still seems ECE governments 
are having to deal with environmental interest groups (NGOs) whether they would like to 
or not. In this way traditional interest cleavages are forming between industry and 
environmentalists, and between neo-liberal/market oriented politicians and NGOs. The 
environmental sector in Poland and the Czech Republic are beginning to exhibit some the 
characteristics of a ‘western’ policy community, with a host of competent groups 
regularly challenging government programmes, liaising with local and European media, 
and critically, they are offering the public alternatives to government policy. But this 
sector is lacking connections, to both its own constituency (e.g. ecologically oriented 
Czechs and Poles) and the state (e.g. the bureaucracy and/or Ministry of Environment). 
Important to developing a lasting and potent environmental network in ECE is the 
creation of vertical advocacy chains, moving upwards from informal local groups to 
professional organizations with policy competency. At the top of this chain is where the 
state and professional NGOs meet. Here, the actions of state officials and government are 
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critical to the transmittance of policy ideas from the third sector to the Ministry of the 
Environment or to government proper. It is worth noting what USAID said about this 
working relationship in the Czech Republic first, and Poland Second: 
 
Czech Repbulic: 
Cooperation between the government and NGOs needs to be improved. The 
government does not perceive NGOs as partners; some prominent government 
officials even refer to NGOs as illegitimate, non-elected organizations with 
verifiable democratic structures.  
 
Poland: 
Despite [many tangible] advances, NGOs continue to face serious problems: 
financial viability remains elusive for many organizations; relationships with the 
government require strengthening; and the general public still does not have a 
solid understanding of the role of NGOs.57  
 
Given the tradition of organized opposition in Poland (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998) it is 
surprising that environmental groups seem preoccupied with elite level or formalized 
interest contestation (i.e. the establishment of a green party) rather than developing 
further as a sub set of civil society. In the Czech Republic, the push for a green party has 
been tempered by the organizational success of NGOs, which have garnered considerable 
attention from the press and academia58 and have, compared to Poland, been active since 
the early 1990s. Therefore the intervening variable with the most impact on repertoires of 
contention in post-communist Europe is the state, for government and state officials are 
establishing the terms of contentious politics and augmenting institutions and laws on 
almost a monthly basis.  
It is not an overstatement to say the post-communist state is concerned about its 
prospects of losing power to interest groups and sub-state agencies. A recent example 
                                                 
57
 Both citations are taken from United States Agency for International Development “2001 NGO 
Sustainability Index,” published by USAID and available on their website, www.usaid.gov. 
58
 It has been this author’s experience throughout the course of researching environmental 
organization in Poland and the Czech Republic, that the environmental movement in 
Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic has received the lion’s share of scholarly attention since 
the collapse of communist in 1989. There are a number of reasons for this, but the two dominant 
ones seem to be the critical role played by environmentalists nearer to the end of communism and 
second (cf. Pavlinek and Pickles, 2004), the recent activity of Greenpeace and FoE, which has 
kept the environment, if not at the top of the political agenda, certainly at the top of the scholarly 
agenda. 
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comes via Ladislav Jakl, secretary to president Vaclav Klaus, who said: “I think NGOs’ 
power over people is dangerous – this power should only be used by institutions with a 
public mandate, which can be overseen” (Radio Praha, 13/07/2005). Ultimately 
contentious politics is shaped not by the actions or character of interest groups in 
isolation, but by the government or state’s perception of NGOs and reaction to their 
lobbying. If Jakl’s comments are truly representative, then it seems only too obvious why 
environmental NGOs and the government are distrustful of each other. A viable thesis 
emerges from this cleavage which posits third sector weakness is a consequence of 
unfavourable working condition between governmental agencies and NGOs and/or 
international NGOs. In Poland, Kurek et al. (2001) argue “unfortunately the influence of 
ENGOs [Environmental Non-governmental Organisations] in the administrative process 
is weak because membership and financial resources are limited and the record of 
concerted action is poor” (p. 511). In situations where the state is openly hostile towards 
organized interests, e.g. Klaus’ view of civil society and NGOs, it is no longer acceptable 
to regard low levels of political efficacy as the root cause of third sector marginalization. 
The focus should be squarely on the state and its administrative competencies (including 
the particular ethos of the Ministry of the Environment) in order to determine 
impediments to ecological mobilization and collective action.  
After the collapse of communism politically hardened environmental advocates 
began to liaise and sometimes supplant home-grown activists in CEE (Carmin and Hicks, 
2002; Davis 2004). Many of the groups which formed after 1989 are branches of 
established international NGOs, thus securing the help of policy experts, media 
consultants and senior campaigners during the formation of CEE offices. The 
environmental movement in both Poland and the Czech Republic has benefited from a 
preexisting network of environmental NGOs and has used the experiences of West 
European and North American groups to good effect. Therefore, when looking at 
contemporary NGOs in the Czech Republic one sees media campaigns, membership 
drives59 and protests that resemble those of established groups in countries with a longer 
                                                 
59
 This author witnessed members of Greenpeace CZ carrying out a membership and donation 
drive in the Prague subway (July 2003). The scene resembled western Greenpeace campaigns, 
with members wearing Greenpeace T-shirts, toting clipboards and asking commuters to join or 
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history of public protest and volunteerism. For instance the quality of a recent 
Greenpeace CZ television advertisement lambasting the government’s poor record on 
pollution and waste management is consistent with (if not better than) what Greenpeace 
has produced outside ECE60. Greenpeace has been active in Poland as well (recent 
campaigns to remove a ‘pirate’ fishing vessel from Gdansk harbour and separately to stop 
genetically modified seeds from entering Poland bears this out) but interest among local 
green organizations is with creating a Green party that can compete at state and EU level 
elections (cf. Ferry and Rudig 2002). Part of the problem in establishing a competent 
green party in Poland is with environmentalism itself. As Ferry and Rudig (2002) argue 
“environmental issues (…) had played their symbolic role as carriers of anti-communist 
challenges, but then had little role to play in post-transition party politics” (p.2). With 
political transition came a host of more pressing issues and policy conundrums, such as 
economic restructuring and privatization, by which the environment seemed less 
pressing.      
But the above examples do not speak to the growing levels of dissatisfaction 
amongst greens in Poland or to the limited role NGOs play in the formulation of Czech 
environmental policy. In Poland, the green movement has sought to create one, unified 
and encompassing, Polish green party to compete in national and sub-national elections. 
This is consistent with the history of dissidence in Poland which saw Solidarity acquire 
the characteristics of a political party in waiting when the opportunity to compete in 
semi-free elections emerged in 1989. This episode, as it will be discussed, ended up 
marginalizing those Solidarity members that favoured a more environmentally friendly, if 
not overtly ‘green,’ movement (Ferry 2002: 172). In the Czech Republic, a core group of 
environmental NGOs has managed to develop into a fairly effective network, but as 
Fagan (2005) argues 
With a few exceptions, the core professional environmental NGOs that dominate 
policy arenas, comment on policy drafts and articulate the dominant 
                                                                                                                                                 
give generously to Greenpeace. People seemed quite receptive, but this is a purely anecdotal 
statement. 
60
 The advertisement can be viewed at www.greenpeace.cz or via the Prague Post website, 
www.praguepost.com/P03/2005/Art/0217/news4.php. The Greenpeace advertisement has been 
criticized by Regional Development Minister Jiri Paroubek, who said “this is a strike below the 
belt (...) it basically presents us as some sort of dump for the whole of Europe” (Prague Post, 17 
Feb 2005) 
 120  
environmental discourse in the media and within the policy sphere have failed to 
root themselves within society at large (p.529)    
 
This leaves a disjuncture between potential grassroots activists and the political 
movements themselves, on the one hand and, a growing gulf between policy makers and 
professional environmental NGOs on the other. Both outcomes place limitations on what 
environmental groups can politically do, whether it is the building of a grassroots support 
network or developing a constructive relationship with policy makers. For instance, the 
above two structural conditions puts into question the legitimacy of environmental groups 
and the movement in general. Insofar as NGOs are not connected to the population they 
supposedly represent (cf. Fagan, 2005: 529), potential membership. Subsequently the 
development of a more robust environmental policy community is jeopardised. This 
leaves the state in a powerful position as the environmental ministries of Poland and the 
Czech Republic are able to manipulate the policy process to their advantage. As 
executive director of Greenpeace Praha Jiri Tutter pointed out, while the Ministry of the 
Environment has publicly proclaimed its willingness to work with environmental NGOs, 
like Greenpeace and FoE, it is common for them to release a huge policy dossier only 
days before a particular matter is to be introduced in Parliament.61 With a staff of only 
thirteen, Tutter proclaimed that it is impossible to analyze and comment on complex and 
complicated policy briefs only days before they enter the Bill stage. He also added that 
the Czech Ombudsman, who handles complaints from NGOs, “has no legal force” and 
cannot compel government to open-up the policy process to third party organizations62. It 
is up to the discretion of the Ministry and government whether or not policy will be 
tabled publicly and discusses at the committee level. Both Polish and Czech legislation 
(particularly the broad environmental ‘mission statements’ prepared by each respective 
Ministry of the Environment) calls for the creation and maintenance of a multilevel, 
transparent, policy process which incorporates NGOs and other interested parties in 
decisions making. However, NGOs are still very much at the periphery of environmental 
policy formulation.  
                                                 
61
 Interview conducted in Prague, 22/08/03. 
62
 Interview conducted in Prague (Greenpeace Office, Ceskomalinska 27, 16 000, Praha 6) 
22/08/03 
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In Poland, the Green movement was fairly active during the communist period, 
securing a place within the Solidarity movement and at the roundtable talks. However, 
post 1989 the green movement has not developed into a stable sector with any tangible 
political power. Attempts have been made to rectify this through the formation of a large 
umbrella organization, which would place gay/lesbian groups, feminist organizations and 
ecological clubs, alongside more established environmental NGOs. Amongst greens in 
the Krakow area the trend has been towards the development of a political party. This has 
caused the green movement in Krakow to fissure rather than move towards the creation 
of an effective lobby.63 Furthermore, as Krawczuk points out, the Green movement sees 
“huge regional disparities in terms of environmental activity – some areas those (sic) 
interest groups are quite well organized, others, very weak indeed” (Interview, 18/07/03). 
But the overall impression one gets of the Polish green movement and NGOs is that they 
are well regarded by Poles generally, but are not actively encouraged to form or grow by 
the state or political parties.  
On the one hand, Polish environmental groups have decided to focus their 
attention on formalized politics, working towards the establishment of a Polish green 
party. On the other hand, evidence suggests Czech environmental groups are seeking to 
influence decision makers through lobbying and direct action campaigns. While there are 
a few examples to the contrary, the environmental movement in each country is 
developing according to the opportunity structure available – which is largely contingent 
on state practice and overall policy direction. This cements earlier assertions that it is in 
fact the state, institutions and the parameters of contentious politics that are shaping 
interest group politics, and not the internal dynamic of groups or accordant levels of 
political efficacy. This is why structural determinants are here being placed ahead of 
agential or ideational variables.  
As environmental policy develops and ministries expand to accommodate new 
EU environmental directives and the neo-liberal prerogative of the common market, state 
officials and the political elite are provided with an excuse – the EU excuse. This permits 
them, in good conscience, to ignore huge swaths of the policy community. They are 
                                                 
63
 Interview conducted in Krakow with Dr Wojciech Krawczuk, former green activist and now 
professor at Jagiellonean University, 18/07/03 
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forced, as adherents to the Acquis and other international agreements, to prioritize public 
policy decisions according to the external pressures and the integration timeline. As 
Andova (2004) argues “most accounts of EU enlargement also present the adoption of 
EU rules by accession countries as driven exclusively from above by empowered 
executives and the European Commission, with limited involvement of societal interests 
and parliaments” (p.18). It is impossible to analyse NGOs in Poland and the Czech 
Republic without seriously considering how external environmental norms and explicit 
rules shape the conduct of all environmental actors, at all levels of the policy process – 
the ministry of the environment, government and lobbyists, etc. This sort of multilevel 
policy making and lobbying, to which environmental standards and sustainable 
development are privy to, is unprecedented. Never before has an examination of interest 
groups and environmental policy had to peel back so many political layers. It is in this 
environment that institutions and the way decisions are made (or excuses are made) 
increasingly matter. One example offered by Andonova (2004), “the policy process in all 
three countries [Poland, Bulgarian and the Czech Republic] was dominated by 
governmental agencies, industrial actors, and parliaments without substantial input from 
advocacy organizations” (p. 26). 
During transition and after, there is a tendency according to Dryzek and Holmes 
(2002: 248), for newly elected politicians and their mandarins to see politics in “black 
and white terms, with clear heroes and clear villains – as opposed to the more pragmatic 
politics of interest which supposedly characterize mature liberal democracies.” Again, 
contentious politics is shaped in large measure by institutions and institutional choices, 
thus choosing a particular economic policy (a five year plan, for instance) would place 
limitations on NGOs from the outset. Blazyca (2003) highlights the Polish case: “where 
the authorities predicted a short, sharp recession before better times, what they got was a 
much longer and depper downturn (…) the room for manoeuvre was much less than the 
neo-liberal approach assumed (p. 217).Therefore in the Czech and Polish cases, though 
the political environment and historical legacies influence group politics in difference 
ways, the environmental movements in each country are faced with similar institutional-
level impediments.      
* * *  
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This chapter weaves established theories of interest articulation and public policy into the 
analysis of post-communist group politics. Fagan (2004: 35) cautions against using 
western theories to explain the deficiencies or indeed character of post-communist 
environmental politics. But as the purpose of this dissertation is to highlight structural 
level impediments to collective action, it seems appropriate to use theories and concepts 
that ultimately accentuate institutionalized forms of interest contestation. When one is 
looking expressly for deficiencies in state-NGO relations, it is useful to look at the 
architecture of contentious collective action and the repertoires of contention utilized by 
participants. Institutional and/or functionalist theory also help illuminate how power 
dynamics in the policy system affect normal channels of communication between interest 
groups and state agencies. 
This is being done here for two specific reasons. First, it will help cement the case 
studies in language which is less normative and more conceptually robust, making this 
dissertation’s methodology useful for other comparative assignments.  Second, it will 
allow for a more critical assessment of group politics in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
which are considered two of the more advanced post-communist states in the region. In a 
way they are liberal democratic trailblazers (Dryzek and Holmes, 2002).  
When examining post communist models of democracy (cf. Dryzek and Holmes 
2002: 4-15) and civil society (cf. Putnam 1995), it is important to stress Arato and 
Cohen’s (1995) thoughts about social movements and civil society: “social movements 
constitute the dynamic element in processes that might realize the positive potentials of 
modern civil societies” (p. 492). While their comprehensive book on the topic of civil 
society is most helpful, covering the normative revival of civil society in ECE, along with 
the historical roots and development of the concept (and theory), a clear link is never 
established between interest articulation, state practice and autonomy (at either the state 
or sub-state level). If this discussion elucidates only one thing, it must be that groups are 
competitive, ecological groups being no exception, which makes it impossible to 
extrapolate from one sector’s activity the overall condition of civil society.  
Further, Arato and Cohen supply a six fold summary of the Chicago school’s 
(social psychological paradigm) assumptions about collective action. Of interest is 
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number two, which reads: “Noninstitutional-collective action is action that is not guided 
by existing social norms but is formed to meet undefined or unstructured situations” (p. 
495). The idea that group action can occur outside structured avenues of interest 
contestation is one that this dissertation fails to support. In newly democratic states it is 
precisely the institutions, both formal and informal, which guide or influence contentious 
politics. For example, from the first free parliamentary elections in 1991 the ecological 
movement in Poland has been preoccupied with establishing one, unified and 
encompassing, green party. This is directly the result of an electoral system which early 
in transition favoured smaller parties (Waller and Millard 1992: 168). Now, even though 
a new threshold limits smaller more radical parties from winning seats, political parties 
are still the preferred method of interest articulation – to the detriment of classical forms 
of interest articulation and mediation. Political parties have become powerful actors. Both 
in the traditional sense, as they have capacity to form government or part thereof, and in a 
more unconventional sense, as political parties which gain a parliamentary (Sejm) or 
senatorial (Senat) seat are guaranteed a state allowance and access to information. 
Acknowledging the upward mobility of some interest groups for purely economical 
reasons is important, as some political parties, like Poland’s Samoobrona (Self-Defence) 
exhibit many of the characteristics of a social movement or protest group, including the 
use of direct action campaigns and disruptive protest, rather than those traditionally 
associated with a political party concerned with interest aggregation. Violence at an 
August 1999 Samoobrona protest, which injured approximately 70 people, mostly police, 
illustrates the mentality of this union come populist party and the turbulence surrounding 
the Polish party system (Financial Times, 1999).   
    I have presented elite theory and new institutionalism as two important and 
valuable paradigms in the study of post-communist group politics and public policy. The 
prior emphasizes closed bargaining (‘inner circles’) and the persistence of certain actors 
and modes of behaviour (i.e. corruption), two realities of post-communist politics. Elite 
theory, in that it emphasizes power arrangements and the significance of political elites 
during regime change, helps explain why both the Polish and Czech state has managed to 
maintain a degree of autonomy that, in effect, keeps many interest groups at bay and 
outside formalised policy making channels. The latter, neo institutionalism, brings the 
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state back into civil society analysis – which has been done previously, by Skocpol and 
Offe, just not in the context of post-communist policy formulation and interest politics. 
For all intents, the state’s ability to act ‘alone’ is further enhanced when state officials are 
confronted with the task of state-building and law making, as is the case with Poland and 
the Czech Republic. As Higley and Burton (1987) argue, “in many ways, elite settlements 
are as consequential as social revolutions, yet they have not been systematically studied 
as a discrete class of events” (p.295). Elites play an important role in developing new 
institutions and new policies and, if their preferences emerge during this period, it should 
not be entirely surprising. Consider the impact of EU legislation, and indeed European 
level environmental lobbyists, on member-state environmental policy and the activities of 
local environmentalists and government. As Watson and Shackleton (2003) argue 
“environmental groups have built up particularly extensive contacts inside the different 
institutions and, with the help of certain ‘greener’ governments, have influenced the 
Commission’s sustainable development policies” (p.92). This is the new reality of Polish 
and Czech environmental policy. Even if groups are unsuccessful ‘at home’, at the 
domestic level, they will undoubtedly have an equally fervent section of lobbyists at the 
EU level to do their bidding.   
Environmental legislation and the environmental ministry, which were recreated 
in both Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1989 (and again in 1993 in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia), had to deal with the ecological past while preparing for a much greener 
European Union future. Describing the deficiencies of pre-1989 environmental policy, 
Waller and Millard (1992) argue, “the state’s priorities favoured quantity of production 
over social costs (…) In particular, the ruling party controlled the written and spoken 
word in these pre-glasnost days (…) the population was ill-informed (p.164). During the 
communist period the state exercised a great deal of political control, which had direct 
impact on the way environmental policy was constructed and implemented. But there was 
limited opportunity, more so in Poland than Czechoslovakia, for sub-state actors to exert 
influence on state officials. At certain points in its forty year lifespan, the communist 
state did in fact pursue a more green-friendly policy agenda. In Poland, Kurek et al. 
(2001: 511) identify the Nature Protection Act (1974), the environmental protection act 
(1980), and the act dealing with packaging and movement of poisonous substances 
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(1963), as substantial and important pre-transition environmental laws. Poland also 
ratified a number of international conventions, ranging from the Washington Convention 
on the international trade of wildlife animals and plants hazarded by extinction (1985) to 
the Helsinki Convention on the protection of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea 
(1974)(Kurek at al. 2001: 511). Czechoslovakia made similar commitments during the 
1970s, culminating in the establishment of a Commission for the Environment in 1972 
and also a Ministry for Territorial Administration and Environmental Protection in 1973 
(Carmin and Hicks 2002: 310). 
After the collapse of communism the state did not simply step aside to allow civil 
society to take over – though many dissidents did assume posts in the new 
administrations. In certain policy areas it must be recognized that the state actually gained 
power – albeit in a more conventional form – as the third sector fragmented and realigned 
after the collapse of communism. Post-communist environmental policy emanates from a 
Ministry which has a host of domestic and international policy obligations to meet. These 
range from the Kyoto protocol to EU environmental policy harmonization and 
standardization. In the Czech instance, a pressing concern has been the lack of 
information available to NGOs, international NGOs and private citizens. As Carmin 
(2003) point out, “although the Czech constitution mandated availability, legislation on 
access to environmental information was not enacted until 1998 and regulations 
regarding access to state and territorial information were not enacted until 1999” (p.46). 
Still in 2006 the EU Commission is accusing the Czech Ministry of the Environment of 
limiting access to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) hearings. An EU press 
release of 3 July 2006 contends “Czech EIA rules unduly restrict the public’s right to go 
to court to uphold their entitlements to participate in EIA procedures”.64  Which theory of 
group politics/state power best explains this condition?  
As  Nordlinger (1985) argues “the preferences of the state are at least as important as 
those of civil society in accounting for what the democratic state does and does not do” 
(p.1). The post transition policy programme has reflected the priorities of successive 
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 European Union press release: “Environmental Impact Assessment: Commission takes legal 
action to improve implementation in 10 Member States”, 3 July, 2006 
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governments, not interest groups as such, and in this sense post-communist states have 
been primarily concerned with: 
 
1) Developing economic competency, to a) secure EU membership, and b) stabilize 
the liberal democratic order;   
2) Securing foreign direct investment (FDI) in key industries; 
3) Meeting the political (and democratic) provisions for EU entry as set by the 
Acquis Communautaire. 
 
Bearing in mind the above areas of concern and the possibility that too comprehensive an 
environmental regime (or the appearance of one) may complicate FDI and infrastructural 
programmes (i.e. new highways, power generation plants and pipelines), post-communist 
environmental policy has been constructed by stealth. According to Friends of the Earth 
CZ executive director Vojtech Kotecky, the result of this autonomy is that environmental 
policy is more or less a ‘private issue’ of the Ministry/Minister of Environment, 
its/his/her programmes and priorities.65” In this way, both institutional and elite theories 
have something to say about the way environmental policy is created in post-communist 
ECE. As Church (1993) points out, “rebuilding the structures of the state seems to be the 
sine qua non for solving the environmental problems of the east (…) merely taking over 
the old structures is not enough” (p.351). With new institutions comes a new elite class 
and new practices. Even if some of these new political elites were dissidents or 
sympathetic to Charter 77’s cause, the overwhelming majority of these new political 
elites are primarily concerned with securing the Czech Republic place in an expanded 
European Union.     
 Unlike the politics of women’s rights (and minority rights, as it will be presented 
in the next chapter), environmentalism or a programme if sustainable development often 
complicates if not directly challenges the state building (democracy building) process. 
For the state must choose between competing policy options in view of limited resources, 
internal pressure and international obligations and, the logic of capitalist production. As 
Waller and Millard (1992) point out:  
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 Email interview, 13/07/2006 
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Economic crisis will continue to dominate the political agenda; and economic 
crisis is not conducive to an environmentalist political orientation (…) but they 
[ECE ministers of the environment] can take some comfort fro the fact that the 
population to whom they are responsible is likely for the moment to assign a 
higher priority to having bread on the table than to having clean air to breathe 
(p.173).   
 
For example, Polish and Czech policymakers must consider the economic and political 
viability of burning ‘dirty’ coal in outmoded power generating plants while heeding 
emerging EU regulations and accepting the need to create wealth for locals and foreign 
investors alike. It is much easier for a government to publicly decry inequitable hiring 
practices than cut or curtail power generation in a time of economic hardship; it is much 
easier for a government to extol the virtues of liberalism and human rights than divert 
millions of euros from their education or healthcare budget to a programme for the safe 
disposal of hazardous waste. These are already tough choices, but by having to make 
them during a period of institution building and ad hoc law making, when national 
budgets and international aid are being stretched to the limit, it becomes even more 
politically difficult to advance post material concerns (cf. Inglehart 1981) over materialist 
ones66. This goes back to the idea of policy priorities and addenda setting. At the moment 
the priority in Poland and the Czech Republic is economic growth and harmonizing their 
domestic politics with EU standards. However, the Czech Republic has yet been able to 
find a balance between the needs of the environment, the interests of the population, the 
demands of environmental groups and the regulations set by the European Union. This 
summarises the problem: 
It will be impossible to mobilize the massive resources necessary to reach EU 
standards without relying on and involving all sectors and interest groups of 
society, from private citizens to nongovernmental organizations, industry and the 
public sector. While environmental organizations are relatively strong and active, 
the vast majority of Czech citizens, businesses and government organs are 
oblivious of environmental issues and their importance to the future of society. 
Environment is a non-issue in the Czech lands, only raised uncomfortably now 
and again by the European Union. Improving the environment is not seen as a 
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 The post-materialism thesis assumes “the basis value priorities of Western publics had been 
shifting from a Materialist emphasis toward a Post-Materialist one – from giving top priority to 
physical sustenance and safety, toward heavier emphasis on belonging, self-expression and the 
quality of life” (Inglehart 1981: 880). 
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positive challenge but rather as a bothersome task, like some extra homework 
assigned unfairly by a stern teacher (Beckmann, 1999). 
The Polish Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 
(PMEP), acknowledged early on that it would be a challenge to reconcile sustainable 
practices/development with state building. Under the heading, “Reasons for the New 
National Environmental Policy for Poland,” it is stated: 
I.1 Poland, a country confronted with ecological disaster, faces the very difficult 
task of reshaping its environmental policy during a time of radical change in the 
national economic system (…) I. 3. Thus environmental protection is its broadest 
sense, will be any ally to a modern, effective and prudent economy (PEMP, 
1991)67. 
There is obvious difficulty in adopting sustainable development policies during a period 
of rapid democratization and trade liberalization, especially when Poland’s agricultural 
sector lags behind other European Union states in efficiency of production and per capita 
production. The Czech government’s broad environmental policy statement emphasises 
the impact of EU accession on Czech environmental policy and subsequently the need to 
meet the stipulations set forth by EU level environmental policy. The policy document 
states: 
(…) there is a direct connection between the SEP CR (State Environmental Policy 
of the Czech Republic) and the National Program for the Preparation of the CR 
for Membership in the EU, with the Approximation Strategy in the Environment, 
and with the Implementation Plan for the Chapter 22 (…)(MECR, 2001)68. 
 
What does this mean for environmental groups in both countries? In the Polish instance, 
the government has publicly acknowledged the difficulties associated with implementing 
at the same time economic development policies, to increase production and overall 
GDP, and sustainable development programmes, which would require significant 
financial investment. As the Institute for Sustainable Development in Warsaw (2002) 
                                                 
67
 The full text of this document is available in English at 
www.mos.gov.pl/mos/publikac/environmental.html. Last accessed 18 June 2006. 
68
 The full text of this document can be found in English at www.env.cz. Last accessed 21 June, 
2006. 
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reports: “because of the painfulness of the transformation, particularly in the field of the 
economy, and the stimulation of consumption, the political significance of environmental 
protection diminished” (p.2).  In the Czech Republic, environmental groups are 
attempting to gain access to institutions and political elites (Fagan 2004:169). 
Considering the elite nature of the policy process and the Ministry’s ability to insulate 
itself from the wider environmental movement, it seems this tactic, to gain institutional 
competency, is in-line with the dominant policy model of the day. 
While equal rights legislation is the hallmark of an enlightened/post modern 
society and integral to liberal democracy, its application rarely challenges prevailing 
economic or industrial policy. The political struggle waged between the state and 
environmentalists over sustainable development and green policies must be analysed in 
the context it occurs – and in the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, it is happening 
whilst policy makers are doing everything in their power make their respective countries 
appealing to increase foreign direct investment (FDI). Social movements in the West 
came about during a period of social change, but not during a period of significant 
institutional change. For example the system of governance used in the United States, 
Britain and Canada, remained relatively fixed over the period 1960 – 1980, which as it 
happened was witness to the sharpest growth in rights based organizations. Women’s 
groups and environmental groups could therefore hone their lobbying skills without the 
worry of sudden and dramatic shifts in the political landscape. What environmental 
groups in Poland and the Czech Republic have experienced since the end of communism 
is an unending series of political and institutional changes at the domestic level, along 
with new EU regulations and targets – covering everything from car emissions to 
preferred production methods. As Andonova (2004) argues “the process of EU 
integration changes the environmental interests of industrial actors and thus the domestic 
political dynamics of environmental regulation in Central and Eastern Europe” (p.11).  
Integration is having the added effect of changing the parameters of contentious 
politics as well. As EU environmental regulation now trumps domestic legislation in 
many sensitive areas, it provides environmental groups with two sets of politicians to 
lobby – not including local (or municipal) level government. It has in a relatively short 
period of time transformed from a vertical top-down system of governance to one which 
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is multilevel and multidimensional with a multitude of new political actors occupying 
newly created government offices. The effect this development has had, and will continue 
to have, on environmental groups and ecology clubs cannot be underestimated. Crucially, 
“Czech EMOs [Environmental Movement Organizations] face aggressive foreign direct 
investment and an increasingly diffused power structure. Rather than replicating a bygone 
stage of western development, they face a political and economic context in which pro-
growth neo-liberal consumerism and subservience to foreign direct investment is the 
accepted mantra” (Fagan and Jehlicka 2003: 52). These two authors have identified a key 
variable, the process of democratization and state-building itself. Unlike western 
environmental movements, Czech and Polish groups are operating at a time when 
progress, internationalization and capitalism are overarching policy directives. Where no 
significant middle class exists and government is compelled to play catch-up, in both the 
economic and political sector, many policies that could otherwise be challenged – either 
internally or externally – become a part of the unofficial state building accord.      
Complicating matters are two interrelated developments. One is the withdrawal of 
foreign aid for civil society development, in the form of monetary donations to particular 
groups and/or sectors and the expertise that comes with transnational networking. The 
second concerns the harmonization of Czech and Polish environmental law with 
preexisting EU standards and future targets – in areas such as car emissions, toxic waste 
disposal and the use of PVC.  These are indeed separate processes but as both are 
occurring at the same time they are causing tremendous strain on the third sector and 
specific NGOs. Pavlinek and Pickles (2004) offer a compelling thesis regarding the 
implications of EU accession. In one way they argue, EU integration and the onset of 
market capitalism in post-communist ECE states has meant an increase in overall 
consumption, which is detrimental to the environment. But they also argue that while the 
EU has had a positive effect in some policy areas, it has also been to the benefit of neo-
liberal politicians. They write: “While the new environmental regulations provide 
common standards and procedures for applicant states, the minimum standards required 
by the acquis are, in some cases, also being used by neo-liberals in CEE countries to 
water down existing more comprehensive environmental legislation” (p.238). One cannot 
be entirely certain then whether the EU will be to the benefit of environmental advocates, 
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which Pavlinek and Pickles admit. Polish and Czech politicians are able to use the EU as 
both a scapegoat and a savior, depending on their policy needs. Perhaps surprisingly, 
many ECE groups “have been profoundly ambivalent about the environmental 
consequences of EU enlargement” (Andonova 2004: 25) and the development of a pan-
European environmental lobby network. However, a more likely scenario is that many 
groups are still learning how to effectively lobby the EU and their domestic ministries. 
Also, the funding many of these groups receive from international philanthropic 
institutions means their immediate goals are with building networks at home and not with 
evoking EU conditionality. This will come as groups begin foster deeper ties with 
Brussels-based environmental NGOs.  
Three statements about environmental policy and activism should be made before 
proceeding. 
 
1.  To quote Pavlinek and Pickles, “many of the improvements in air and water 
 quality have been achieved as a result of political struggles waged in the 1980s 
 and economic reforms arising in the 1990s (2004: 261). Therefore, ones 
 understanding of contemporary environmentalism and the activities of NGOs in 
 post-communist Poland and the Czech Republic cannot be informed only by post-
 1989 events and policy, because the environmental groups that took part in the 
 1989 demonstrations did alter the trajectory of environmental policy – in many 
 cases for the better. As Davis points out, “regardless of motives, the 
 environmental movement emerged as one of the most significant elements in the 
 Velvet Revolution” (2004: 377). 
2.  EU accession helps NGOs in that environmental policy becomes much more 
 straightforward and predictable – e.g. all EU standards and directives are public 
 knowledge (cf. Aarhus Convention, 199869) and groups are legally entitled to 
                                                 
69
 The Aarhus Convention stipulates: “the right of everyone to receive environmental information 
that is held by public authorities ("access to environmental information"). This can include 
information on the state of the environment, but also on policies or measures taken, or on the state 
of human health and safety where this can be affected by the state of the environment. Applicants 
are entitled to obtain this information within one month of the request and without having to say 
why they require it. In addition, public authorities are obliged, under the Convention, to actively 
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 access environmental policy information. However, the EU should not be 
 construed as a panacea for all environmental problems. Just as environmental 
 groups have access to the EU Commission and Parliament, so to do thousands of 
 corporations, industries and pan-European business associations. Approximately 
 300 public interest groups routinely lobby the EU; whereas 1300 private 
 organizations (plus 270 law firms and consultancies) occupy the same space (cf. 
 Watson and Shakleton 2003: Chapter 5). By no means do EU structures and 
 processes benefit environmental NGOs over other types of organized interests. 
3.  The environmental lobby in the Czech Republic and Poland is tied to an 
 international policy community, which means among other things that pressure 
 is being exerted by a multitude of actors from several different planes – local, 
 national, European and global.   
 
Not to diminish the complexity or importance of policy concerning gender equality or 
minority rights, it must be recognized that environmental policy is now an extremely 
complicated multi-level affair. It involves not only Brussels and a given member state’s 
environmental ministry, but also a host of corporate associations, professional 
organizations and several other related EU institutions (i.e. EURATOM, CAP and 
fisheries). There may be greater opportunity to lobby EU institutions and evoke EU 
conditionality in an effort to challenge domestic-level policy (i.e. an increased 
opportunity structure), but this is certainly tempered with the complexity of EU laws and 
harmonization protocols.  
A quick look at the Friends of the Earth (FoE) website reveals they are concerned 
with a host of environmental issues – from car emissions to airport expansions, from 
                                                                                                                                                 
disseminate environmental information in their possession; the right to participate in 
environmental decision-making. Arrangements are to be made by public authorities to enable the 
public affected and environmental non-governmental organisations to comment on, for example, 
proposals for projects affecting the environment, or plans and programmes relating to the 
environment, these comments to be taken into due account in decision-making, and information 
to be provided on the final decisions and the reasons for it ("public participation in environmental 
decision-making"); the right to review procedures to challenge public decisions that have been 
made without respecting the two aforementioned rights or environmental law in general ("access 
to justice")” (www.ec.europa.eu/environment). 
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public transit to aviation related pollution (www.foe.co.uk/campaigns). The 
corresponding agencies at the EU and domestic level are share policy competency in 
some areas, like air pollution and aviation, but not others, like public transit. The problem 
groups like FoE face in an expanded Europe is dealing with the poor advocacy networks 
in ECE states while at the same time trying to improve their pan-European environmental 
community, which is a mix of green parties and non-governmental organizations and old 
green movements and fledgling ones.  
In the Czech Republic, environmentalists played a critical role in galvanizing anti-
state sentiment in the lead up to the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Motivated by the severe 
ecological degradation they saw around them, environmentalists publicly challenged the 
state’s record on such issues as air pollution, water contamination and deforestation. 
Davis argues “in the 1970s and early 1980s (…) environmental discontent began to 
manifest itself through increasingly bold, though often surreptitious, activities both inside 
and outside this small legal movement” (2004: 377). Because many ecological groups 
were de facto sanctioned by the state, they had a degree of legitimacy that other groups, 
like Charter 77, did not have. Even though the sympathies of many Czechs rested with 
the Chartists, in environmental groups Czechs had an outlet for their anti-state sentiments 
without fear of state reprisal.  Even though the activities of these state sanctioned 
environmental groups consisted of planting trees and cleaning up river banks, they served 
as a useful tool in elevating the status of the environment in both party circles and the 
general public. It is useful to quote Waller and Millard at length: 
The decade leading up to 1989 saw also the emergence of numerous other 
movements, initiatives and even parties organized specifically around the 
environmental issue. Even the official ‘mass organisations’ at times demonstrated 
an independence of spirit by embracing the environmental cause, a celebrated 
case being the Czechoslovak party’s youth organization’s espousal of a protest 
action at Krivoklat in the Berounka Valley in 1988 (…)In this sense the eventual 
professional environmental organization had a base to draw ecologically minded 
activists and volunteers from. Czechs has been concerned with the environment 
from some time, culminating in the establishment of a Green party in 1989 (1992: 
167).  
 
Although taking momentum into the first elections, the Green party did not manage to 
win one seat in either the Federal Assembly or the Czech National Council. This has 
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more to do with the dominate position of Civic Forum after the roundtable than the 
competency of the Greens.  
The Polish green movement gained organizational competency early in 1980. 
Taking advantage of the Party’s lenience towards environmental clubs and the pluralistic 
conditions that existed in Poland, “environmental concern was to a certain extent able to 
take on full organizational form, with first the creation of the Ecology Club in 1980, and 
then of a Green Party in 1988 (Waller and Millard, 1992: 166).  But like their Czech 
counterparts, the Polish green movement found it difficult to compete with the larger and 
more vocal ‘official opposition’ group, Solidarity. It was the case that Solidarity spoke on 
behalf of all anti-state/regime groups, whether the groups in question wanted them to or 
not. Solidarity was a popular association with an extensive network of regional offices 
throughout Poland and thus was able to supplant many other autonomous groups, which 
may or may not have shared in Solidarity’s vision for political and social change. In this 
way many ecological clubs and environmental organizations that existed during the 
1980s found a dwindling constituency awaiting them when the transition period 
commenced.  
Solidarity’s success at the semi-free elections of 1989 meant they alone carried 
the democratic torch into the new era of pluralist politics (which was quickly 
extinguished soon after). As a result it was Solidarity that established the terms of 
political debate up until the first free elections, and in so doing also pushed 
environmentalists to the margins of the Solidarity group. But key to the limited impact of 
environmental groups in the early days of democracy, Ferry and Rudig argue “once the 
transition has been set in motion and communist rule had been overcome, there seemed 
little room for green in the newly established party systems” (2002: 2).  The party system 
exploded, with hundreds of new political parties vying for seats and state funding. As one 
Jagiellonian University security guards told me in the summer of 2003: “all of my friends 
were starting political parties [back then].”70 Once a national threshold was put into place 
the party system started to resemble that of a stable democracy, with political parties 
                                                 
70
 Informal interview conducted (with aid of interpreter) at Jagielloneian University, Krakow 
Poland 15 July 2003. 
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representing the gamut of ideological persuasions. But the Greens, which appeared well 
placed to secure a spot in the Sejm were effectively silenced during the 1991 elections.  
 This however was not an indictment of green politics as such, as by 1995 there 
were approximately 250 officially registered political parties in Poland, and of those, 
some 17 proclaimed a green orientation (Ferry and Rudig, 2002). It is therefore 
unsurprising that the Green movement, at both the party and NGO level, was finding it 
difficult to carve out a niche in the often turbulent Polish party system. Here the fortunes 
of NGOs and Green political parties were intertwined as the economic restructuring 
(chiefly Balcerowicz’s shock therapy) distracted many Poles from environmental issues, 
like water contamination and air pollution.71 In Poland, the environment as an area of 
policy concern quickly became overshadowed by massive unemployment, inflation and a 
decrease in production levels. 
Carmin and Hicks (2002) argue 
The Polish movement entered this volatile era with greater internal coordination 
and higher mobilization levels than the Czech movement, but the pressures from 
donors, networks, and increasingly routine political processes began to foster 
similarity. Both movements found environmental issues sliding down the list of 
public priorities as the hardships of economic transition took hold (p. 316). 
 
In the final analysis, despite the institutional and cultural advantages (e.g. structural-
functional advantage) Polish ecological associations and pressure groups had 
immediately before transition, the environmental movements in both states are now 
discovering that the problems associated with lobbying the state, or even finding ‘local’ 
grassroots support, are extremely difficult to overcome during a period of wide scale 
institutional and economic restructuring. Pavlinek and Pickles believe “there is a 
surprising correspondence between the neo-liberals after 1989 and communist politicians 
                                                 
71
 The New York Times summarises the task as follows: “The plan, which Polish officials hope to 
begin next month, will make Poland a pioneer in pursuing the tortuous economic path from 
Communism to capitalism. The plan calls for removing price controls, restraining wage increases, 
balancing the budget and slashing subsidies for most goods and services. Mr. Balcerowicz admits 
that as a result of his plan the real income of Poles may fall by 20 percent next year, industrial 
production may drop by 5 percent and hundreds of thousands of workers may be laid off ” (26 
December 1989).  
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before 1989 in the ways in which they understood and acted in regards to the 
environment” (2004: 259).  
It is important to recognize that in Poland and the Czech Republic support for 
greens and/or green politics is split between political parties and interest groups or social 
movement organizations. It would seem that green politics is caught between two 
traditions, institutionalized interest aggregation on the one hand and pressure group 
politics on the other. Unlike in North America or Great Britain, where the origins of 
Green parties lay in environmental NGOs, Western Europe has had a long tradition of 
Green parties taking the lead in environmental policy. This is especially true in Germany 
where Green parliamentarians have held cabinet posts in coalition governments and 
pushed the Green agenda in ways no environmental pressure group could (most notably 
in the last Schroeder cabinet). By embracing the West European model of green politics, 
which emphasizes green political parties, while the third sector remains underdeveloped, 
Polish and Czech environmentalists are unintentionally splitting their constituency, and 
thus their support base. They may also be inadvertently confusing the population as well. 
But in the early days of transition many environmentalists were skeptical of what a Czech 
or Polish Green party could actually achieve. In reference to the Czech situation, Jehlicka 
and Kostelecky (1992) argue 
During the year and half of its existence, the Green Party has not convinced 
members of the ecological movements – in Bohemia, but partly also in Moravia – 
of its pure intentions and of its ability to provide qualified solutions to 
environmental problems. Most of the ecological initiatives refuse to co-operate 
with the Green Party. It is unlikey that personalities from the ecolgocial 
movement will share the same list of candidates with the Green Party in the next 
elections (p.93).  
 
Protests against the Temelin power plant managed to galvanize many disparate 
environmental groups and politicians into one coherent and effective lobby. Referring to 
the Temelin affair, FoE CZ Director Vojteck Kotecky said: “We used Temelin 
construction site blockades in mid-1990s in order to draw public attention to the project's 
deficiencies and problems - and to keep Temelin high in the public and political debate 
after it was officially approved in 1993. By the way, this was extremely successful”  
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(Interview, 13 July 2006). Temelin nuclear power station is located in the town of 
Temelin and has been an ongoing project since 1978, when the USSR approved of its 
construction (cf. Fawn, 2006: 102-103). For a variety of reasons is have been the subject 
of controversy since 1989, when the newly appointed cabinet decided – with pressure 
being exerted from President Vaclav Havel  - to put the project on hold. This illustrates 
three important things about the environmental sector: 1) when prompted, voluntary 
associations and professional NGOs can work together to effect change; 2) the sector as a 
whole, and Hnuti Duha and Greenpeace CZ in particular, exhibited a level of maturity 
and professionalism that rivaled western protest actions of a similar style; 3) the 
protesters successfully managed to construct a transnational movement out of this local 
protest by lobbying the Austrian government. Having studied this movement in detail, 
Fagan (2004) argues “this sophisticated and highly professional campaign reflected a 
maturity and professionalism within the movement that surprised many” (p.103).  It is 
thus the contention of this chapter that far from being poorly organized and naïve, many 
NGOs in both Poland and the Czech Republic have the wherewithal to effectively lobby 
governmental agencies and parliamentarians.  
 The environmental movement in Poland is has been primarily concerned with 
developing a coherent political wing to their less formalized body. Carmin and Hicks 
(2002) identify the difficulties common to environmental movements during periods of 
institutional change:  
From 1997 onward, routinized electoral and legislative processes and denser 
networks of transnational and intergovernmental relations between East and West 
stabilized the basic structures of political opportunity in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. As movements engaged in the long march through institutions, they 
could use their countries’ democratic procedures and the pressures for 
harmonization with the EU to advance their causes, but at the same time they 
were constrained by both (p.316, emphasis added).  
 
The Polish environmental movement had achieved a level of professionalism early in the 
transition period. But there has always been a core group of green activists seeking to 
establish a more potent green party, which could advance the green cause into the 
corridors of Polish power. If one considers the volatility of the Polish party system and 
the vast array of political parties that emerged during the first five years of democracy, it 
does make sense that greens should seek party status. As in the Czech case, disruptive 
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forms of collective action were being replaced with institutionalize forms of lobbying 
and, NGOs were attempting to gain access to “commissions on a routine basis (Carmin 
and Hicks 2002: 318). But still, policy formulation retains its state-directed impulses in 
Poland.  
 
TEMELIN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
The Czech nuclear power plant Temelín is a useful case study as it perfectly illustrates 
how a network of contention can form around an issue of transnational (or international) 
character and how a purely domestic rooted analysis of interest group politics in post 
communist Europe can no long truly suffice. As figure 1.1 shows, groups from across 
Europe converged on the small Czech town of Temelín (near Ceské Budejovice)  in an 
attempt first to halt construction of the NPP in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and 
second,  to have it shut down indefinitely after it became operational at the beginning  of 
this decade (December 2000).  The story of Temelín NPP is a complex and complicated 
one, which has drawn together an assortment of political actors from inside and outside 
the Czech Republic. Today the plant is fully operational. Austrian officials and NGOs 
however are still voicing concern over the NPP’s shoddy safety record (Die Presse 10 
January 2008) and appropriateness.   
The Temelín Nuclear Power Pant (Temelín NPP), located approximately 60 ( to 
80) 72 kilometers from the Austrian border in the South Bohemia region of the Czech 
Republic, has been the focus of NGO ire for nearly twenty years, and a preoccupation for 
Austrian lawmakers and Greens since the project gained new impetus in the early 1990s. 
The plan for Temelín NPP was devised in 1979 during the communist period, though 
construction of the facility did not commence until 1987, two years before the Velvet 
Revolution. Construction of Temelín NPP transects several discrete socio-political 
periods, which made for a complicated nonlinear building process full of unanticipated 
events and setbacks. Ground was broken in 1987 when Czechoslovakia was a communist 
state and the plant did not begin its testing phase until 2000, four years before the Czech 
                                                 
72
 Axelrod (2004) writes Temelin is approximately “80 kilometres from the Austria border.” A 
Google map search put the distance at 67.7 kilometers from the town of Temelín to the 
Austria/Czech border, due south.  
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Republic joined the EU. It went into commercial operation in 2002-2003. The whole 
project was put on hold for nearly three years (1990 – 1993) and then almost completely 
redesigned and overhauled by Westinghouse, the new contractor, in the mid 1990s. 
Temelín NPP was never a sure thing and only received final approval in 1999 when the 
ČSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party) government of Miloš Zeman voted in favour of 
resuming construction (Czech National Newswire CTK 9 July 2000). Temelín has since 
2000 been taken off line (off the power grid) several times, temporarily shut down, and 
had its output capacity intentionally reduced. Anti- Temelín campaigners across Europe 
cite these ‘problems’ as proof that plant is dangerous and ill-advised. The EU, IAEA and 
the Czech Sate Nuclear Safety Office (SÚJB) believe the plant to be safe and operating 
according to the strictest standards.  
During the 1990s a host of environmental NGOs and NGOs from South Bohemia, 
Austria, and beyond made their opposition to Temelín NPP known by organizing 
petitions, road blocks, and several demonstrations outside the Temelín complex. When 
Greenpeace decided to lobby U.S. Congress in 1994, the issue immediately acquired an 
international dimension. Congress, which potentially could have blocked a US $317 
million loan guarantee to finance the work (Fratz, New York Times 22 May 1994) found 
itself supporting the American-based company Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 
their bid to retrofit the Soviet-designed nuclear reactors (ibid). The Austrian government 
raised concerns about Temelín to the Clinton administration in 1994 (ibid). The New 
York Times (1994) reported  “so great is the Austrian anxiety that Chancellor Franz 
Vranitzky told President Clinton (…) during a meeting about Bosnia, that his 
Government was extremely concerned about the potential for an accident at Temelín and 
similar reactors in other neighbouring countries” (ibid)73. The 1986 Chernobyl accident, 
and to a lesser degree the Three Mile Island Accident, was weighing heavily on the minds 
of NGO representatives and Austrian politicians, as they carried out a sustained public 
campaign against Temelín NPP74.  
                                                 
73
 Chancellor Franz Vranitzky held this post in Austria from 1986 to 1997 
74
 In 1986 a reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near Kiev in Ukraine exploded, sending 
radioactive material high into the air. As reported in 1986 monitoring stations in “Sweden, 
Finland and Norway began reporting sudden high discharges of radioactivity in the atmosphere 
two days [after the explosion]” (BBC on-line). This accident changed the nature of contentious 
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Temelín NPP is an example of a contentious issue that has attracted that attention 
of a host of international and domestic actors, all of whom feel compelled for one reason 
or another to act against the Czech government. Austria’s opposition is easily understood, 
as they adopted a blanket anti nuclear policy 15 December 1978. This being said, several 
groups have voiced support for Temelín NPP, such as the Western European Nuclear 
Regulators Association (WENRA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the EC. Germany and Austria have at various points opposed Temelín NPP, and still do, 
but they are nevertheless involved in the ongoing monitoring of the facility. It is rather 
remarkable that so many diverse actors have converged on Temelín NPP, utilizing an 
equally impressive assortment of direct action tactics, lobbying strategies and public 
relations gimmicks. Several authors (Fagan 2000; Fagan and Jehlička 2003; Fagan 2004; 
Axelrod 2004; Fawn 2006) have identified this case as paradigmatic – as it shows cross 
fertilization (or movements and actors) and the impact of international agents, institutions 
and philanthropists. 
   The post Cold War international system, no longer beholden to rigid bipolar logic 
and segmented (by geography) policy spheres, is really what has enabled this sort of 
transnational politicking to occur. Issues which do (or potentiality) involve two or more 
states, like pollution, illegal migration and infectious disease, tend to draw in activists 
from the offending state, the affected state, and from states which have a stake in the 
outcome or resolution. The project has managed to outlive two regimes, 10 prime 
ministers, as many environment ministers, and Czechoslovakia itself. The Temelín 
project has from the outset been plagued with problems. Spiraling costs, antiquated 
technology, and concern over design and instrumentation, are examples of what the 
Czech power utility (CEZ) have had to deal with.     
 Temelín NPP has attracted the attention of both domestic and international NGOs, 
and also international agencies, European institutions and Germany and Austria. What 
                                                                                                                                                 
politics around nuclear power generation in Europe, but especially around power generating 
plants in East Central Europe, where Soviet technology remains in use. Three Mile Island, a 
nuclear power plant located in Pennsylvania U.S.A, suffered a “severe core meltdown” (U.S. 
NRC Fact Sheet) on 28 March 1979. No deaths or serious injuries have thus far been attributed to 
the Three Mile Island meltdown. But the event initiated wide scale and sweeping changes is areas 
of nuclear plant safety, emergency protocols and response, and regulatory oversight. The plant is 
no longer in operation (ibid). 
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makes the Temelín issue different from Raspuda valley, in terms of EU involvement and 
the potential for interest group convergence, simply comes down to the EU not having a 
coherent policy on nuclear energy or nuclear power plant construction. In fact, the EU 
has clearly said energy and energy production is a matter for member states, so long as 
European safety standards are adhered to. While the EU did not, and does not, have any 
specific competency in the area of nuclear energy, it does have an interest in seeing that 
the matter does not affect inter European affairs. As Fawn argues, “the EU assumed 
several new roles and ultimately became protector of one accession state’s vital interests 
over those of an existing member: the Czech Republic against Austrian governmental and 
societal pressure to close the Temelín nuclear power plant” (Fawn 2006: 101). Recently 
the EU hosted the Inaugural European Nuclear Energy Forum, which brought together 
energy sector stakeholders, activists and government representatives. A dedicated website 
outlines its scope and fuction: 
A structured and open debate, without taboo, was organised among high level 
representatives from the nuclear industry, power companies, energy intensive 
consumers, finance and civil society, as well as other key decision makers and 
organizations at national and EU level75 
 
A matter which would have once been between the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the Czech Republic now features a host of peripheral actors, agencies and 
NGOs, with direct and indirect involvement76. The EU does have a say however in how 
radioactive material and waste are transported and disposed. Transportation of dangerous 
or radioactive goods falls within EU competency and several directives pertaining to the 
transportation of dangerous goods were introduced by the Council in the years following 
the Maastricht Treaty. There are also several non-binding directives at the EU’s disposal, 
most notably Council Resolutions 22 (1975) and 18 (1992), which together call for 
cooperation in the area of nuclear technology and safety. Council Resolution 18 (92/C 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/bratislava_prague/2007_11_26/index_en.htm 
76
 The following actors have been involved (and some continue to be involved) with the Temelin 
NPP issue:  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM), Western Europe Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), the European 
Commission (EC), European Parliament (EP), Germany, Austria, ECE Bankwatch, Greenpeace, 
Hnuti DUAH (Friends of the Earth), Czech power utility (CEZ), State Nuclear Safety Office 
(SUJB) and the South Bohemianíí Mothers. 
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172/02) is noteworthy because it extends the non-binding regime to non-EU countries in 
Central Eastern Europe and the Republics of the former Soviet Union. Many of these 
countries, like the Czech Republic, are now full-fledged EU members. The European 
Council and Commission have been responsible for establishing a normative order, of 
sorts, as most of what comes out of the Commission and Council relating to atomic 
energy is non-binding. This does not mean the EU, its directives and EURATOM, are 
ineffectual instruments in establishing preferred practices in the field of atomic energy 
and energy production. Governance literature has long suggested that non-traditional and 
informal sources of power and influence become much more significant in highly 
stratified polities, where decision-making occurs both vertically and horizontally (cf. 
Rhodes 1997: 46; Jachtenfuchs 2001: 250) 
According to Axelrod (2004) the EU became “officially involved [with Temelín] 
in July 2000”. Before this date EU officials were working in an unofficial capacity, 
mediating between non-nuclear Austria and the soon to be nuclear Czech Republic. Three 
was some concern that Austria, an EU member, would attempt to block or at least 
complicate Czech accession (Fawn 2006: 104). As a way to allay fears and smooth 
political tensions, Coreper asked the Atomic Questions Group (AQG) to write a report 
detailing areas of cooperation in the implementation of nuclear safety. An EU non-paper 
detailing the non-legal basis for cooperation in the area of nuclear energy and plant safety 
was published 29 September 2000. The purpose of the non-paper is to highlight the 
nonlegal basis for cooperation between EU states and accession states, and between 
European states and European institutions. As it happened the publication of the AQG 
report coincided with a period of Czech government posturing. A spokesman for Temelín 
NPP, Milan Nebesar, said the Czech government would not consult outside institutions or 
actors as plant safety was the sole responsibility of Czech bodies (Czech National 
Newswire ČTK 8 February 2000). But in a non-legal way the EU was involved. The EU, 
which supports a process of isomorphism and harmonization of national laws, had (and 
has) an obligation to all EU members to support the development of pan European 
nuclear safety regime. The non-paper suggests:  
The fact that no EU legal “acquis” has been developed in the field of nuclear 
Installation safety does not mean that national systems have nothing in common. 
A fundamental “non-binding acquis” exists as a result of a historic and economic 
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based on voluntary co-operation between the main nuclear actors at EU level 
(AQG Non-Paper: 2). 
 
Almost thirty-five years of accumulated recommendations, directives and opinions have 
gone into the formulation of contemporary European Union environmental policy. 
Hildebrand (1992) points to 1972 as a jumping off point, when both the public and their 
respective governments recognized the need for a coordinated approach to environmental 
lawmaking in Europe (p. 15). It was not environment degradation and pollution that 
necessarily concerned lawmakers back then, as Hildebrand argues, but the prospect of 
“uncoordinated local environmental protection measures causing intra-community trade 
distortions”. From 1973 on the EU has produced a series of directives and 
recommendations that together work to constrain and/or influence member state 
environmental policy. EU standards and directives pertaining to emissions, hazardous 
waste and environmental conservation often trump corresponding member state law. The 
EC’s interventionist attitude towards Poland over Rospuda Valley/Via Baltica (presented 
above) shows how fundamentally things have changed since 1972, when the EU regarded 
the environment as “incidental to the overriding economic objectives” (Hildebrand 15).  
With respect to nuclear energy the EU does claim some regulatory oversight. For 
the most part however EU power is exercised peripherally and does not impinge on each 
member-state’s right to devise energy policy. But since the Aarhus Convention (1998) 
and the EC’s White Paper on European Governance (2001) the lines between EU 
competency and national jurisdiction are blurring, which means even though EU states 
are technically allowed to build nuclear facilities, they are becoming increasing enmeshed 
in an European regulatory regime. Thanks to crisscrossing networks of anti-nuclear 
activists, pro-nuclear associations, and EU institutions, it is in any practical sense 
impossible for a member state to escapes scrutiny. Before proceeding to the actual case 
study, it is worth noting that the EU is starting to play a larger role in the coordination of 
nuclear safety and information. Since 1998, twenty-four reports have been commissioned 
on ‘nuclear issues’, seventeen of which were produced after 2000, with two further 
articles exploring the impact of eastern enlargement on exiting safety standards and 
regulation. Temelín nuclear power plant, even before the Czech Republic acceded to the 
acquis communautaire, was entangled in this web of EU safety recommendations, norms 
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and expectations, and subject further to international oversight (i.e. the IAEA) and a U.S. 
Congressional hearing77. For EU member states, contentious politics is best understood as 
a fluid and dynamic process. The case of the Czech nuclear power plant, Temelín, 
illustrates the changing boundaries (and character) of post accession contentious politics.  
The NGO dimension has attracted a lot of scholarly attention and analysis (Axelrod 2004: 
157; Fagan and Jehlicka 2003). The Temelín matter managed to galvanize both local and 
European activists, and lobbying occurred on several different political planes s During 
the late 1970s environmental NGOs and nongovernmental organizations were gaining 
prominence and starting to engage in the sort of lobbying and contentious political action 
that today is commonplace, and this raised environmental consciousness across Europe. 
A variety of tactics were employed by anti-nuclear activists in the Czech Republic, 
Brussels and America. These strategies and tactics of contention, or as Tilly and Tarrow 
(2007: 16 – 18) call it, claim-making repertoires, are highly contextual and temporal.   
 
ROSPUDA VALLEY/VIA BALTICA 
It is difficult to find a better example of interest group convergence in post accession 
Poland than the one being presented here. A segment of a proposed motorway linking 
Warsaw, Poland to Helsinki, Finland, the ‘Via Baltica’, would have cut directly through 
an environmentally sensitive area of north-east Poland, the Rospuda valley. To give some 
sense of perspective, in a letter to the EU Commissioner of the Environment, Stavros 
Dimas, the Secretary-General of the International Mire Conservation Group (IMCG) 
wrote: “the plans to build a road across Rospuda valley has aroused alarm among mire 
specialists worldwide” (Joosten, 7 February 2007).  
The EU finds itself in public opposition to the Polish government and residents of 
Augustów, as both regard the motorway as an important infrastructural project. In 2006 
the IMCG and representatives of several environmental NGOs raised concern over the 
Polish government’s refusal to adhere to EU directives. A wide array of INGOs, NGOs 
                                                 
77
 While “several Congressional committees are examining issues related to Temelin” the 
“primary investigation is being conducted by the oversight subcommittee of the House of Energy 
and Commerce Committee, which [was] being chaired by Representative John D. Dingell, 
Democratic of Michigan” (Frantz, 22 May 1994). 
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and institutions, from Europe and elsewhere, have become entangled in the debate78.  
This matter garnered international attention when the EC and EP instructed Poland to 
stop the motorway project until a proper environmental assessment could be carried out. 
Furthermore, the EC made a formal request to the ECJ on 5 April 2007 asking they issue 
an injunction to the construction of the Augustów bypass.  This case clearly shows that 
political power in Europe is much more diffuse and segmented than traditionally thought 
(cf. Moravcsik 2003). Transnational advocacy networks and international actors are able 
under certain circumstances to influence domestic policy through EU institutions and 
courts. 
This case study relies on information gleaned from newspaper reports, Polish 
government and EEA press releases, and NGO WebPages. A cursory search of the 
internet reveals this issue has caught the attention of both Polish based environmental 
NGOs and international NGOs, with few of the latter having any direct ties to either 
Augustów town, the region (Voivodship) of Podlaskie, or Poland. The international press 
has reported on the matter and several INGOs have established a ‘Via Balitca’ link on 
their home pages (cf. Greenpeace.org). A dedicated website also exists79. 
The political and legal wrangling lasted approximately two years and passed 
through four discernable phases. First, in January 2006 several NGOs, WWF Poland, 
Polish Society for the Protection of Birds (OTOP) and ECE Bankwatch, filed a formal 
complaint with the EC over the proposed route (Birdlife International, 2006: 1). Under 
EU law individuals and NGOs are able to petition and/or file a complaint with the 
European Union Ombudsman, the European Commission or the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) if it is believed EU law has been inappropriately applied or ignored by a 
member-state. By planning to construct the Augustów and Wasilków by-pass through a 
                                                 
78
 I identified the following actors as being directly involved in the Rospuda debate: European 
Parliament (EP); European Environmental Agency (EEA);European Court of Justice (ECJ);Polish 
Society for the Protection of Birds (OTOP);British Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPD);East central European Bankwatch Network (ECE Bankwatch);International Mire 
Conservation Group (IMCG);Birdlife International;Greenpeace; WWF Poland; Polish Green 
Network (PGN); and, Augustów Township. 
79
 The website, www.viabalticainfo.org, provides information about the highway project and its 
potential impact on the Rospuda valley. It also serves as a forum for monitoring and 
disseminating news about the motorway project. This site is sponsored by ECE Bankwatch, 
WWF Poland and Birdlife International. 
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Special Protection Area (SPA) the complainants believed Poland was in contravention of 
two specific EU directives relating to the protection of birds and animal habitat (the Bird 
Directive 79/409/EEC and the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC) and also the Natura 2000 
programme. The European Union programme, Natura 2000, was established “to 
safeguard the 27-nation bloc’s most important wildlife areas and species” (BBC 28 
February). On 12 December 2006 the EC notified Poland in writing they were in breach 
of EU law (IP/06/1775)80. The EC was now formally involved in this matter through the 
‘infringement procedure’ mechanism.  
The second phase began 21 March 2007. Poland seemed intent on proceeding 
with the project despite several direct warnings. Dimas said to the press, “I urge the 
Polish Government to once more consider ways of building these bypasses without 
causing such serious environmental damage” (BBC 28 February 2007).The infringement 
procedure was at that point being ignored by Poland and work was set to commence at 
the earliest opportunity, 1 August 2007. The EC recognizing Poland was unwilling to 
suspend construction asked the ECJ to issue an order halting construction of the 
Augustów and Wasilków bypasses until the ECJ has rendered a final decision (Europa 21 
March 2007). Important to this development was the NGO community, which remained 
engaged in the process and kept public pressure on the Polish government. Groups like 
Greenpeace, WWF Poland and OTOP managed to organize public demonstrations in 
Warsaw and Augustów, and also initiate a petition campaign. Below is a plea for help 
that was posted on the IMCG website:  
 As the measures to protect the Rospuda valley, which could be undertaken on the 
 national level, seem to be exhausted, we ("Save Wetlands" Association, Poland) 
 appeal to the international authorities to take action to help us to preserve this 
 very valuable unique mire complex. In this case the international pressure on the 
 Polish government and involvement of international organisations seems to be the 
 last hope for the valley (http://www.imcg.net/threat/01.htm). 
 
With the involvement of INGOs and the EU, specifically the ECJ, the EC with the EP, 
the Via Baltica matter was transformed from essentially a local issue to one with 
international scope and appeal. Despite the protests and warning from the EC, the Polish 
                                                 
80
  The press release indicates “Article 226 of the Treaty gives the Commission power to take 
legal action against a Member State that is not respecting its obligations” (12 December 2006 
IP/06/1775). 
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government believed their actions were not in contravention to any EU directive.  
Referring to the EC’s warnings, Prime Minister Kaczynski said: “if we allow restrictions 
and obstacles by every group to block such a major investment, the Poland’s great 
opportunity will be lost” (Reuters, 13 May 2007). The way this matter has unfolded – 
Poland pitting itself against the EC, EP and ECJ -  is symptomatic of a more acute tension 
that exists between post communist states and European institutions, or more precisely 
between post materialist and materialist societies. As suggested by Grajewski (30 July 
2007), “some analysts see the Rospuda dispute as a prelude to more conflicts between the 
EU and its new members from central and eastern Europe over the environment as they 
seek to upgrade some of their outmoded road and railways”   
On 5 April 2007the Commission of the European Communities (referred to above 
and below as the European Commission - EC) officially brought an action against Poland 
to the ECJ. The EC requested the ECJ order Poland to suspend all work on the motorway 
until the ECJ has appropriately dealt with their initial complaint and delivered a judgment 
(Case C – 193/07). The EC’s initial warnings did not seem to resonate with the Polish 
government. The legal action, though downplayed by Polish authorities, changed the 
complexion of this dispute and gave NGOs a small victory in their battle with Poland.     
The third phase of the dispute began summer 2007. The Polish government delayed the 
beginning of construction until 1 August 2007, as not to disturb bird nesting. As of July, 
the Polish government seemed intent on going forward with the original plan, which 
would have seen the construction of a ring-road around the towns of Augustów and 
Wasilków and the building of a bridge over the Rospuda valley. Perhaps believing the 
EC’s actions amount to meddling in Poland’s domestic affairs and a clear cut challenge to 
a member state’s sovereignty, both Slovakia and Lithuania publicly announce their 
intentions to back Poland in this dispute, insisting also the EU not punish Poland too 
severely. Not satisfied with Poland’s response to numerous warning over the Rospuda 
project the EC sought help from the ECJ. The EC “asked the European Court of Justice to 
take interim measures to ensure Poland does not go ahead with the construction” (Europa 
30 July 2007). Convinced that the Natura 2000 network and protection of ‘European’ 
wetlands and bird habitat is more important to Europe as a whole than the Via Baltica 
project, or at least the proposed route, the EC took the unusual step of asking the ECJ to 
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issue an injunction, as a way to override Polish domestic policy. This was the culmination 
of years of protest and sophisticated lobbying on the part of a diverse group of INGOs 
and NGOs. In the days before Poland was set to resume construction, the European 
Parliament’s Committee of Petitions voted to support the EC. It was the committee’s 
view that the route proposed by the Polish government was ill conceived and should be 
changed. This phase clearly illustrates the multi level character of EU governance and 
how disparate actors and be pulled together for sake of a discrete, for the most local, 
issue.    
The fourth (and by no means final) phase of this dispute started the last day of 
July 2007. Twenty-four hours after the EC appealed to the ECJ for an injunction, Poland 
decided to stop all construction indefinitely or at least until the ECJ had reached a final 
judgment on the matter. The possibility of incurring fines seemed to bring an abrupt end 
to Poland’s impertinence. However several hundred protestors took to the streets in 
Augustów to protest the government’s inability to get the project done. The townspeople 
too were unhappy with the whole ordeal. For them, a discrete constituency in their own 
right, the issues were (and are today) first and foremost the safety and economic vitality 
of their town. The highway running through both Augustów and Wasilków, for which the 
bypass was sought, is particularly busy. One report estimates 4,500 heavy goods vehicles 
pass through the small town of Augustów, population 29,951 every day (BBC 2 Feb. 
2007). One website refers to this motorway as ‘Poland’s highway to hell’. 
 In October 2007 Civic Platform (PO - Platforma Obywatelska) won the 
parliamentary election and almost immediately undid all plans concerning the Via 
Baltica. PO decided to hold public consultations on the rerouting of the by passes. The 
construction of the motorway will not proECEd until all stakeholders, including 
environmental NGOs and Augustów town council, have had a chance to comment on all 
proposed routes (there are at least four). The new Environmental Minister, Professor 
Maciej Nowicki, intends to work collaboratively will all parties concerned has vowed not 
to make any unilateral decisions on this matter.   
Via Baltica managed to galvanize the Polish ecological sector as well as European 
level policymakers. Consensus was (and is) the proposed route would irreparably harm 
the region’s ecosystem and wildlife. This short case study will analyze how this 
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convergence, more precisely an opposition movement against the motorway, has 
impacted the Polish government’s decision calculus. The immediate solution to the 
problem, rerouting the motorway around the ecologically fragile wetlands in the Rospuda 
valley, was not entirely the most popular or easiest one to implement. The town most 
directly affected by this stretch of the Via Baltica, Augustów, was calling on government 
to continue with the highway project (Reuters 31 July 2007). The townspeople were (and 
are) in favour of the project because it supported the building of a ring road (bypass) 
around Augustów, thus alleviating traffic congestion. Hence this example of contentious 
politics is both a complex and multilayered affair.   
It is difficult to imagine an issue similar to Via Baltica receiving such public 
exposure even a decade ago. Unlike Temelin NPP in the Czech Republic, which has 
immediate and direct impact on neighboring states (i.e. Austria) and the South Bohemia 
region, Rospuda valley could easily be view as a local matter. But now that Poland is a 
member of the EU and entangled in a web of directives and laws, a local issue can 
quickly become a European and/or international matter. If anything this case study shows 
the impact of horizontal and vertical networks and community norms (and law) on the 
framing of contentious politics. The Rospuda valley debate can be summarized in three 
points.  
First, European competency extends to environmentally protected areas, like the 
Rospuda valley, by virtue of the Natura 2000 programme81. The intention of this EU 
sponsored and subsidized project is to protect “seriously threatened natural areas” 
(Transitions Online, 10 August 2007). The EC is therefore acting in accordance with 
treaty law, which Poland acceded to, when they threaten to impose sanctions for failure to 
reroute Via Baltica. The 1992 Habitat and 1979 Birds Directives constitute the 
community law underpinning the Natura 2000 programme. The EC believes Natura 2000 
is the “centerpiece of the EU nature and biodiversity policy” (EC website). The 
environment and specifically environmental protection is fast becoming, if it has not 
already become, a European issue.  
                                                 
81
 Information on the scope and design of the Natura 2000 programme can be found at EC 
website:   www.ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/index_en.html 
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Second, through infrastructure improvement and modernization schemes Poland 
is trying to bring their antiquated transport system (especially in the northeast) up to 
existing EU standards. In some instances this desire to ‘westernize’ brings the Polish 
government into collision with Polish and European environmentalists, who place 
conservation and protection ahead of large-scale projects, like Via Baltica.  Referring to a 
proposed local referendum on the matter, Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kacynski “we are 
fighting today for Poland’s right to rapid development” (Reuters 13 May 2007).  
Third, Nongovernmental organizations from inside and outside Poland have been fighting 
against the proposed motorway route since early 2006. Though origins of the plan date 
back to 1996 (BBC 1 February 1996) the specific route of the Polish segment was not 
known until fairly recently. NGOs have worked collaboratively to publicize the issue and 
lobby EU representatives. This plan was more out of necessity than design because both 
the townspeople and Prime Minister Kaczynski were intent on implementing the original 
plan, which would have rerouted a 17 kilometer section of the Via Baltica around 
Augustów and over the valley (Zoeller 2007). Environmental group and the EC were (and 
are) against this plan.  
The Rospuda affair brought together a mélange of political actors with divergent 
and convergent interest. All of the participant NGOs were primarily concerned with 
environmental and wildlife protection in the region. The Polish government and 
inhabitants of Augustów, guided by more immediate and tangible concerns, wanted the 
project completed in a timely fashion. For the Polish government, the proposed bypasses 
and bridge were of symbolic as well as economic importance; a chance to bring Poland 
into 21st century with a comprehensive road network, stretching from Prague to Helsinki, 
that would facilitate commercial trade. The townspeople were ultimately unhappy with 
the traffic congestion, which is acutely a post accession problem. This short case study 
shows that transnational advocacy in Europe is both a political reality and a highly 
contentious development. A system that provides INGOs and transnational advocates a 
political opportunity, through EU institutions, to affect domestic legislation and challenge 
national law, is one that shares little resemblance to any other existing polity or political 
community. 
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An analysis of ECE civil society must take into consideration the impact of 
international advocacy networks and actors. The examples presented above indicate that 
home-grown interest groups are not the only stakeholders involved in lobbing ECE 
governments and European institutions. In fact both Poland and the Czech Republic have 
recently been the scene of transnational activism and a brand of contentious politics that 
involved several levels of government, a myriad of activists and actors, and pays little 
regard for established patterns of policy contestation. What is affecting modes of 
contention in ECE more than the scope and character of domestic political culture and 
civil society is issue salience and European institutions, name the ECJ and Commission.  
 The two examples presented above, Rospuda valley (Poland) and Temelín nuclear 
power plant (Czech Republic), support this position. Once maligned domestic interest 
groups are gaining political advantage through the mechanisms of multi-level governance 
and transnational advocacy networks, and are thus utilizing new political opportunities to 
pressurize state-level lawmakers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Modes of interest articulation are shaped in large part by state institutions and policy 
networks, as pressure groups are most likely to seek a path of least resistance when 
lobbying. Government policy, which is developed ad hoc during periods of state-
building, often constrains volunteerism and philanthropy rather than empower groups or 
prospective donors. It is during this period of uncertainty that the state, by virtue of 
entrenched patterns and institutional practices, gains power and influence over most, if 
not all, policy sectors. The state is particularly potent in areas where they alone have a 
monopoly on information, statistics and programme development. As the Euro-Czech 
Forum (2003) reported in 2003, “As yet there has been no success in creating partnership 
relations between public administration, non-governmental ecological organizations and 
economic spheres. In many cases, lack of confidence and ‘unfriendliness’ persist” (p.46). 
On the surface of it, environmental policy development and implementation in both 
Poland and the Czech Republic appears routine and well orchestrated. The official line in 
Poland, as articulated by former Minister of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources 
and Forestry, Jan Szyszko (1998): 
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The Ministry (…) recognizes ecological non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
as its natural allies and partner in activities for environmental protection 
according to principle of sustainable development, irrespective of their opinions 
on both general and detailed matters. 
 
But below the surface, the development of an already fragmented and somewhat 
inexperienced ecological sector is being further complicated by a state with little regard 
for NGOs or the principle of pluralism. As Krzeminski (2003) argues, at around the same 
time the above statement was made by Minister Szyszko, the working relationship 
between third sector organization and the Polish state were already strained. She argues 
“it is worth noting that in the second part of the 1990s central government and parliament 
declared war against foundations and, more generally, their sector organizations” (p.51). 
Much of what transpires at the policy development phase is contingent on the 
structure and function of the state and governmental agencies. This, as argued, is even 
more pronounced during periods of regime change and flux, when political institutions 
are being remodeled (or created from scratch) and uncertainly exists around the 
appropriateness of political custom and convention – i.e. the style of lobbying and its 
venue82. With a more autonomous state stifling third sector group development, by virtue 
of its power vis-à-vis the media and other channels of communication, civil society 
development becomes less about normative postulations and more about policy 
networking and concrete forms of interest articulation. In the case of environmental 
policy it was argued above that many NGOs have developed institutional competency 
and professionalism, which is indication of how far many of these groups have come 
since 1990, when they were not much more than amateur, loosely configured, grassroots 
associations. The fluidity of environmental policy during the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
which stems from a rapid development of environmental legislation, as per international 
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 It is important to remember that much of what transpires in the west, in terms of lobbying and 
informal policy networks was established not through laws and legislation, but through custom 
and norms developed over hundreds of years – stemming from interactions between 
parliamentarians (and members of Congress)and lobbyists at Westminster and later in and around 
Congress. The same logic applies to post-communist lobbying. Many of the laws pertaining to 
lobbying and interest group financing came into effect at the end of the 1990s, thus permitting a 
decade of informal pressure politics.   
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agreements and EU harmonization (i.e. acquis communautaire), must be seen as an 
impediment to collective action in both countries under study here. 
Civil society cannot develop in isolation; its very ethos is shaped by its 
interactions with the state and policy makers. In the area of environmental advocacy and 
policy making, it is most revealing that representatives of two of the largest, most 
publicly visible environmental pressure groups believe the government to be 
disingenuous when dealing with NGOs. What is even more remarkable, especially to 
those that subscribe to the transition paradigm or other linear theories of democratic 
development, is that many of the problems of the early transition period have not been 
entirely solved or even addressed. Andrzej Kassenburg of the Polish Ecology Club 
argued in the early 1990s “cooperation between the Ministry of the Environment and the 
numerous environmental organizations had ceased” (Waller and Millard, 1992: 172). 
Sixteen years later, even though Polish NGOs are gaining institutional competency and 
showing signs of professionalism (Carmin and Hicks, 2002: 317) there is still a belief 
amongst activists that the state has little time for NGOs (which survey data seemed to 
suggest) and will continue to take decisions that further their immediate policy 
preferences: economic and industrial growth. However, some of the examples point to a 
system that is not controlled exclusively by states. European governance and the 
transnationalization of interest politics can put government at a disadvantage, especially 
if it is trying to introduce policy without appropriately consulting all major stakeholders. 
Most recently contentious politics has been less about national politics, in a strict sense, 
and more about European norms and integration. Some of this will be explored in relation 
to women’s NGOs in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Women’s Rights Sector 
 
Despite the opportunities that come with democratization, i.e. improved forms of interest 
articulation, open and receptive political institutions and rights of assembly and 
association, it seems the women’s movement has stopped short of developing into a 
stable, potent, network of advocacy organizations. Without the requisite amount of direct 
government funding and/or private donations, advocacy groups, interest groups and 
women’s centers are left to ‘beg and borrow’ for the resources they need to operate. This 
economic reality coupled with an institutional environment hostile to lobbying and 
devoid of meaningful policy dialogue means groups dedicated to furthering the interests 
of Czech and Polish women remain at the periphery of the policy making process. In this 
way, democratization and market liberalization has produced a new set of structural 
conditions which hamper mobilization and diminish opportunities to lobby decision 
makers.   
Instead of acquiring lobbying know-how, many observers report women’s rights 
NGOs are faltering, becoming less political and further alienated from political parties 
and decision makers. By all indications, the women’s movement in the early 1990s was 
assuming a place alongside other emergent advocacy groups. As a whole the third sector 
was growing exponentially, largely as a result of the euphoria that marked this period and 
the growing financial assistance from Western philanthropists. Despite this, the women’s 
movement (inc. more formalized organizations) has yet celebrated any policy victories. 
For as Bystdzienski (2001) argues “the feminist movement in Poland (…) is still 
fledgling and fragmented” (p.501) and with this, unable to mount a campaign against 
restrictive abortion policies and growing gender inequalities. The situation is no better in 
the Czech Republic, where successive governments, paying only lip service to women’s 
issues, have managed to keep women’s groups out of the policy process altogether. 
Ignoring their pleas for a comprehensive domestic violence law, legislation for equal pay 
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in the workforce, and better laws relating to human trafficking and prostitution, the 
political elite’s preoccupation for the past decade has been with corruption and party 
financing scandals and EU accession.83 A membrane has developed between the elites of 
these two countries and respective public interest groups, which makes constructing a 
vertical policy network almost impossible. 
Women’s groups in both countries are discovering first-hand how difficult it is to 
lobby a state which is both powerful (relative to interest groups) and insulated (from 
societal stakeholders) during this period of protracted institution building. Instead of 
concentrating on the list of demands issued by domestic sub state actors, post-communist 
era politicians were focusing attention an institionald and economic reform. Czech and 
Polish policy makers have shown little inclination to develop a responsive, organized, 
policy community. Part of this may be a result of what Cameron (2003) argues: 
 
It is not a great exaggeration to say that on  accession, the new members will be 
re-created as  states, committed to processes of policy making and policy 
outcomes that in many instance bear little or no relation to their domestic policy-
making processes and prior policy decisions but reflect, instead, the politics, 
policy-making processes, and policy choices of the EU and its earlier member 
states (p.25) 
 
Polish and Czech lawmakers did little to further minority rights and gender equality until 
they were forced by the acquis communautaire to do so. Cameron believed the policy 
process would change upon entry, and based on research conducted in the post accession 
period it is safe to say it has. The Polish government successfully kept the issue of 
abortion off the agenda and outside the parameters of the EU accession treaty when it 
convinced Brussels to annex reproductive laws, thus enabling Poland to circumvent EU-
level human rights law and laws pertaining to the status of women in the EU. The annex 
reads: 
The government of the Republic of Poland understands that none of the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union, or in the treaties establishing the 
European Communities (…) shall disturb the right of the Republic of Poland to 
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 Interview conducted with Lenka Simerska, senior member of the Gender Studies Centre, in 
Prague 15 August 2003.  
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regulate on issues of moral importance and concerning the protection of human 
life (East European Constitutional Review, 2003: 39) 
 
While being an intergovernmental matter between Poland and the EU, this annex also 
effects and/or restricts the sort of lobbying tactics available to women’s organizations in 
Poland at across Europe. Protest repertoires will have to change, as EU level negotiations 
and legal challenges may become more effective than mobilizing at the domestic level to 
effect change. The Polish annex is unique (as Ireland and Malta have similar 
conditionality in place) because it was negotiated after the accession agreement was 
complete. Polish Prime Minister Miller and President Kwasniewski argue the annex was 
a way to prevent Euroskeptics from derailing Poland’s entry (EECR 2003: 39) but as it 
occurred, it also ensured no women’s groups could properly intervene or comment on this 
policy shift.     
Failure on the part of Polish and Czech decision makers to include women’s 
groups in the policy process should be seen as both a procedural failure, because such a 
top down policy exercise ultimately produces incomplete and uninformed policy (driving 
a wedge between concerned constituents and their parliamentarians) and, a moral failure, 
because it shows contempt for democracy and emerging citizen initiatives. It is true 
“many Central and East European women had participated in dissident opposition 
movements, yet (…) rejected the idea that they needed to organize as women” (Jaquette 
2001: 113). But what is further contributing to this political malaise is the inaction of 
post-communist leaders who have done little to support women’s initiatives and at certain 
points have even actively discouraged the activities of women’s rights groups.     
To test the vitality of post-communist democracy it is important to carefully 
consider how particular sectors function relative to the political opportunities available to 
them – if they exist at all. In doing this, it is equally important to come to some 
understanding on how political opportunities are created or made and which political 
actors are best equipped to take advantage of them. During a period of wide-scale 
political change and state-building, political opportunities can, at the same time, be 
abundant and scarce. As Jaquette (2001) suggests “in most cases, democratization and the 
political mobilization of women are mutually reinforcing (p.112), but in Poland and the 
Czech Republic this has not bee the case. There is theoretically an opportunity for 
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formerly aggrieved and marginalised groups to mobilize once barriers to collective action 
have been broken down, but for the transition to be carried through, the state must limit 
its involvement with outside stakeholders. It is easy in such circumstances for 
government to forgo a drawn out consultative policy process in favour of a more 
efficient, essentially elite-driven, model of policy creation. And as a fragmented and 
disorganized sector, women’s groups (and women’s movement writ large) have been 
unable to penetrate the inner citadel of the policy community.  
Taking into account the above thesis, this chapter argues that to explain the 
weakness of the women’s lobby in Poland and the Czech Republic, one must look at what 
is happening in political society instead of civil society, and also, what is happening at 
the structural level instead of at the agential level. For instance, The number of “women’s 
NGOs” has decreased since the beginning of the ‘90s – none of them receive any funds 
from the Czech State, apart from a few grants for certain concrete social purposes 
(IHFHR, 2000: 146). Without a policy network that incorporates the third sector, 
institutionalized mechanism to encourage dialogue between policy makers and women’s 
groups cannot exist. In other words, a policy network is ineffectual when it stops short of 
linking decision makers and bureaucrats with interest groups. The reason for interest 
group mobilization, after all, is the acquisition of power and influence at the policy level. 
The argument presented here is predicated on five observations and understandings:  
 
1) The ideological nature of women’s groups means policy makers, the media, 
and many Polish and Czech women themselves, look at ‘feminist’ 
organizations with a certain degree of suspicion;  
2) The state has done little to help with the establishment of a coherent women’s 
lobby and in many respects has directly contributed to their marginalization;  
3) Women’s group in Poland and the Czech Republic have actively sought the 
support of Western donors (including the European Union) and specific 
Western-based women’s organizations to help offset the costs associated with 
organizing and lobbying;  
4) State institutions have thus far failed to honour general principles of gender 
equality and human rights;  
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5) The instability of the third sector coupled with the ad hoc nature of policy 
formulation has provided women’s groups with little opportunity to make 
inroads at either the bureaucratic or legislative policy levels.      
 
As theses 1 through 5 suggest, it is structural-level impediments to collective action that 
are limiting the scope and activities of the women’s advocacy sector, and not necessarily 
ideational or agential factors. It is therefore the contention of this section that the 
problems encountered by women’s group and subsequent under representation at the 
policy level can only be solved by changing current institutional arrangements. By 
opening up the policy process third sector groups will become unified and more active, 
and until such time will remain inconsequential actors. Recommendations to this effect 
have been made by government committee already (The first quote relates to the Czech 
Republic; the second to Poland): 
 
One of the most urgent tasks is to raise the level of awareness and knowledge among 
broad layers of the population. NGOs are in this regard important actors, helping to 
increase the knowledge and awareness of gender issues. According to the newly adopted 
directive 2002/73/EC, article 8c, Member states shall encourage dialogue with non-
governmental organizations that have a legitimate interest in contributing to the fight 
against discrimination on the grounds of sex.84 
 
Women have joined the public dialogue, recognizing that they have equal rights as well 
as the duty to speak out on issues of vital importance to society and to actively participate 
in problem solving (…). One of the principal threats to the Polish women’s movement is 
unstable state policy. A good example is the instability of offices responsible for 
                                                 
84
 This recommendation was made in a report “Improvement of the Public Institutional 
Mechanism for Applying, Enforcing and Monitoring Equal Treatment of Men and Women” 
which was part of a twinning project (CZ 2001/IB/SO-01) between the Czech Republic and 
Sweden. Last accessed on-line 15 May, 2006.  
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promoting gender equality and the lack of legislation regulating co-operation between 
the state and NGOs defending women’s rights.85 
 
Understanding the need to enhance democracy and the status of women through the 
development of effective policy networks, the Government Council For Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men in the Czech Republic, and the now defunct 
Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Women and Men in Poland, have called 
upon government to incorporate women’s NGOs into the policy making rubric. But, as 
this chapter argues, it is becoming increasingly obvious that without the fear of political 
repercussion post-communist elites (inc. parliamentarians) will continue to ignore 
recommendations made by stakeholders. In the case of public policy which directly 
affects women, the institutions currently in place offer women’s organizations little 
opportunity to advance their policy preferences. 
 
* * *  
 
A comparison of the women’s NGOs in Poland and the Czech Republic reveals a 
communist legacy and the specific models of dissidence employed by Charter 77 and 
Solidarity have less impact on how this sector mobilize than it might on other sectors (i.e. 
student organizations – Impulse 99). On the whole, women’s groups are not anti-political 
or apolitical nor do they carry with them the normative baggage of the dissident 
experience. Unlike many other newly formed interest associations, women’s groups are 
attempting to reacquire some of the benefits extended to them during the communist 
period. For instance: 
 
• With the exception of Poland (…) from 1980 onwards, 80 to 90 percent of 
children between 3 and 6 had access to kindergarten; 
• In all [ECE]countries 80 to 90 percent of women had gainful employment at 
the end of the eighties; 
                                                 
85
 From the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Women and Men, on-line at 
www.rownystatus.gov.pl  – last accessed 14 April 2006 
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• Acts were adopted at an early stage of the system assuring equal rights for 
women in politics (the right to vote and be elected), and within marriage 
(Ferge 1997: 161-162); 
• Women were guaranteed unfettered reproductive rights, extending to free 
medically administered abortions. 
 
Even if the above statistics are accurate, as the reliability of state generated data has been 
questioned before (cf. Ferge 1997; Wolchik 1991; Ramet, 2005), there remains a clear 
disjuncture between state ideology and the lived experiences of women. Einhorn (1991) 
argues, “the fundamental contradiction inherent in the paradigm adopted by state socialist 
countries lay in a definition of women as workers and mothers without any parallel 
conceptualization of men’s role” (p. 4). In this way, one should not assume that women 
were more politically powerful or privy to the same advantages as men during the 
communist period, because they were not. For example “In the socialist era, the status of 
women was imposed from above – it would be a mistake to regard it as an independent 
self-assertive process” (Smidova 1999: 217). Post-communist women face the following 
socio-economic and political problems: 
 
• As of 1996/97 women were about 20 percent more likely than men to be 
unemployed (Ramet 2005:2) 
• The closure of and/or price rises for childcare facilities (Einhorn, 1991: 8) 
• More teenage girls are giving birth now, drug abuse and alcohol abuse are 
increasing, [and] domestic violence and rape are reportedly also rising (Ramet 
2005) 
• Fewer women politicians at all levels of government in both countries  
• Restrictive abortion laws  
 
These issues have galvanized segments of the women’s movement, but on the whole 
women’s rights groups remain unable to channel this solidarity into any tangible political 
benefit.  There is however one aspect of the women’s movement which is informed by 
both the socialist experience and post-communist socio-political realities. Aware of 
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public disdain for rigid ideology, many groups and centers, i.e. the Gender Studies Centre 
in Prague and the Network of East West Women in Poland (NEWW Polska), have been 
unwilling to adopt a feminist narrative or admit their activities are framed by feminist 
ideology. As Sloat (2005) reports: 
Negative conceptions of feminism also hinder NGO efforts to promote gender 
equality as a policy priority. A recent survey in the Czech Republic (…) found 
that almost 50 percent of men and more than one-third of women consider 
feminist groups fighting for women’s rights to be useless, while one-quarter of 
both sexes remain uncertain about them (p. 442)   
 
Thus feminism, like any ‘ism’ in post-communist ECE, becomes the matter of concern 
rather than an instrument for empowerment. As a consequence, the women’s movement 
remains fragmented and embroiled in theoretical debate, often times with western 
women, about how the movement should be constructed and framed. Valuable time and 
limited resources have therefore been diverted to conferences and workshops rather than 
being used to determine the most feasible way to improve the women’s group network 
and their status vis-à-vis policy makers. The debate over the use and misuse of feminist 
ideology has strategic overtones, for as Einhorn argues “many women are averse to the 
idea of feminism, as they associate it with state intervention and discredited ‘isms’ of the 
past” (Sloat, 2005: 442). Thus, women’s groups in Poland and the Czech Republic have 
had to abandon the sort of rhetoric that empowered the women’s movements in North 
America and Western Europe for language that is less inflammatory and more 
conciliatory, on the belief this would create more opportunities for their movement. 
There is however an even a larger problem with such an inter-movement debate. 
It allows the state to ignore many of the more politically active (government would say 
‘radical’) women’s groups on the grounds they only have a tenuous connection with 
‘average’ Polish or Czech women. An inability to assume some sort of a tangible identity 
means the women’s movement will continue to falter. But one has to wonder how much 
of this has to do with the state, its agenda and programme, opposed to the women’s 
movement itself. For as Beckwith (2005) argues “in several postcommunist 
democratizing nations of Central and East Europe, as institutions democratized, 
opportunities for activist women began to close” (p.588). The dynamism of 
democratization, with the state assuming the lead role in determining policy and 
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institutional design, leads to a situation where state priorities take precedence over the 
demands of third sector organizations. This can be viewed in two ways: one, the state 
must guard its autonomy during state-building, to ensure the democratization programme 
does not become overburdened with divergent interests; two, the state strategically uses 
its autonomy to expedite it’s policy preferences rather than establish a consultative 
framework with interest groups.86 As Wolchik (1995) argues, “the growth of non-party 
associations and organizations typical of established democracies has been inhibited by 
the suspicion that many political leaders have of non-profit organizations and by 
regulations that do not favour their development” (p.38).In this scenario it’s not 
specifically women’s groups that are excluded from the policy process but rather any 
group which seeks to challenge the political status quo.  
Through direct funding and incentive schemes ECE governments have been most 
eager to support only those women’s organizations that compliment their policy 
programme. An example offered by Haskova (2003) illustrates this: “Organization 
proFem has been for years organizing training for lawyers for domestic violence. When 
applying for funds for continuing this project, it has been rejected by the Czech agency 
but succeeded when applied directly to Brussels” (p.6). It would seem odd for any 
government to fund organizations that publicly disagree with their policy priorities or 
method of governance (cf. Pal, 1993), but the consequence of not doing so, in some 
measure, is a policy system without any regulated or institutionalized competition. 
Ultimately without domestic support groups turn to international donors, EU level 
funding schemes and private corporations for funding. The result, as McMahon (2001) 
argues     
While independent of the state, they remain extremely dependent on the 
international community. This predicament has affected the issues they take on, as 
well as the type of activism they use to respond to inequality and existing political 
conditions. The bottom line is that this dependency on the international 
community has translated into a lack of accountability, if not interest, in 
grassroots constituency building (p. 57). 
 
                                                 
86
 This latter scenario is predicated on neo-institutionalism, as it is consistent with the idea that 
“the state is not a captive of economic groups, its autonomy is based on unique sources of power, 
on the capacities and will of state officials. The result is a policy process driven by the logic of 
the state itself” (Pal 1993: 31) 
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The above is critical to our understanding of interest group development in Poland and 
the Czech Republic, because if it is the responsibility of post-communist states to devise 
a more democratic policy making system and, in-turn a more open pluralistic form of 
politics, then it is also their obligation to fund third sector initiatives.  
Considering the international community (i.e. American foundations and West 
European women’s associations – European Women’s Lobby) and specifically the 
European Union have invested millions of dollars and euros into grassroots women’s 
initiatives, it is surprising women’s groups have not become more politically active and 
powerful (cf. McMahon 2001). As Penn argues 
Grassroots women’s groups had begun forming in every country of the former 
Eastern bloc and needed the  intellectual and material support of Western 
feminists, because such resources were sorely lacking inside their own countries 
(Penn, 1998: 48) 
 
A dependency on international donations coupled with domestic-level impediments to 
collective action, like instability at the party level, means women’s groups have opted for 
a less political-form of existence. McMahon (2001) determines that American law, which 
prohibits donors from directly funding any overtly political group, has largely determined 
the conciliatory nature of many Czech and Polish women’s groups. As he argues, “the 
outcome, unfortunately, is that women’s groups in East Central Europe have become 
narrow, single-issue groups with little interest in domestic politics” (McMahon 2001: 57). 
This structural reality goes a long way in explaining why so many of the women’s 
organizations in Poland and the Czech Republic, that one reads about in organizational 
listings (i.e. Directory of women’s organizations and initiatives in Poland )are resource 
or training centers rather than political organizations. This fact would be lost if one were 
to look exclusively at the total number of groups in civil society, which has been on the 
increase in several sectors since 1989. But women’s groups in particular, in both Poland 
and the Czech Republic, are very small, lack a robust grassroots membership base, are 
unsure of their political persuasion and, are almost exclusively located in major 
metropolitan areas (Warsaw and Prague being home to the majority of women’s groups). 
The problem with focusing on civil society instead of specific groups or sectors, as was 
identified in chapter II, is one may mistakenly consider all groups, associations, and 
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organizations as being equal in political value, regardless of whether they are pressure 
groups or not. To speak of civil society without mentioning advocacy groups would be 
akin to examining a legislature without paying attention to political parties. Examining 
the potency of the women’s movement in ECE and the specific groups which claim to 
represent women’s interests, along with legislation and institutions, will help determine 
how parts of civil society function in light of institutional shortcomings and economic 
underdevelopment.  
It is important to consider both political culture and popular culture when 
analyzing women’s groups and feminist politics. The ratio of female to male 
parliamentarians, the depiction of women in the media and, the cultural norms associated 
with family and motherhood, are all issues that guide the activities of feminist 
organizations and women’s rights groups. In this sense, the protections and rights groups 
seek in ECE are as much about pay equity and abortion as they are about human rights 
and democratic citizenship. An information booklet published by the Czech government 
(The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) has on the cover a quote from T.G. Masaryk 
(the Czechoslovak President 1978-1935) which reads: “There is no women’s issue just as 
there is no men’s issue; there is only the human issue.” This may seem innocuous, but it 
is precisely this sort of language and reckoning that concern contemporary feminists. For 
they argue that there are a host of issues, like abortion, prostitution and domestic 
violence, which disproportionately affect women - to say otherwise is to misunderstand 
or ignore the power dynamics in post-communist societies. Funk identifies something 
novel about this wave of feminism. She writes: 
The paradigmatic “women” is no longer who she once was  in the early 1960s and 
1970s, the white upper middle class women trapped on the “pedestal” or in a 
domestic prison. Post-communist developments also make vivid the importance 
of women’s participation in the political public sphere. Post-communist women’s 
needs  epitomize second wave feminism, state two (1993: 328) 
 
There was a hope that immediately after the 1989 transitions women, like their male 
counterparts, would acquire the political gumption needed to fight for women’s (and 
often children’s) rights. As Polish women were active within the Solidarity movement 
and also developed independent feminist organization during the 1980s, there was a sense 
they would be in a good position to continue such activities after 1989. However as the 
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Solidarity movement gained prominence and subsequently entered the realm of 
institutionalized politics, it began to take decisions that would compromise the 
position(s), specifically on abortion, articulated by its own women’s section 
(Bystydzienski, 2001: 505). This organization did manage to survive the transition 
period, but “it has lost its feminist stance of the early period and in 1995 characterized 
itself as a ‘mass organization aimed at satisfying the needs of working and unemployed 
women and their families” (ibid). Thus the development of the Solidarity women’s 
section as a feminist organization stopped in 1995, and like Solidarity itself, fractured 
into several other organizations and political units.  
This again illustrates the fluidity of organized politics in post-communist 
countries. As groups and political parties break-apart and form new units, established 
ideological lines become blurred making it difficult for women’s groups to identify 
opportunities and political allies. As a consequence, instead of becoming more political, 
more militant and better organized, Polish women’s groups depoliticized in their pursuit 
of foreign funding and popular support (McMahon 2001: 56-58). However, since 
McMahon published on American NGOs and their funding of ECE women’s groups, 
Poland and the Czech Republic have joined the European Union. This seems to have 
reinvigorated the women’s movement because a battery of new equal opportunity 
legislation accompanied accession needs to be harmonized/transposed with existing (and 
sometimes nonexistent) domestic law – a chance to influence new policy for the first 
time. This window of reform, as presented by John Keeler (1993), suggests that 
“successful policy innovations are only possible when the various constraints that 
normally prevent policy changes give way to a policy window” (Helfferich and Kolb 
2001: 145). New EU directives offered women’s groups a window of reform during the 
acquis period but quickly vanished as soon as membership was formally ratified. The 
influence of the EU on contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic will be 
discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter. But it is important to recognize that 
women’s NGOs “play a crucial role in ‘passing down’ the information, including issues 
of the European Union” (Zielinska 2005: 31), which is a vital component of policy 
dissemination and integral to third sector development. 
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While recognizing the existence of cultural differences between Western and 
Eastern women and the models of feminism they employ, and also between women in 
Poland and the Czech Republic, women’s NGOs have not been entirely effective in 
realizing policy reform. Current cultural practices, specifically the Polish Catholic 
Church’s influence over policy relating to the family and abortion, and the socio-
economic standing of women in post-communist Europe have a lot to do with this. That 
is, women in post materialist or developed democracies are not subject to the same 
ideological constraints as their Czech and Polish counterparts (Inglehart, 1990; Nevitte 
1996). There is evidence to suggest, rather than the demobilization of the women’s 
movement being a result of poor tactics and strategy on their part, it is an overall 
breakdown in state – third sector relations that undermine the further politicization of the 
interest group community (cf. Green 1999). Green argues that “the key to democratic 
development is in the quality of the state-society connection, which is generally 
perceived to extend beyond the act of voting” (p.2). The development of a robust policy 
community is essential to the achievement of a more politicized third sector. If women’s 
groups are consistently blocked from entering the policy process, their rational 
calculations will soon steer them away from institutionalized interest articulation 
altogether.   
A policy community “refers to all actors or potential actors who share either an 
interest in a policy area or a common ‘policy focus’ and who, over time, succeed in 
shaping policy” (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 158). This definition is generally 
accepted, but it suggests that for a community to exist, key stakeholders will at some 
point manage to influence the decisions taken by parliamentarians and/or bureaucrats. 
Much of the literature on public policy and interest group formation stems from N. 
America and Great Britain (cf. Pal 1997) and pays scant attention to the structure and 
function of a state during periods of regime shift or transition. Therefore some of the 
concepts and theories presented in policy textbooks have little currency in the counties 
like Poland and the Czech Republic, which since the collapse of communism have 
experienced a series of  significant political events – the break-up of Czechoslovakia 
(1993), economic shock therapy in Poland (1990-94), and EU membership for both 
(2004). But interest group and policy literature provides a useful template because it can 
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be used to show how the shortcomings of the present policy process undermine the 
development of third sector organizations. For instance, there is a noticeable gulf between 
a theoretically desirable policy system, such as an open and consultative pluralism, and 
the one which exists in Poland and the Czech Republic. In the latter case, agenda setting 
(Pal 1993) has been firmly in the hands of government and state elites. And while the 
‘opening of policy windows’ (Kingdon 1995) should occur more readily in political fluid 
environments, which would provide groups with an opportunity to change the policy 
status quo, in the case of women’s specific legislation, it is other interests and issues 
which have dominated post-communist politics.      
Policy issues such as abortion, gainful employment and equality rights had almost 
no salience during the state socialist period, as state ideology determined women had a 
right to all of these things. However there is a disjuncture between the rights afforded to 
women during communism and the rights women are seeking today. The ‘emancipation’ 
of women during communism was the result of state generated ideology and Soviet 
imposition, not a ‘cultural’ development as such. Thus, many men (and indeed women) 
see post-communism as an opportunity to return to a value system that existed before 
Soviet hegemony. This has caused serious problems for women’s organizations, 
particularly in Poland, which are charged with the daunting task of condemning 
communism while at the same time championing certain communist era policies. For 
example,  
While women obtained a number of progressive welfare provisions (…) including 
extensive maternity leaves, free day care and education, as well as the right to 
abortion, they were not allowed legally to establish  autonomous women’s 
organizations (Bystydzienski 2001: 502)   
 
In communist Poland, the voice of women was routed through The League of Polish 
Women (Liga Kobiet Polskich), which worked as a vehicle for socialist ideology rather 
than an organization for the advancement of women (Bystydzienski, 2001: 502-503). In 
Czechoslovakia a similar scenario emerged. The Communist Party usurped independent 
organizations and established the National Women’s Committee, in part to facilitate a 
dialogue between men and women, but also pragmatically, as a way to direct women into 
particular professions and political stations (Wolchik, 1991: 200-205). By incorporating 
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women into party hierarchy the state managed to first subdue feminist thought and 
potential organization along that line, and second it ensured any debate on gender 
equality would stay within the party. As Wolchik (1991) argues, the National Women’s 
Committee (CZ) “began to question party dogma concerning the position of women 
under socialism [but] for the most part, however, such activities and criticism remained 
confined to intellectuals and members of the political elite (p.30). The result of this 
schism, between elite and non-elite, and Party and individual, is as Funk (1993) argues 
Women in state socialist countries appear to be more oriented than Western 
feminists toward children and the family, have different attitudes towards the 
individual and the collective and to authority, (…)  and have different attitudes 
toward men or toward collective action87 (1993: 320) 
 
This is an important consideration, for specific issues which galvanized women’s 
movements/groups in the West will have less salience among women in ECE. This point 
has been advanced by several feminist scholars working in the area of post-communist 
women’s rights and feminist politics (cf. Funk 1990; Kapusta-Pofahl 2002; Baldez 2003; 
Siklova 1996) and has been identified as a methodological issue that cannot be 
overlooked when examining the evolution of this interest sector. But, this chapter argues 
far from political disengagement being a matter of low political efficacy among women, 
the post-communist state – including institutions and laws -  has done little to enhance the 
standing of women’s groups (both formally and informally) in the policy formulation 
process. Culture may preclude women from adopting a western oriented feminist stance; 
it however has no bearing on institutionalized forms of interest contestation to which 
women’s groups should otherwise be privy to.  
It is solely the state’s responsibility to foster the necessary conditions for an open 
policy dialogue between women’s groups and state institutions, a process which ought to 
be responsive to the concerns of women’s groups and promote the production of 
competent legislation. However the total number of groups in civil society has no bearing 
on the above recommendation. Statistics suggest women’s nonegovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) have been on the increase since 1990 (IHFHR, 2000: 146), but still 
many of these post-communist era groups lack the political will and/or expertise needed 
to assume an advocacy role in their new democracies. Ramet (2005) argues that 95 
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 Emphasis added 
 170  
percent of Czech women’s organizations “are not concerned with politics at all” and 
prefer not to label themselves as feminists (p.306) nor assume a feminist agenda. 
However, Siklova (1996) believes Czech women are exercising their democratic rights in 
a uniquely Czech way, by not joining associations and entering politics. She argues “in 
the Czech Republic, it is understood that freedom does not come from organizations” 
(p.94). It has been suggested that this is because East Central European women are not as 
concerned with their relative social status or standing as Western feminists were during 
their campaign for equal rights in the 1970s (Funk,1993). Thus the post-communist 
women’s movement(s) in ECE is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from 
anything studied before. The key consideration is not what motivates a group to mobilise, 
i.e. their grievances or policy concerns, but how they mobilize and whether they have 
access to relevant policy makers.  
Alas one if left to determine whether it is historical and/or cultural difference 
between Western women and Eastern women that render Czech and Polish Women’s 
groups politically impotent, or structural-level impediments to collective action which 
work to frame contentious politics in the fist place. The political agenda can be set by the 
state alone, insomuch as “the state is an active agent, molding society and serving the 
interests of office-holders sometimes as much as, or more than, the interests of citizens” 
(Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 154). The reality is however “many CEE women’s NGOs 
have been unable to initiate large-scale projects or lobby for political reforms (…)” 
(Sloat, 2002: 440). So even if Siklova’s assessment of Czech feminism and women’s 
groups are correct, that is, Czech women feel no affinity with Western feminist discourse 
and are not by ‘nature’ political, it still does not adequately explain why Women’s 
interest groups in the Czech Republic are so ineffectual. Siklova is assuming, a) that all 
Czech women fall into this category, of not wanting or needing to be political, and b) that 
there are no external, tangible, impediments to collective action. Women’s groups, by 
virtue of how diverse the constituency is (e.g. lesbian women, women of colour and 
Roma women, older women, women from lower socio-economic backgrounds, or from 
academia etc.) cannot be viewed or analyzed as a homogenous sector. There are women 
who want to be politically active; develop or join associations; engage with policy 
 171  
makers over particular issues, and; join the ranks of Czech and Polish parliamentarians, 
bureaucrats and advisors.     
In Poland, women were active in Solidarity, comprising 50 percent of the 
membership (Bystydzienski 2001: 504) and drew on this experience when developing 
independent women’s organizations after the collapse of state socialism. Czech women 
were equally political during the communist period, with 18 percent of the signatories 
and 31 percent of the spokespersons within the Charter 77 movement being women 
(Einhorn 1991: 1). It goes almost without saying then that women have both capacity to 
be politically astute and facility to be effective organizers. But for purely political reasons 
that states under discussion have taken effort to introduce policy that only compliments 
their economic programme. As a result women’s groups are routinely blocked from 
participating in policy development,88 even though in many cases the legislation concerns 
abortion, pay equity and domestic violence, which are almost exclusively women’s 
issues. Institutional entrepreneurs, which are those “individuals or groups who adopt a 
leadership role in episodes of institution building” (Colomy 1998: 270), have ignored 
huge swaths of the potential policy community. The Polish Plenipotentiary provides this 
analysis of the abortion issue: 
The biggest debate on women’s human rights was the dispute over the right abortion for 
social reasons – a debate that got started in the late 1980s. In 1993, in spite of protests 
by more than a million people demanding a referendum on the issue, parliament passed a 
restrictive abortion law, depriving women of the right to decide their maternity. The 
ruling right did not want any discussion on women’s right89.    
 
The Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs published a report that suggests: 
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 In the Czech Republic for example, many of the newest statutes dealing with equal 
opportunities and human rights call for the inclusion of NGOs in the policy making and 
institutional building process. However, as Havelkova’s (2005) report to the Open Society 
Institute suggests, many of these ‘laws’ and/or recommendations fall short of changing the status 
quo in any meaningful way. NGOs are given only 10 days to comment on proposed legislation, 
are not permitted to liaise with Cabinet and/or senior policy analysts directly, and 
recommendations for government and NGO cooperation is “but followed only by a part of the 
ministries” (p.25).  
89
 The Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Women and Men, statement on ‘Co-
operation with non-governmental organizations’ (www.rownystatus.gov.ol). Last accesses 
12/04/2006 
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The (…) structure of institutional guarantee in the agenda of equal opportunities 
emerged in the course of the years 1998 to 1999. Co-operation between individual 
elements of this structure is not ideal. Creation of basic measures beyond the 
competencies of individual departments remains in the hands of the Government and the 
public can only influence it indirectly and in an ad hoc manner (Sec. 167: 1999)90 
 
In both Poland and the Czech Republic, even though the histories of these two countries 
are vastly different, the opportunities for women’s groups to actively engage policy 
makers and institutional entrepreneurs are equally meager. The Solidarity movement 
campaigned ostensibly for Polish workers and engaged particularly in the Gdansk and 
Szczecin shipyards in direct action campaigns (Ost 1990: 86-88). The movement grew 
exponentially in the early 1980s before martial law was mandated, but it managed to 
incorporate other trade unions and guilds throughout Poland into its organizational 
structure. Solidarity grew into a potent advocacy group and opposition movement with 
the aid of a committed and professional core of organizers – which as discussed, included 
some 4 million women. In Czechoslovakia, dissidence was less public and obviously 
political and for reasons already alluded to, never developed into a Solidarity-type 
network of regional offices. The argument here is that with the commencement of the 
state-building process came the creation of a new political society, which is vastly 
different than dissident era society and controlled for the most part by governing 
coalitions. For instance, as new political institutions were created or reconstructed to 
meet the needs of democratic governance, interest group in both countries, regardless of 
dissident traditions and the level of organization attained by dissident groups, have found 
it increasingly difficult to influence their respective areas of concern. It is important to 
consider Moe’s (1990) argument, “political institutions are (…) weapons of coercion and 
redistribution. They are the structural means by which political winner pursue their own 
interests, often at the great expense of political loses (p. 213). Post-communist 
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 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Czech Republic (December 7, 1999) “Second Periodical 
Report on the Fulfillment of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, In the Czech Republic over the period 1995 to June 31, 1999” 
(www.mpsv.cz/en/1991) 
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institutions are thus shaping and/or influencing the interest community in profound ways. 
For as groups begin to form and consider their place in an ever changing and politically 
dynamic environment they are forced to deal with certain, and in many ways unique, 
institutional impediments. One being the uncertainty which comes with economic 
restructuring and EU harmonization, the other being the considerable fluidity at the 
ministerial and deputy ministerial levels – which gives NGO personnel little chance to 
develop lasting ‘friendships’ with decision makers. 
 
* * *  
 
As social movement and feminist scholars have identified, there are a wide array of 
women’s groups in the third sector, taking issue with a variety of causes and concerns. 
For instance in Poland, there are several issue groups which disseminate information on 
women’s employment and homemaking (i.e. Work and Home; The Working Woman, 
and; the Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs in Poland), and others 
that straddle policy spheres, like Manushe, a Roma women’s initiative that seeks to 
advance Roma as well as women’s rights. It should be said that since 2000 many multiple 
issue groups have emerged, but are ostensibly isolated from the wider policy community 
– in both countries.   
There are a number of groups in both Poland and the Czech Republic that self 
identify as ‘women’s rights groups’. For example, a prominent group in Poland, Network 
of East-West Women (NEWW), say on their website: “Founded in 1991 NEWW is and 
international communication and resource network supporting dialogue, informational 
exchange, and activism among those concerned about the status of women in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Newly Independent States, and the Russian Federation.”91 They are 
primarily concerned with helping or assisting women’s NGOs in ECE organize 
campaigns, whether at the state, sub-state or European Union level. Nine women’s 
groups in Poland and only two in the Czech Republic are members of this association 
which is based in Gdansk, Poland. The Polish groups range from a women’s 
entrepreneurial society to a crisis intervention society and in the Czech Republic the most 
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 www.neww.org.pl – last accessed 23 April, 2006 
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notable member of the NEWW is the Prague Gender Studies Centre (PGSC), which 
houses a women’s resource library and several permanent full time staff to coordinate 
activities in the Czech Republic. As a resource centre and hub of the women’s movement 
in the Czech Republic, the Gender Studies Centre has engaged in public awareness 
campaigns on such issues as domestic violence and pay equity, along with women’s 
political participation and the history of Czech women – especially during the communist 
period. The PGSC has also published a report, entitled Gender Audit of the EU Pre-
Accession Funds 1999-2004, which identifies what is potentially a crucial development in 
the way NGOs acquire funding. The report (2005) argues: 
  
The Czech non-profit and non-governmental organizations (NGOS) are recently 
experiencing a new  and specific situation. Foreign foundations, mostly of American 
origin like Open Society Fund, Ford Foundation and others, are either leaving the 
Central and Eastern Europe region or significantly restricting their programmes in the 
area (Gender Studies o.p.s.,  2005: 5)  
 
The women’s movement and specifically women’s rights groups are not only trying to 
create awareness in their own constituency (i.e. women) but are operating in an 
environment with few political certainties. The party system, electoral system, the ethos 
of parliament and international agreements (i.e. the EU), all work to inhibit the traditional 
lobbying techniques available to non-state actors. For example, as Benoit and Hayden 
(2004) have correctly observed, political parties and the electoral system in Poland has 
been in a state of constant flux since 1990. They argue “since the transition to 
competitive elections in 1989, every election has (…) been preceded by a change of 
electoral rules92” (Benoit and Hayden, 2004: 403). While structural changes at the 
electoral and party level tend to complicate the development of some grassroots 
organizations, in the Czech Republic it was more substantial institutional-level 
developments that altered the parameters of interest articulation and lobbying. With the 
creation of an upper house (Senate) in 1998 and constitutional changes that reorganized 
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the distribution of political power in the Czech Republic thus keeping interest groups at 
bay. As Reported in Nations in Transit 2004: 
The state administration has undergone significant changes in recent years. The 
14 administrative regions, created in 2001, were given considerable oversight 
powers in education, health care, territorial planning, and the environment. Power 
was also transferred from the former 73 districts (abolished by January 1, 2003) to 
205 newly created municipalities (Klvana, 2004: 12). 
 
The correlation between women’s sector fragmentation and political instability cannot be 
overlooked. There was a sharp increase in the number of women’s groups immediately 
after the fall of Communism in 1989, as women were legally entitled to form associations 
and political organizations for the first time. But from the mid 1990s many of these 
transition era groups either amalgamated, forming large ‘multipurpose’ groups, or were 
forced to disband, because of limited funds and political resources (IHFHR, 2000: 146).  
The net result of this fluidity – of both institutions and the women’s movement - 
is a women’s movement without the stability and permanence needed to compete in their 
target policy area – broadly, equal opportunities and women’s rights. It has been 
determined that “women’s movements often emerge and prosper in times of major 
societal upheavals” (Bystydzienski, 2001:501), when a sudden change in social and 
political orientation permits new issues, such as feminism or gender equality, to enter the 
popular discourse. As the previous chapter argues, while there is an opportunity for 
groups to emerge during regime change, they are still by virtue of the state building 
process, at the mercy of the new political elite. While there is opportunity to form 
organizations and pressure groups, the economic realities in Poland and the Czech 
Republic placed limitations on what new groups could feasibly do. This hit the women’s 
movement particularly hard, as Heinen (1997) argues “the democratization of political 
systems and the transitions to market economy in Central and Eastern Europe goes along 
with a process of marginalization of women in the economic and political field” (p.577). 
Without any substantial dissident movement to call their own, Polish and Czech women 
found the post-1989 political environment devoid of any established mechanisms for 
interest articulation.  
The civic zeal that once captured the hearts and minds of Poles and Czechs and 
western philanthropists is no longer capable of sustaining interest group activity, 
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especially in an era of institutionalized interest contestation when a premium is placed, 
not on the message being conveyed, but on results. This logic is consistent with ‘western’ 
lobbying which regards policy and policy formulation as an interactive and dynamic 
process inhabited by a multitude of pressure groups, consumer groups and professional 
lobbyists. Importantly, in this sort of an environment the interest groups themselves are 
charged with the responsibility of organizing and funding their lobby – the state has little 
involvement with political organizations. Pross (1992) contends “persuasion depends on 
organization” (p.3) and “above all, pressure group activity must have continuity if it is to 
have lasting effect” (ibid.). This last point is critical, as the women’s movement has, 
chiefly as a result of the ever changing political institutions and governmental personnel, 
been unable to develop a coherent movement or stable, reputable, women’s rights 
organizations.  
I want to return to an example mentioned above, the closure of the Polish 
Government’s Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Women and Men (Plenipotentiary). 
The Polish government established the Plenipotentiary 25 June 2002, which came into 
effect 1 July, 2002. The purpose of this Plenipotentiary was to assess the overall status of 
women in Polish society in relation to their male counterparts and whilst offering advice 
to the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister’s Office were charged with 
“incorporating the principle of equal status of women and men into all the fields and 
scopes of the government policy” (Sec.3:2). There was acknowledgement that 
government should do the following:  
Retain or strengthen the Office of Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of 
Women and Men. While having equal rights, women do not have equal chances and 
opportunities, hence institutional mechanisms are required to support women's 
aspirations to achieve (…) One of the principal threats to the Polish women's 
movement is unstable state policy. A good example is the instability of offices 
responsible for promoting gender equality and the lack of legislation regulating co-
operation between the state and NGO's defending women's rights. 
This committee was established in 2002 within the office of the Secretary of State in the 
Chancellery of the Prime Minister. As it began to function as a gender rights watchdog to 
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ensure public policy reflected the government’s commitment to women’ equality, it was 
abruptly closed down 4 November, 200593. The message on the Plenipotentiary website 
confirming this is equally abrupt: “On the 3rd of November 2005, the Regulation of the 
Council of Ministers on Cancellation of the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Status 
of Women and Men came into force”94. Almost immediately women’s groups were 
publicly questioning the closure of this office, which as the Network of East Women 
argue, is in contradiction to “Poland’s obligations towards the European Communities” 
95and the government’s own equity programme. 
In the Czech Republic, the Government Council for Equal Opportunities for Men 
and Women (Government Council) was established in October 2001, but as it was 
reported, did little to create a meaningful policy community with the women’s advocacy 
sector. On publication of the Open Society Institute’s report on equal opportunities in the 
Czech Republic, the Government Council had “not created any committees or working 
groups” (Havelkova 2005: 18). By not creating working groups or committees, women’s 
rights groups have been effectively blocked from the policy process and may only 
participate at the discretion of the Council’s deputy ministers – and they have no 
executive or supervisory powers (ibid). If either the Government Council had been 
granted more power or women’s groups were permitted to network with cabinet minister 
or senior bureaucrats via committee meetings, it would have enhanced the standing of 
women’s groups. But Czech decision makers seem unwilling to open up the policy 
process to ‘outside’ actors. Policy formulation is not a regulated or regularized exercise, 
for it is largely left to the discretion of ministry analysts to determine consultative 
practices. Sometimes experts are called upon to comment on draft legislation but as 
Green (1999) reports, “only rarely have ministries consulted with outsiders, and even 
then only on a case by case basis” (p. 6). The Committee does cannot address these 
policy lacunae either, for it has no power of oversight and sits only three times a year. 
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 See the Plenipotentiary website for details: www.rownystatus.gov.pl [last accessed 22 April 
2006]  
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 www.rownystatus.gov.pl 
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 The complete letter can be found at the Network of East West Women website, 
www.neww.org.pl. Last accessed 09/06/2006 
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Furthermore, the Czech government decides committee composition and is under no 
obligation to select members from any particular NGO. 
Consider what Musilova (1999) writes about the ‘rights revolution’ in the Czech 
Republic: 
Equal opportunities (recognized as a matter of public interest) are an instrument 
for fulfilling another  matter of public interest, i.e. entry into the European Union. 
This is at present a priority for midterm interests, since the Czech Republic is 
actively seeking membership” (p.197). 
 
Musilova argues the motivation for establishing equal rights committees in the Czech 
Republic is not the advancement of women, but the economic growth and security that 
EU accession offers. Yet again the elite is manipulating political institutions to their 
benefit and not working to develop a robust form of interest articulation. When 
examining the case of the Polish Plenipotentiary, one cannot help but be suspicious of the 
circumstances which surrounded its closure. Government insists it was a necessary cost-
cutting measure, but the action to dissolve this office came only after Poland was 
formally admitted to the European Union.  Groups are now dispersing, disbanding, or 
moving towards a less ‘political’ form of existence, which is in part due to a host of 
institutional level impediments. Ramet (2005) identifies and important characteristic of 
the women’s movement in the Czech Republic: “some 95 percent of women’s 
organizations are not concerned with politics at all, while both the label ‘feminism’ and 
the feminist agenda have been so thoroughly deprecated that few advocates of women’s 
equality dare refer to themselves as feminists” (p. 306). The situation is such that: 
Women’s groups don’t talk to each other. They remain atomized from each other, 
sometimes by ‘status’  schisms, sometimes by ideology, many times by suspicion 
of peoples outside their ‘circle’ (…) As of 1994, there is no structure and no 
single goal that unites them (Olesky, 1995: 5). 
 
Things have changed since 1994, when the above concern was raised by Peggy Simpson, 
but still women’s organizations are either preoccupied with sorting out the sector as a 
whole, i.e. looking to establish the sorts of policy and advocacy networks that were 
absent in the early 1990s, or giving up on lobbying altogether.  While statistics supplied 
by the Polish government suggests the presences of a robust women’s NGO sector, the 
fact remains that very few groups are active in the policy formulation process. As a 
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result, Women’s groups have been unable to augment or challenge state directed policy in 
any meaningful way.  Thus, Polish and Czech women’s groups of the post-communist era 
have been met with two distinct types of institutional impediment. The first is the ‘run of 
the mill’ gender inequality that is pervasive enough in many parts of the industrialized 
world, which in and of itself is not a unique characteristic of Poland and the Czech 
Republic today. The second is the nature of Polish and Czech institutions themselves, 
which are in states of flux and without clearly defined policy networks. 
In Poland it is the issue of abortion that has prompted many groups to mobilize - 
on both sides of the debate. It is particularly complicated in Poland because up until the 
transitions period reproduction laws were liberal. As Kulczycki (1995) argues “ following 
the lead taken by the former Soviet Union in 1955, Poland shortly thereafter made 
abortion legally available practically at the request of a women, and the procedure 
promptly became a primary means of fertility regulation” ( p. 471). Kulczycki’s helpful 
summary of Poland’s abortion law points to a dramatic shift in abortion policy, from 
being restrictive before WWII, to openly available and free of charge during the 
communist period, back to a more restrictive model after the collapse of communism in 
1989-1990. The power and political influence of the Polish Catholic Church has a lot to 
do with the more restrictive stance adopted by successive  governments, as it is the one 
organization that has remained politically potent after democratization. As Saxonberg 
(2000) determines, “On moral issues (…) the Catholic Church has a much greater 
influence on politicians than on citizens. On the controversial question of abortion, for 
example, the populace is much less ‘Catholic’ than the politicians (…)” (p.240). The 
power and potency of the Polish Catholic Church will be explored in some detail, but for 
now it should be regarded as an organization which challenges – and in some cases 
denies - many of the aims and goals of the women’s movement in Poland. 
 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS/ABORTION IN POLAND 
Since the 1960s abortion has been by far the most contentious and contested topic among 
women’s groups in North America, particularly the United States. Pro-life and pro-choice 
forces, as they self-identify, have clashed repeatedly over the legality and morality of the 
practice. In a landmark decision (Roe v. Wade) the Supreme Court of the United States 
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ruled (with a 7-2 majority) the practice of limiting or preventing access to abortion is 
unconstitutional. From 1973 until present, the pro-life movement has tried to get the 
Supreme Court decision of 1973 overturned on the grounds that abortion contravenes the   
‘right to life’ provision in the Constitution. The Polish case is almost the reverse.  
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Poland’s highest court, interpreted the ‘right 
to life’ provision in the Polish Constitution to mean ‘right to life from time of 
conception.’ In a 1997 ruling it struck down the more liberal abortion law introduced 
only a year earlier by the SLD government. A New York Times article quotes the tribunal 
chairman Andrzej Zoll, “the highest value in a democracy is human life, which must be 
protected from its beginning to the end” (29 May 1997). The 1997 ruling bolstered the 
‘anti-choice’ movement, as Nowicka labels it, which has been active since 1993. It is 
supported both by the Church hierarchy and American pro-life activists (2001:234). 
Nowicka indicates that many American ‘anti-choice’ groups have helped train and fund 
their Polish counterparts (ibid.). Only a small fraction of pro-choice women’s NGOs 
actively lobby government on the abortion issue, instead “the majority of women’s 
groups choose not to take a position on abortion” (ibid.). Reproductive rights (or access 
to state-sanctioned abortion) in Poland is a complex case study, but it illustrates the 
fundamental way contentious politics has changed. Not only are Polish NGOs, the Polish 
Catholic Church (PCC) and the state involved in this on-going contentious episode, but 
so are European and American NGOs, the European Parliament, European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice.    
The abortion issue galvanized the Polish women’s movement in a way few other 
issues could have. NGOs became active in the early 1990s when existing abortions, 
introduced during the communist period, were under threat of repeal. For nearly 40 years 
the laws on reproductive practice had provided Polish women unfettered access to state 
subsidized medical abortion96. By the time Hanna Suchocka assumed the premiership in 
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 Abortion was legalized in Poland in 1956. Wanda Nowicka writes, “the regulations 
allowed abortion on social grounds, which meant that abortion was abailable practically 
on demand for almost 40 years [and] although exact figures do not exist, it is estimated 
that there were between 180,000 and 300,000 per year during this period” (p.224).  For 
comparative purposes, the Polish government claimed 151 abortions were carried out in 
1999 and 134 in 2000.  
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July 1992, there was much speculation that a more restrictive abortion law would soon be 
tabled in the Sejm. It was reported late in 1990 that the anti-abortion movement was 
gaining momentum. A New York Times report determined: 
 
 The anti-abortion movement has been strongest in Poland, where politicians, 
 faced with the power of the Catholic Church, are apparently unfazed by polls 
 showing that most women are against a proposed ban on abortion that has already 
 cleared the Polish Senate, with the only real opposition coming from the 
 discredited Communists. (Bohlen 1990) 
 
At the beginning of 1993 abortion became illegal except for instances when “pregnancy 
threatens a women’s life or health, results from incest or rape, or when the foetus is 
hopelessly damaged” (Barker 1996). Women’s NGOs have been trying to get 
government to relax anti-abortion laws since they were introduced. Abortion laws were 
only relaxed, or ‘liberalized,’ for a short period in 1996 after Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz’s government of the Demoratic Left Alliance won parlimentary majority. 
Such a sudden change in reproductive policy brought moderate women (and men) into 
the pro-abortion camp. A poll taken in 2002 discovered that 49 percent of Poles wanted 
government to relax abortion laws (AFP 8 Jan 2003). A few years earlier, a survey 
conducted by Warsaw based Centre for Research on Public Opinion found 65% of Poles 
to be ‘pro-choice’. Abortion is an emotive issue in Poland and has proven to be quite 
divisive. Women’s NGOs are positioned in opposition not only to rightist political 
parties, but to the Polish Catholic Church, which has been a powerful civil society 
organization since the early days of communism. 
The Polish Catholic Church (PCC) has remained a key political actor in the 
democratic era. During the communist-period the PCC was discreetly anti-communist, 
though it refrained from coming out publicly against the Polish regime. This being said a 
high ranking Polish Cardinal, Cardinal Wyszynski, was arrested by secret police after he 
gave an inflammatory sermon in which he condemned a recent bishop’s arrest. Along 
with KOR and Solidarity, the PCC provided Poland with an independent and autonomous 
sphere, giving Poland the impression of a civil society. The PCC was held in high-esteem 
during the communist period and was credited, along with Solidarity, with initiating 
regime collapse. This is one reason why political parties are afraid to challenge the 
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existing abortion laws. During the lead up to EU entry, for example, the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) moved very slowly and cautiously on the abortion issue (AFP 18 Jan 
2003). They were the most populous part in the Sejm, having gained 41% of the popular 
vote in the 2001 election, but still were “anxious to win the support of the Catholic 
Church for Poland’s entry into the European Union” (ibid). The PCC is the most 
powerful nongovernmental actor in Poland and unlike many women’s NGOs has access 
to an established nation-wide network (churches and Bishops) of associations. The 
League of Polish Families (LPR), an ultra-right and anti-EU political party that held 38 
and 34 seats in the 2001 and 2005 Sejm respectively, has been involved in planning 
public pro-life/anti-abortioni rallies throughout Poland (PAP 28 Mar. 2007).  While not 
being directly affiliated with the PCC it has managed, successfully it could be suggested, 
push the Church’s agenda in the political sphere. Few political parties are willing to do 
the same for the pro-abortion/choice movement.   
The leading pro-choice civil society organization in Poland is the Polish 
Federation for Women and Family Planning (PFP). It is comprised of nine independent 
women’s NGOs, which as Girard and Nowicka (2002) suggest “are among the few 
groups that have campaigned actively for women’s choice on abortion over the years” 
(p.24). Nowicka, the executive director of PFWFP has done a great deal to keep the 
abortion issue on the political radar. She organized a tribunal on abortion rights 25 July 
2001, which entailed several Polish women sharing with ‘international judges’ their 
abortion stories. Girard and Nowicka (2001) explain: 
 Seven testimonials were presented over the course of the day. They were selected 
 to illustrate what happened to women who were entitled to an abortion under the 
 Act and those who were not, and women who had managed to obtain an abortion, 
 legally or illegally, and those who had not (p.24). 
 
The testimonials were subsequently published in book form under the title Contemporary 
Women’s Hell Polish Women’s Stories and is available online. Pro-choice NGOs, 
especially the PFP, have been very successful disseminating statistics about clandestine 
abortions to national and international press agencies. Newswire and newspaper stories 
on the topic of abortion in Poland invariably use statistics supplied by women’s NGOs. 
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They estimate between 80,000 and 200,000 underground abortions are performed every 
year in Poland (AFP 20 Jan. 2003).  
Every pro-choice rally organized by the PFP or associate NGO is met a week or 
so later with a ‘counter’ pro-life event. An illustrative example happened March 2007. 
On 4 March the PFP organized a protest in Warsaw attended by approximately 2,000 
people (Xinhua General News Service. 5 Mar. 2007). They were protesting a proposed 
change to the Constitution that would see abortion enumerated as an illegal activity – this 
could ban abortion outright. Wanda Nowicka, the pro-abortion/choice movement’s well-
known activist and organizer, addressed the crowed and demanded the Polish state 
respect women’s reproductive rights and recommended they hold a referendum on the 
matter (ibid.). Twenty-four days later “around 3,000 anti-abortionists staged a Life March 
[in Warsaw] demanding a total ban on abortion in Poland” (PAP 28 Mar. 2007). The 
League of Polish Families (LPR) and the ultra conservative Radio Maryja, event 
organizers, were probably responding to the pro-choice rally (ibid). Most likely for 
symbolic effect the protesters, along with opposition party leaders, attend Holy Mass in 
Warsaw’s St Alexander Church (ibid.). A year earlier abortion supporter demonstrated 
outside the Sejm. As a NEWW press release indicates, this is the first “protest action 
against the anti-abortion law in Poland of this kind, where women who’ve had 
terminations are speaking out about it openly” (NEWW 12 Dec.2006). Public 
demonstrations are occurring more frequently in Poland.       
Women’s NGOs active in the area of reproductive rights, either pro-choice or pro-
life, have been so intermittently since 1993 – pro-abortion activists started campaigning 
almost immediately after Solidarity’s electoral victory in 1989. Women’s NGOs that are 
in favour of liberalized abortion laws have been met with considerable institutional 
opposition. The PCC, and the Law and Justice party, along with several other prominent 
parties, are inclined to maintain the status quo. However external actors and institutions, 
the UN, EP and ECHR for example, are wading in on the debate. 
 
The European Dimension: 
In June 2002 the European Parliament passed a resolution on “Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Rights”. The Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities 
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convened to draft an ‘own-initiative report’ on the matter of reproductive rights. Included 
below are two articles from the tabled Resolution. 
 12.  Recommends that, in order to safeguard women's reproductive health and  
 rights, abortion should be made legal, safe and accessible to all; 
 13.  Calls upon the governments of the Member States and the Accession 
 Countries to refrain in any case from prosecuting women who have undergone 
 illegal abortions; 
 
While the European Union cannot quash strict abortion laws, it can offer an opinion on 
reproductive rights. Based on the above resolution, it appears the EU in a general sense 
opposes strict abortion laws. Other than Ireland, Poland has the most restrictive abortion 
laws in the EU. The resolution was submitted two years before Poland joined the EU, 
perhaps diminishing its impact. 
 On 20 March 2007 the European Court of Human Rights ruled Poland had 
contravened the Convention on Human Rights when it refused to grant an abortion to a 
woman in medical need. After receiving authorization from a Polish doctor to have an 
abortion, the complainant Alicja Tysiac was refused the procedure. Her eyesight 
deteriorated quickly afterward, to the point where she has great difficulty seeing objects 
five feet away (PAP 20 Mar. 2007).The Court instructed the Polish state to pay her court 
fees and damages as a result of their negligence. This case has put pressure on the Polish 
government to clarify what is meant by a ‘medically necessary abortion.’ 
The Council of Europe’s parliamentary assembly, which has no legal authority in 
the area of reproductive rights, voted 102 – 69 in favour of a resolution legalizing 
abortion in its 47 member states (AFP 16 April 2008). Poland and other nations 
condemned the comprehensive resolution that contains 72 separate amendments (ibid.). It 
called for the legalization of abortion in any state where it is illegal, an end to “de facto 
inaccessibility” and age appropriate sexual education (ibid.). Resolution 1607 (2008) both 
offers suggestions to member-states, on how to augment existing reproductive laws for 
example, and general facts about the legal status of abortion in Europe. Section 7 (see 
below) clearly challenges Poland’s abortion laws. 
 
 7. The Assembly invites the member states of the Council of Europe to: 
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 7.1. decriminalise abortion within reasonable gestational limits, if they have not 
 already done so; 
 7.2. guarantee women’s effective exercise of their right of access to a safe and 
 legal abortion; 
 7.3. allow women freedom of choice and offer the conditions for a free and 
 enlightened choice without specifically promoting abortion; 
 7.4. Lift restrictions which hinder, de jure or de facto, access to safe abortion, and, 
 in particular, take the necessary steps to create the appropriate conditions for 
 health, medical and psychological care and offer suitable financial cover…97 
 
The resolutions of the Council of Europe and European Parliament have worked to 
change the nature of contentious politics in Poland. Polish pro-choice NGOs worked in 
relative isolation at the national level until quite recently. European institutions have 
changed the parameters of contention by simply, intentionally or unintentionally, stating 
their opposition to restrictive abortion laws. Associations/networks like PFP can now 
claim their position on abortion is the majority position and is, in fact, backed by several 
European institutions. Only time will tell if Europeanization can bring Poland’s abortion 
laws in-line with the rest of the EU, save Ireland.   
 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
Czech women were without a domestic violence law for nearly 15 years. It was not until 
2004 that a Czech government passed a law detailing the crime of spousal abuse. Before 
then physical abuse between married couples, common law partners and cohabitating 
adults were treated the same as any other physical assault. In 2007 police were given the 
authority to remove perpetrators of domestic violence from their homes for up to 10 days 
(CTK 23 May 2007). Even though domestic violence is punishable under Czech law, 
some of the recommendations made by the ‘committee for the prevention of domestic 
violence’ have yet to be implemented (CTK 14 Dec. 2007). As Roma NGOs experienced, 
the 1990s were a time for institutional and societal recalibration.  
Despite pressure from NGOs, both national and European, successive Czech 
governments failed to develop and implement comprehensive domestic violence 
legislation. That a law on domestic violence finally appears in 2004 is perhaps 
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coincidental. However, as Forest argues “the accession process provided a window of 
opportunity, thus developing co-existence between different – and relevant – levels of 
influence for women’s groups” (2006: 180). Women’s NGOs were politically weak for 
some time but are now in the post accession period gaining power and legitimacy. The 
presence of powerful, competent and professional national NGOs or advocacy networks 
is sometimes not enough to overcome malaise at the institutional level. If lawmakers are 
unwilling to act, there is very little NGOs can do.       
The four respondent NGOs from the women’s rights sector in the Czech 
Republic, based on survey data, still appear to be aggrieved. The groups in question, Bílý 
kruh bezpečí (BKB), Občanské Sdružení Élektra (Civic Association Electra), Gender 
Studies o.p.s. and La Stada, all work with survivors of domestic violence or have lobbied 
government on issues related to domestic violence. They are all very active in Czech 
society and well-respected for their work in the area of women’s rights, gender equality 
and domestic violence. All four groups receive funding for their activities from the 
European Union, have been operating for more than 10 years, are not the result of a 
merger and have a permanent (paid) staff. However successful these groups are, they still 
feel unappreciated and underutilized.  
Presented in table form below are five statements that were given to NGOs in the 
questionnaire. The four groups mentioned above (like all 29) were asked to respond to 
five statement by indicating their level of agreement on a scale from 1 (‘strongly agree’) 
to 10 (‘strongly disagree’). A mean average was calculated from the answers given by the 
four participant NGOs – the average is listed in the right column. 
 
  6.1 NGOs Operating in the Area of Women’s Rights 
 
  Statement to NGO    Average Score 
1. Government encourages groups like 
mine to participate in the policymaking 
process 
5 
2. Government is eager to hear what my 
organization has to say about pending 
policy 
4.25 
3. Democracy is further enhanced with the 
presence of organizations like mine 9 
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4. Political parties are better able to 
translate the needs of the population 
than non-governmental organizations 
1.5 
5. Since joining the European Union in 
2004, I have noticed government  
representatives taking more effort to 
consult NGOs like mine 
3.75 
 
 
The results, though generated from a small sample, do suggest something worth looking 
into – at least with respect to these four NGOs. Perhaps not surprising they hold 
themselves and NGOs generally in high regard. One result that appears to challenge 
thesis 3 of this dissertation is the one related to the European Union (No. 5). The four 
respondent organizations have not noticed a significant change in their dealings with 
government, despite EU accession.      
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter identified several institutional-level impediments that are working to thwart 
the development of a potent women’s lobby in Poland and the Czech Republic. It showed 
how women’s groups can often be excluded from the policy process even though Poland 
and the Czech Republic established quasi autonomous governmental agencies during the 
acquis period to address gender inequality in post-communist society. While this 
illustrates the important role played by the European Union in spurring on domestic 
institutions to take gender and equality issues more seriously, it does not indicate the 
existence of policy system geared to the needs and/or demands of the women’s sector. In 
Poland, women’s groups have tended to butt heads with the Catholic Church, an 
organized lobby which exerts tremendous pressure on government. Of all the interest 
groups that have come and gone in Poland since 1989, the Polish Catholic Church is the 
only organization capable of pressuring government one way or the other. As Chimiak 
(2003) reports,   
  
In Poland the Catholic Church is strengthening its influence on politics and on the 
adoption of laws. An example of the interventionist policy of the Church in 
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Poland is the introduction of the institution of separation in 1999, which allows 
spouses to break up their marriage, but not to marry again. As the leader of the 
League of Polish Women put it, ‘Poland after 1989 has become a state much more 
ideological and this ideology is directed against the freedom and rights of 
women” (p. 19) 
 
Not having gone into great detail about the role of religion and culture in framing 
contentious collective action in Poland, this chapter does concede that the Catholic 
Church in Poland, along with the aversion to ideology that seems prevalent in the Czech 
Republic, places constraints on women’s NGOs in both countries. As Einhorn and Sever 
argue, the ‘personal is political’ mantra espoused by Western feminists has worrisome 
connotations, it “sounded dangerously like inviting surveillance back into the home, and 
women were reluctant to invite legislative intervention into the domestic sphere” (2003: 
172). It has also been reported that women in both Poland and the Czech Republic are 
increasingly taking on the traditional role of stay-home wife and mother, which was 
denied to them during the communist period (Chimiak 2003: 19; Einhorn and Sever, 
2003: 172). I have not discussed these aspects of post-communist society in great detail 
but they should nevertheless be recognized as a structural-level impediment to collective 
action. 
 Collective action and mobilization is determined by opportunities and, 
considering the few opportunities available to women’s group it seems sensible they have 
become marginalized. There is little impetus to form purely political organizations in 
ECE because the chances of success are severely constrained by post-communist political 
institutions, which are preoccupied less with developing civil society than implementing 
EU monetary policy. The negotiations that do take place at the political level rarely 
include interest groups, resulting in sometimes inadequate legislation. In both Poland and 
the Czech Republic domestic violence laws, for example, have been the focus of much 
attention. Women’s groups in both countries have announced their disappointment with 
the way domestic violence laws misrepresent and even ignore power dynamics in society. 
Women’s NGOs argue that ‘unfavorable’ laws of this sort are the net result of an 
insulated policy process that favours efficiency over consultation. By placing the state 
building enterprise ahead of pluralist politics, post-communist elites have managed to 
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justify, only to themselves, the logic of a policy process that has no formalized 
consultative arrangements with the third sector (cf. Green 2003).  
The examination of women’s groups in Poland the Czech Republic confirms: a) 
that agential factors are less relevant in the context of a fluid political environment, where 
political parties, state institutions and, decision-makers lack permanence, and; b) that 
women’s groups in both counties face similar problems, especially in terms of their 
inability to access the policy process for the purpose of representing the interest of 
women. Like the environmental sector (see chapter 6) the infusion of Western aid to 
support civil society programmes and the establishment of information centres in ECE is 
having unintended consequences.  It is worth quoting McMahon at length: 
International involvement has meant that women’s NGOs are dependent upon 
Western actors for resources to maintain their infrastructure, further their skills, or 
complete their proposal projects. Assistance from international donors has 
allowed these groups to focus on issues once considered taboo in Polish (…) 
society, such as violence against women, and to engage in Western-style 
activities, such as opening shelters, lobbying the parliament, and conducting 
research on the changing status of women. The absence of domestic financial or 
moral support, along with their dependence on international actors, has meant that 
women’s NGOs remain isolated from the general public and marginalized from 
the local decision-making process (2002: 48)   
 
The issue of funding, or more precisely the origin of funding and its impact on the ethos 
of civic society, is one that straddles several sectors. All the groups under discussion 
here, environmental groups, Roma organizations and indeed women’s groups, have 
benefited from international assistance and developed according to the donor agencies 
requirements. Out of necessity, women’s groups have sacrificed their potential 
relationship with the grassroots for sake of establishing a western-type policy community, 
which would at the very least communicate a women’s perspective on contemporary 
sociopolitical issues to the first generation of democracy.   
The argument has a hint of circularity about it. Women’s groups are politically 
weak because the state is strong and, the state can ignore the women’s sector because it is 
underdeveloped and lacking power. But this statement actually reveals a lot about how 
the women’s sector and the state interact. For instance, the Polish government closed the 
Plenipotentiary because after considering the political ramifications it recognized no 
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significant political backlash would result. Remembering that the state is an autonomous 
actor and has its own policy preferences, it makes sense that a government looking to cut 
expenditures – as the Marcinkiewicz government said it was doing – would target those 
sectors with the least political and/or economic power (or clout).    
 EU accession has reinvigorated the women’s NGO sector, and has meant a series 
of new human rights and gender equality directives for national governments. Also, 
similar to what is happening in the environmental sector, women’s groups are beginning 
to form extensive advocacy networks. In many respects international and European 
norms have helped contentious collective action in the areas of domestic violence and 
abortion. The latter has attracted much attention from European institutions and courts, 
which plays to the advantage of pro-choice NGOs. But for both Polish and Czech 
women’s NGOs a societal aversion to ideology (i.e. feminism) and gender mainstreaming 
has been most difficult to overcome. The next chapter will explore Roma NGOs in an 
integrated Europe.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The European Union and Roma 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand and explain how the European Union and 
European Governance (conceptually multilevel governance) change the parameters of 
contention for groups originating in CEE countries. In other words, in recognising the 
need to develop a concrete understanding of what post-communism specifically is, this 
chapter will draw a link between perceived collective action ‘problems’ and the general 
principles and practices that frame post-communist political discourse. This section is 
guided by the belief “the quality and profile of protest culture is closely connected to the 
structure of political opportunities, which is based on the prevailing political institutions 
and political culture” (Szabo, 2000: 74). At this stage in the political development of both 
countries it would be impossible to discuss the structures and processes of governance 
(inc. institutions of state) without considering how the act of state building and 
democratization, along with the politicization of civil society, affect the relationship 
between interest groups, the state (inc. government) and political parties.  
This chapter also discusses how European Union (EU) accession might help alleviate 
some of the problems Polish and Czech interest groups currently face. It appears the EU 
has the potential to assist third sector development and their relative potency by: 
1. Providing domestic organizations with an immediate and expansive network of 
European organizations from which they can a) glean information and b) increase 
their representative base (if claiming to speak on behalf of the same constituency 
or cause).  
2. Providing groups with additional points of entry, which enables them to enter the 
policy-making chain (or web) from outside their host state – i.e., Brussels, 
Strasbourg and/or EU Parliament, Council etc.     
3. Developing a more unified and accepted culture of interest articulation and 
lobbying, which as it is popularly perceived, the EU is in favour of. Schmitter 
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(2003) argues: “Regarding one dimension of the EU’s impact, virtually everyone 
is in agreement: Given its functionally skewed agenda, the EU has tended to first 
to benefit interest groups98 over other forms of collective political action, and 
second to benefit those interests that have been most capable of organizing 
themselves across national borders” (p. 82).  
The EU and the potential to lobby more receptive politicians and mandarins is an 
important structural development in the short lives of Polish and Czech interest groups 
and NGOs and certainly one that illustrates the dynamic system they find themselves. 
The final section of this chapter is dedicated to the Roma community of Poland 
and the Czech Republic, although most of the examples are drawn from Romani 
experiences in the Czech Republic. It explores several issues that disproportionately 
affect the Roma community and Roma NGOs, namely forced sterilization, education, 
housing and equality legislation and law. Because Roma NGOs have benefited 
enormousnly from EU accession, both materially and nonmaterially, it was decided this 
case study best illustrates the rofound impact Europeanization has had on the NGO sector 
in post communist Europe. 
What defines Czech and Polish politics and society after 1989 is the presence of a 
whole host of inherited political and social practices. During the communist period some 
of these coping mechanisms developed out of necessity (i.e., Black Market) and others 
created in recognition of a need to, as Havel opined, ‘live in truth’ (i.e., Samizdat, Flying 
Universities and the idea of ‘parallel polis’) or turn inwards to, as Gellner suggested, the 
inner citadel. Indeed as Rose and Mishler argue, “the most trusted institutions in 
communist society were informal, unofficial networks or families” (p.6). These historical 
facts (not artefacts) is ultimately what makes the political culture of both Poland and the 
Czech Republic different from older ‘western’ democracies, which are ostensibly 
immune from such issues of cultural/political carry-over.  
Therefore, this chapter considers post-communism to be, in the strictest possible 
sense, a phase in the development of democratic polity whereby certain practices and 
patterns of behaviour are derived from the communist experience. Part of this includes 
                                                 
98
 Italics in original  
 193  
the idea of legacy and transition, which in conjunction suggest certain dynamism, in that 
the state is evolving and developing new institutions, and stagnation, in the sense some 
communist era social and political practices remain. Ken Jowitt (1999) suggests: 
Any substantial analysis of democracy’s and market capitalism’s chances in 
Eastern Europe must interpret the maelstrom itself, and that means coming to 
analytical grips with the cultural, political and economic ‘inheritance’ of forty 
years of Leninist rule (p. 215). 
The issue at hand, how post-communist society and specifically state building effect 
interest group formation and their relative level of influence – whether on policy makers 
or in society generally, is by default intertwined with ideas of political efficacy, political 
culture and civil society. However it must be stressed that this project is only concerned 
with legacy so far as it impacts the institutions of state and the manner by which interest 
groups go about lobbying. Legacy, post-communism, civil society and democratisation 
are valuable concepts and ideas for grounding the discussion here, but the goal of this 
project is to show how the third sector is being purposely excluded from the policy 
sphere because of structural impediments caused by the various processes of state 
building and general political volatility. 
If trying to explain why civil society and the third sector in Poland and the Czech 
Republic is underdeveloped and under-utilised, one could persuasively argue that it is a 
host of structural (and institutional) deficiencies that are working to deter or prevent 
interest groups from taking their – rightful - place in the policy formulation community. 
What was left after 1989 was “in institutional terms, a tabula rasa. As the leading role of 
the party was stricken from the rulebook, nothing was at hand to fill that leading role 
(Elster et al. 1998: 25). These ‘problems’ or deficiencies are often the result of 
democratisation or state building itself. For example, political parties in both countries 
are without a robust grass-roots membership base to draw on and are prone to sudden and 
profound changes in leadership and political – ideological - direction. Such actions taken 
by political parties, while not confined solely to the post-communist region, tend impact 
the interest group sector in a more profound and substantial way. So while post-
communism may be a difficult thing to quantify and categorise, it is the sudden and 
abrupt changes  - at all levels of governance – which is indicative of post-communism 
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and to which Czech Republic and Poland have been privy. Szczerbiak (2002) argues this 
point effectively: 
The September 2001 parliamentary election, therefore, shattered what appeared to 
be the new emerging order in the Polish party system. Moreover, the political 
scene is likely to remain extremely fluid and unstable, and the contours of the new 
political landscape unclear, for sometime to come (p. 67)99.      
The ideational elements of post-communism are somewhat difficult to quantify, although 
many scholars of democratic transition and post-communist politics are indeed 
attempting to understand the political and societal dimensions and impact of ideas (see 
Schopflin, 2003; Dawisha and Ganey, 2005). Legacy firmly belongs in the realm of 
ideas, as it is precisely about perception (of government and state) and belief (of the value 
of participation – i.e., political efficacy). As Rupnik (1999) argues “more important than 
the manner of the changeover in 1989-91 in influencing the longer-term prospects for 
democratic success are the nature of the old communist regime and the depth of its 
imprint on society” (p.57). 
It is difficult for any particular post-communist government to develop all the 
structures and processes a democratic state needs or ought to have without encountering 
difficulties along the way. This is not, of course, to offer an excuse for what in many 
instances are poorly devised plans for implementing what amounts to wide scale 
institutional and sometime social changes. Raising the threshold for political parties to 
enter the Polish Sejm or reconfiguring the mathematic formula for proportional 
representation were wise political acts, but had the added effect of changing the 
parameters of interest group politics. It is true, as Almond et al. (2004) argue that interest 
groups are more than capable of locating sources of power in a given polity. However 
when the polity is consistently changing, witnessing both a change in personnel       
The absence of a coherent law on lobbying or charitable contributions may be the 
reason for such low levels of volunteerism. Without an incentive to organise or join an 
association, people may be inclined to remain private citizens. The problems with 
creating a viable law on charitable donations is also noteworthy because if potential 
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fluid’ does indeed have merit. 
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philanthropists (whether they be individuals, an existing organisation or a business) are 
unsure of how much the government may take – in the form of tax – from their donation 
or what they can declare on their tax forms, they may wait until a law is proclaimed. As 
Green (1999) argues “ the development of civil society in the Czech Republic has been 
slow and hesitant, in no small part due to the legal vacuum in which non-profit 
organisations have existed” (p.7). In Poland, NGOs seem to be “hampered by the lack of 
stability in the government’s fiscal policies” (Nations in Transit), and as a result unable 
to make long-term budgetary arrangements.While this appears a possible if not probable 
explanation for the third sectors poor showing, it is also important to consider matters of 
the mind. This refers to issues of resentment towards the new political elite; 
disappointment with the new liberal democratic arrangement; frustration with the high 
level of corruption that is purportedly occurring at all levels of government. Appel 
identifies the consequences of this corruption: “It became commonly recognised at home 
and abroad that the Czech Republic suffered from systemic corruption. In March 1998, 
the European Commission cited pervasive corruption as one of three potential obstacles 
to the Czech Republic’s bid for European Union (EU) membership” (p. 528).    
A consensus has formed that would suggest a communist legacy, in its various 
manifestations, is affecting the way Czechs and Poles go about their democratic business 
(see Tismaneanu 2002; Lovell 2001; Holmes, 1997). That is, the forty years of 
communist rule in those countries has left an indelible imprint on the collective psyche of 
the two respective nations – and this applies equally throughout the ECE region. There is 
a difficulty in quantifying such an hypothesis because a) it is hard to know exactly what 
is of the past and what is of the near present; b) it is difficult to draw a line from an 
independent variable in the communist past and connect it with a dependent variable of 
the democratic present - this in consideration of the numerous institutional and societal 
changes that have occurred since 1989; and c)it is near impossible to isolate any one 
particular event as the catalyst for a communist legacy. As Leslie Holmes (ibid) argues, 
“There is no readily identifiable and reasonably specific ideology or even theory of post-
communism as there was for communism…This is a major reason why it is so difficult to 
conceptualise post-communism” (p. 13).This will be done in consideration of how post-
communism, as a particular stage of democratization, may alter the standard interest 
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group – government (or state) relationship. While emphasizing how this impacts group 
politics and collective action in the two countries under study, this chapter will also 
carefully consider the notion that pluralism (and civil society in general) enhances 
democracy – and is a prerequisite for its establishment. Many of the essays and books 
generated since the fall of communism mention post-communism in passing, perhaps 
assuming that such a title or category can be used without saying what post-communism 
actually is.  
A communist legacy implies the continuation of certain practices and learned 
behaviour, which were developed during the communist period (1949-1989) and continue 
to endure despite a change in the social and political environment. The failure on the part 
of Czechs and Poles to mobilise in the 1990s and into the 21st century is often explained 
away as a result of a ‘communist legacy’ and/or post-communism. Jan Kubik determines 
the following: 
Cultural legacies should be then defined as patterns (scenarios) of behaviour or 
 thought that are transmitted from the past and enacted in the present. (implicitly) 
 and thus serve as habitual ‘ways of doing things’ or are explicitly and deliberately 
 invoked as models (blueprints) for current actions by cultural entrepreneurs (p. 
 318). 
Perhaps the most significant event to have occurred in the short history of interest group 
development in Poland and the Czech Republic is EU accession. This is a point of 
departure for many groups as it symbolised, in the Czech case, ‘a return to Europe’ and 
for the Poles a recognition of the ‘western’ and ‘liberal’ credentials. The post-communist 
‘tag’ if not irrelevant, was beginning to be reconsidered as an appropriate description of 
these states.The introduction to this chapter briefly mentioned how the European Union 
and the more abstract idea of Europeanization may both enhance the profile of domestic 
interest groups and create a political environment more conducive to lobbying and 
interest group politics. In a sense, and in functionalist speak, the atmosphere of lobbying 
that now pervades Brussels will ultimately ‘spill over’ to the member states (Diez, 1999). 
It is similarly thought that the democratic conditionality attached to the Acquis 
Communautaire did prod the candidate countries forward towards a more stable brand of 
liberalism. 
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The worry is that instead of forming uniquely national groups, NGOs will opt to 
join the rapidly expanding pan-European interest community. As Holmes argues (2003), 
“incentives for the development of robust political parties and other mechanisms to 
articulate group interests disappear when large swaths of domestic policy are effectively 
dictated from a foreign capital” (p. 113). In-turn, this movement away from traditional 
forms of – homegrown - interest articulation will be to the detriment of post-communist 
civil society. Countries that are building institutions and developing a civil society can ill 
afford to lose groups to the EU juggernaut. If Poland and the Czech Republic had been 
displaying the beginnings of a viable third sector, then I too would be worried about what 
the EU might do to those groups already formed. But this paper will argue that the EU 
will bring not only institutional convergence, but a convergence of political norms that 
value pluralism and lobbying.  
It may be overstating it a bit to argue, as Mair (2003) does, that citizens of East-
Central European countries will lose out to EU technocracy. He writes, “Not only have 
they [East Europeans] recently acquired a voice for the first time, but they are now 
risking to have it removed at one fell swoop” (p.63). Not being able to develop beyond its 
present incarnation, the third sector will be stuck precisely at the point of EU accession. 
Hall (1998) argues “it is civil society which makes liberalism and democracy truly 
desirable”(p.32). Two questions arise: 1) is this really what is going to happen; after all, 
NGOs have not yet vanished from the British, German or French polity, and; 2) why 
should we assume accession to the EU is best represented by zero-sum logic; can 
Brussels lobbyists not teach and reinforce Prague or Warsaw based lobbyists; thus 
increasing NGO status throughout Europe.  
With the European Union (EU) about to admit ten new countries (eight having 
been authoritarian only fifteen years ago) it seems appropriate to examine how European 
institutions (namely the Council, European Parliament and European Court of Justice) 
and Europeanisation100 more generally, might provide interest groups from accession 
countries with new political opportunities. This paper will concentrate on public interest 
groups from two of the new member-states, Poland and the Czech Republic. 
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democracy, liberalism etc. – are now, especially with EU membership and in fulfillment of the 
Acquis Communautaire, an aspect of Eastern Europeanan political culture.  
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Environmental (ecological) and women’s rights groups will constitute the bulk of the 
examples used – as these two ‘types’ of groups have been active throughout the 
transitions period, have an international dimension, and have communist era incarnations.   
EU technocracy favours lobbyists and those with a keen interest in public policy, 
with the Commission seeking out and often rewarding those NGOs with specific policy 
expertise. As Lehmann et al. (2003) propose in their working paper for the International 
and Constitutional Affairs Division: 
Modern government implies close co-operation with stakeholders from all sectors 
of society.  Therefore, civic and producer interests contribute to the perception, 
presentation and definitions of issues in European Union policy-making . . . There 
are already institutionalised advisory bodies established to assist the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU (p. 1). 
 
European Union governance may produce a democratic deficit, a system for example that 
devalues direct citizen participation in the form of elections; however, the structure of the 
EU provides interest groups with an opportunity to partake in the creation of pan-
European policy. They may not be successful all the time, but importantly, lobbying and 
NGOs have become a part of the political process.  
Several access points exist (the EP, Commission, advisory bodies) in two 
different cities (Strasbourg and Brussels) that enable lobbyists to informally and formally 
approach parliamentarians and other ‘important’ members of the policy community. And 
because “the EU’s institutions are extremely resource-poor” (Watson and Shackleton 
2003: 93) NGOs perform an invaluable task: they supply information to policy makers. 
While the EU is resource-poor and third sector rich, Poland and the Czech Republic are 
really below the poverty line on both accounts. As Elster et al. (1998) argue, “since the 
intermediary sphere is weak in the Czech Republic and, moreover, dismissed as less 
important, perhaps even dangerous by the leading political forces of the country, the 
political parties have thus far remained the predominant actors in the public domain” (p. 
281). As we have come to realise, political parties are no substitute for interest groups 
(and pressure groups). They provide an invaluable service to EU politicians and in 
Brussels have become as common as translators.  
Unlike the EU then, institutionalized politics in Poland and the Czech republic is 
not flanked by a diverse and robust third sector. In the Czech Republic for example, from 
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the immediate aftermath of the Velvet Revolution to present, Vaclav Klaus (in his various 
incarnations – prime minister, president, economic minister etc.) has made it known that 
he is no friend of civil society or lobbyists, urging all those with political aspirations, or 
views contrary to his, to join an existing political party or create one.101 For him, and 
many other politicians of his era, political parties are quite simply superior to any other 
form of organised interests. Similarly in Poland, political parties have assumed a leading 
role, forming around a multitude of issues, such as beer, farmer’s rights and the 
environment. In most other states an interest group would have adequately represented 
these ‘special interests’. The reason why political parties are so numerous in Poland is 
perhaps because “in the second part of the 1990s central government and parliament 
declared war against the foundations and, more generally, third sector organizations” 
(Krzemiński 2003: 51). The examples above seem to indicate that those organizations 
that exist outside formalised political channels are looked upon with a degree of 
suspicion. On the face of it, this relationship between the state and organised interests is 
very much reminiscent of pre-1989 political culture. 
These examples reveal an under-appreciated and under-utilized third sector that 
has limited access to policy-makers and elites. If this is the case, then surely the EU will 
provide public interest groups with a ‘get out of jail card’ by setting an agenda that 
includes NGOs at both the European and the domestic levels. As Pross (1992) argues, 
“pressure groups are seen as ‘adaptive’ instruments of political communication, equipped 
with sensitive antennae for locating power” (p. 2). If lobbying has no affect at the 
domestic level, then surly lobbyists will go to where they may find success. If in fact, 
“the promise of European Union enlargement has brought with it enormous potential for 
political and economic integration, new freedoms to travel and work . . .[and has led] to 
improvements in ethnic minority rights, freedom of the press, and anticorruption 
efforts”(Grzymała-Busse and Innes 2003:64) then groups will reap all the benefits that 
accompany such a political development.  
What is significant about this is that there is a good chance that the EU will 
actually enhance group politics in these countries. By providing public interest groups 
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with access to policy makers and parliamentarians (in the Commission and European 
Parliament) the EU will be cultivating the skills lobbyists need. The 2, 6000 interest 
groups that call Brussels home have had to come from somewhere, and there is no reason 
not to expect that Polish and Czech groups will add to that number, or that individuals 
will help swell the ranks of those groups already there.102 Interest groups from post-
communist states will benefit – politically and culturally – from their daily exchanges 
with EU politicians and mandarins. Groups will also benefit from European law and the 
European Court of Justice’s obligation to uphold European Union treaties, rules and 
regulations. Europe is becoming increasing litigious, relying on the courts to sort out 
jurisdictional matters. By extending a rights-based culture to countries lacking one, 
disenfranchised groups should find the impetus to organize and pool their resources.103 
The EU will provide an outlet for frustrated groups, and if this takes some of the pressure 
off post-communist governments, preoccupied with state building and macro economic 
policy, it can only be a good thing. It is not surprising that post-communist governments 
have been less concerned with ‘special’ interests, opting (out of necessity in many cases) 
to work diligently on policy issues of an international and continental dimension – e.g. 
economy, EU accession, NATO etc.   
By providing an outlet for disgruntled public interest groups – in the form of 
lobbying the Commission and/or the European Parliament and/or the ECJ – the EU could 
indirectly bolster the third sector in Poland and the Czech Republic. According to Watson 
and Shackleton (2003) the European Union “provides an alternative arena where groups 
that are not gaining access at the national level have a second chance to be heard”(p. 
                                                 
102
 A working paper from the International and Constitutional Affairs Division (January 2003) of 
the EU comments that in 2000, of the 2,600 interest groups that had permanent representative 
Brussels, approximately 10% are European NGOs (public interest).  
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 The idea of a ‘rights based culture’ is most clearly (in my mind) linked to Canada and the 
introduction of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms there in 1982. Some argue that The Supreme 
Court of Canada acts more like a legislature than a judiciary, in the sense that it rules on the 
‘legality’ of proposed legislation before parliamentarians get an opportunity to introduce it in the 
House of Commons. Interest groups can lobby Parliament or their respective Provincial 
legislature, but in Canada they increasingly take their grievance to the ‘Court’. Lobbyists from 
Poland and the Czech Republic rarely take matters to court, but with the EU comes a host of legal 
and quasi-legal bodies that can pass judgment on a number of issues (e.g. environment, trade and 
commerce, employment equity etc.). If groups believe they can get results, it may well increase 
political efficacy and decrease levels of government mistrust among the populations of Poland 
and the Czech Republic.   
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105). This means groups thwarted by their national legislatures can use pan-European 
channels to further their cause and EU institutions to test the salience of their claims.  
Policy success at the EU level would provide a particular group or a specific campaign 
with the political ammunition needed to attack their national legislature yet again. This 
method would certainly take a lot of patience and resources, not to mention the know-
how. Lobbying a different government at different times requires an extremely dedicated 
and experienced group of activists, who would have to be able to forge relationships with 
policy makers at all levels and learn the idiosyncrasies of multi-level lobbying. But with 
many groups now transcending borders and, even continents, the likelihood of 
establishing an omnipotent and omnipresent interest group is perhaps more feasible today 
than ever before.   
The eight leading environmental groups at the EU level (the G8) have 
successfully used EU policy to challenge member-state legislation, and where a gulf 
between the two has existed, have been able to force national parliaments to amend non-
compliant policy. This is a development worth noting. It suggests that borders and 
specific ‘lobbying’ cultures are less inhibiting today than they were before supranational 
governance became a reality.104 As a result, as Rucht (2001) argues, “some national 
groups in some issues may primarily focus on EU institutions, which, in turn put pressure 
on the national government because the latter lags behind the standards of other countries 
or remains unresponsive to direct intervention by domestic groups” (p.130).105 It is 
important when discussing the current status of interest groups and lobbying in post-
communist Europe to spend some time detailing recent ‘protest’ movements and 
collective action. A paper of this length can only briefly allude to some of these trends, 
but I must stress, it is specifically these trends that shed light on the relative strength of 
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 J.N. Rosenau argues, “Government refers to activities that are backed by formal authority, 
whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals. Governance is a more 
encompassing phenomenon because it embraces not only governmental organizations but also 
informal, non-governmental mechanisms” (Quoted by R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding 
Governance, Open University Press, Buckingham p.51). This is an important distinction, because 
the EU is open to lobbying and open to the idea of pluralism (its under funded policy think tanks 
actually require NGO involvement), whereas many national legislatures would rather block 
special interests from ‘pestering’ ministers and junior ministers.   
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 Emphasis added 
 202  
the Polish and Czech third sector and help illustrate why public interest groups are less 
prominent then they might otherwise be.  
The second half of the 1990s was a period of hope, despair and rapid 
internationalization for Poland and the Czech Republic. President Havel’s hope for a 
unified and politically congruent Czechoslovakia quickly gave way to the realization that 
many Slovaks felt marginalized and disenfranchised in Czecho-Slovakia, and separation 
would be the surest way to solve this problem. Poland did not have to deal with such 
matters of nationalism. As a unified state for the first time in some sixty-five years, the 
immediate concern was with implementing ‘shock therapy’ and reinvigorating a 
somewhat ‘backwards’ agrarian - based economy. When national unemployment reached 
approximately 20 percent (some areas up to 40%), Poles were in a state of relative 
despair. Gone were the days of secured employment and manufacturing prowess. 
Democratisation meant government was concerned with market and trade liberalization, 
privatisation and currency stabilization. 
Another development of extreme importance is that Poland and the Czech 
Republic found the western world to be rather hospitable. Germany was advocating the 
EU on behalf of Poland, the Czech Republic was selected a candidate country for the EU 
without much reservation, and both states were finalising their NATO applications and 
joining the relevant global regimes. However successful this period was for establishing 
their democratic and free-market credentials, the development of civil society as such 
was not a priority. In the Czech Republic, broadly defined citizen initiatives, the most 
prominent being ‘Impulse 99’ and ‘Thank You: Now Leave’ called for sweeping changes 
within government and demanded more involvement from society at large. Reminiscent 
of Charter 77, these groups sought to challenge what they perceived as a lack of morality 
amongst the ruling elite and a large segment of the population. They wanted to increase 
civic awareness but were a – self-professed – apolitical movement that saw ‘politics’ as 
the problem. One of the organisers, Tomas Holik, argued at the time “[we do not want] to 
transform ourselves into a political party. That would be a shame, and I think we have the 
potential to do more” (Hill and Navazelskis, 1999). Writing for Central Europe Review, 
Andrew Stroehlein (1999) went so far as to say “such a warped and naïve view of politics 
on the part of the petition-lovers is, sadly a legacy of Charter 77. But while a mild public 
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petition in a closed society is a strong statement . . . things should work differently in a 
democracy” (CER 1999).  
At the same time in Poland, public interest groups were feeling the effects of a 
slumping economy and as a result most individuals sought out political parties – which 
could get state funding - in an attempt to find an outlet for concerns. Jack Kurczewski 
(2001) comments “observers of Polish civil society point to a lack of self-sustainability of 
the organisations, which is certainly true in most of the cases” (CER 2001). Considering 
national unemployment was at 18-20% and the state lacked the resources to deal with a 
woefully weak third sector, it comes as no surprise that Polish interest groups were a 
political rarity. Instead, public grievances were translated into votes for such political 
parties as Samoobrona (Self-defence), which during the 2001 election managed to secure 
53 seats in the Sejm (10% of the popular vote). Surprisingly, a combined total of 200 
seats (41% of the popular vote) went to political parties in the 2001 Polish General 
Election that gained naught seats in 1997. Of the four, only Samoobrona was a registered 
political party in 1997.106   In summary, the mitigating factors that seem to impede further 
interest group development are: 
 
1) Lack of resources: Groups in Poland and the Czech Republic lack a variety of 
resources – volunteers, donations and government support are relatively low;  
2) Mistrust of Organisations: Howard (2003) reports that East Europeans are 
generally skeptical of organizations. He argues that forced participation during 
the communist era left many doubting the benefit of associations or societies; 
3) Episodic/sporadic mobilization: Based on Czech examples of ‘Impulse 99’ and 
‘Thank You: Now Leave’, and the Polish example of rapidly dissolving political 
parties, it would seem that longevity in the third sector is rather the exception than 
the rule. 
 
This argument that the EU will foster third sector growth hinges on a belief that the EU 
will create new political opportunities for interest groups in Poland and the Czech 
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 All election data was take from Jacek Wasilewski (2003) “Poland and the Political Challenges 
of ‘Europe’” Poland on the eve of EU membership, George Blazyca (ed.) Centre for 
Contemporary European Studies (Working paper series No. 2003/01) University of Paisley 
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Republic. That point is not really controversial. But what is debatable is whether or not 
they (environmental and women’s rights groups) have the capacity to take advantage of a 
wider and multi-layered playing field. Not only have groups had to learn how to deal with 
a completely new and evolving (uncharted) political system, but have also had to learn 
how to lobby ‘new’ local councillors, ‘new’ national parliamentarians, ‘new’ bureaucrats 
and policy advisers, ‘new’ intergovernmental bodies, and finally, ‘new’ supranational 
institutions. To say the cards are stacked against lobbyists is perhaps an understatement.  
But groups like the Network for East-West Women have been trying to redress 
the problem of over-stretch. They have developed a ‘kit’ that outlines various pieces of 
EU legislation and how it will impact domestic gender-equality laws and more generally 
the status of women. It also discusses what the EU will mean for woman in politics and 
women in the labour market.107 This should be viewed as a positive step and an indication 
that at least women’s rights groups have been actively preparing for EU membership. By 
all indication, women’s groups (with the Network of East-West Women being perhaps 
the leading group of this kind) will benefit from the institutional convergence that 
accompanies EU enlargement.  
Malovà and Haughton argue (2002) “institutional convergence is likely to 
contribute to overall democratisation and stability on the continent, because it increases 
predictability, that is, political actors in CEE are increasingly expected to behave at the 
state level according to the democratic rules of the game” (p. 102). Considering that most 
groups from Poland and the Czech Republic have been in search of such stability, they 
will certainly benefit from an open and transparent policy process. The harmonisation of 
domestic law and economic practices with those of the EU should be appreciated as a 
step towards further democratisation. A step that will benefit lobbyists and public interest 
groups by setting institutional standards that ought to favour at least a modicum of 
pluralism. Considering East European civil society is weak and still amidst development 
(see Howard, 2003) there is a need to consider the relative importance of civil society for 
the creation and maintenance of interest or lobby groups. If pressure groups are 
essentially a separate and unique part of a polity, then surly, they can successfully exist in 
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 This information can be found at www.neww.org.pl, the Polish chapter of the Network of 
East-West Women. The particular newsletter that informs this discussion was published on-line 
20 September, 2003 and is catalogued as No 15 (36). 
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a state that lacks a substantial third sector (see Green, 1999). But if civil society is a 
precursor to interest group development and lobbying in general, then one should expect 
a state, like Poland or the Czech Republic, which has a post-communist civil society, to 
have a fragmented and underdeveloped third sector. That these states have less than a 
robust voluntary/third sector is not up to debate. By most accounts (Howard, 2003; 
Tucker, 2000; Dahrendorf, 1999; Rupnik 1999, etc) civil society is weaker in Poland and 
the Czech Republic than it is in western democracies. But the EU is something quite 
different from a traditional nation-state (Moravcsik, 2003) and as such, it can advocate 
for civil society without having to worry about the political consequences.  
Interest groups and many other NGOs (e.g. Red Cross, Amnesty International, 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights etc.) can exert pressure domestically without ever 
having to set foot in the country it takes issue with. Pressure politics is a transnational 
phenomenon. Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic, which on the whole lack the 
resources required to sustain a large multifarious civil society, will surely gain more from 
being a member of the EU than they lose by it – this is especially true for public interest 
groups. Moravcsik (2003) argues 
…recent research reveals that EU regulatory processes are as open to input from 
civil society, and as constrained by the need to give reasons, as the (relatively 
open) systems of Switzerland and the US. The EU system may be unfamiliar to 
citizens, but it is hardly closed (p. 42).  
 
For the European Union is, above all else, a policy making machine that requires copious 
amounts of fuel just to maintain its production rate. In this analogy, NGOs provide the 
fuel, in ideas and position papers, and the EU presses out the desired policy. As long as 
there is a democratic deficit, NGOs will be the legitimising factor. Just by the simple fact 
the EU has adopted qualified majority voting and attaches ‘democratic’ conditionality to 
membership, means it has the potential to positively influence third sector development 
in all EU member-states.   
This discussion of civil society will quickly come to an end, but it is worth 
considering the core question here: Does a strong civil society give rise to an active 
lobbying and interest sector (i.e. pluralism)? It is my contention that the civil society 
debate is only one part of a larger issue; that issue being fair and equitable policy. Civil 
society is supposed to be strong enough to counter-balance the state (Gellner 1994), but if 
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no organised groups exist to challenge government policy, it becomes a rather hollow 
concept. In short, interest groups are a part of civil society, but pressure groups are there 
not to keep the state in check, but rather to ensure specific policy is respectful of the 
section of society it affects.      
This paper is predicated on the belief that interest groups are important for the 
development of fair and equitable policy and are crucial if participatory democracy is to 
be realised. In the context of state building, a stage Poland and the Czech Republic find 
themselves, groups are even more important. The reason is quite simple: to avoid future 
grievances the government of the day should encourage all interested parties to present 
their specific concerns to policy makers. This way, cleavages are minimized and policy 
becomes less a game of chance and more a consultative process that appreciates the 
diversity of public opinion. This does not mean that all groups will offer good advice or 
represent the interests of society as a whole, just that any future battles between policy 
makers and interest groups will out in the open and constructive, rather than hidden and 
destructive. For example, the Czech branch of Greenpeace (which was previously 
deemed an extremist organization by the Czech government) finds the so-called 
consultative policy-process, which the government applauds, rather discriminatory. 
According to Greenpeace officials, the Czech Environmental Ministry regularly provides 
them with huge dossiers and working papers only days before the policy is to be 
submitted to the legislature108. Again, this is clearly a practice that devalues interest 
groups and works to reinforce the groups/state divide.      
When groups feel marginalised or worse still victimised, they resort to a host of 
unsavoury tactics and protest strategies, which can only exacerbate tensions between civil 
society and the state. Commenting on the Prague demonstrations that took place in 
response to the suspension of TV Nova executives, Dermot O’Shaughnessy (2003) 
argues, “perhaps the reason Czechs turned out in force on this particular occasion was 
because, for once, they knew that their opinions would actually be broadcast and their 
voices heard” (p.5). This suggests that a) people want and need to be heard, and b) that 
people will forgo lobbying in favour of disruptive forms of collective action, if other 
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 Interview conducted August 2003 with Jiri Tutter, Greenpeace Executive Director (Praha), 
Prague, Czech Republic. 
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forms of collective action end up being ineffectual. How groups protest and what 
methods they employ will largely depend on where they appear in the ‘funnel of 
mobilization’ (Pross 1992: 7). A pressure group, which has access to policy-makers and 
politicians and has a stable and defined place in the policy community, will very rarely 
use disruptive tactics – i.e. picketing, protest, demonstrations etc. Whereas groups 
situated at the open, unaggregated end of the funnel, will often resort to disruptive tactics 
out of necessity. This latter response to unfavorable political developments occurs most 
often when the government has effectively blocked a group from participating in the 
policy process.  
In the Czech Republic, groups and movements, such as ‘Impulse 99’ or ‘Thank 
You: Now Leave’ were, as Pross determined, ‘solidary’ groups. Pross (ibid) contends “a 
solidary group is made up of individuals with common characteristics who also share 
some sense of identity” (p.6). With reference to these two fleeting groups, both of which 
being comprised of student leaders from 1989, disgruntled academics, artists, journalists 
and others that had simply lost faith in the political system (The New Presence, August 
1999: 8/99). Below is an excerpt from Impulse 99s appeal. 
Civic participation for citizens and non-governmental institutions is becoming 
hindered and increasingly controlled by the major political parties, who are in –
turn primarily preoccupied with internal party politics and increasing their power 
(ibid). 
 
This is a topic worth further discussion, but suffice to say ‘Impulse 99’ and ‘Thank You: 
Now Leave’ did not lead to the establishment of a permanent interest group or a political 
party. They started and finished as a solidary group.  Lipsky defines the political 
opportunity structure as “the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to 
power and to manipulate the political system” (appears in Cram et al. 2001). As already 
stated in this essay, the EU has several access points which offer groups an opportunity to 
liaise with policy makers. As Helfferich and Kolb (2001) correctly argue, there is a sense 
among some scholars that “due to the process of European integration, new supranational 
level of political opportunities is developing, which is shaping both contentious politics 
on the European level and reshaping domestic conflict”(p.145). The idea that new 
institutions bring with them new opportunities is not necessarily a new one and applies to 
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most political developments that bring about significant institutional change. Whether 
these changes are at the transnational, regional or continental level is not necessarily a 
concern.  
Accordingly, the collapse of Soviet communism and capitulation of Eastern 
European socialist regimes - which made it their business to subjugate and destabilise 
much of civil society - meant interest groups finally had a legal right to lobby 
government and publicly voice their collective angst. While this paper discusses only 
those political opportunities that come with EU accession, it wishes to point out that what 
is happening now, in terms of interest group development and the building of civil 
society more generally is only one part of a continuous process.  Because already the 
Acquis Communautaire has influenced existing policy and altered the way policy is 
created and implemented. And if the EU Constitution is ratified in June, a whole host of 
new opportunities for interest groups should arise. 
Implicit to the idea of political opportunity is the presumptions the group(s) in 
question have the means available to take advantage of institutional developments. That 
is, they must have within their repertoire the tools required to ‘lobby’ and interact with 
European-level policy makers. A professional team – preferably a permanent staff - 
capable of writing and presenting policy is a necessity, especially considering EU 
lobbyists now number approximately 14-15 000 (Watson and Shackleton, 2003: 89). It is 
an increasingly competitive arena and if a particular group is not up to the task, they will 
undoubtedly be overlooked in favour of other more competent organizations. Greenpeace 
and World Wide Fund for Nature have cornered the environmental market, so to speak, 
taking advantage of their international standing and brand recognition to become two of 
the more successful pan-European public interest bodies. An indication perhaps of just 
how successful environmental groups have been, is, according to Rucht (2001) the fact 
very few protests in Brussels have been carried out in their name. He writes: 
A more convincing reason for the absence of environmental protests in Brussels 
might have to do with the possibility that lobbying EU institutions is by far more 
adequate and effective than the kind of unconventional protest action that is so 
common at national and subnational levels” (p.136).  
 
With the EU comes a host of policy channels that most interest groups have, or in the 
case of Poland and the Czech Republic will have, access to. It is significant that EU 
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policy is scrutinised by several agencies, think tanks, levels of government (the EP, 
Commission, Coneccs) and interest groups of all shapes and sizes. More importantly, the 
ECJ offers legal recourse to those groups that feel marginalised or have a genuine 
concern with the way in which laws are introduced and enforced; or not introduced for 
that matter.  
For example, the Czech Republic does not have a specific domestic violence law 
on the books. Instead, law enforcement officials treat domestic violence the same as they 
would any other type of assault. According to the Gender Studies Centre in Prague, 
failure to recognise the need for specific and detailed domestic violence legislation results 
in a very real tension between women’s organizations and elected officials109. And 
significantly, it reinforces the gender divide that seems to plague most post-communist 
countries – countries where feminism, because of its ideological dimension, is frowned 
upon by so many. The various Czech governments since 1994 have tended pay lip service 
to the principle of gender parity in government, but have allocated few resources to 
achieve a more equitable civil service and legislature.  
So here we have a concrete example of an interest group at odds with its national 
policy makers and legislators. The European Court of Justice becomes an important 
institution for such groups, for it offers a political opportunity that previously did not 
exist, and which can directly or indirectly pressure the national government into action. 
Indirectly, the threat of circumventing national institutions in favour of European ones 
might force elected representatives to act (perhaps to save embarrassment), directly, the 
ECJ could rule in favour of the Czech women’s lobby and by extension pressure the 
national legislator to amend the legislation in question. EU enlargement should provide 
Poles and Czechs with a new set of political norms that favour, rather than frustrate, third 
sector development. It should also give Polish and Czech politicians a reason to trust 
NGOs. For if they really want to ‘return to Euorpe’, they have to return to a form of 
politics that accepts groups as a part of an institutionalized bargaining process. Easier 
said than done, I fully admit, but if national politicians fail to do this, they may find that 
groups circumvent the usual (domestic) channels for the more group-friendly EU 
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 Interview conducted August 2003 with Alena Kralikova, Director of Education, Gender 
Studies o.p.s., Prague, Czech Republic. 
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environment. While interest groups may find this tolerable – even preferable - such a 
process would surely create more pronounced cleavages between the state and the third 
sector. 
Civil society and interest group development is a two way street. The state is just 
as important for the realisation of a dense network of lobby groups as citizens themselves 
are. The political environment must change from one that favours political parties and 
elite bargaining to one that draws on public interest groups (even funds them!) for their 
expertise and resources. The EU has set a standard for such an arrangement. Groups 
should therefore find new political opportunities within EU institutions and therein 
discover a political environment that reinforces the principle of pluralism.  
The hope is not that the EU will somehow magically infuse Poland and the Czech 
Republic with a sense of pluralism, but that interest groups frustrated at the domestic 
level will find a sympathetic ear in Brussels and/or Strasbourg; thus lessening the 
likelihood of disruptive protest movements. As it stands, “EU institutions are probably 
more open to a variety of interests than most national administrations” (Lehamm et al. 
2003: 53), but the possibility is open for national legislators to follow the EU’s lead. 
Finally, there is no reason to assume EU membership will have an adverse affect on 
interest groups and interest articulation. On the contrary, the Czech Republic and Poland 
are joining an intergovernmental organisation that values the third sector, and this will 
enhance group status at all levels of EU (and member-state) decision-making.     
 
THE ROMA 
The Roma are “verbally derided, subjected to physical abuse, social marginalization and 
even legal disenfranchisement (Fawn 2001: 1193). This chapter will not investigate in 
any great detail the root cause of the problems identified by Fawn in the quotation below 
nor look closely at the structure and function of any one particular organization claiming 
to represent Romani interests. Instead it has the singular task of determining whether or 
not the state works constructively with Romani interest groups. In this way I am looking 
primarily at the structure of state-Roma group relations and not at the bases for it. As it 
stands, the Roma NGOs with international standing are having a difficult time 
establishing a suitably robust grassroots network. This condition is strikingly similar to 
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the one faced by environmental organizations. State-directed minority/Roma policy 
means the Roma, stakeholders in the system, are not directly contributing to the 
development of laws which directly affect them.  
The Romani of the Czech Republic in particular, but Roma elsewhere in ECE, are 
finding life after the collapse of communism extremely difficult. Institutionalized racism, 
high rates of unemployment and, physical assaults, are just three of issues this minority 
group must face. In this way, the Roma rights sector is qualitatively different than the 
other two sectors analysed here, as they are not only dealing with structural impediments 
to collective action, but an environment hostile to their political and human rights 
demands. But significantly, they share important similarities with the environmental and 
women’s rights sector. One, all three interest sectors are tethered to international 
networks, which has enhanced their status at both home and abroad. Two, all three 
sectors rely on international aid, in the form of private philanthropic organizations (e.g. 
Open Society Fund) and state derived financial assistance (USAID). Three, in attempting 
to alter the policy formulation status quo, all three sectors share similar aspirations and 
goals. Concern over the closed nature of post communist policy making in Poland and the 
Czech Republic has been articulated by groups stemming from all three sectors. State-
directed policy, instead of being confined to one particular policy sector, appears to be a 
broad, encompassing, strategy employed by lawmakers to limit interest group influence. 
The Romani movement and subsequent interest groups (and NGOs) are, however, 
managing to develop an advocacy network which is pan-European in scope and 
international in composition110. 
But critically, the Roma movement cuts across national boundaries, governmental 
jurisdictions and autonomous regions like no other movement in Europe. This makes it 
difficult to mount one cohesive lobbying campaign. Also complicating matters, “Roma 
were among the last groups in Europe to discover the potential and power of ethno-
nationalism and to struggle for a political space of their own (quoted in Guy 2001: 20). 
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 The International Romani Union (IRU) is comprised of representative from all over the world. 
A cursory examination of the IRU membership and executive (elected July 2000) shows how 
international it really is. For instance, Members of the Cabinet hail from the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Sweden and Bulgaria (to name a few). While amongst the parliamentarians are delegates 
from Canada, Israel, Norway, England etc. The Roma diaspora is large and geographical diffuse.  
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This is different from the environmental movement, which formed as a coherent grouping 
during the communist period, and the women’s rights sector, which organized almost 
immediately after associational rights were legally guaranteed by post communist 
governments. Romani rights are not just a post communist phenomenon either. The Roma 
used the opportunity of Prague Spring to form an independent organization in 1968. But 
their organization, like others developed during this period, was disbanded by the state 
and then banned outright (Siklova 1998: nps; Guy 2001: 292). Charter 77 took up the 
Romani cause and published “a caustic report on the Communist policy towards Roma 
listing specific human rights abuses” (Guy 2001: 292). The Chartists, and particularly 
Vaclav Havel, did a great deal to raise the socio-politico status of Roma during the last 
years of communism. Havel included the Romani Civic Initiative (ROI) as a partner in 
the coalition parties which ultimately won the first democratic elections (ibid.). But 
Havel’s eloquence and oratory skill could not change widely held beliefs in society that 
‘Gypsies’ should not be accorded the same rights as ‘white’ Czechs and Slovaks. 
Chomsky (1994) issues this warning: 
Up until a couple years ago, Eastern Europe was under the control of a very harsh 
 tyranny – the Soviet system. It immobilized the civil society, which meant it 
 eliminated what was good, but it also suppressed what was bad. Now that the 
 tyranny is gone, the civil society is coming back – including its warts, of which 
 there are plenty (p.62). 
 
Racist attacks on Roma constitute one such wart. With regard to their potency as a 
discrete interest community, it is important to acknowledge racism does not stop at the 
door to the legislature.  
In Poland, ten different Roma organizations have been registered, but as Mroz 
(2001) reports, “five or six are not very active” (p.262). Like their Czech and Slovak 
counterparts, Polish Roma organizations have been actively seeking compensation for 
maltreatment during the war (Mroz 2001: 262). During the transition period, Polish Roma 
began establishing formal organizations and have subsequently developed a wider 
network of Roma associations. However, instability at the party level and within 
government generally, means state funding of Roma organizations is not entirely secure. 
As a truly pan-European nation, the Roma have been working  
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Roma NGOs cover and indeed represent a much broader scope of issues than 
other issue oriented advocacy groups. Romani groups are active in areas ranging from the 
education of Romani children to the protection of Roma arts and culture and, are 
concerned with every aspect of Romani life, from citizenship to domestic violence. 
Barany (2002) writes: “in the last decade the Roma have established a wide variety of 
social, cultural, and economic organizations from militias to protect themselves from 
racial attacks in Slovakia through trade unions and Gypsy university student associations 
in Romania to artists’ groups in the Czech Republic” (p. 210). While Roma have made 
strides in the above noted areas, there still exists problems in the political sphere, where 
interest groups are without the grassroots support they need. 
It is wrong to think the Roma have no political experience whatsoever. As 
Vermeersch (2001) reports, “in Czechoslovakia (…) Roma played an active part in the 
anticommunist movement and joined the coalition parties that overwhelmingly won the 
first democratic elections” (p.3). But the Roma did not constitute a discrete political 
organization, as such. It is also important to recognize that immediately after the fall of 
communism and, in the period immediately before EU accession, human rights were a 
top the political agenda. It goes to reason that “Central European states were particularly 
sensitive to the discourse of human rights norms because they realized this was becoming 
a key issue pertaining to their standing in the international community (especially vis-à-
vis the EU)” (Vermeersch 2001: 3). It is a monumental task, however, to implement 
policies that directly help the Roma population. Roma are a divergent group with ranging 
socioeconomic status, which makes it difficult to make generalizations concerning what 
the Gypsy populations needs, in either material or political terms (cf. Pogany 200: 8-11). 
This chapter will advance two arguments. First, that the Roma population of Europe 
(with emphasis on Poland and the Czech Republic) has managed to develop a fairly 
robust organizational network that is both asserting Roma rights and fostering the 
development of a more coherent Roma identity. Second, political parties and government 
agencies, while publicly stating their intention to help end discriminatory practices 
against Romani peoples, are showing little motivation to end systemic racism. During 
transition, the Helsinki Watch reported: 
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Despite (…) improvements in the legal status of the Romani minority in 
Czechoslovakia, Helsinki Watch has found that the consequences of past policies 
toward Romanies continue to affect the Romani community today. An extremely 
serious matter is the current government’s failure to condemn publicly and 
thoroughly investigate and prosecute those responsible for medical procedures in 
which Romani women were sterilized without their consent and, in some cases, 
without their knowledge (Human Rights Watch 1993: 1). 
 
While this was written before Czechoslovakia split, it should be noted that similar 
concerns have recently been raised about the exact same issue. For instance, the 
European Roma Rights Centre provides the following summary of a statement released 
on 1 September 2006 by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): 
In its Comments, the Committee commended the Czech government for several 
aspects of its work to combat discrimination against women. However, it 
expressed serious concerns in a number of areas, including on the problem of 
coercive sterilisation of Romani women by Czech doctors (EERC – online 
newsletter) 
 
In terms of government intervention, to stop the practice of forced sterilization and 
improve the status of Roma more generally, not much has changed since 1992, when the 
Human Rights Watch report was published. If the issue of forced sterilization is a litmus 
test for the government’s overall commitment to ending discrimination against Roma, 
then surely they fail.  
To say institutions are unimportant when it comes to the vitality of a particular 
interest group or interest sector is to underestimate the significance of formalized politics 
in an era of rapid social and political change. The government, judiciary (both local and 
national courts) and bureaucracy develop and implement new laws, procedures and 
institutions, which in turn define the parameters of contentious politics for minority 
groups.  Any movement for civil rights and indeed human rights will undoubtedly target 
existing laws and the lawmakers, for law and legislation are what established a society’s 
rights discourse. This occurs because it is law, in the form of a Bill of Rights or Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, which ultimately determine a group’s relative status and 
designation in society. In both Poland and the Czech Republic, steps were taken to 
expand legislation to include Roma rights. But this was not done voluntarily. As Trehan 
argues, “as a result of the early work of many NGOs in publicizing rights violations 
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against Roma, the European Union has adopted specific criteria with respect to Romani 
integration in accession countries.”(2001: 142). But the problem is identified in this next 
quote from the same author: “Independent experts argue that post-Communist countries 
have adopted changes (some claim merely cosmetic) to their legal and judicial structure 
in an attempt to make themselves more palatable to Europe and enhance their chances of 
speedy EU accession” (Trehan 2001: 142).  
One is left, then, to determine whether legal changes were the result of a strong 
Romani lobby, or strategic calculation on the part of Polish and Czech lawmakers. 
Considering how government has kept environmental and women’s right groups at arms 
length, and the continuance of Roma maltreatment at the hands of judges, magistrates and 
the police, it may be easier to support the latter version (cf. Fawn 2001). Human rights 
become state priority only when they serve to further other goals, like increased EU 
funding. To this end, Musilova argues “in the Czech Republic there is a situation in 
which equal opportunities policies are implemented ‘from above (…) For this reason they 
remain confined to the basis of legislation, and decision-making bodies do not furnish the 
space to link up with all other parties” (1999: 202). While this argument relates to 
women’s groups and their pursuit of equal rights, the thesis has equal application in the 
context of Roma rights. It is the nature of the system which works to exclude interest 
groups from the policymaking process. As Musilova argues, in transitional societies large 
constituent groups (usually society writ large) garner the most attention from state 
agencies and lawmakers. 
The Romani of the Czech Republic and Poland (and ECE) are not afforded the 
same level of protection under the law as say the largest minority linguistic group 
(francophone) in Canada is. Being recognized under the law as a distinct but equal 
member of society means any discrepancy which may arise in the application of law, in 
this case language laws in Canada, can be settled by the courts, instead of by politicians.  
But with a majority of Eastern Europeans harboring “extremely negative attitudes toward 
the Roma” (Barany 2002: 189), a legal quick fix may well be out of the question. But as 
Fonadova (2003) reports “in legal terms, Roma are members of a minority with rights 
equal to the other inhabitants of the Czech Republic in accordance with the democratic 
constitution” (p.30). This may be the case, legally, but in terms of the Roma’s ability to 
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utilize the law to further their own ends, it appears most judges are unable to establish 
any sort of meaningful precedent. Another problem, identified by Siklova and 
Miklusakova, is the restrictive and discriminatory nature of Czech citizenship laws. 
While Roma are entitled to protection under the law, the law only applies – in its full 
capacity – to those individuals granted Czech citizenship after the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, 1 January 1993. Siklova and Miklusakova write:  
To select Czech citizenship between January 1, 1993 and June 30, 1994, in 
accordance with Sec. 18 of Law No. 40/1993 Coll., was made all the more 
difficult by a number of conditions that the Roma wre often unable to meet. The 
group, as a whole, is largely ignorant of the law; many Roma are semiliterate and, 
without assistance, they have been unable to understand administrative procedures 
or deal with state authorities (1998: nps). 
 
Thus, a disjuncture exists between the law in theory, and the law and practice. Its ability, 
therefore, to end discriminatory practices should be seriously questioned. No matter how 
organized Romani NGOs may have been during this period (1992-1993), the sudden and 
rapid shift in political boundaries (literally) had serious ramifications for the movement 
and the status of Roma. The fluidity of laws pertaining to the Roma directly and minority 
groups in general made lobbying almost impossible. It was possible to communicate a 
desire to see Romani rights improved, in a general way, but much more difficult to 
‘attack’ or question specific legislation and laws. It was difficult for Roma groups to 
determine, in any definitive way, what the government was going to do. This placed (and 
continues to place) limitations on what they can politically do and moreover what they 
can expect.  
 In terms of their ability to organize, it appears thus far Roma activists (and 
activists representing Roma) have been able to construct an impressive network of 
advocacy groups. But as Barany (2002) cautions: “the majority of Gypsy organizations 
are loosely structured and are elite driven” (p.208). This echoes the description provided 
in chapter five (5) for the women’s movement and their respective interest groups. Part of 
the reason why Romani political groups are elite driven comes down to the way financial 
aid was (and continues to be) distributed amongst civil society organization. The 
requirement to apply for international funding, which is a fairly commonsense approach, 
means groups with an established membership or existing international ties have a 
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distinct advantage over upstart groups. This is a step in the right direction though, as “all 
previous attempts by the countries of the region to devise policies aimed at managing 
their Roma populations had been without any participation by Roma themselves” (Guy 
2001: 19). This is not to say Romani groups have achieved political parity with other 
NGOs, because the reality is many of NGOs concerned with Roma rights are without the 
political clout needed to affect change. This does not mean they are ineffectual, because 
some important legislative changes have occurred as a result of lobbying. But linkage 
mechanisms between state agencies responsible for Romani welfare and the Roma 
population are underutilized and, indeed, underdeveloped (Trehan 2001: 136-37).  
The transition to democracy was not wholly enabling for the Roma. Romani 
organizations were faced with the difficult task of representing the interests of a disparate 
group which had experienced a sudden and abrupt change in their legal status post 1989. 
First, the policy of assimilation ended when the Communist regime capitulated. It must 
be recognized that “from the 1950s onwards, instead of violent repressive decrees, the 
Communist state pursued a paternalistic and assimilatory re-education policy. A 
systematic effort to deal with the Roma question began in 1957 and lasted up until 1989” 
(Fonadova 2003: 29). After 1989 then, the Roma were not only having to discover their 
political voice vis-à-vis the development of interest groups and political parties, but were 
also, most significantly, having to come to terms with newfound status.   
 In Canada, the aboriginal population fought long and hard to see the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) recognize their right to sovereignty and self-
determination.111In Australia, a long and somewhat difficult series of negotiations on the 
topic of aboriginal self-government has produced little results – even though self 
government is a part of Australian common law. But the point here is that minority 
groups, especially those with customs and practices that clash with mainstream culture, 
have sought remedy through the courts and legislature, and not as it were through popular 
protest112. It is otherwise impossible to change institutionalized forms of racism without 
first changing the legal climate that condones it.  
                                                 
111
 Sec 35 (1-4) of the Constitution Act 1982, “Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” 
112
 Although public protest is a part of their repertoire it does not constitute their main activity. 
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This case study on the development of Roma NGOs in the Czech Republic and 
ECE (with some evidence from Poland) illuminates three things: 
 
1)  International donors and human rights groups (e.g. the International Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights – IHFHR) have helped the Roma population of the 
Czech Republic, in particular, establish advocacy networks. But too many cooks 
can ‘potentially’ spoil the broth. As the number of organizations dealing with 
human rights and Roma rights increase, the greater the likelihood of a fragmented 
and ineffectual advocacy network, which would weaken the standing of most 
groups. 
2) Roma rights groups remain detached from their grassroots base. This is 
however partly the result of how disperse the Roma population of ECE is. But 
they are beginning to develop international organizations, like the International 
Romani Union, to rectify this problem. 
3) EU membership should help Roma groups develop a more effect policy 
network. The EU will also facilitate the development of better, more 
comprehensive, laws relating to human rights and citizenship. The EU will 
provide lobbyists with a second tier of government, which they can utilize should 
state governments prove unhelpful. However, as Kovats (2001) argues, the 
European Union may be too far removed from the Roma to fully appreciate the 
economic, social and political problems faced by Roma. He contends “for Europe 
to play its role effectively its institutions need to be realistic about their own 
competence and recognize that the complexities involved require the channeling 
of policy initiatives through state-level structures” (p.110). But this is contingent 
on there being responsive state-level structures, and so far, this does not seem to 
be the case. 
 
The transitions to democracy was not entirely enabling for the Roma. As Guy (2001) 
argues 
While the moribund assimilation policies of the Communists lapsed, they were 
replaced by pandemic unemployment and destitution, verbal and physical racist 
attacks sometime escalating to murders and pogroms, increasing segregation in 
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education and housing, and widespread health problems aggravated by poverty 
(…) the head of the Council of Europe Specialist Group on Roma, Geraldine 
Verspaget, declared that Roma were now worse off than under Communist rule 
(P.13). 
 
The problems encountered by Roma are the result of systemic racism and rapid 
institutional change. Changing laws, and most significantly the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, left the Roma community without a clear sense of their entitlements and 
position. This did not empower the Roma as a minority group nor the agencies and 
organizations that represent(ed) their interests. Roma organizations now have to compete 
with other minority groups for government assistance, recognition and access to the 
policymaking process. As civil society opened-up, competition amongst groups grew 
increasingly fierce. Without having the benefit of existing international advocacy 
networks, like environmental and women’s rights groups had in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, Roma organizations – begin separate from international human rights agencies 
– were faced with the take of building their movement from the ground up. The issues 
facing Roma in the Czech Republic and Poland, like poverty and illiteracy, can only be 
dealt with correctly through local groups. There have been improvement in Roma – 
government relations since accession, and many local authorities in the Czech Republic 
have introduced programmes geared toward ending institutional racism and social 
exclusion.  
 
FORCED STERILIZATION, EDUCATION AND EQUITY 
This short case study on the Romani minority in Poland and the Czech Republic 
illustrates how profoundly EU funding and wider European NGO coordination has 
impacted the status of Romani organizations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Simply 
stated many of the most active and visible organizations, like Sdruzeni Dženo 
(Association Dzeno), Romodrom, in the Czech Republic, and Związek Romów Polskich  
(Union of Polish Romanies)  in Poland, owe their existence to EU monies. While this 
section refers to Roma and Romani organizations, the reader should be aware the ‘Roma 
community’ is not without political fissure and ideological disagreement. In Poland the 
Roma community is split over the issue of education and whether Romani children 
should be segregated from the majority population (Sobotka 2002: 13-14). In the Czech 
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Republic the Romani movement and chiefly the Romani Civic Initiative (ROI), a main 
Roma political party, has experienced in-fighting amongst the leadership (CTK 1 April 
2003). Total agreement on how Roma NGOs, ancillary associations and education 
centers should operate has not been realized.    
Racism toward the Roma persists despite Poland and the Czech Republic’s 
accession to the European Union, but this is hardly surprising. It will be some time before 
Roma are treated as equals in two societies that have for so long considered them outside 
the mainstream. However the existence of EU directives and treaty law relating to human 
rights, the treatment of minorities and equity in the workplace, such as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty, does put pressure 
on the 2004 accession countries, in particular, to revamp existing human rights 
legislation. Mechanisms of a punitive nature were added to the Treaty on European 
Union (Art 6, 7, 49 and 46 TEU113) in the hope of giving teeth to the EU’s many human 
rights declarations, which in most instances were not binding on member states. This, 
combined with the EU’s commitment to governance, a decision-making system that 
encourages NGO participation, and civil society, has given the Roma NGO community 
hope.  
Presented below are two separate but certainly interconnected case studies 
relating to the treatment of Roma in the Czech Republic and Poland. Each is an issue that 
affects the Roma community directly and has attracted the attention of international 
media, European and national NGOs and, in all three cases, the European Union. As 
stated at the beginning of the Roma section the intention here is not to delve into the 
                                                 
113
 The EU Commission’s  Justice and Home Affairs website summarizes this change: “The 
Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 1999, established procedures intended to 
secure their protection: It established, as a general principle, that the European Union should 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, upon which the Union is founded ( Art 6 TEU) 
The Union can suspend certain rights of a Member State deriving from the application of the 
Treaty, if it has determined the existence of a serious and persistent breach of these principles by 
that Member State.(Art 7 TEU) Candidate countries will have to respect these principles to join 
the Union (Art 49 TEU) It has also given the European Court of Justice the power to ensure 
respect of fundamental rights and freedoms by the European institutions (Art 46 TEU)” (  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unit/charte/en/rights.html). 
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historical or socio-political reasons for institutionalized racism and/or xenophobia, but 
rather is to look at how (or if) contentious collective action in the area of Romani rights 
has changed in any significant way since consolidation and EU accession.    
One of the biggest changes in the past four years has been direct EU involvement 
in issues and matters relating to the Roma community. Before formal accession talks had 
even begun the Commission was voicing concern over the plight of the Roma 
communities throughout Central Europe, and in particular, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. In 1999 the EU was already pledging to support, “both financially and 
politically, social programmes aimed at improving the situation of the Roma minority in 
the Czech Republic” (AP 11 Nov. 1999). A year earlier in 1998, the EU was confronted 
with a clear-cut case of racism in a potential candidate country, the Czech Republic. In 
Usti nad Labem and Plzen, the town council approved the building of a ‘separation wall,’ 
which would have in effect ghettoized the Roma population. This controversial project 
drew ire from national Roma associations, international human rights groups and, the EU, 
which suggested the Czech Republic’s membership bid would be harmed if this 
segregation were permitted to continue (BBC 21 Nov 1999).  As the BBC reported in 
1999, “the gypsies of Usti Nad Labem believe what can help them now is the Czech 
Republic's eagerness for membership of the European Union….As the accession talks 
continue, the diplomatic pressure is growing on Prague to improve its record on human 
rights” (BBC 26 Feb 1999). With central government’s prompting (and financial 
assistance) the wall separating the Roma from the non-Roma was eventually torn down 
and, five years later, the Czech Republic joined the EU. 
In 1999 the EU Commission also criticized Poland for its failure to adequately 
legislate for the Roma population (Sobotka 2002: 2), which numbered approximately 
45,000 in the mid 1990s -- 0.1172 % of the Polish population (Barany 1998: 313). Like 
the Czech Republic, Poland was taken to task by several European institutions. The 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recently suggested to 
Polish authorities “a series of measures to address the situation of disadvantage and 
discrimination faced by the Roma community” (ECRI 2004) and more specifically, it 
“encourages them [Polish authorities] to cooperate with and support NGOs which 
promote Roma culture and work in the field of combating discrimination against Roma” 
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(ECRI 2004: 34). For all the plans and intentions Poland is still without a comprehensive 
strategy for combating Roma racism and stigmatization. As the Commission’s 2002 
Regular Report outlines:  
 
These good intentions [communicated in 2001] have not, however, fully survived 
the transition into practice. The pilot project has been launched, but budgetary 
difficulties have placed severe limitations on the elements of the project which 
have been undertaken to date (p.31). 
 
This shows even when international institutions are involved, monitoring and making 
recommendations, it is still up to the state to devise and implement public policy. If they 
are unwilling to take recommendations seriously or are unafraid of the political 
consequences chances are legislation will stop short of solving the inequality problem. 
Also, just because political opportunities exist, does not mean that all NGOs or even 
whole sectors will benefit.   
The EU is not a panacea for the Roma, which will most likely encounter ill-
treatment and hostility for some time to come. But the EU does serve as a catalyst for 
change and as way to influence the nature and course of contentious politics in Poland 
and the Czech Republic. It becomes acceptable and legitimate for European and 
international actors to join national NGOs in their campaign to end racism toward the 
Romani population of Central Europe. Furthermore, a host of new mechanisms, both 
judicial and political, became available to NGOs, first after 1989, and second after 
accession to the Union in 2004. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the 
European Convention of Human Rights and, the Council of Europe (CoE), all ratified by 
the Czech Republic between 1992 – 1993, offer Roma NGOs and activists new political 
and legal opportunities. In fact recent rulings by the ECHR have prompted government to 
make substantial legislative change in areas of Roma education, healthcare and housing. 
The presence of courts and EU-level institutions alone does not guarantee victory for 
Roma NGOs, though is does help with the development of Roma political assertiveness 
(Vermeersch 2002: 94). Vermeersch contends: 
Making policy on minority issues in post communist central Europe today is far 
from exclusively a matter of domestic politics; it is significantly influenced by the 
norms and standards emerging in the international political arena of contemporary 
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Europe. In particular the EU has attempted to alter central European policies 
related to minorities by explicitly linking normative pressure with membership 
conditionality (2002: 83 – emphasis added). 
 
These conditions of membership, which are outlined in Article 49 and Article 6 (1) of the 
TEU114 and, elucidated in the text of the Copenhagen criteria, are also coincidently the 
characteristics of a ‘good’ western European democracy as well – and there is both 
internal and external pressure to conform. 
An important feature of this assistance comes in the form of PHARE grants. The 
PHARE programme was (is) meant to help accession countries establish functioning 
democratic institutions and civil societies. A PHARE report (2002) reads: 
 
Candidate countries are encouraged to earmark support to Roma communities as 
well as to increase the participation of NGOs in programming. Funding priorities 
are discussed in the context of the frequent contacts the European Commission 
maintains with numerous Roma organizations (DG Enlargement Information Unit 
2002: 8).     
 
Mentioned elsewhere in the dissertation, the Roma community has benefited enormously 
through the EU’s PHARE programme, and related granting bodies. It is true that money 
cannot (always) buy a NGO political power and influence, but what it can do, which is 
almost as important at this stage of post communist development, is help NGOs acquire 
basic operational supplies – computers, paper, fax machine and telephone. Looking 
through PHARE reports one will discover that many one-off grants went toward the 
purchase of such equipment and office needs. PROM PO DROM, a Romani organization 
in Poland, acquired €1, 870 under the PHARE National Programme in 1994 to purchase a 
computer to, as indicated, edit a Roma periodical (DG  EIU 2002: 25). The total amount 
of PHARE grants going to Roma initiatives and NGOs in the Czech Republic to May 
2002 was €8, 127, 600 (ibid). In the same period Polish Roma received €91, 700, with  
                                                 
114
 Article 49 of the TEU: “Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 
6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, 
which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the 
European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.”  
Article 6 (1) of  the TEU: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to 
the Member States.” 
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€ 79,260 (ibid) going to a “confidence building” project in the Carpathian Basin, a 
particularly problematic area of Poland for Romani (Sobotka 2002: 13). The PHARE 
programme in combination with philanthropic agencies, such as the Open Society 
Institute, which through its Roma Participation Programme has assisted Roma NGOs, is 
helping to construct a professional and competent network of Roma NGOs in Central 
Europe115.  
 
FORCED STERILIZATION 
The matter of coercive or forced (or at best uninformed) sterilization of Romani women 
in the Czech Republic was thought to be of an historical nature, in that it happened only 
during the dark days of state socialism. In fact Roma women were being unknowingly 
sterilized as late as 2004-05, after the Czech Republic had already acceded to the TEU. 
This case illustrates two opposing developments in Czech politics. First, it shows how 
NGOs, European institutions and international sentiment, can together force change on 
Czech lawmakers. But second, it also reveals despite the Copenhagen criteria, The 
Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union, Section 49 and 6 (1) of 
the TEU and numerous human rights directives, to which the Czech Republic is a 
signatory, many Roma in the Czech Republic still experience racism and hostility. This 
part of the case study focuses exclusively on the European institutions and NGOs that 
helped end the practice of sterilization.  
In 1958, a Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
(CCCPC) Politburo Resolution identified the Roma as “a socially and culturally 
backward population featuring characteristic lifestyles” (Public Defender of Rights – 
PDR: 2005 44). It was the State’s goal to assimilate Roma into mainstream Czech 
society, as any other approach, they determined, would not have the desired effect of 
                                                 
115
 The Roma Partnership Programme’s (RPP) webpage outlines its activities: It “provides 
institutional support and training to grass-roots Romani NGOs engaged in community-issues 
advocacy. In addition, RPP supports broad-based campaigns aimed at systemic policy reform at 
the national level through funding projects by Romani NGOs that have the requisite 
professionalism to operate on the national and international levels. The desegregation of schools 
is the current primary example of this type of funding” 
(http://www.soros.org/initiatives/roma/focus/rpp). 
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ending their “backwardness”. Charter 77 Document No. 23/1978 references the practice 
of forced sterilization. It reads: 
 Particularly serious is the sterilization issue, which is admissible in cases with 
 proper medical justification, sometimes perhaps necessary, although always 
 dubious in moral terms. The consent of Romani women to sterilization is obtained 
 through persuasion, the impartiality of which is not guaranteed (…) Thus 
 sterilization becomes one of the policies of the majority population against the 
 minority population directed at preventing childbirths in the minority ethnic group 
 (PDR 2005: 24) 
 
Most recently the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) drew attention to the issue of 
sterilization. However as JUDr. Otakar Motejl, the Czech Republic’s Public Defender of 
Rights, acknowledged in his comprehensive report on the matter, “civic initiatives in the 
former Czechoslovakia pointed out the questionable practice of sexual sterilization as a 
social measure long before 1989” (p.24). Thus non-state organizations, both before and 
after the collapse of communism in 1989, have actively sought to put an end to this 
practice. The Czech NGOs, IQ Roma Servis, ERRC, Liga lidských práv (League of 
Human Rights) and Vzájemné soužití (Living Together) initiated the claim on behalf of 
10 Romani women and played a key role in helping the Public Defender of Rights collect 
information from the complainants (PDR 2005: 1-2). A total of 87 cases were presented 
to the Minister of Health before the final report was authored in 2005. 
The Czech Ministry of Health still maintains that all sterilizations, which were 
carried out by doctors, were both medically necessary and non discriminatory. The Czech 
Ministry of Health concluded, “by no means were the sterilizations a racial or 
nationalistic policy” (Hulpachová 2007). However, the Regional Court in Ostrava 
ordered the City Hospital in Ostrava to pay one of the complainants, Iveta Červeňáková, 
Kč 500, 000 (approximately £16,600)in damages (ibid). According to her lawyer, this is 
the first time a Czech court awarded damages to a Romani women for being coercively 
sterilized (AFP 12 Oct. 2007). NGOs played a vital role in bringing about this particular 
settlement and also bringing the once ‘accepted’ practice of coercive sterilization to the 
attention of the European and international community.  
A recent statement issued by the European Parliament with reference to anti-
discrimination measures called for sweeping policy reform in several sectors, with 
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housing, healthcare and education atop the ‘most pressing’ list. The EP press release 
concluded: “MEPs urge the Commission to "shape a Community Action Plan on Roma 
Inclusion", to give one Commissioner "responsibility for coordinating a policy" and "to 
promote Roma staff within its structure" (EP 2008). According to the EP ‘ghettoization’ 
of the Roma is a very real concern, as many Roma exist at the periphery of society. The 
EP suggested the nearly 10 million Roma, the majority of which gained EU citizenship 
after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements deserve special protection. Parliamentarians 
believe “the situation of European Roma communities is distinct from other national 
minorities, they say, arguing that this justifies specific measures at European level” 
(ibid).  
The EU is thus able to exert pressure on member-states to, either change national policies 
and programmes so they reflect European norms and standards, or adopt new EU-
initiated policies. Either way state autonomy in matters/areas relating to the Roma 
community, their treatment and rights, is being etched away. Furthermore, Roma and 
human rights NGOs have successfully put coercive sterilization on the EP and EC 
agenda, and chance are it will remain there until NGOs stop pressurizing EU officials to 
do something.  
The press release did not specicially mention the Czech Republic, but it did say 
something concrete about sterilization, which had been carried out in Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic. The quotation: “In addition, "extreme human rights abuses (...) 
including racial segregation in health facilities and coercive sterilisation of Romani 
women" must be ended” (EP 2008). The U.S Department of State also chastised the 
Czech government publicly for its poor treatment of Roma. At a hearing on 15 August 
2006, the U.S. Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) discussed 
the matter of eugenics and coercive sterilization in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The 
commission report, Accountability and Impunity: Investigations into Sterilization without 
Informed Consent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia” was informed by the testimony of 
two NGO representatives, Gwendolyn Albert from the League of Human Rights and 
Claude Cahn of the ERRC. It subsequently issued reservations and recommendations 
(CSCE 2006) to the Czech and Slovak governments. The report was particularly critical 
of the investigation, as the Czech Ministry of Health was investigating itself. The CSCE 
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called this a “conflict of interest” (ibid). Certainly all of the NGOs directly involved in 
this ‘international’ inquiry into the practice of sterilization grew in reputation and 
influence.     
 
EDUCATION AND SEGREGATION 
Another issue that disproportionately affects Roma is housing, or rather access to 
affordable (or state subsidized) housing. Both the EU and UN mention the problem of 
Roma “ghettoization” and/or segregation. Referring directly to the situation of Roma in 
Poland, The European Network Against Racism (ENAR) determined “the process of 
democratization seems to have had a good impact on the situation of minorities in 
general; however, the conditions of one of the groups, Roma, has broken down as a result 
of the economic transition process.” ENAR is the hub of a 600 strong network of 
European human rights NGOs and associations, endeavoring to monitor and report on 
national anti-discrimination policy and member-state implementation of EU directives116. 
The Polish government did introduce a programme in 2001 aimed at improving relations 
between the Roma and majority population in the province of Malopolska (PAP 13 Feb 
2001). But this plan popularly referred to as the Malopolska Programme117 only came 
about after intense pressure by the United Kingdom “alarmed by the increasing number 
of Romani asylum seakers from Poland (Sobotka 2002: 3).The EU Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, reported that the Malopolska Programme, which is 
now a permanent feature of education policy in the region, was making a positive change 
in lives of Romani children (CHR Report 2006: 22).  
For many years Romani children in the Czech Republic were sent to ‘special’ 
schools for children with learning difficulties, instead of to regular mainstream schools 
which are attended primarily by non-Roma children. In a groundbreaking decision, the 
ECHR ruled that this practice, which was prevalent in many parts of the Czech Republic, 
                                                 
116
 The ENAR report refers to Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which “gave the European 
Union a legal base on which to develop appropriate measures to combat discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” (ENAR 
Pamphlet). 
117
 PAP reported “the programme is to provide equal opportunities in education by increasing the 
number of people finishing school, raising school attendance figures and improving the results of 
children and young people. It is also intended to fight unemployment (be encouraging people to 
get new qualifications) and reform health care and safety” (PAP 13 Feb 2001).  
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constituted a form of illegal segregation. In 2000 several Romani between the ages of 16 
and 22 lodged a joint complaint with the ECHR believing they had be “discriminated 
against on racial grounds and deprived of their basic right of access to education” 
(EurActiv 2007). The ECHR was in fact their third stop. This matter was presented, first, 
to the Ostrava education authority, which dismissed the complaint outright, and second, 
to the Czech Constitutional Court, which in 1999 ruled the special schools to not be an 
infringement of their rights (ibid). Further to this, “legislation in all member states of the 
Council of Europe…will have to be revised” (AP 15 Nov 2007). The Roma complainants 
would certainly not have won their litigious battle with Czech authorities had it not been 
for the ECHR, which in this instance acted like an appellate court.   
Roma NGOs saw the ruling as a wake-up call and signal to push for the formation 
of a pan-European strategy on Roma (Goldirova 2007). Romani children are sent to such 
special schools in Italy, Slovakia and Romania as well. According to Livia Jaroka MEP, 
there are more than 600 such classrooms in Hungary at the moment (BBC 2005). Thus a 
pan-European approach to solving Roma segregation is required. The EU Commission’s 
website on the Roma,118 which provides links to all available EU reports on Roma, 
xenophobia and human rights, is helpful. But the ECHR court ruling adds judicial weight 
to the many EU directives and programmes. As reported, “NGOs are setting their hopes 
on the recent ruling by the Strasbourg-based European human rights court” (ibid). 
Whether the Czech and Polish government will execute policy recommendations in a 
timely fashion is another matter altogether. 
All of the Roma NGOs surveyed from the Czech Republic (N = 5) are funded 
though both EU and national government programmes. Three of the groups were 
established over 10 years ago, while the other two are between 6 and 10 years old. 
Returned questionnaires from several prominent Roma organizations, Romodrom, Dženo, 
Společenství Romů na Moravé o.p.s (The Association of Romanies in Moravia), IQ Roma 
servis and, Vzájemné soužití (Life Together) suggest a degree of tension still exists 
between government and Romani Organizations, despite their affiliation with EU 
institutions and agencies. A representative from Dženo believes “they [government] 
should learn to listen and to communicate [in a] better way.” The results indicate political 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/fundamental_rights/roma/ 
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culture and politics in the Czech Republic is still elitist, meaning political parties and 
government take decisions unilaterally, and without and established system of interest 
mediation.  
Directly below is a list of seven statements from a questionnaire distributed to 
Czech Roma NGOs at the end of 2007. Respondents were asked to indicate on a ten point 
scale, with 1 representing “strongly disagree” and 10 “strongly agree,” the extent to 
which they agree or disagree with each separate statement. The mean average from five 
respondent Roma NGOs is indicated in the right column. 
7.1 Roma NGOs Political Efficacy and Perceptions of Politics 
Statement     Average Score 
1. Government encourages groups like 
mine to participate in the policy 
making process 
 
4 
2. Government is eager to hear what 
my organization has to say about 
pending policy 
 
3 
3. Democracy is further enhanced with 
the presence of organizations like 
mine 
 
7.8 
4. Political parties are better able to 
translate the needs of the population 
than non-governmental 
organizations 
 
1.6 
5. Since joining the European Union in 
2004, I have noticed government 
representatives taking more effort to 
consult non-governmental 
organizations like mine 
 
 
4 
6. Government thinks they know best 
 
 
8 
7. The policy process is controlled by 
political elites 
 
7.6 
 
 
The numbers, though generated from a small sample size, are telling in terms of what 
they say about how Roma NGOs view Czech politics and policymaking. They regard the 
policy process as essentially elite driven with government not really appreciating the 
expertise Roma NGOs bring to the policymaking table, even though the EU explicitly 
asked the Czech government (and other EU member states) to work more closely with 
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Roma NGOs in the correction of discriminatory policies and practices. Despite the effort 
of NGOs (via policy networks) and the presence of external (supranational) institutions 
and international agencies, the Roma are still facing economic hardships and political 
marginalization. Referring to international philanthropists and funding agencies, the 
Dženo representative wrote, “without them [it] would be impossible to work.”   
The three contentious issues presented above demonstrate how outside political 
and judicial influences, namely the ECHR, the EU Commission, EP and EU treaty law, 
can change the parameters of contention for national NGOs. Further, international 
organizations, like the United Nations, and national governments (i.e. U.S. Congress) 
inside and outside Europe, can have a profound effect on how contentious collective 
action occurs. No single institutions or actor has power ‘over’ national lawmakers in 
Poland and the Czech Republic, as sovereignty still rests in the hands of their respective 
legislators – in the Polish Sejm and Czech Poslanecká sněmovna (Chamber of Deputies). 
But NGOs, especiallly those that are members of a network or community, are 
significanly more powerful today as result of the EU and the internationalization of 
human rights discourse. The quesnttionnaire results, presented below, indicate that the 
five most recognized and embedded Roma NGOs in the Czech Repubilc still lack the 
political capital needed to alter power dynamics in any lasting way. Though it sould be 
noted they are, in fact, making an impact at the EU and international level, and 
publicising injustices experienced by Czech Roma . 
 
CONCLUSION 
Roma rights have been taken up by a number of international organizations (e.g. Helsinki 
Human Rights Federation), European agencies (e.g. the European Roma Rights Centre), 
state-level non-governmental organizations (e.g. Roma Women’s Initiative and the 
Romani Civic Initiative) and governmental agencies (e.g. Office for Ethnic Equality and 
Roma Integration, Czech Republic, or Office of Gypsy Affairs, Poland). The situation is 
improving for the Roma. Peter Vermeersch (2001) contends  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a growing transnational 
advocacy network focusing on the situation of ethnic minorities in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Many international NGOs started to criticize the maltreatment of 
minority citizens in these countries and conducted campaigns aimed at changing 
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government behaviour, educating citizens and raising awareness of right within 
minority communities (p.1). 
 
Stressing the language of rights and citizenship, many of these NGOs (like Human Rights 
Watch) have helped establish an encompassing human rights discourse in ECE. They 
have also drawn media attention to what are often obvious examples of institutionalized 
forms of racism. But like the other sectors investigated, this sort of international 
assistance is not always the best thing for a fledgling movement. It tends to cut the 
activist off from the grassroots and the advocacy groups off from the populations they 
represent. Considering the plight of Roma post-1989, however, direct international 
support was the only way to jump start the Roma-rights movement, which has found little 
sympathy and compassion within majority group. 
 The Roma rights sector is a multilayered policy arena that sees a multitude of 
actors voicing often divergent opinions. But in this way, Roma rights and, minority rights 
in general, is beginning to be explored by a host of political actors. Though state power 
and government priorities places certain constraints on he development of ‘rights’ 
legislation, it must be recognized this sector is exhibiting characteristics common to 
pluralist systems. That is, the state, while having its own preferences, must contend with 
and mediate between often politically powerful agencies and non-state actors in the 
construction of new policy. While the transition to democracy must be regarded as having 
brought to the fore Romani rights, as governments were concerned first and foremost 
with meeting existing EU human rights protocols, it must also be seen as a destabilizing 
force for much of the Roma population.  
 The structure-agency problem is one that has specific application in the context of 
Roma rights. For the most, it is structural level impediments to collective action that have 
been the most damaging – and have delayed the development of a more potent Roma 
lobby. Uncertainty does not lend itself to the formation of stable, effective, Roma 
organizations, or the creation of policy networks. The most striking thing about the Roma 
movement, and this applies equally to the other sectors under study here, is how isolated 
it is from the rest of civil society. There is a Romani women’s rights group, the Roma 
Women’s Initiative, which cuts across two of the sectors investigated here. But for the 
most, Polish and Czech interest groups tend not to cross sectoral lines.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
 
The case studies and empirical research presented above suggest contemporary 
contentious politics has been significantly influenced by both European and international 
actors, to the point where non-national NGOs and institutions can alter the outcome of 
what are essentially local or national contentious episodes.   
Four assertions can be made. First, transnational issues like the environment (i.e. 
pollution, water contamination and nuclear energy) and human rights can potentially 
attract a broad coalition of international activists and organizations to a discrete policy 
issue. Two, any direct correlation between a ‘strong’ civil society and an active interest 
group sector must be rethought, as post communist era contentious politics is complicated 
by a host of intervening variables, such as international actors, institutions and legal 
norms. Many local/domestic groups are a part of larger global coalitions and networks 
and therefore not directly affected by domestic socio-political conditions and/or power 
dynamic. Three, European governance not only allows for non-traditional forms of 
interest intermediation and political mobilization, but also even generated previously 
unknown forms of activism and lobbying. Four, the long-term impact of such an 
arrangement on civil society development is unknown, but it goes to reason that 
contentious politics in CEE will for some time to come present social scientists with both 
theoretical quandaries and conceptual headaches. It is difficult to predict how many 
international or strictly European NGOs (or which ones) will mobilize in response to an 
essentially local contentious episode. The number, type and duration of protests is related 
to political opportunity structure, which he defined as “the degree to which groups are 
likely to be able to gain access to power and manipulate the political system” (in 
McAdam et al. 1996:23). In a multilayered European polity, POS is not confined or 
restricted to one administrative level. NGOs looking for power and/or influence will no 
doubt look to EU institutions and actors if stymied at the national level.    
For over 40 years civil society in Poland and the Czech Lands, and elsewhere in 
the eastern ‘bloc,’ was frozen, save for a few movements in the latter part of this period. 
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Even Poland, which had an incredibly active voluntary sector when compared to other 
Soviet-styled states, did not have a civil society in the classical Tocquevillian sense. 
Poland had autonomous, voluntary groups, but they were never a legitimate part of the 
decision-making apparatus – groups like KOR and Solidarity were not a feature of the 
regime type, they were in effect an anomaly. The hypotheses in the introductory chapter 
were positioned to reflect this historical reality. Even with international funding the 
nonprofit sector would remain weak, as it did not have tangible grassroots support. This 
was based on the fact that, a) many prominent dissidents ‘exited’ civil society for 
positions in government just as democratization began thus decreasing the effectiveness 
of NGOs (Bernhard 1996); b) the new power structure was and would continue to be 
essentially anti-NGO, with prime minister Klaus’s censuring119 of Czech environmental 
groups a clear example, and; c) the significant institutional changes taking place would 
disadvantage NGOs, in that ad hoc lawmaking, abrupt constitutional change and a 
fracturing, unpredictable political party system would take attention away from civil 
society, putting is squarely on political elites and the institutions they occupy. 
Furthermore, many academics and practitioners were reporting that post communist civil 
society was weak (Kopecky and Barnfield 1999; Carothers 2000; Howard 2002; Kopecky 
and Mudde 2003), with low levels of volunteerism and associational affiliation, and 
without any large, strong, grass-roots organizations to speak of. Dahrendorf argued just 
after the ‘1989revolutions’ minimally six decades were required for  CEE states to 
develop a proper civil society. His initial projections have change somewhat as EU 
membership, he argues, provided unforeseen impetus for fledgling CEE democracies 
(Dahrendorf 2005). Accession forced Poland and the Czech Republic to expedite 
democratization and gave many NGOs reason to become more involved (if not involved 
for the first time) in the political process. 
 The initial argument was that in Poland and the Czech Republic government and 
administrative agencies are able to construct policy in relative isolation. Some 
                                                 
119
 It has been reported that the PM Václav Klaus put Hnuti DUHA and other prominent 
environmental NGOs on a ‘terrorist watch list’ (Bechmann 1999). Radio Prague reported that 
Miloš Zeman’s foreign minister, Jan Kavan, announced he would have the intelligence service 
monitor the activities of Czech and Austrian environmental NGOs demonstrating Temelín NPP 
(Radio Prague 25 Feb. 1999). 
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challengers, lobbyists and advocates manage to exert influence, but policymaking 
remains predominantly the responsibility of legislators and political elites. In a ‘winner-
take-all’ majoritarian system government is able to keep stakeholders at bay by taking 
decisions and augmenting institutions in such a way as to maximize their power and 
influence. The so-called ‘opposition agreement’ between two rival Czech political parties 
(also ideological opposites) the Civic Democrats and Social Democrats in 1998 supports 
this idea. After examining contentious collective action in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, it appears this initial argument did not fully appreciate the potential for external 
actors to offset power disparities at the national level.  For as the case studies show and 
empirical research suggest, democratization and Europeanization have helped certain 
NGOs and interest sectors accumulate political capital.  It is important however to not 
over extend this argument either, as EU institutions cannot help NGOs overcome all 
obstacles and impediments to collective action. Sidney Tarrow (1999) offers the 
following idea. 
 International institutions are created by states, supported by states, and – beyond a 
 certain level of tolerance – serve the interests of states. While they provide venues 
 for network formation, mobilization and collective action, they are not in the 
 business of dissolving state authority structures (p.26). 
 
However the EU is not a ‘normal’ international institution as its supranational 
institutions, namely the Commission and ECJ, are able to usurp state authority in areas 
falling under the Union’s recognized competency. Also, through the process of 
Europeanization, decision-making has shifted away from national legislatures to EU 
institutions, such as the EP (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 42), thus opening up the policy 
process to a host of substate actors and other influences. For this reason it was impossible 
to evaluate government-NGO relations in Poland and the Czech Republic without 
considering EU decision making and governance. Irrespective of who ultimately ‘wins’ a 
contentious episode/event, the state or the NGOs (and any other actors) opposing national 
policy, the very presence of EU institutions changes the parameters of contention.  
Poland and the Czech Republic are still sovereign states, which means each 
respective government still retains considerable influence over policy-making and 
implementation, even in areas of environment, gender equality and Roma policy. Just as 
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European states do not fully control the political environment, so to the European Union 
is seldom able to force policy change in areas it does not have competency. There is a big 
difference then between disappointing the EU, such as when Poland closed the 
‘Plenipotentiary on the Equal Status of Women and Men’, and contravening an 
enumerated EU directive or article, which Poland would have done had it proceeded with 
construction of Via Baltica motorway through the Rospuda valley. European decision-
making is complex and sometimes even complicated, as there are a multitude of actors 
operating all levels of the decision making rubric. The examples presented in this 
dissertation point to a highly stratified system in which member states and EU agencies 
often work collaboratively to deliver policy solutions. Contentious collective action 
seemed to occur when the national government was either: disregarding an express EU 
directive or progamme; the national government was failing to transpose EU policy or 
other international laws quickly enough, thus creating a policy lag, or; the national 
government was refusing to replace or augment existing policy so that it reflect a 
particular NGOs preference. In this way traditional lobbying still occurs alongside EU-
level contentious collective action.      
 
* * * 
 
The next two sections revisit the research questions and hypotheses from chapter 1. First, 
it was asked, does the myriad of European and international actors that inhabit 
contentious spaces in post communist Europe change domestic patterns of contentious 
politics and NGO in any discernable activity? Based on the sporadic but well attended 
public demonstrations that took place in the Czech Republic in the mid to late 1990s, and 
the high levels of dissatisfaction Poles felt for their new economy and political system up 
until the beginning of the 21st century, it would be easy to think that in post communist 
Europe the state/government, political elites and political parties wield considerable 
power. Marc Morjé Howard’s (2003) examination of civil society in post communist 
Europe revealed an overall weakness among CEE civil societies, with low rates of 
volunteerism, associational affiliation and political efficacy. This is not entirely 
surprising if we consider for a moment the sheer scale of the economic and political 
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upheaval that marked the first decade of transition. Democratization, as Diamond (1997) 
points out, it a complicated process involving socio-political, cultural, economic and 
international determinants. Not surprisingly Poland and the Czech Republic’s path to 
democratic consolidation was at times made more complicated by instances of 
corruption, cronyism and cover-up (cf. Holmes 2006: 34-36). The introduction of 
‘foreign’ NGOs into the region, even though most were staffed by locals, immediately 
changed the nature of contentious politics in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
 The most significant change came when Poland and the Czech Republic acceded 
to the EU 2004 and its many directive, protocols, practices and laws. This provided 
advocacy NGOs, both inside and outside these states, with an opportunity to extend their 
activities to neighboring states and Brussels. Almost overnight existing networks grew to 
accommodate the 10 new member-states. Did this change national contentious practices? 
Looking at the examples presented in this dissertation and the results of the NGO 
questionnaire distributed in the fall of 2007, it is clear the architecture of contentious 
collective action has changed since 2004. A host of groups, actors and institutions are 
involving themselves in national-level issues. But in an interconnected Union ‘local’ 
problems or concerns, especially those of an environmental nature, quickly attract the 
attention of other NGOs and institutions.       
 Second, can an underdeveloped civil society be ‘topped up,’ so to speak with 
political actors from other regions and countries?  Civil society has two faces, the 
political and the apolitical or nonpolitical. The latter is most commonly associated with 
the idea of democratic political culture and social capital (Putnam 1993, 1995). 
Contentious collective action is a political event, in that stakeholders mobilize to 
influence decision making or policy. The cases of contentious politics examined in this 
dissertation suggest that when European and international NGOs mobilize alongside their 
national counterparts, their concerted effort is seemingly taken more seriously by 
European institutions and national lawmakers. However this is very difficult to quantify. 
Also, not all groups are weak or in need of international or Europeans assistance. But 
even when competent national NGOs are engaging in contentious collective action actors 
from other jurisdiction seem compelled to lobby alongside or parallel to them. Temelín 
NPP is one of the best examples of this. A well organized group of Czech environmental 
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NGOs were able not only to initiate a public debate about Temelín NPP but also nuclear 
energy in general. The campaign against Temelín NPP was successful, in that it attracted 
NGOs, actors and institutions from Europe (and America), but in the end the Czech 
government gave the project final approval. The EU supported the Czech government’s 
position on Temelín, and worked hard to discover a solution all actors but especially 
Austria could deal with. Note here that the EU did not blindly endorse environmental 
NGOs or anti-nuclear Austria, but instead interpreted existing directives and rules 
relating to nuclear energy production in the Union. Ultimately the Czech position was 
made stronger by receiving EU endorsement.  
 Third, what will happen to strictly national NGOs in a highly integrated European 
polity? The likelihood of strictly national NGOs remaining isolated from European 
advocacy networks and/or institutions for much longer is rather low. Even if they operate 
alone at the national level other institutions will surely influence their environment and 
thus the mobilization strategies they employ. There will always be room for national or 
local NGOs in the EU, as many policy areas, thanks to the principle of subsidiarity, are 
becoming the responsibility of town councils, municipal bureaucrats and burgomasters. 
As my research indicates, collective action tends to involve a multitude of actors from the 
local, national, European and sometimes international level.  
Three separate by interrelated hypotheses formed the basis of this dissertation, the 
first one asserted, for the foreseeable future government and state institutions will possess 
an inordinate amount of political power and by extension an ability to shut NGOs and 
other stakeholders out of the policy process, regardless of their popularity and policy 
competence. Several of the examples presented in this dissertation act to confirm this 
hypothesis. Yet, several others point to a much more complex system of political 
mobilization and contentious collective action, wherein power is highly diffuse and 
national governments are only one of many potentially potent actors. The Rospuda valley 
episode, which pit Polish authorities against an amalgam of international, European and 
local environmental activists, was presented to show how EU institutions, namely the EP, 
ECJ and Commission (esp. European Commissioner for the Environment, Stavros 
Demas)  can be used by NGOs to initiate policy change at the national level. Because 
Poland acceded to the Natura 2000 programme, which established a European-wide 
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network of protected natural areas, it was unable to ‘unilaterally’ build on an ecologically 
sensitive parcel of land near Augustów, north-east Poland. Another example of how 
European institutions change the parameters of contention was presented in the Roma 
section of the EU chapter. The matters of coercive sterilization and ‘special’ (segregated) 
schooling for Romani children attracted the attention of many European and international 
actors, which in turn put pressure on the Czech government to augment or completely 
change related policies. Thus Roma NGOs based in the Czech Republic were not 
mobilizing against the Czech government alone but rather with a multitude of actors, 
each having a particular relationship with the Czech Republic, the EU and the Roma 
community. 
 The post communist state is neither entirely weak nor powerful, though it has held 
a privileged position since 1989 as architect of the new democratic order, complete with 
transposing the EU’s acquis communautaire. Institutional redesign has been a massive 
undertaking for state officials in Poland and the Czech Republic. Writing an essentially 
new constitution, designing a multi-party parliamentary system, expunging socialist 
jargon from statutes and bureaucratic manuals, creating new political subunits and in the 
Czech instance a brand new state, has been no easy task. As a result of this process, 
which happened very quickly, many stakeholders, advocacy NGOs and CSOs were 
excluded. As Schmitter (1997) cautions, too many powerful civil society actors can 
actually disrupt democratization and lead to a fragmented and asymmetrical polity. Also, 
“civil society can contribute to democratic consolidation only if other institutions are also 
favourable” (1997: xxxiii). This suggests the institutional bias of early post communist 
governments, especially Klaus’ in the Czech Republic, may have been a good thing for 
transition and democratic consolidation. From 2004 the parameters of contention have 
changed. The state is no longer the sole architect of policy and NGOs (along with other 
CSOs) are an accepted (and acceptable) part of European governance. 
The second thesis assumed The NGOs under analysis here, due to their 
inexperience and material weakness, will not be able to influence policy in a meaningful 
way. Considering the emergence of transnational advocacy networks and the oversight 
granted EU institutions, especially in the areas of environment and human rights policy, it 
appears the relative material weakness of any single national NGO is less consequential 
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than at any time before. In this regard the above thesis can be challenged. Polish and 
Czech NGOs are not isolated actors in the sense they must acquire skills and experience 
without help from outside advocacy groups and institutions. As presented above, PHARE 
grants and other targeted funding programmes have helped Roma organizations 
immeasurably. They provided Roma NGOs with basic material needs, such as computers 
and fax machines, and also a degree of legitimacy that was previously lacking. Still with 
the Roma example, the presence of the ERRC, a dedicated website on and for Roma 
(through the Directorate General, Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities), 
a European anti-discrimination NGO network and EU laws concerning racial 
discrimination and unfair hiring practices, have extended POS beyond national 
boundaries. NGOs are able to influence policy by utilizing ‘new’ EU institutions, ‘new’ 
EU directives and policy and ‘new’ EU-level NGO networks. This does not mean 
however national governments are altogether politically weak and unable to frustrate 
some NGOs and NGO communities. The Czech government did not back down over 
Temelín NPP despite pressure from Austria and a broad coalition of environmental 
NGOs to decommission the plant altogether. In Poland, government refuses to seriously 
consider any measure that would undo strict abortion laws, even though an international 
consortium of women’s NGOs have been active in opposition. 
 The groups and sectors used to explore post communist contentious collective 
action have gained most from EU accession, as the EU has full or partial competency in 
environment, gender equity and minority rights policy. And even when jurisdiction has 
not been expressly assigned to EU institutions by member-states, the EU is still able to 
exert influence through direct or indirect funding of NGOs, civil society organizations 
and research. Romani NGOs for instance, including all of the organizations surveyed for 
this dissertation, cover a significant portion of the operating costs with EU monies. They 
would not be able to function as they do without EU funding. Thanks to private 
philanthropy, direct government funding (from the Czech and Polish state) and EU 
support, the Roma NGO sector is no longer materially weak.  
 Finally, accepting that EU accession would present NGOs with greater 
opportunities, the third thesis determined EU accession should alter status quo power 
dynamics in an empirically significant way. Thus political parties (and government of the 
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day) will be unable to retain control over all aspects of the policy process. What EU 
accession had done for the NGO community in Poland and the Czech Republic is provide 
several new access points through which they can enter the policymaking process/chain. 
In POS terms such access point are important in shaping the nature and scope of 
contentious collective action.  In this way pre accession power dynamics have been 
altered, in some cases substantially. As members of the European Union national 
governments cannot introduce policy that contradicts existing directives and practices, as 
such NGOs are able to focus attention on transposition and implementation. If a 
discrepancy arises between national legislation and EU law, they can alert/lobby the 
Commission and if required the ECJ. This addition layer of judicial (and political) 
oversight is good for NGOs, and in the cases presented proven bad for national 
lawmakers. In terms of how contentious politics actually occurs in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, several of the cases presented above (namely Rospuda valley, Temelín and 
Roma schooling) show NGOs to have a heightened awareness of their institutional 
surroundings and recognition of the collective action opportunities European integration 
creates.  
 Separately, the process of Europeanization has reinforced practices that benefit 
NGOs and civil society actors. For example, the EU’s insistence on ‘governance’ and 
‘civil society’ has given many NGOs impetus to form larger, more specialized networks 
across the whole of the European Union. NGOs in Poland and the Czech Republic have 
in effect been ‘gobbled up’ by these ever growing transnational advocacy networks and 
policy communities. European integration helps to reinforces human rights norms and 
environmental law in new accession states. It also enables NGOs to more readily and 
easily coordinate their activities, as they do not have to worry about any significant 
variation in policy and approach. Isomorphism is helping smooth out any noticeable 
wrinkles in the institutional landscape, which can only assist the development of 
advocacy networks. The integration/harmonization process is not without problems. The 
Polish Catholic Church, which favours Poland’s restrictive abortion law, backed EU 
membership so long as government kept the existing legislation in place after accession 
(AFP 20 Jan 2003). Not all groups favour continued EU integration, including the Polish 
Catholic Church, as it could mean the erosion of national culture and religion.  
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* * *  
 
In the final analysis NGOs in Poland and the Czech Republic are beginning to 
exhibit characteristics common to competent, professional advocacy organizations. Many 
of the more prominent groups in the women’s rights, environmental and Roma rights 
sector have benefited from international financial support. Other groups, like Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth (Hnuti DUHA) and Network of East West Women in Poland, gained 
immediate advantage through their membership in already established NGO networks. 
While NGOs are gaining institutional competency and learning how to perform functions 
in-line with their status, such as lobbying, they nevertheless are faced with the prospect of 
developing much needed grassroot connections in a political system that seems to favour 
upward motility. The government’s underutilization of the third sector means policy 
reflects the interests of the state and the dominant discourse of the day, which so happens 
to be neoliberalism (Ost 1993; Orenstein 2001; Holmes 2006).   
 There was great hope and sometimes unrealistic expectations for Poland and the 
Czech Republic after their communist regimes capitulated in 1989. However one 
evaluates the current situation, it is remarkable that these two societies have proceeded 
from authoritarianism to the European Union in less than fifteen years without any 
significant social unrest. It is extremely difficult to say where these young democracies 
will go next. Democratization has bee disrupted but at the same time reinforced or 
expedited by EU membership. The state is sill a power actor yet at times besieged by 
European and international lobbyists, institutions and NGOs. The examples, case studies 
and survey results indicate contradictory develops. NGOs feel marginalized, 
underappreciated and mistrusted though are working collaboratively with other NGOs 
(mainly in Europe), exerting pressure on both national and European lawmakers, and 
realizing impressive policy victories in two of three sectors examined. 
 Any future research into the form and scope of contentious politics and political 
mobilization in post communist Europe will have to at the very least acknowledge the 
increased role of external actors and institutions. Additionally, researchers should be 
encouraged to use the language and conceptual tools of social movement scholarship 
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when exploring NGO activity in post communist Europe because it is well suited to 
explaining collective action during periods of comprehensive institutional change. 
Finally, the political opportunities that came with EU accession may only be temporary, 
the result of Czech and Polish lawmakers adapting to European laws and norms. Once 
this honeymoon period is over, NGOs may find that collective action is best carried out at 
the local and national levels.  
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APPENDIX A 
POLAND LAW ON PUBIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY AND VOLUNTEERISM120 
Article 4  
 
1. The domain of public tasks mentioned in the Law covers tasks in the following fields:  
 
1) Social care, including assisting families and individuals in difficult life situations, and 
providing equal opportunities to such families and individuals;  
2) Charitable activities;  
3) Sustaining national tradition, cultivating Polishness, and the development of national, 
civil, and cultural identity;  
4) Activities for the sake of national minorities;  
5) Protection and promotion of health;  
6) Activities for the sake of the handicapped;  
7) Promotion of employment and job-related motivation of individuals who are 
unemployed or who are threatened with redundancies;  
8) Protection and promotion of women’s rights and activities for the sake of equal rights 
for men and women;  
9) Activities that support economic development, including the development of 
entrepreneurship;  
10) Activities supporting the development of communions and local communities;  
11) Science and humanities, education and upbringing;  
12) Tourism and leisure of children and adolescents;  
13) Culture, arts, protection of national heritage and tradition;  
14) Promotion of sports;  
15) Natural environment and animal welfare and the protection of environmental 
heritage;  
16) Public order and social safety and prevention of social pathologies;  
17) Promotion of knowledge and skills for the State defense;  
18) Protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms, as well as activities 
supporting the development of democracy;  
19) Protection of people and emergency rescuing;  
20) Assistance to the victims of catastrophes, natural disasters, military conflicts and wars 
in the territory of the State and abroad;  
21) Protection and promotion of consumer rights;  
22) Activities for the sake of the European Integration and development of relations and 
co-operation among nations;  
23) Promotion and organization of volunteerism;  
24) Activities that provide technical support, training, information and/or financial 
assistance to non-governmental organizations and units mentioned in art. 3 par. 3, 
within the scope of points 1–23.  
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 An English translation of Article 4 of the Law on Public Benefit Activity and Volunteerism is 
provided by the U.S. International Grantmaking. The full document can be found at : 
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/laws/Poland/Poland%20PBA%20Article%204.pdf 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRES IN ENGLISH 
 
 
 
School of international relations 
University of st Andrews 
 
Survey of Polish and Czech NGOs 
 
Dear NGO Director/Member: 
 
My name is Neil Cruickshank and I am a PhD student at the University of St. Andrews. My 
research concerns the development of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Poland and 
the Czech Republic. I am especially interested in government-NGO interaction and policy 
development. As part of this research project, I am distributing a questionnaire designed to gather 
input from groups such as yours on issues pertaining to policy development and political 
activism.  
In completing the questionnaire, I encourage you include as much information as you 
can. I feel it is important to consult directly with people like you, who have first hand knowledge 
of the NGO sector and its development.  Feedback gathered from the responses to the 
questionnaire will be incorporated into my PhD dissertation. I am happy to provide you with a 
summary of my findings as soon as they become available. Without your participation it would be 
impossible to accurately analyze NGO activity and influence in Central Europe. Thank you for 
taking the time to answer the enclosed survey. 
If possible, please return the questionnaire within two weeks of receipt. For further 
information on the issues contained in the questionnaire, please feel free to contact me directly at 
the email address provided. Although the questionnaire is designed for NGOs, responses will be 
accepted from other groups and associations interested in changing, challenging or augmenting 
government policy through activism and/or lobbying.   
You can submit the completed questionnaire by e-mail, fax or mail (a postage paid 
envelope has been provided) to my university of employment. Please return your response to:  
  
Mr. Neil Cruickshank  
Department of Political Studies 
University of Prince Edward Island 
Charlottetown, PE 
C1A 4P3 
CANADA 
 
…Or by email at nac3@st-andrews.ac.uk or by fax to 00 + 1 + 902 566 0339.    
 
Thank you for your participation in this process. I look forward to receiving your feedback. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Neil A. Cruickshank, BA MA MSc  
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Questionnaire (Czech Republic) 
 
 
Thank you for taking time to complete this questionnaire. It should take you 20 - 25 
minutes to complete. The results of this survey will appear in my PhD dissertation, 
Power, Civil Society and Interest Articulation in Post Communist Europe, and separately, 
in two conference papers.  
I will be happy to supply you and your organization with the amalgamated results 
as soon as they become available. This survey is being sent to a variety of NGOs in both 
the Czech Republic and Poland and should yield very useful data.  
Please tick (check) the box which best reflects your answer. You are encouraged 
to expand upon your answer when prompted. Space has been provided at the end of this 
survey for any additional comments you may wish to convey. Your assistance is greatly 
appreciated. 
 
1. Name of Organization __________________________________________________ 
 
2. Address and email:     ___________________________________________________ 
 
       ___________________________________________________ 
 
       ___________________________________________________ 
 
The information gathered from this survey is for my personal use only. Only aggregated 
data will be publicly disclosed. The data that is collected through this survey will be 
kept private to the extent allowed by law. Data will be kept for personal use only. 
Association and Organization information will be kept in a secure, limited access 
location. Respondent identities will not be revealed in any publication or presentation of 
the results of this survey.  There are no foreseeable risks by participating in this study.  
* If you DO NOT want to be mentioned by name in my dissertation, please mark this 
box:  [       ].   
 
3. How long has your organization been in operation? 
 
       Less than 1 year 
 
        2 – 5 years 
 
        6 – 10 years 
 
         10 + years 
 
4. Please indicate your position: 
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        Director 
 
        Assistant director 
 
         Staff (paid) 
 
         Staff (volunteer) 
 
           Other:  __________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
5.   
a) Does your organization have a permanent administrator?            YES        NO 
 
b) Does your organization have more volunteers than paid staff?               YES        NO                
 
c) Does your organization have an on-site resource centre?             YES        NO 
 
d) Does your organization receive draft government policy?             YES         NO 
 
e) Is your organization registered as an ‘Obecně prospěšná společnost’ 
 (Public Benefit Corporation)?               YES        NO 
 
6. How would you classify your organization? You may select more than one category. 
 
        Pressure group  
 
        Interest group  
 
        Non-governmental organization  
 
        Civil society organization 
 
        Other__________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
7.  Is your organization the result of a merger between two or more 
associations/organizations? 
 
        YES 
 
        NO 
 
If YES, please list below which organizations have merged to form your organization?  
a. _____________________________________ 
 
b.______________________________________ 
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c. ______________________________________ 
 
d. ______________________________________ 
 
8. How does your organization meet its operating costs? You may select more than one 
source. 
 
        Donations from private individuals 
 
        Donations from private organizations or corporations 
 
        European Union 
 
        Direct government funding  
 
        International funding bodies 
 
        Other __________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
9. Would you say your organization needs additional funding? 
 
       Entirely 
 
        Mostly 
 
        Partly 
 
        Not at all 
 
10. Has your organization applied to any of these sources for funding? 
 
        European Union 
 
        Czech Government 
 
        Other Government ______________________________(Please specify) 
 
        Private philanthropist (i.e. Open Society Fund) 
 
        International NGOs 
 
        Other _______________________________________(please specify) 
 
11. Do you consider your organization knowledgeable enough to offer valuable policy 
advice to government? 
 
 248  
        Definitely yes 
 
        Most of the time, yes 
 
         Undecided 
 
        Not always 
 
         Never 
 
Please elaborate on your answer below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. How many regular members does your organization have?             _____________ 
 
a) How many irregular (i.e. part-time) members does your organization have?             
     ____________ 
 
b) How many members do you need to perform all necessary tasks?   _____________ 
 
13.  Would you say the majority of your membership consists of: 
 
        Full-time Students  
 
       Full-time professionals 
 
        Part-time professionals 
 
        Retired people (pensioners) 
 
        Other _______________________________(please specify) 
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14. Rate the government’s performance (to date) in your policy area 
 
        Very good 
 
        Good 
 
       Neither good nor poor 
 
          Poor 
 
        Very poor 
 
 
15. How regularly does your organization meet with ministry representatives? 
 
      Weekly 
 
       Bi-monthly (twice a month) 
 
        Monthly 
 
        Never 
 
        Other ______________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
 
16. Government encourages groups like mine to participate in the policy making process  
  
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
    
17. Government is eager to hear what my organization has to say about pending policy: 
  
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree     
 
18. Democracy is further enhanced with the presence of organizations like mine:       
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
19. Political Parties are better able to translate the needs of the population than non-
governmental organizations: 
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1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
20. Since joining the European Union in 2004, I have noticed government representatives 
taking more effort to consult non-governmental organizations like mine: 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
 
21. My organization has issued a press release (please circle):   YES    NO 
 
If YES, please indicate how many: _____________ 
 
22. My organization has participated in a public demonstration:    YES        NO 
 
If YES, please indicate how many: _______________ 
 
23. My organization is a member of a larger European NGO network: YES        NO 
  
24. If you answered YES for question # 22, please name this network below: 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
25. My organization is a member of a larger international NGO network:   YES      NO 
 
 
26. If you answered YES for question #24, please name this network below: 
 
_____________________________________________________________  
 
27. Rate the following list of prime ministers according to their commitment to your 
policy area (i.e. environment, women’s rights and equity): 
 
1 = excellent   2 = very good   3 = good  4 = fair  5 = poor  
 
a) Petr Pithart    1 2 3 4 5  
 
b) Václav Klaus  1 2 3 4 5 
 
c) Josef Tošovský  1 2 3 4 5 
 
d) Miloš Zeman  1 2 3 4 5 
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e) Vladimír Špidla  1 2 3 4 5 
 
f) Stanislav Gross  1 2 3 4 5 
  
g) Jiří Paroubek  1 2 3 4 5 
 
h) Mirek Topolánek  1 2 3 4 5 
 
28. Please circle the level of importance you attach to each task or undertaking (note the 
scoring key below): 
 
1 = extremely important  2 = very important  3 = somewhat important  
4 = not very important  5 = not at all important 
 
a) Being able to comment on government policy:  1 2 3 4 5     
 
b) Increasing membership:    1 2 3 4 5 
 
c) Developing a relationship with the ‘grassroots’:   1 2 3 4 5 
 
d) Developing closer ties with European NGOs:  1 2 3 4 5 
 
e) Learning how to more effectively lobby:  1 2 3 4 5               
   
 f) Educating others about environmental problems: 1 2 3 4 5 
 
g) Working directly with the European Union: 1 2 3 4 5  
 
h) Developing closer ties with international NGOs:  1 2 3 4 5 
 
i) Securing more financial support:   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
29. Is your organization provided time to read draft governmental policy?   YES   NO 
 
30. Does your organization provide written feedback directly to government about 
proposed policy?     
 YES   NO 
31. Does your organization employ the use of: 
 
a) Policy experts     YES NO 
 
b) Media Consultants     YES NO 
   
c) Professional lobbyists    YES NO    
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d) Scientists or academics    YES  NO 
 
32. Is the policy process transparent?      YES NO 
 
33. Does the policy process occur in a predictable way?   YES NO 
 
34. Please indicate what percentage of your operating budget goes toward: 
 
_____ Advertising   
 
_____ Daily operating costs (i.e. rent, heat and hydro) 
 
_____ Lawyers or legal advisors   
 
_____ Consultancy     
 
_____ Staffing costs 
 
_____ Other _____________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
35. The policy process more consultative (interactive) today than it was 10 years ago. 
 
Definitely yes…… - …… - ……- ……...- ……... Not at all  
  
36. Democracy is better today than it was 10 years ago. 
 
 Definitely yes…… - …… - ……- ……...- ……... Not at all  
   
37. The current government ignores NGOs. 
 
  Always…..-……-……..-………-……..Never 
 
38. The media report on issues important to NGOs. 
 
  Always…..-……-……..-………-……..Never 
 
39. Political parties and NGOs work collaboratively on public policy. 
 
  Always…..-……-……..-………-……..Never 
 
 
 
40. Government thinks they know best. 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
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Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
41. The policy process is controlled by political elites: 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
42. Please comment on what could be done to improve links between NGOs and other 
voluntary association and policy makers?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43. How important have international donors and philanthropists been for the 
development of organization like yours? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44. Does government favour certain types of organizations over others?  
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45. Please use this page to include any additional comments or anecdotes relating to your 
organization and government policy.  You may continue on the back of this sheet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your assistance is greatly 
appreciated. 
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Questionnaire (POLAND) 
 
 
Thank you for taking time to complete this questionnaire. It should take you 20 - 25 
minutes to complete. The results of this survey will appear in my PhD dissertation, 
Power, Civil Society and Interest Articulation in Post Communist Europe, and separately, 
in two conference papers.  
I will be happy to supply you and your organization with the amalgamated results 
in four to five months. This survey is being sent to a variety of NGOs in both the Czech 
Republic and Poland and should yield very useful data.  
Please tick (check) the box which best reflects your answer. You are encouraged 
to expand upon your answer when prompted. Space has been provided at the end of this 
survey for any additional comments you may wish to convey. Your assistance is greatly 
appreciated. 
 
 
 
1. Name of Organization __________________________________________________ 
 
2. Address and email:     ___________________________________________________ 
 
       ___________________________________________________ 
 
       ___________________________________________________ 
The information gathered from this survey is for my personal use only. Only aggregated 
data will be publicly disclosed. The data that is collected through this survey will be 
kept private to the extent allowed by law. Data will be kept for personal use only. 
Association and Organization information will be kept in a secure, limited access 
location. Respondent identities will not be revealed in any publication or presentation of 
the results of this survey.  There are no foreseeable risks by participating in this study.  
* If you DO NOT want to be mentioned by name in my dissertation, please mark this 
box:  [       ].   
 
3. How long has your organization been in operation? 
 
       Less than 1 year 
 
        2 – 5 years 
 
        6 – 10 years 
 
         10 + years 
 
4. Please indicate your position: 
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        Director 
 
        Assistant director 
 
         Staff (paid) 
 
         Staff (volunteer) 
 
           Other:  __________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
5.   
a) Does your organization have a permanent administrator?            YES        NO 
 
b) Does your organization have more volunteers than paid staff?               YES        NO                
 
c) Does your organization have an on-site resource centre?             YES        NO 
 
d) Does your organization receive draft government policy?             YES         NO 
 
e) Is your organization registered as a ‘Public Benefit Organization’?  
  (Organizacje pożytku publicznego)        
                 YES        NO 
 
6. How would you classify your organization? You may select more than one category. 
 
        Pressure group  
 
        Interest group  
 
        Non-governmental organization  
 
        Civil society organization 
 
        Other__________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
7.  Is your organization the result of a merger between two or more 
associations/organizations? 
 
        YES 
 
        NO 
 
If YES, please list below which organizations have merged to form your organization?  
a. _____________________________________ 
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b.______________________________________ 
 
c. ______________________________________ 
 
d. ______________________________________ 
 
8. How does your organization meet its operating costs? You may select more than one 
source. 
 
        Donations from private individuals 
 
        Donations from private organizations or corporations 
 
        European Union 
 
        Direct government funding  
 
        International funding bodies 
 
        Other __________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
 
9. Would you say your organization needs additional funding? 
 
       Entirely 
 
        Mostly 
 
        Partly 
 
        Not at all 
 
10. Has your organization applied to any of these sources for funding? 
 
        European Union 
 
        Czech Government 
 
        Other Government ______________________________(Please specify) 
 
        Private philanthropist (i.e. Open Society Fund) 
 
        International NGOs 
 
        Other _______________________________________(please specify) 
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11. Do you consider your organization knowledgeable enough to offer valuable policy 
advice to government? 
 
        Definitely yes 
 
        Most of the time, yes 
 
         Undecided 
 
        Not always 
 
         Never 
 
Please elaborate on your answer below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. How many regular members does your organization have?             _____________ 
 
a) How many irregular (i.e. part-time) members does your organization have?             
     ____________ 
 
b) How many members do you need to perform all necessary tasks?   _____________ 
 
 
13.  Would you say the majority of your membership consists of: 
 
        Full-time Students  
 
       Full-time professionals 
 
        Part-time professionals 
 
        Retired people (pensioners) 
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        Other _______________________________(please specify) 
 
14. Rate the government’s performance (to date) in your policy area 
 
        Very good 
 
        Good 
 
       Neither good nor poor 
 
          Poor 
 
        Very poor 
 
15. How regularly does your organization meet with ministry representatives? 
 
      Weekly 
 
       Bi-monthly (twice a month) 
 
        Monthly 
 
        Never 
 
        Other ______________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
 
16. Government encourages groups like mine to participate in the policy making process  
  
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
    
17. Government is eager to hear what my organization has to say about pending policy: 
  
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree     
 
 
18. Democracy is further enhanced with the presence of organizations like mine:       
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
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19. Political Parties are better able to translate the needs of the population than non-
governmental organizations: 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
20. Since joining the European Union in 2004, I have noticed government representatives 
taking more effort to consult non-governmental organizations like mine: 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
 
21. My organization has issued a press release (please circle):   YES    NO 
 
If YES, please indicate how many: _____________ 
 
22. My organization has participated in a public demonstration:    YES        NO 
 
If YES, please indicate how many: _______________ 
 
23. My organization is a member of a larger European NGO network: YES        NO 
  
24. If you answered YES for question # 22, please name this network below: 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
25. My organization is a member of a larger international NGO network:   YES      NO 
 
 
26. If you answered YES for question #24, please name this network below: 
 
_____________________________________________________________  
 
 
27. Rate the following list of prime ministers according to their commitment to your 
policy area (environment/women’s rights): 
 
1 = excellent   2 = very good   3 = good  4 = fair  5 = poor  
 
a) Tadeusz Mazowiecki   1 2 3 4 5  
 
b) Jan Krzysztof Bielecki   1 2 3 4 5 
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c) Jan Olszewski    1 2 3 4 5 
 
d) Waldemar Pawlak    1 2 3 4 5 
 
e) Hanna Suchocka    1 2 3 4 5 
 
f) Józef Oleksy    1 2 3 4 5 
  
g) Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz  1 2 3 4 5 
 
h) Jerzy Buzek    1 2 3 4 5 
 
i) Leszek Miller    1 2 3 4 5 
 
j) Mark Belka     1 2 3 4 5 
 
k) Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz   1 2 3 4 5  
 
l) Jarosław Kaczyński    1 2 3 4 5 
 
28. Please circle the level of importance you attach to each task or undertaking (note the 
scoring key below): 
 
1 = extremely important  2 = very important  3 = somewhat important  
4 = not very important  5 = not at all important 
 
a) Being able to comment on government policy:  1 2 3 4 5     
 
b) Increasing membership:    1 2 3 4 5 
 
c) Developing a relationship with the ‘grassroots’:   1 2 3 4 5 
 
d) Developing closer ties with European NGOs:  1 2 3 4 5 
 
e) Learning how to more effectively lobby:  1 2 3 4 5               
   
 f) Educating others about environmental problems: 1 2 3 4 5 
 
g) Working directly with the European Union: 1 2 3 4 5  
 
h) Developing closer ties with international NGOs:  1 2 3 4 5 
 
i) Securing more financial support:   1 2 3 4 5 
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29. Is your organization provided time to read draft governmental policy?   YES   NO 
 
30. Does your organization provide written feedback directly to government about 
proposed policy?     
 YES   NO 
 
31. Does your organization employ the use of: 
 
a) Policy experts        YES NO 
 
b) Media Consultants        YES NO 
 
c) Professional lobbyists       YES NO  
 
d) Scientists or academics       YES  NO 
 
32. Is the policy process transparent?      YES NO 
 
33. Does the policy process occur in a predictable way?   YES NO 
 
34. Please indicate what percentage of your operating budget goes toward: 
 
_____ Advertising   
 
_____ Daily operating costs (i.e. rent, heat and hydro) 
 
_____ Lawyers or legal advisors   
 
_____ Consultancy     
 
_____ Staffing costs 
 
_____ Other _____________________________________________(please specify) 
 
35. The policy process more consultative (interactive) today than it was 10 years ago. 
 
Definitely yes…… - …… - ……- ……...- ……... Not at all  
  
36. Democracy is better today than it was 10 years ago. 
 
 Definitely yes…… - …… - ……- ……...- ……... Not at all  
   
37. The current government ignores NGOs. 
 
  Always…..-……-……..-………-……..Never 
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38. The media report on issues important to NGOs. 
 
  Always…..-……-……..-………-……..Never 
 
39. Political parties and NGOs work collaboratively on public policy. 
 
  Always…..-……-……..-………-……..Never 
 
40. Government thinks they know best. 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
41. The policy process is controlled by political elites: 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
 
42. Please comment on what could be done to improve links between NGOs and other 
voluntary association and policy makers?  
 
 
 
 
 
43. How important have international donors and philanthropists been for the 
development of organization like yours? 
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44. Does government favour certain types of organizations over others?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45. Please use this page to include any additional comments or anecdotes relating to your 
organization and government policy.  You may continue on the back of this sheet. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your assistance is greatly 
appreciated. 
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE IN POLISH 
      
 
School of international relations 
University of st Andrews 
 
SONDAZ polskich i czeskich niezaleznych organizacji poza-rzadowych: 
 
Drogi Prezesie/ Czlonku Niezaleznej Organizacji Poza-rzadowej: 
 
Mam na imie Neil Cruickshank i jestem doktorantem na Universytecie St. Andrews w Szkocji.  
Moja praca naukowo-badawcza dotyczy rozwoju Niezaleznych Organizacji Poza-rzadowych w 
Polsce i Republice Czeskiej. Moje szczegolne zainteresowanie skupia sie na stosunkach 
pomiedzy organizacjami poza-rzadowymi a rzadem oraz ich wplywie na ksztaltowanie polityki 
rzadu.  Czescia moich badan jest rozprowadzenie do organizacji podobnych Pana/Pani 
organizacji, kwestionariusza z pytaniami na temat ich politycznego zaangazowania w 
ksztaltowaniu polityki rzadu.  
Zachecam Pana/Pania mocno, aby podczas wypelnianie kwestionariusza, wlaczyl/a 
Pan/Pani jak najwiecej informacji w poruszanych kwestiach.  Wierze, ze opinia czlonkow 
organizacji jest bardzo wazna i cenna, albowiem oni maja bezposredni kontakt, doswiadczenie i 
wiedze w dziedzinie dzialalnosci organizacji.  Wszystkie dane z sondazu beda zawarte w mojej 
pracy doktorskiej.  Z przyjemnoscia udostepnie Panu/Pani wyniki sondazu, wkrotce po tym, jak 
zostana one przeze mnie opracowane. Dokladna analiza i ocena dzialalnosci Niezaleznych 
Organizacji Poza-rzadowych i ich wplywow w Centalnej Europie bylyby niemozliwe bez 
Pana/Pani udzialu.  
W miare mozliwosci, uprzejmie prosze o zwrot wypelnionego kwestionariusza w ciagu 
dwoch tygodniu od daty jego otrzymania.  Jesli potrzebuje Pan/Pani dodatkowych wyjasnien w 
kwestiach zawartych w sondazu, prosze o bezposredni kontakt ze mna na podany adres 
internetowy.  Pomimo, ze sondaz jest zaprojektowany glownie dla  Niezaleznych Organizacji 
Poza-rzadowych, to jednak z zadowoleniem przyjme odpowiedzi od wszelkich grup i 
stowarzyszen zainteresowanych zmiana, wyzwaniem lub wzmocnieniem polityki rzadowej 
poprzez dzialalnosc polityczna i nacisk (lobbying). 
Ma Pan/Pani mozliwosc przeslania wypelnionego kwestionariusza droga pocztowa, 
faxem lub emailem do Universitetu, w ktorym jestem zatrudniony.  Prosze zauwazyc, ze wraz z 
kwestionariuszem otrzymal/a Pan/Pani zaadresowana zwrotna koperte wraz z oplata pocztowa. 
Prosze o zwrot wypelnionego kwestionariusza na ponizszy adres: 
 
Mr. Neil Cruickshank 
  Department of Political Studies 
  University of Prince Edward Island 
  Charlottetown, PE  CANADA     C1A 4P3 
 
lub na moj email: nac3@st-andrews.ac.uk lub na fax: 00-1-902 566 0339. Uprzejmie dziekuje za 
Pana/Pani udzial w moim projekcie naukowym.  Bede wdzieczny za udostepnienie mi Pana/Pani 
opinii. 
 
Z powazaniem  Neil A. Cruickshank BA MA MSc 
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Kwestionariusz (PL) 
 
Dziękuję Panu/Pani za poswięcenie czasu na odpowiedzi na pytania zawarte w tym 
kwestionariuszu, co nie powinno zajac wiecej niz 25 minut. Wyniki tego sondażu  
zostaną opublikowane w  mojej pracy doktorskiej, zatytuowanej “Władza , 
Społeczeństwo oraz  Sposoby  Określania Dążeń  w Po-Komunistycznej Europie” , oraz 
niezależnie w dwóch publikacjach seminaryjnych .  
Z przyjemnością dostarcze Panu/Pani i Panstwa organizacji polaczone rezultaty 
badan w ciagu nastepnych czterech do pięciu miesięcy.  Pytania, na które Pan/Pani 
odpowiada,  zostały rozesłane do wielu różnych niezależnych organizacji poza-
rządowych w   Polsce oraz Republice Czeskiej.  Spodziewam się, że przyniosa one wiele 
uzytecznych danych naukowych..  
Proszę o zaznaczanie wersji odpowiedzi , która według Pana/Pani najlepiej  
oddaje kwestie, o która pytam.Zachęcam Pana/Pania do wpisania dodatkowych uwag, 
wyjasnień i obserwacji we wskazanych miejscach, jak i na koncu kwestionariusza. 
Z góry dziękuję za okazaną mi pomoc. 
 
1. Nazwa Pani/Pana Organizacji: __________________________________________ 
 
     __________________________________________ 
  
2.Adres oraz kontakt mailowy : __________________________________________ 
 
       __________________________________________    
 
      ___________________________________________  
Informacje zebrane za pomocą tego kwestionariusza są wyłącznie do mojego użytku . 
Tylko opracowane zbiorcze rezultaty zostana opublikowane . Poszczególne odpowiedzi 
uzyskane za pomocą tego kwestionariusza nie będą udostępnione publicznie , respektując 
zasady prywatności nakreślone przez prawo . Nazwy związku czy też organizacji będą  
przechowywane w trudno-dostępnym zabezpieczonym miejscu . Dane osobowe 
odpowiadających na te pytania nie będą ujawnione w żadnej publikacji , jak też w 
opracowanym połączonym wyniku tych badań . Uczestnicząc w tej ankiecie nie jest 
Pan/Pani narażony/a na żadne ryzyko .  
* Jeżeli NIE WYRAZA Pan/Pani ZGODY na ujawnienie swojego nazwiska w mojej 
pracy doktorskiej prosze zaznaczyc to pole:   [       ]     
 
3. Jak długo działa Pana/Pani Organizacja? 
 
       Mniej niż 1 rok. 
 
        2 – 5 lat 
 
        6 – 10 lat 
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         10 + lat 
 
4. Proszę o określenie swojej pozycji w organizacji : 
 
        Dyrektor/Prezes 
 
        Zastępca Dyrektora/Prezesa 
 
         Pracownik (zatrudniony na etacie ) 
 
         Pracownik (wolontariusz) 
 
           Inna:  __________________________________________ (proszę określić) 
 
5.   
a) Czy Pana/Pani organizacja ma stałego administratora?              TAK        NIE 
 
b) Czy Pani/Pana organizacja ma więcej wolontariuszy niż opłacanych pracowników?                  
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                       TAK        NIE                     
 
c) Czy Pana/Pani organizacja  ma na miejscu (w waszej siedzibie) dostęp do materiałów 
informacyjnych , naukowych oraz potrzebnego wsparcia w waszej działalności?   
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                     TAK        NIE            
 
d) Czy Pana/Pani organizacja otrzymuje zarys projektu polityki (polisy) rządu . 
    
                                                                                                                      TAK        NIE           
 
e) Czy Pana/Pani organizacja jest zarejestrowana jako Organizacja Pożytku Publicznego 
‘Public Benefit Organization’?  
              
                   TAK        NIE         
 
6. Jak moze Pan/Pani sklasyfikować swoją Organizację ? Mozna wybrać więcej niż jedną 
z klasyfikacji. 
 
        Grupa nacisku (Pressure group) 
 
        Grupa Zjednoczonych Celów  (Interest group ) 
 
        Organizacja poza - rządowa 
 
        Organizacja społeczna 
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        Inne__________________________________________ (proszę określić) 
 
7.  Czy Pana/Pani organizacja powstała na skutek połączenia się dwóch lub więcej 
związków lub organizacji . 
 
        TAK         NIE 
Jeżeli tak, prosze wymienic organizacje, które się połączyły formując Pana/Pani 
organizację?  
 
a. _____________________________________ 
 
b.______________________________________ 
 
c. ______________________________________ 
 
d. ______________________________________ 
 
8. Z jakich źródeł Pana/Pani organizacja czerpie fundusze na jej utrzymanie? Można 
wybrać więcej niż jedno źródło. 
 
        Wsparcie od osób prywatnych 
 
        Wsparcie od organizacji prywatnych lub korporacji  
 
        Unia Europejska 
 
        Bezpośrednie finansowanie przez rząd   
 
        Międzynarodowy Fundusz 
 
        Inne __________________________________________ (proszę określić) 
 
9. Czy uważasz, że Pana/Pani organizacja potrzebuje dodatkowego wsparcia (funduszy)? 
 
       W całości 
 
        W większości 
 
        Częściowo 
 
        Zupełnie nie  
 
10. Czy Pana/Pani organizacja występowała już do poniżej wymienionych źródeł o 
wsparcie finansowe? 
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        Unii Europejskiej 
 
        Rządu Polskiego 
 
        Rządu Innego kraju _________________________ (proszę o wymienienie którego ) 
 
        Prywatnego filantropisty (dla przykładu prywatny fundusz filantropijny) 
 
        Międzynarodowej Organizacji  poza - rządowej  
 
        Innej_______________________________________ (proszę określić jakiej) 
11. Czy uważasz, że Pana/Pani organizacja ma wystarczająco wiedzy, aby zaoferować 
znaczącą pomoc w  kształtowaniu polityki rządu? 
 
        Definitywnie tak 
 
        W większości tak 
 
         Nie jestem zdecydowany 
 
        Nie zawsze 
 
         Nigdy 
Proszę o rozszerzenie swojej odpowiedzi poniżej: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Ilu stałych czlonków liczy Pana/Pani organizacja?                     
              _______________________________ 
 
a) Ilu czlonków nieregularnie uczestniczy w pracach Pana/Pani organizacji (np w 
niepełnym wymiarze godzin)?             
               _______________________________ 
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b) Ilu członków potrzebuje Pana/Pani organizacja aby wykonać stojące przed nią 
zadania?                       
                                                                               ________________________________  
 
13.  Prosze okreslic, kto stanowi wiekszosc czlonkow Pana/Pani organizacji: 
 
        Studenci uczący się w pełnym wymiarze godzin  
 
       Profesjonaliści zatrudnieni w pełnym wymiarze godzin 
 
        Profesjonaliści zatrudnieni w niepełnym wymiarze godzin  
 
        Renciści 
 
        Inni _______________________________(proszę określić) 
14. Prosze ocenic pracę rządu w sferze działania Pana/Pani organizacji 
 
        Bardzo dobra 
 
        Dobra 
 
        Ani dobra ani zła 
 
        Zła 
 
       Bardzo zła 
 
15. Jak częste Pana/Pani organizacja spotyka sie z przedstawicielami ministerstwa: 
 
      Raz w tygodniu 
 
       Dwa razy w miesiącu 
 
       Raz w miesiącu 
 
       Nigdy 
 
        Inne ______________________________________________ (proszę określ) 
 
16. Rząd zachęca grupy podobne do Pana/Pani organizacji do uczestnictwa w procesie 
kształtowania jego polityki: 
 
  1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Absolutnie się niezgadzam     Absolutnie się zgadzam     
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17. Rząd jest skłonny do poznania stanowiska Pana/Pani organizacji wobec kierunku 
obecnej jego (rządu) polityki: 
  
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Absolutnie się nie zgadzam     Absolutnie się zgadzam               
     
18. Demokracja jest bardziej wzbogacona poprzez obecność organizacji takiej, jak 
Pana/Pani organizacja:       
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
 Absolutnie się nie zgadzam     Absolutnie się zgadzam      
            
19. Partie polityczne potrafią lepiej odczytać potrzeby społeczenstwa niz  
 organizacje poza-rządowe : 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 Absolutnie się nie zgadzam     Absolutnie się zgadzam  
20. Od czasu wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej w 2004 roku przedstawiciele rządu 
wykazują więcej zainteresowania wobec konsultacji z organizacjami poza-rządowymi 
takimi, jak Pana/Pani organizacja : 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Absolutnie się nie zgadzam     Absolutnie się zgadzam   
 
21. Pana/Pani organizacja opublikowała informacje w prasie (proszę zakreśl): 
                                                                                                                        TAK   NIE                                     
          
Jezeli tak, to jak często: ____________ 
 
22. Pana/Pani organizacja uczestniczyła w publicznych demonstracjach:    TAK NIE       
 
Jeżeli tak , to jak często:        ____________ 
 
23. Pana/Pani organizacja jest członkiem większej sieci europejskich organizacji  poza - 
rządowych:                                                               
                                                                                                                        TAK   NIE 
  
24. Jeżeli odpowiedź na pytanie 23 brzmi “ tak “ -  proszę o podanie nazwy europejskiej 
sieci organizacji poza-rządowych (NGO)  poniżej:  
 
____________________________________________________________ 
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25. Pana/Pani organizacja jest członkiem większej międzynarodowej sieci organizacji 
poza-rządowych  :    
                                                                                                                         TAK   NIE 
 
26. Jeżeli odpowiedź na pytanie 25  brzmi “ tak” -  proszę o podanie nazwy sieci: 
  
_____________________________________________________________  
 
27. Prosze ocenic działalność polskich premierów z poniższej listy  - w odniesieniu do 
ich zaangażowania w dziedzinę działalności, jaką prowadzi Pana/Pani organizacja  
(środowisko naturalne / prawa kobiet itp.): 
 
1 = Wspaniała    2 = Bardzo dobra    3 = Dobra    4 = Taka sobie     5 = Zła  
 
a) Tadeusz Mazowiecki   1 2 3 4 5  
 
b) Jan Krzysztof Bielecki   1 2 3 4 5 
 
c) Jan Olszewski    1 2 3 4 5 
 
d) Waldemar Pawlak    1 2 3 4 5 
 
e) Hanna Suchocka    1 2 3 4 5 
 
f) Józef Oleksy    1 2 3 4 5 
  
g) Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz  1 2 3 4 5 
 
h) Jerzy Buzek    1 2 3 4 5 
 
i) Leszek Miller    1 2 3 4 5 
 
j) Marek Belka    1 2 3 4 5 
 
k) Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz   1 2 3 4 5  
 
l) Jarosław Kaczyński               1          2 3 4 5 
 
28. Proszę zakreślic poziom ważności  ponizej wymienionych przedsięwzięc/ 
działalności wg Pana/Pani opinii (prosze uzyc skalę ocen umieszczoną poniżej): 
 
1 = Ogromnie ważne  2 = Bardzo ważne  3 = Nieco ważne  4 = Niewiele ważne  
5 = Zupełnie nieważne     
 
a) Możność komentowania polityki rządu:                1 2 3 4 5     
 
 273  
b) Zwiększenie liczby członków organizacji: 1 2 3 4 5 
 
c) Rozwinięcie więzi z szeregowymi członkami  1 2 3 4 5 
    organizacji:  
                                                                                      
d) Stworzenie silniejszych związków z  
    Europejskimi organizacjami poza – rządowymi:  1 2 3 4 5                                                                     
 
e) Uczenie się jak bardziej efektywnie wywierać  
    nacisk (lobbying):     1 2 3 4 5 
   
 f) Nauczanie innych o problemach środowiska  
naturalnego:     1 2 3 4 5 
 
g) Bezpośrednia współpraca z Unią Europejska: 1 2 4 4 5                                                                                 
  
h) Stworzenie mocniejszych powiązań z  
    międzynarodowymi organizacjami  
    poza – rządowymi:      1 2 3 4 5 
                                                                                        
i) Zabezpieczenie większego dopływu poparcia  
    finansowego dla organizacji :   1 2 3 4 5 
 
29. Czy Pana/Pani organizacja otrzymuje wystarczającą ilość czasu na przestudiowanie 
zarysu projektu polityki (polisy) rządu?   
                                                                                                          TAK    NIE      
 
30. Czy Pana/Pani organizacja dostarcza pisemne uwagi bezpośrednio do rządu w 
sprawie proponowanego przez rząd stanowiska(polisy) ?     
             TAK   NIE    
31. Czy Pana/Pani organizacja korzysta w swojej pracy z: 
 
a) Expertów polityki     TAK   NIE 
 
b) Konsultantów medialnych    TAK   NIE 
 
c) Profesjonalnych lobbystów   TAK   NIE    
 
d) Naukowców i Akademików   TAK   NIE 
 
32. Czy proces ustalania polityki (polisy) jest przejrzysty?     TAK NIE 
 
33. Czy proces ustalania polityki (polisy) przebiega w sposób spodziewany, łatwy do 
przewidzenia?                                                                                             
           TAK NIE 
34. Prosze wskazać, jaki procent budżetu przeznaczany jest w Pana/Pani organizacji na : 
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_____ Reklamę   
 
_____ Codzienny koszt działalności (dla przykładu czynsz, ogrzewanie, prąd) 
 
_____ Adwokatów i doradców prawnych   
 
_____ Konsultacje     
 
_____ Koszty pracownicze 
 
_____ Inne _____________________________________________(proszę o określenie) 
 
35. Czy proces tworzenia polityki (polisy) przebiega obecnie w atmosferze większej 
konsultacji niż 10 lat temu . 
 
Definitywnie tak…… - …… - ……- ……...- ……... Absolutnie nie  
  
36. Demokracja jest większa niż 10 lat temu. 
 
Definitywnie tak…… - …… - ……- ……...- ……... Absolutnie nie 
   
37. Obecny rząd ignoruje organizacje poza - rządowe. 
 
  Zawsze…..-……-……..-………-……..Nigdy 
 
38. Środki masowego przekazu informują o wydarzeniach ważnych dla organizacji poza - 
rządowych. 
 
  Zawsze…..-……-……..-………-……..Nigdy 
 
39. Partie polityczne wspólnie z organizacjami poza-rządowymi pracują wspólnie nad 
programem społecznym (polisą). 
 
  Zawsze…..-……-……..-………-……..Nigdy 
 
40. Rząd myśli, że wie wszystko najlepiej. 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
 
Absolutnie się nie zgadzam     Absolutnie się zgadzam          
 
41. Proces kształtowania polityki (polisy) jest kontrolowany przez polityczne elity : 
 
1 ______2_____3_____4_____5____6____7_____8____9_____10 
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Absolutnie się nie zgadzam                                                 Absolutnie się zgadzam 
 
42. Proszę o wypowiedzenie się, co należy zrobić, aby poprawić powiązania pomiędzy 
organizacjami poza-rzadowymi i innymi organizacjami wolontariuszowskimi a tymi, 
którzy opracowują rządowe plany działania ?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43. Jak ważną rolę spełnili międzynarodowi dawcy oraz filantropiści w rozwoju 
organizacji podobnych do Pana/Pani organizacji? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44. Czy rząd faworyzuje specyficzne typy organizacji ponad inne?  
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45. Proszę użyć następną stronę na ewentualne dodatkowe uwagi i obserwacje, jak 
również anegdoty wiażące się z Pana/Pani organizacją oraz polityką rządu i 
kształtowaniem polisy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dziękuję serdecznie za poświęcenie czasu i odpowiedzi na moje pytania. 
Jestem wdzięczny za Pana/Pani pomoc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
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QUESTIONNAIRE IN CZECH 
 
 
 
 
School of international relations 
University of st Andrews 
 
Průzkum polských a českých mimovládních organizací (MO). 
 
Vážený pane/ vážená paní/ vážený pane řediteli mimovládní organizace, 
 
 jmenuji se Neil Cruickshank a studuji doktorát na Universitě St. Andrews. Můj 
průzkum se zabývá vývojem mimo-vládních organicací (MO) v Polsku a České 
republice. Zvláště mne zajímá spolupráce mezi vládou a MO a vytváření politiky. Jako 
součást tohoto průzkumu rozesílám dotazník navrhnutý k získání informací od skupin 
jako jest ta Vaše týkající se vytváření politiky a politického aktivismu. 
Při vyplňování dotazníku neváhejte připojit co nejvíce informací. Věřím, že je 
důležité zkontaktovat přímo osoby jako jste Vy, protože máte zkušenosti v sektoru MO a 
jeho vývoje. Získané údaje budou včleněny do mé dizertační práce. Rád Vám a Vaší 
organizaci poskytnu souhrnné výsledky hned jakmile mi budou k dispozici. Bez Vaší 
pomoci by bylo nemožné přesně analyzovat aktivity a vliv MO ve střední Evropě. Děkuji 
Vám za Váš čas strávený vyplněním tohoto dotazníku. 
Zašlete, prosím, dotazník zpět během dvou týdnů, když to bude možné. Další 
informace týkající se otázek v dotazníku můžete dostat přímo ode mne přes e-mailovou 
adresu níže uvedenou. Ačkoliv je dotazník navrhnut pro MO, odpovědi budou přijaty i od 
jiných skupin a organizací, které mají zájem změnit, vyzývat nebo umocnit vládní 
politiku cestou aktivismu a/nebo agitace. 
Vyplněný dotazník můžete zaslat e-mailem, faxem nebo poštou (předplacená 
obálka jest přiložena) na moji universitu. Zašlete, prosím, odpověď na adresu: 
 
  Mr. Neil Cruickshank 
  Department of Political Studies 
  University of Prince Edward Island 
  Charlottetown. PE   C1A 3P3 
  Canada 
 
nebo na e-mail  nac3@st-andrews.ac.uk  nebo faxem na c. 00 1 902 566 0339. Děkuji 
Vám za Vaši spolupráci. Teším se na Vaši odpověď. 
 
S pozdravem,  
 
Neil A. Cruickshank, BA MA MSc  
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Dotazník 
 
Děkuji vám za Váš čas strávený vyplněním tohoto dotazníku. Mělo by Vám to zabrat asi 
20-25 minut. Výsledky tohoto průzkumu se objeví v mé dizertační práci: Moc, občanská 
společnost a vyjadřování zájmů v post-komunistické Evropě, (Power, Civil Society and 
Interest Articulation in Post Communist Europe) a dále ve dvou konferenčních 
přednáškách. 
 
Rád Vám a Vaší organizaci poskytnu získané údaje hned jakmile mi budou k dispozici. 
Tento průzkum je poslán mnoha mimovládním organizacím (dále jen “MO”) v České 
republice a Polsku a měl by přinést spoustu užitečných informací. 
  
Zaškrtněte, prosím, nejlepší z možných odpovědí. Můžete rozvinout svoji odpověď tam 
kde je k tomu pobídka. Na konci dotazníku je možno uvést další připomínky a 
komentáře. Vaše spolupráce je velmi ceněna. 
 
 
1. Jméno organizace  _____________________________________________________ 
 
2. Adresa a email     ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Informace získané tímto průzkumem jsou pouze pro mé vlastní použití. Pouze souhrnné 
výsledky budou publikovány. Informace získané tímto průzkumem budou drženy tajné v 
mezích zákona. Informace o společnostech a organizacích budou drženy na bezpečném 
místě s omezeným přístupem. Totožnost odpovídačů nebude zveřejněna při žádné 
publikaci nebo prezentaci výsledků tohoto průzkumu. Neexistuje žádný předvídaný risk 
zúčastnit se tohoto průzkumu. 
 
* Jestliže nechcete být jmenováni v mé dizertační práci, zaškrtněte tuto kolonku. 
[       ] 
 
3. Jak dlouho existuje vaše organizace? 
 
 méně než rok 
 
 2-5 let 
 
 6-10 let 
 
 více než 10 let 
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4. Vaše pracovní pozice: 
 
 ředitel 
 
 pomocný ředitel 
 
 zaměstnanec (placený) 
 
 zaměstnanec (dobrovolník) 
 
 jiná (popište): ________________________________________________ 
 
5. 
a/ Má vaše MO stálého administrátora?              ANO     NE 
 
b/  Má vaše MO více dobrovolníků než placených zaměstnanců?        ANO     NE  
 
c/ Má vaše MO středisko zdrojů přímo na pracovišti?            ANO     NE  
 
d/  Dostává vaše MO návrhy vládních postupů?                                    ANO     NE 
 
e/  Je vaše MO vedena jako “Obecně prospěšná společnost”?             ANO     NE 
 
6. Jak byste charakterizoval vaši MO? Můžete zaškrtnout více možností. 
 
 nátlaková 
 
 zájmová 
 
 mimovládní organizace 
 
 občanská společnost 
 
 jiná (popište): ________________________________________________ 
 
7. Vznikla vaše organizace sloučením dvou nebo více organizací? 
 
 ANO     NE 
 
Jestliže ANO, které organizace se sloučili ve vaši? 
a/ ______________________________________ 
 
b/ ______________________________________ 
 
c/  ______________________________________ 
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d/ ______________________________________ 
8. Z jakých zdrojů je provoz vaší MO podporován? Můžete zaškrtnout více možností.
 dary privátních osob 
 
 dary privátních organizací nebo podniků 
 
 Evropská Unie 
 
 přímé vládní financování 
 
 mezinárodní finanční tělesa  
 
 jiná (popište): ________________________________________________ 
 
9. Myslíte si, že vaše MO potřebuje více finanční pomoci? 
  
            absolutně 
 
 většinou 
 
 částečně 
 
 vůbec ne 
 
10. Žádala vaše MO o finance některé tyto zdroje ? 
 Evropská Unie 
 
 vláda ČR 
 
 jiná vláda   ______________________________________ 
 
 privátní filantrop (např. Open Society Fund) 
 
 mezinárodní mimovládní organizace 
 
 jiná (popište): ________________________________________________ 
 
11. Považujete znalosti vaší MO za dostatečné, že může vládě nabídnout užitečné rady    
      při formovaní politiky? 
            určitě ano 
 
 většinou ano 
 
 nerozhodné 
 
 ne vždy 
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 nikdy 
Rozveďte, prosím, vaši odpověď:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Kolik stálých členů má vaše MO?   ____________ 
 
a/ Kolik nestálých členů má vaše MO?   ____________ 
 
b/ Kolik členů potřebujete ke splnění nutných úkolů? ____________ 
 
13. Řekli byste, že většina členů vaší MO se skládá z: 
 
 studentů na plný úvazek 
 
 odborníků na plný úvazek 
 
 odborníků na částečný úvazek 
 
 důchodců 
 
 jiných osob (popište): ________________________________________________ 
 
14. Ohodnoťte výsledky vaší vlády (dosud) ve sféře vaší politiky. 
 
 velmi dobré 
 
 dobré 
 
 ani dobré ani zlé 
 
 zlé 
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 velmi zlé  
 
15. Jak často se vaše MO stýká se zástupci ministerstev? 
 
 týdně 
 
 2x do měsíce 
 
 měsícně 
 
 nikdy 
 
 jinak (popište): ________________________________________________ 
 
16. Vláda podporuje naší a podobné skupiny zúčastnovat se formování politiky. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Silně nesouhlasím                            Plně souhlasím 
 
17. Vláda si velmi přeje vyslechnout, co má moje MO říci k navrhnuté politice. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Silně nesouhlasím                            Plně souhlasím 
 
18. Demokracie je posilněna existencí organizací jako je ta naše. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Silně nesouhlasím                            Plně souhlasím 
 
19. Politické strany jsou lépe schopny pochopit potřeby obyvatel než mimovládní  
      organizace. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Silně nesouhlasím                            Plně souhlasím 
 
20. Od vstupu do EU v roce 2004 se vládní zástupci snaží více konzultovat mimovládní 
      organizace jako je naše. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Silně nesouhlasím                            Plně souhlasím 
 
21. Naše organizace vydala tiskovinu/publikaci (zakroužkujte). ANO      NE 
       
  Jestliže ANO, napište kolik _________ 
 
22. Naše MO se zúčastnila veřejné demonstrace   ANO     NE 
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 Jestliže ANO, napište kolikrát _________ 
23. Naše MO je součástí větší evropské sítě MO.   ANO  NE 
 
24. Jestliže jste uvedli ANO v otázce č. 23, napište jméno sítě: 
 
 ___________________________________________ 
 
25. Naše MO je součástí větší mezinárodní sítě MO.  ANO  NE 
 
26. Jestliže jste uvedli ANO v otázce č. 25, napište jméno sítě: 
 
 ___________________________________________ 
 
27. Ohodnoťte seznam ministerských předsedů dle jejich závazků ve sféře vaší činnosti 
      (např. životní prostředí, práva žen, rovnoprávnost mezi pohlavími): 
 
1 = výborný 2 = velmi dobrý 3 = dobrý 4 = dostatečný       5 = špatný 
 
a) Petr Pithart    1 2 3 4 5  
 
b) Václav Klaus  1 2 3 4 5 
 
c) Josef Tošovský  1 2 3 4 5 
 
d) Miloš Zeman  1 2 3 4 5 
 
e) Vladimír Špidla  1 2 3 4 5 
 
f) Stanislav Gross  1 2 3 4 5 
  
g) Jiří Paroubek  1 2 3 4 5 
 
h) Mirek Topolánek  1 2 3 4 5 
 
28. Zakroužkujte, prosím, stupeň důležitosti, který přikládate každemu vašemu úkolu  
      nebo závazku (popis stupňů následuje): 
 
1 = extréme důležitý   2 = velmi důležitý  3 = jaksi důležitý 
4 = ne moc důležitý  5 = nedůležitý 
 
a/ schopnost komentovat vládní politiku:  1 2 3 4 5 
 
b/ zvyšování členstva:     1 2 3 4 5 
 
c/ vývoj vztahů s řadovým obyvatelstvem:  1 2 3 4 5 
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d/ vývoj bližších vztahů s evropskými MO:  1 2 3 4 5 
e/ nauka efektivněji agitovat:    1 2 3 4 5 
 
f/ vzdělávat ostatní o životním prostředí:  1 2 3 4 5 
 
g/ pracovat přímo s EU:    1 2 3 4 5 
 
h/ vývoj bližších vztahů s mezinárodními MO: 1 2 3 4 5 
 
i/ zajistit větší finanční podporu:   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
29. Dostane vaše MO dostatek času na studium navrhnuté vládní politiky/postupu? 
 
        ANO  NE 
 
30. Poskytuje vaše organizace vládě přímou písemnou odezvu k navrhnuté politice?  
 
        ANO   NE 
31. Používá vaše MO: 
 
a/ politické experty:      ANO   NE 
 
b/ poradce přes sdělovací prostředky:   ANO   NE 
 
c/ profesionální lobisty:     ANO   NE 
 
d/ vědce a akademiky:     ANO   NE 
 
32. Je politický proces zřetelný?    ANO   NE 
 
33. Probíhá politický proces předpokládanou cestou? ANO   NE 
 
34. Procentuální podíl vašeho rozpočtu jde na: 
 
_______ reklama 
 
_______ denní výdaje (nájem, elektřina, topení) 
 
_______ advokáti nebo právní poradci 
 
_______ poradenství 
 
_______ výdaje na zaměstnance 
 
_______ ostatní (popište) ____________________________________________ 
 
35. Je politický proces více interakční než před 10 lety? 
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 Určitě ANO  1 2 3 4 5  vůbec NE 
36. Demokracie je lepší dnes než před 10 lety. 
 
 Určitě ANO  1 2 3 4 5  vůbec NE 
 
37. Současná vláda ignoruje MO. 
 
 Stále  1 2 3 4 5  nikdy 
 
38. Sdělovací prostředky informují o MO. 
 
 Stále  1 2 3 4 5  nikdy 
 
39. Politické strany a MO spolupracují na vytváření veřejné politiky. 
 
 Stále  1 2 3 4 5  nikdy 
 
40. Vláda si myslí, že ví vše nejlépe. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Silně nesouhlasím                            Plně souhlasím 
 
 
41. Politický proces je řízen politickou elitou. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Silně nesouhlasím                            Plně souhlasím 
 
42. Popište, prosím, co lze udělat pro zlepšení vztahů mezi MO, ostatními dobrovolnými 
spolky a tvůrci politiky. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43. Jak důležití byli mezinárodní dárci a filantropové pro vývoj vaší a vám podobným  
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      MO? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44. Upřednostňuje vláda jeden druh organizací před druhými? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45. Na tuto stránku uveďte, prosím, další komentáře či příběh/anekdotu vztahující se  
      k vaší  MO a vládní politice. Můžete využít i druhou stranu tohoto listu. 
 
 
 
Děkuji vám za Váš čas strávený vyplněním tohoto dotazníku. Vaše pomoc je velmi 
ceněna. 
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 MAILING LIST OF CZECH NGOs 
 
 
Environmental Groups 
 
Beskydcan Movement 
Muchovice 393 
Ostravice  
Czech Republic 
793 14 
Fax: 420 658 682 439 
Email: beskydcan@raz-dva.cz 
Responsible person: Sarka Kostalova,  
Contact person: Sarka Ksinanova, 
Manager, Leo Klostal, Secretary 
 
Association of South Bohemian Mothers 
Sdruzeni Jihoceske Matky 
Ceská 13 
Ceske Budejovice 
Czech Republic  
370 01 
Phone:(420-38) 27-091  
Fax:(420-38) 731-2650, (420-337) 717-
105  
E-mail:jihoceske.matky@ecn.cz  
Responsible person:Dana Kuchtova,   
Contact person:Monika Wittingerova,  
 
Hnuti Duha – Pratele Zeme Cr 
Friends of the Earth Duha Movement 
Bratislavska 31 
Brno 
Czech Republic  
602 00 
Fax:(420-5) 4521-4429  
E-mail address:hduha@hnutiduha.cz  
WWW:http://www.hnutiduha.cz  
Responsible person:Jan Beranek,   
Contact person:David Vanek 
 
Hnuti Duha – Olomouc 
Friends of the Earth Czech Republic – 
Olomouc 
Dolni Namesti 38 
Olomouc 
772 00 
E-mail address:hduhaol@iol.cz  
Responsible person:Jirina Koukalova, 
Coordinator  
Contact person:Jirina Koukalova, 
Coordinator 
 
Zeleny Kruh 
Green Circle (GC/ZK) 
Lublanska 18 
Praha 2 
Czech Republic  
120 00 
Phone:(420-2) 2251-7143  
Fax:(420-2) 2251-8319  
E-mail address:zk@ecn.cz  
Web page 
address:http://www.ecn.cz/GreenCircle  
Responsible person:Zuzana Drhova, 
Director  
Contact person:Zuzana Drhova, 
Director 
 
Regional Association of Czech Nature 
Conservation Union In Brno 
Regionalni Sduzeni Cesky svaz 
ochrancu prirody v Brne 
Panska 9 
Brno 
Czech Republic 
602 00 
Phone:(420-5) 4221-8353  
Fax:(420-5) 4221-0561  
E-mail address:jana.drapalova@ecn.cz  
Responsible person:RN Dr. Pavel 
Trnka CSc.,Chairman  
Contact person:Jana Drapalova, 
Secretary 
 
Children of the Earh 
Deti Zeme Brno 
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Cejl 48/50 
Brno 
Czech Republic 
602 00 
Fax:(420-5) 4521-0393  
E-mail address:dz.brno@ecn.cz  
WWW:http://www.detizeme.cz  
Responsible person:Miroslav Patrik, 
Manager  
Contact person:Miroslav Patrik, 
Manager 
 
Czech Forest Society 
Ceska Lesnicka Spolecnost (CFS/CLS) 
Novotneho Lavka 5 
Praha 1 
Czech Republic 
116 68 
Fax:(420-2) 2222-2155  
Responsible person:Ing. Stepan Kalina, 
President  
Contact person:Ing. Karel Svoboda, 
Sekretary 
 
Greenpeace  
Pluku 12/143 
Praha 8 
Czech Republic 
186 00 
 
Arnika Association 
Chlumova 17 
Prague 3 
Czech Republic 
130 00 
Tel/fax: 420 222 781 471 
arnica@arnika.org 
 
 
 
 
PRO-BIO Svaz ekologických zemĕdĕlců 
Nemocniční 53 
787 01 Šumperk 
Czech Republic 
Phone/fax: 583 214 586; 583 216 609 
Email: pro-bio@pro-bio.cz 
 
(Czech Union for Nature Conservation) 
ČSOP Central Executive Council Office 
Uruguayská 7 
Praha 2 
120 00 
Czech Republic 
Fax: 420 222 511 496 
Email: csop@ecn.cz 
 
Nadace Partnerství 
Údolní 33 
602 00 Brno 
Czech Republic 
tel: 00420 515 903 111 
fax: 00420 515 903 110 
e-mail: pship@nap.cz 
www.nadacepartnerstvi.cz 
Miroslav Kundrata, director 
 
Bioinstitut, o.p.s. 
Křížovského 8 
771 47 Olomouc 
Czech Republic 
Attention/Pozor: Mgr. Pavla Samsonová 
tel.: +420 585 631 179, 
fax : +420 585 631 178 
E-mail : Bioinstitut@seznam.cz 
WWW : http://www.bioinstitut.cz 
 
Česká společnost ornitologická 
Na Bělidle 252/34 
150 00 Praha 5  
Smíchov 
Czech Republic  
Lucie Hošková 
tel.: 274 866 700 
fax : 274 866 700 
E-mail : cso@birdlife.cz 
WWW : http://www.birdlife.cz 
 
České Švýcarsko o. p. s. 
Pražská 52,  
407 46 Krásná Lípa 
Czech Republic 
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tel.: 412 383 413 
E-mail : informace@ceskesvycarsko.cz 
WWW : http://www.ceskesvycarsko.cz 
 
AUTO*MAT 
Pelléova 7 
Praha 6 
160 00 
Czech Republic 
420 257 531 983 
Auto-mat@auto-mat.cz 
 
Centrum pro dopravu a energetiku 
Jicinska 8 
130 00 
Praha 3 
Czech Republic 
Tel/fax: 420 274 816 571 
cde@ecn.cz 
 
GREENWAYS 
Údolní 33 
Brno, 602 00 
Czech Republic 
fax.:  +420 515 903 110   
 
GREENWAYS 
Krátká 26 
Praha 10 
100 00  
Czech Republic 
tel./fax.:  +420 274 816 727 
 
Kancelář Hnutí Brontosaurus 
Hvězdová 10 
Brno, 602 00 
Czech Republic 
telefon: 544 215 585 
e-mail: hnuti[@]brontosaurus.cz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Women’s Groups 
 
proFem o.p.s. 
Plzeňská 66 
150 00 Prague 
Czech Republic 
Tel./fax: 224 917 224 
info@profem.cz 
www.profem.cz 
 
ROSA 
Podolská 25 
147 00 Prague 4 
Czech Republic 
 tel./ fax: 00420 241 432 466 
e-mail: info@rosa-os.cz  
 
Association of South Czech Mothers 
Bedřicha Smetany 19 
37001 České Budĕjovice  
Czech Republic 
Email: jihoceske.matky@ecn.cz 
Telephone: +420-38-742-7091; +420-
38-731-2650 
Fax: +420-38-731-2650 
WWW: www.jihoceskematky.cz 
 
Forum 50% 
Plzenska 846/66 
150 00 
Prague 5 
Czech Republic 
Email: bennerova@padesatprocent.cz 
 
Slovo 21 
Francouzská 2 
120 00 Prague 2 
Czech Republic 
Telephone: (+420) 222 518 554, 222 511 
434 
Telephone/fax: (+420) 222 520 037 
E-mail: slovo21@centrum.cz  
www.slovo21.cz 
 
Women's Forum 
Husova 9 
11000 Prague,  
 290  
Czech Republic 
Email: forumzen@seznam.cz 
Telephone: +420-604 209 214 
Website: www.forumzen.cz  
 
Slovak-Czech Women’s Fund, Czech 
Republic 
Bořivojova 105 
130 00 Praha 3 
Czech Republic 
tel./fax.: 00420 222 716 823 
hronkova@womensfund.cz 
www.womensfund.cz 
 
Czech Women's Union 
Panská 7  
P.O. Box 457 
11153 Prague 
Czech Republic 
Email: csz@volny.cz; cszl@seznam.cz 
Telephone: +420-2-24-21-1017 
Fax: +420-2-24-23-3708 
Website: www.csz.cz  
 
Association for Equal Opportunities of 
Men and Women 
Gorazdova 20 
12000 Prague 2 
Czech Republic 
Email: asociace_pro_rp@seznam.cz 
Telephone/Fax: +420-2-24-91-5666 
 
 
Gender Studies, o.p.s.  
Gorazdova 20  
120 00 Prague 2  
Czech Republic 
tel: 224 913 350, 777 910 941, 777910 
933 
tel./fax: 224 915 666 
 
 
 
La Strada Czech Republic 
P.O.Box 305 
111 21 Praha 1 
Česká Republika / Czech Republic 
Phone:  
Office: +420 222 721 810 
Info/SOS: +420 222 717 171  
E-mail: lastrada@strada.cz 
Web: http://www.strada.cz 
 
Bílý kruh bezpečí 
civic association 
U Trojice 2 
150 00 Praha 5 
Czech Republic 
Website: www.bkb.cz 
 
Women's Forum 
Husova 9 
11000 Prague 
Czech Republic 
Email: forumzen@seznam.cz 
Telephone: +420-604 209 214 
Website: www.forumzen.cz  
 
Bliss Without Risk (Prague) 
Bolzanova 1 
110 00 Praha 1 
Czech Republic 
Fax: 420 224 236 162 
Email: rozkos@rozkosbezrika.cz 
 
Elektra - Centre of Help to Women 
Abused in Childhood 
Michnova 1622 
14900 Prague 
Czech Republic 
Email: elektra@braillnet.cz 
Telephone/Fax: +420-2-72-1110 
Website: www.centrumelektra.cz  
 
Project Magdala – Koordinační 
centrumADCH Praha 
Londýnská 44 
120 00, Praha 2 
Czech Republic 
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Association of Businesswomen and 
Managers in the CR 
Plzeňská 221/130 
15000 Prague 
Czech Republic 
Email: info@apmcr.cz 
Telephone/Fax: +420-2-57-21-8416 
Website: www.apmcr.cz 
 
HNUTÍ ZA AKTIVNÍ MATEŘSTVÍ 
(Movement for Active Motherhood) 
Nová 152 
25225 Zbuzany 
Czech Republic 
Email: ham@hyperlinx.cz 
Telephone: +420-603-561-609 
Website: www.iham.cz 
 
National Contact Centre - Women & 
Science 
Institute of Sociology of the Academy of 
Sciences of the Czech Republic 
Jilská 1 
110 00 Prague 1 
Czech Republic 
 
Movement for Women's Equal Rights 
Rimeka 4412000 
Prague 2,  
Czech Republic 
Tel: 0042 2 627 93 98 
Fax: 0042 2 531 322 
 
Evropská kontaktní skupina v České 
republice 
Žitná 45 
Praha 1, 110 00 
Czech Republic 
T/F: +420 222 211 799 
 
Roma Organizations 
 
Vzájemné Soužží 
30. dubna 3 
Ostrava 
702 00 
Czech Republic 
tel./fax: + 420 596 130 715 
 
Společenstvi Romů na Moravé o.p.s. 
Francouzská 84 
602 00 Brno 
Czech Republic 
Fax: 420 545 246 674 
Email: srnm@srnm.cz 
 
IQ Roma servis, o.s. 
Cejl 49 
602 00 Brno 
Czech Republic 
Fax: 420 549 241 250 
Email: iqrs@iqrs.cz 
Romodrom o.s. 
Mezibranská 3 
110 00 Praha 1 
Czech Republic 
info@romodrom.cz 
 
Pražské matky 
Lublaňská 18 
Praha 2 
120 00 
Czech Repubilc 
 
EPS Tábor 
Převrátilská 330 
390 01 Tábor 
Czech Repubilc 
 
Liga lidskych prav 
Bratislavska 31 
602 00 Brno 
Czech Republic 
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APPENDIX F 
 MAILING LIST OF POLISH NGOs 
 
 
 
 
Environmental NGOs 
 
Instytut na rzecz Ekorozwoju 
(Institute for Sustainable Development) 
Ul. Nabielaka 15 lok.1 
00 – 743 Warszawa 
POLAND 
Polskie Towarzystwo Turystyczno 
Krajoznawcze (PTTK) 
(Polish Touring and Touristic Society) 
ul. Senatorska 11 
00 – 075 Warszawa 
Mazowieckie 
POLAND 
 
Stowarzyszenie na rzecz Ekorozwoju 
Agro  
Association for Sustainable 
Development Agro  
ul. Ciepła 19 A 
15  Białystok  
podlaskie 
POLAND 
 
Bieszczadzkie Stowarzyszenie 
Ekoturystyczne Baszta  
“Baszta” Bieszczady Ecotourism 
Association  
ul. Widokowa 4 
38-600 Lesko  
podkarpackie 
POLAND 
 
 
Fundacja Kulture Ekologicznej  
Foundation for Ecological Culture  
ul. Strumykowa 2 
58-500 Jelenia Góra  
dolnośląskie 
POLAND 
 
Fundacja Wspierania Inicjatyw 
Ekologicznych 
Foundation for the Support of Ecological 
Initiatives address 
ul. Czysta 17/4 
31-121 Kraków  
małopolskie POLAND 
 
Klub Gaja  - Gaya Club  
ul. Parkowa 10 
43-365 Wilkowice  
śląskie 
POLAND 
 
nstytut Spraw Obywatelskich  
The Civil Affairs Institute 
ul. Więckowskiego 33/127 
90-734 Łódź  
łódzkie 
POLAND 
 
Liga Ochrony Przyrody  
League of Nature Conservation  
Tamka 37/2 
00-355 Warszawa  
Mazowieckie 
POLAND 
 
Stowarzyszenie na Rzecz Ekorozwoju 
Ziemi Świętokrzyskiej „NATURA” 
Association “NATURE”  
ul. Starachowicka 9 
27-400 Brody  
świętokrzyskie 
POLAND 
 
undacja Pierwiosnek  
Primrose Foundation  
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Bukwałd 45a 
11-001 Dywity  
warmińsko-mazurskie 
POLAND 
 
Polskie Towarzystwo Przesyłu i 
Rozdziału Energii Elektrycznej 
Polish Power Transmission and 
Distribution Association  
ul. Wołyńska 22 
60-637 Poznań  
wielkopolskie 
POLAND 
 
Stowarzyszenie Krajowy Ruch 
Ekologiczno – Społeczny 
Polish Association for Ecology and 
Society  
ul. Chyliczkowska 28 
05-500 Piaseczno  
mazowieckie 
POLAND 
 
Stowarzyszenie „Zrównoważony 
Rozwój”  
Association “Sustainable Development”  
ul. Tetmajera 13 
80-313 Gdańsk  
pomorskie POLAND 
 
Towarzystwo Badań i Ochrony Przyrody 
The Wildlife Research and Conservation 
Society 
ul. Sienkiewicza 68 
25-501 Kielce  
świętokrzyskie 
POLAND 
 
WWF Polska - WWF Poland  
Wiśniowa 38 
02-520 Warszawa  
Mazowieckie 
POLAND 
 
Greenpeace Polska  - Greenpeace Poland  
Włoska 10 
00-777 Warszawa  
Mazowieckie  
POLAND 
 
Centrum Prawa Ekologicznego  
Environmental Law Center  
Uniwersytecka 1 
50-951 Wrocław  
dolnośląskie 
POLAND 
 
Związek Stowarzyszeń Polska Zielona 
Sieć  
Polish Green Network  
Sławkowska 26A 
31-014 Kraków  
Małopolskie 
POLAND 
 
Women’s Organizations: 
 
Centrum Praw Kobiet 
ul. Wilcza 60/ 19 
00-670 Warszawa 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 22 652 01 17 
E-mail: temida@cpk.org.pl 
 
Centrum Praw Kobiet Gdańsk 
ul. gen. de Gaulle'a 1B lok. 15  
80-261 Gdańsk  
POLAND 
Phone: +48 58 341-79-15 
E-mail: cpk_gdansk@cpk.org.pl 
 
Centrum Praw Kobiet Łódź 
ul. Piotrkowska 115 
90-430 Łódź, lok. 205 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 42 633 34 11 
E-mail : cpk_lodz@free.ngo.pl 
 
Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet 
ul. Rybnicka 39 
52-016 Wrocław 
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POLAND 
Phone: +48 71 342 16 93 
E-mail: dukwroc@free.ngo.pl 
 
Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet Gdańsk 
ul.Miszewskiego 17 pok. 201 
80-239 Gdańsk 
POLAND 
Phone:+48 58345 50 16 
E-mail: dukgd@poczta.onet.pl 
 
Federacja na rzecz Kobiet i Planowania 
Rodziny 
ul. Nowolipie 13/15 
00-150 Warszawa 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 22 635 93 95 
E-mail: federacja@federa.org.pl 
 
Federacja Organizacji Służebnych Na 
Rzecz Kobiet i Ich Rodzin "VICTORIA" 
ul. Komeńskiego 42 
Elbląg 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 55 642 98 98 
E-mail: maria.rogowska@wp.pl 
 
Fundacja Centrum Promocji Kobiet 
ul. Lwowska 17 lok.3 
00-660 Warszawa 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 22 629 92 57 
E-mail: centrum@promocjakobiet.pl  
 
 
Fundacja Centrum Promocji Kobiet 
ul. Lwowska 17 lok.3 
00-660 Warszawa 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 22 629 92 57 
E-mail: centrum@promocjakobiet.pl 
 
 
Klub "Kobieta 2000" 
ul. 22 lipca 4 
73-200 Choszczno 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 95 765 0415 
E-mail: stowarzyszenie@kobieta2000.pl 
 
Kobiety Też, grupa nieformalna 
ul. Dymińska 9/38 
01-519 Warszawa 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 22 839 11 89 
E-mail: info@kobiety.pl 
 
La Strada Foundation Poland 
skrytka pocztowa 5 
00-956 Warszawa 10  
POLAND 
Phone: +48 22 628 99 99 
 
Liga Kobiet Polskich 
ul. Bracka 5 
00-501 Warszawa 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 22 621 29 64 
E-mail: ligakobietpolskich@o2.pl 
 
Lubuskie Stowarzyszenie na rzecz 
Kobiet BABA 
pl. Matejki 3a 
65-001 Zielona Góra 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 68 454 92 32 
E-mail: baba@baba.org.pl 
 
OSKa - the National Women's 
Information Center Poland 
OŚKa - Ośrodek Informacji Środowisk 
Kobiecych 
ul. Piękna 66 a, lokal nr 11 
00-672 Warszawa  
POLAND 
 
Phone: +48 22 622 78 02  
E-mail: oska@oska.org.pl 
 
Śląskie Centrum Równych Szans 
Francuska 70; pok.1313  
40-082 Katowice 
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POLAND 
 
Phone: +48 327573916 
E-mail: sc_rowneszanse@gazeta.pl 
 
Stowarzyszenie Kobiet Polskich  
po 40-ce 
ul. Kościuszki 3 
41-300 Dąbrowa Górnicza 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 32 262 59 27 
E-mail: czterdziestka@post.pl 
 
Stowarzyszenie na Rzecz Kobiet 
Poszukujących Pracy VICTORIA 
Adres: ul. 3-go Maja 26 
35-030 Rzeszów 
POLAND 
 
Phone: +48 17 853 42 47  
E-mail: victori@wp.pl 
 
Stowarzyszenie Samopomocy "Krąg" 
Ośrodek Doraźnej Pomocy dla Kobiet i 
Dzieci Maltretowanych 
ul. Olsztyńska 41 
Gdańsk-Olszynka 
POLAND 
Phone: + 48 58 301 92 62 
 
Towarzystwo Interwencji Kryzysowej 
ul Krakowska 19 
31-062 Kraków 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 12 431 15 59 
E-mail: againsthate@poczta.onet.pl 
 
Women's Foundation eFKa 
Fundacja Kobieca eFKa 
skrytka pocztowa 12 
30-965 Kraków 45 
POLAND 
Phone: +48 58 422 69 73 
E-mail: efka@efka.org.pl 
 
Women's Rights Center 
Wilcza 60/19 
00-679 Warszawa  
POLAND 
tel/fax 0048-22-6520117 
Contact: Urszula Nowakowska, Director 
E-mail:temida@medianet.com.pl 
Web site: http://free.ngo.pl/temida 
 
Polish Roma Organizations: 
 
Stowarzyszenie Romów we Wrocławiu 
"Romani Bacht" 
3 Maja 11 m. 11 
52-119 Wrocław  
POLAND 
 
Fundacja Integracji Społeczniej "Prom" 
ul. Podwale 13  
50-043 Wrocław 
POLAND 
 
Dolnośląskie Stowarzyszenie Romów  
Prezes: Dachil Bil  
ul. Odrzańska 23  
50-114 Wrocław  
POLAND 
 
„Neło Drom – Nowa Droga”  
Towarzystwo Dzieci i Rodziców 
Romskich  
prezes: Czesława Wiercińska  
ul. Mościckiego 46/1  
52-116 Wrocław  
POLAND 
 
Centrum Kultury Romów w Tarnowie  
Romano Kulturno Center  
ul. Żydowska 13  
33-100 Tarnów 
POLAND 
 
Stowarzyszenie Mniejszości Narodowej 
Romów "Roma - Union"  
ul. Żabia 14/16 m. 11  
37-800 Włocławek 
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POLAND  
 
Towarzystwo Przyrodnicze Bocian   
Wildlife Society “Stork”  
Jagiełły 10  
08-110 Siedlce  
Mazowieckie 
POLAND 
 
Europejskie Towarzystwo Ekorozwoju 
EUROPEAN SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY 
ul.Piątkowska 94/3B lok. 11 
61-691 Poznań  
wielkopolskie 
POLAND 
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